Albania In Retrospect

Introduction

The following article by Norberto Steinmayr – is to our knowledge, one of only a few articles where Marxist-Leninists have grappled with the reasons for the causes of the fall of socialism in the People’s Socialist Republic of Albania (PSRA).

The fall of socialism in the USSR was documented in great detail (See for example, Bland in a concise distillation of his path-breaking book at Alliance)  (The full book ‘Restoration of Capitalism in the USSR’ is here). This detailed accounting has not occurred for the PSRA. The failure of the People’s Republic of China to establish socialism has also been clearly documented (see), although it needs to be brought from the Deng era up to date to the 2025 period. Enver Hoxha himself acknowledged to an extent, the difficulties the PSRA faced up to 1984 (Interview Albanian Life – see)

We have defended the PSRA when it was socialist (See extracts from both Ilir Hoxha ‘My Father Enver Hoxha’  and “My Life with Enver’ by Nexhmje Hoxha). However – a full reckoning with revisionist events in PSRA – nor the downfall of socialism in the PSR – has not occurred to date. We will have further articles that will probe this over the next 12 months. That is because several fundamental questions are raised which cannot be wished away.

Before soap-box-ists lecture us about showing ‘dirty laundry’ we have to point out the following. Following with W.B. Bland we were the foremost in publicising the status of the PSRA as the only other state in the world that had established socialism. For example, the articles by Steinmayr and Bland on defence of Hoxha (See). Indeed, the current writer was sent to India to persuade leading Marxist-Leninists there to take a pro-PSRA position. Belatedly – they did – without an open acknowledgement of the delay. Nonetheless, this was positive. However, when the PSRA became openly revisionist, they hesitated to openly condemn the slide. It was important to raise the alarm as clearly as Rex Hollis of New Zealand did (See )

Now – a frank accounting of what happened in the PSRA is still overdue. It is true that some of that was already begun by such as W.B.Bland and Norberto Steinmayr before (See for example, Steinmayr’s article religion in the PSRA). Some of that work can be found at the archives of ‘Alliance Marxist-Leninist’ website (See Alliance) and at the W.B.Bland archive (See Bland) at Marxist Internet Archive (MIA), and at the Albania subject archive at MIA, see Albania.

Hari Kumar, for editors, June 2 2025.

Addendum June 4, 2025: We respond as part of an on-going dialogue to Point Number 7 from Cmde Steinmayr, here – entitled “On how Lenin Became Embalmed and on “Stalinism”

ALBANIA IN RETROSPECT
by Norberto Steinmayr (Committee member of the former Albania Society in Britain)
Written circa January 2024; published 2 June 2025

SOCIALISM (part I)

As the “Albania Society” and as former members of the “Communist League” (UK), we remain proud of the support we gave to Albania as the only existing socialist country during the 1980s. A beacon of revolutionary socialism, proletarian internationalism in solidarity with revolutionary movements and liberation struggles worldwide, heroically challenging the hegemonic policies of the two imperialist superpowers. Even while pursuing its Marxist-Leninist line vis-à-vis the different brands of revisionism which had emerged within the international communist and workers’ movement. As we highlight such a unique political identity, with hindsight – a few decades later – we should equally acknowledge those anomalies that developed within its society and led to its final demise in 1990-91. It is a stubborn fact that Albania’s socialist system imploded, while no popular resistance was attempted to safeguard its continuity. As the proof of the pudding is in the eating, any meaningful evaluation must therefore focus on reality, on the way people lived and struggled.

“In practice man must prove the truth.”
(Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, 1845)

“The standpoint of life, of practice, should be first and fundamental in the theory of knowledge.”
(Lenin, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, 1908).

Accordingly, everything makes sense, history must make sense.

“Take nothing for granted; check everything!” – was another essential principle upheld by Bill Bland.

Bland highlighted how:

“Historical processes often proceed for a certain time ‘behind the scenes’ and only become known to the world at a later stage. This is particularly so in relation to Marxist-Leninist parties, in which decisions of majorities are binding on minorities and party discipline prevents the minority from publicising its objections. If such processes are excluded from historical analyses, the result is to give a false picture of reality.”
(Revisionism raises its head in Albania, Compass n. 79B, August 1990)

As for Albania’s reality at the time of socialism, there is no point in hiding the obvious fact that some mistakes were made in implementing Marxism-Leninism. It would be foolish to judge that history in a black and white separation: either the exemplary Marxist-Leninist citadel or Hoxha’s bloody tyranny. Lessons should instead be drawn and incorporated into the struggle for socialism and communism, for a society ultimately abolishing exploitation of man by man.

I put some of these lessons under various categories below.

1. PRIVILEGED PARTY MEMBERS AND THEIR FAMILIES’ STATUS
   According to its 1976 Constitution, art. 2, the People’s Socialist Republic of Albania (PSRA) was proclaimed as a state of the dictatorship of the proletariat relying on the unity of its people round the Party of Labour of Albania (PLA) and on the alliance of the working class with the cooperativist peasantry under the leadership of the working class. But let us, consider where the PLA leadership used to live, i.e., in the centrally located Bllok area of Tirana, alongside the Martyrs of the Nation Avenue. The Leaders’ Block (Blloku i Udhëheqësve) was closed off to the outside world and constantly guarded by soldiers and plain-clothes servicemen of the Sigurimi (Albanian secret services). The entire Bllok area belonged to the political leadership that, over a period of more than four decades, consolidated its power through an endless series of intermarriages among themselves well into the second and third generations.

An intricate network of nepotism comprising families of members or former members of the Political Bureau, the Central Committee, various ministries, etc. (exception, of course, made for officials who had been recurrently purged together with their families), all receiving a special treatment as Bllok inhabitants. Theirs was a life of comparative luxury in the Bllok, and also in holiday homes across the country. They had housekeeping staff, accessed special shops with Western clothes and with consumer goods and foodstuffs unseen in the usual Tirana shops, had an exclusive club, using official cars out of office hours, sent children abroad for education, received medical treatment abroad, kept important jobs among themselves, possessed libraries with foreign publications and newspapers, watched foreign TV stations and movies and a host of other privileges outsiders were precluded from.

Indeed, the existence of the privileged Bllok compound reflected the most striking divide compared to ordinary citizens. The latter, among other daily tribulations, had to queue up for some milk before dawn. Such a division in terms of living standards – discrepant with the socialist principle “from each according to his ability, to each according to his work” (1976 PSRA Constitution, art. 30) – finds no justification in a dictatorship of the proletariat.

2. LIVING STANDARDS INCREASINGLY DECLINING
   During the 1980s, Albania ranked as the poorest country in Europe. The population relied on meagre food rations, having to use their tollon (ration card) for meat, cheese, coffee, flour, oil, butter, in addition to some other consumer goods. Queues in front of modestly supplied shops became the order of the day, with shoppers standing in line from the early hours of the morning and often going back home empty-handed. Impoverishment and malnourishment-related diseases were reportedly occurring in the countryside (representing two-thirds of the population) with families in some remote villages hardly affording to give children either milk or meat. Meanwhile, even low-scale private initiatives, likewise private possessions by peasants of sheep, cattle, or even chickens (from 1982), remained prohibited by law and it was only as late as 1989 that the leadership acknowledged that extremist left-wing collectivization in agriculture had reached to an unmanageable degree.

Essentially, such increased economic difficulties in Albania can be ascribed to three combined factors:

China’s unilateral cessation of all trade with Albania (about 50% of its total volume) in mid-1978;
the prohibition of any concessions to foreign companies and institutions, including partnership with foreign companies and obtaining credits from them, in order to implement economic self-reliance (1976 PSRA Constitution, art. 14 and 28); and frequent mismanagement in Albania’s planned economy.

In November 1981, Enver Hoxha reported to the 8^th PLA Congress, that he had supported both restricting the peasants’ personal plots and forming joint herds from the peasants’ personal livestock as revolutionary initiatives, as a progressive process in the countryside. These measures:

“will certainly lead to increased agricultural and live-stock production, to guaranteeing and further raising the well-being of the peasantry and the further consolidation of the spirit of socialist collectivism. … the [personal] plot … will eventually wither away completely.”
(Enver Hoxha, Report to the 8^th PLA Congress, November 1981)

Wishful thinking, grey abstractions detached from reality. Such radical ideological dimensions became predominant extending to full stretch in parallel with the economic decline. Couldn’t the PLA leadership recall the New Economic Policy, as implemented by Lenin shortly after the October Revolution? Couldn’t they admit, as Lenin did on March 15, 1921, that:

“We are very much to blame for having gone too far … Was that a mistake? It certainly was. … We went further than was theoretically and politically necessary.”

And in socialist Albania, rather than stubbornly sticking to self-reliance, why not take into consideration some sort of cooperation agreements with foreign countries in order to relieve its stagnant economy and raise people’s living standards?

Official propaganda portraying brave Albanian workers and cooperativist peasants challenging the capitalist-revisionist encirclement through further sacrifices and voluntary labour would hardly be appealing to anyone during the 1980s. Reference was often made to a quotation by Hoxha vis-à-vis Khrushchev’s attempts to subjugate the country.

“The Albanian people and the Party of Labour will survive on grass – if necessary – rather than sell themselves for thirty pieces of silver, because they prefer to die standing and honourably rather than live with shame and on their knees.”
(Enver Hoxha, 7-11-61, Vepra, vol. 22, p.127)

Some twenty years later, such patriotic narrative could have only a marginal impact on people whose priority had become filling their stomachs. Empty slogans, principles no longer significant to the working class, the cooperativist peasantry, the youth and the intelligentsia. Under such grim economic stagnation, it is no surprise that people came to equate socialism with poverty while fostering illusions about capitalism. Supposedly capitalism was a paradise that existed outside the country and was associated with abundance and wealth. Such illusions were mainly prompted by the Italian and Yugoslav TV programs being secretly watched at home. Nexhmije Hoxha also referred to some other illusions, while summing up her long life experience in 2017, by admitting too much idealism and too little pragmatism:

“We believed we had reached the creation of a new model of society, of a new man … but it was an illusion! Obsession for individual profit, for private property prevailed on our idea of socialism. I admit it, maybe we were too idealistic and a little realistic!”
(Interview with Nexhmije Hoxha, Tirana, 29 May 2017, in Lorenzo Manca, Enver Hoxha e la Cina, 2019, p. 274)

One peculiar feature related to the collapse of socialism in Albania was, in fact, the sudden massive flow of people from the countryside to the cities (see invasion of foreign embassies in Tirana, July 1990), then to the coast and to Durrës and from there to Italy (for example, on the Vlora cargo ship to Bari, August 1991) and other West European countries. Such emigration was prompted by desperate living conditions as well as by the abrupt halt of restrictions on traveling abroad. All of a sudden there were economic migrants away from socialism. This was being translated into political terms – and was perceived – on the basis of the democracy-dictatorship dichotomy. Finally reaching freedom and democracy away from socialist/communist/Hoxha’s dictatorship!

3. BUREAUCRACY
   This became an unpleasant plague upon society. Sandwiched between the Bllok’s party hierarchy, on the one side, and the working people, on the other, this increasingly inflated bureaucratic apparatus operated on the middle ground to guarantee “support” to the system until it became inconvenient to do so, that is, up to 1990-91.

We are talking of functionaries, state employees, middle echelon party members, people who managed to reach relatively comfortable positions at various levels and in various offices, dodging difficult jobs and manual labour (with the exception of the one-month productive activity per annum, which was compulsory for all Albanian citizens) while avoiding worker and peasant control by clinging to their own selfish advantages. Focusing on formalism, stereotyped practices, red tape, lengthy reports, repeated meetings, over-involvement in petty details, leaders’ adulation, etc. It was up to these bureaucrats, who were communist only with their mouth, to zealously support and loudly propagate the personality cult around Enver Hoxha, thus proving to be more catholic than the pope.

One phenomenon which struck every visitor to Albania was, in fact, this “cult of the personality”, manifested in Hoxha’s ubiquitous busts and portraits; in the slogan “Party Enver” (Parti Enver, jemi gati kurdoherë!: Party Enver, we are always ready!) which equated Hoxha to the Party; in the customary references to the PLA as “with Comrade Enver at its head”. Hoxha himself had repeatedly criticized such “cult of the personality” as dangerously harmful to the socialist cause, stressing that only collective leadership can play a decisive role in party activities.

“The collective method is the highest principle of the leading work of the Party … Every important question is solved collectively.”
(PLA Constitution, art. 21)

But during the 1980s the cult was once again raised to even greater heights than before. Therefore, as a matter of fact, this heavy bureaucratic establishment in Albania paved the ground towards conformism, clumsiness, mediocrity and obsequiousness at the expense of the creative, revolutionary initiatives of the popular masses themselves. Behaving like a sycophant could often be rather more rewarding than taking innovative steps as true, genuine communists.

4. INFLATED REPRESSIVE MEASURES
   This was another feature of Albanian socialism that was implemented on a wide scale. Given the nature of its proletarian state power, prohibition was made explicit for any forms of:

“fascist, anti-democratic, religious, war-mongering, and anti-socialist activities and propaganda.”
(1976 PSRA Constitution, art. 55)

And in accordance with such provision, on 15 June 1977 the Penal Code made it clear that punishment for “agitation and propaganda against the state” would range from a three year deprivation of liberty to a death sentence. Its full quotation as follows:

“Fascist, anti-democratic, religious, war-mongering, and anti-socialist agitation and propaganda, as well as the preparation, dissemination, or possession for dissemination of literature with such content, in order to weaken or undermine the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat is punishable: by deprivation of liberty for a period of from three to ten years. If these acts have been committed in wartime or have caused particularly grave consequences, they are punishable: by deprivation of liberty for not less than ten years or by death.”
(1977 Penal Code, art. 55)

Recourse to this article, therefore, could apply also to innocent remarks of criticism and dissent. Cracking jokes with friends after a few glasses of wine (exclaiming “long live Khrushchev!”, for example), singing an Italian song, owning a bible or reciting a prayer, expressing an unfavourable comment on shortages in shops or – why not? – casting an ironic glance over rotten tomatoes in a stall, … all such anti-state manifestations could soon alert the Sigurimi and eventually become sufficient indictments to upset or destroy careers, promotions, families and relatives. Even walls had ears, almost no one could be trusted, not even your own shadow – those were some Albanian expressions of the time.

Agent provocateurs were also infiltrated in the queues in front of the shops with the aim of stirring up troubles while singling out those who had expressed dissatisfaction and criticism for food shortages. And worse still, anonymous letters and prefabricated denunciations, just as false witnesses during trials, in addition to confessions extracted under physical/psychological torture, would possibly condemn you together with your family to internment in an isolated village or even to prison. As a consequence of such “divide and rule” within society, all these excessively severe and arbitrary measures translated into a pervasive feeling of unpredictability, leading to suspicion, revenge, unhealthy competition for promotions among colleagues and lack of trust in inter-personal relationships also within families and among friends. Tipping off on others and on neighbours – plainly speaking, becoming an informer – had in fact become quite a harmful and unfair device for undeserved personal profit.

Legal provisions were often tantamount to a dead letter. Law, for example, forbade the use of torture. But in reality, according to live testimonies (after 1991) and to the perpetrators themselves (on the basis of the Sigurimi archival documentation), different types of physical and psychological violence were commonly used in investigators’ offices, prisons and detention centres. Again, although the period of deportation/internment was limited to 3-5 years by law, for some families this was extended, going to in excess of 20/30 years. Their children and grandchildren were born and raised in internment centres only, discriminated against and without minimal rights as other PSRA citizens. That is, collective punishment for families.

The overall above picture of Albanian society, unavoidably, points to oppression, divide and rule, rather than consent.

In this respect, we should contextualize the subject by going back in time to the immediate post-war period, soon after Albania’s national liberation war. Then – strict security and surveillance measures were indeed fully justified by internal and external exceptional circumstances. Such as the presence of saboteurs still fighting in the mountains, strong opposition by reactionary bourgeois elements and landowners against democratic and nationalization reforms, Greece’s territorial claims and incursions into Southern Albania as well as Anglo-American military interventions to overthrow the new democratic power. It was inevitable that, at that time, such conditions were effectively going to exacerbate class struggle.

By the 1980s, however, that hot and cold war confrontation was long gone and forgotten. Equally, due to radical revolutionary transformations, both the bourgeoisie as a class and the big landowners together with the kulaks as a class had all completely disappeared from Albania’s political scene. So, why emphasize the repressive nature of the state rather than its democratic and popular character? Why not authentically extend socialist democracy and socialist humanism as essential ingredients of the dictatorship of the proletariat, instead of the Sigurimi apparatus?

As a matter of fact, Hoxha had made it clear that the strength of the state power lies in its democratic character:

“The dictatorship of the proletariat is inseparable from the most extensive, most thorough-going and complete democracy for the working people.”
(Enver Hoxha, Report to the 7^th PLA Congress, November 1976)

 But quite the opposite seemed to prevail. An evident dichotomy between stated political goals, on the one hand, and reality, on the other. The security apparatus, under control by the Interior Ministry, had developed into a heavy burden upon Albanian citizens, whose lives turned to be tightly and thoroughly monitored professionally, publicly and privately. Traveling abroad for ordinary citizens was almost impossible. And those mainly young Albanians attempting to flee the country – regarded as an illegal, counter-revolutionary act – were usually killed on the spot by border guards, who were instructed to shoot at them up to April 1990.

5. COLLECTIVE PUNISHMENT OR REWARD BY FAMILY STATUS
   In spite of the remarkable successes achieved in overcoming patriarchal, conservative and mediaeval habits and customs inherited from the past, during the whole socialist construction it was the family itself that continued to play a crucial and officially recognized role in Albania’s social structure. That implies a social pattern in which family’s values and demands assumed a position of ascendance over individual merits and prerogatives. The division was made between good families and bad families – with respective good biographies (biografi të mirë) and bad biographies (biografi të keq). All members of the bad families were regarded as enemies of the people (armiq të popullit), also labelled as the touched (të prekun), the declassed (të deklasuem). As a matter of fact the principle of collective punishment extended to parents, sons and daughters, nieces and nephews, even grandchildren. As such, they were all precluded from attending university, getting good jobs, advancing in career, settling down in cities, and it was unlikely that they could befriend, or marry with, good families’ members.

The description that follows can give a general idea on how life was like for a bad family in an Albanian Northern village:

“No one interacted with us. Our own family members cut ties with us too. None of our distant relatives visited our house anymore, and we didn’t visit theirs. We didn’t want to cause anyone trouble. People treated a family with a bad biography like they had the plague. We didn’t even interact with the other people who had bad biographies. It was just safer that way since there was great fear that some would report us for conspiracy. Everyone lived in constant fear of being arrested for doing or saying the wrong thing, so it was in everyone’s best interest to stay quiet and mind their own business.”
(Monika Koleci, Shame among the Shameless, 2020, p. 252)

In this respect it must be noted that, although collective punishment for families was not contemplated by law, it became a reality. The whole aim of the Albanian penal system consisted in re-education and rehabilitation: transforming, though labour, anti-social offenders into useful members of the socialist society. Most cases of petty crime were dealt with outside the courts by public criticism. Detention for some criminal offences, instead, required re-education in labour camps (internment) or exile. While most serious or repeated crimes were the subject of a prison sentence. Re-education applied to both internment and imprisonment, in addition to internal exile in some remote villages (expulsion). As for the death sentence, this was regarded as an extraordinary measure applied for extremely serious crimes, such as treason, and where it was considered that re-education was unlikely to be successful.

However, regardless of the above legal provisions highlighting re-education and rehabilitation, your destiny as an individual would become essentially dependent upon the kind of family you had been born into. You belonged to a good family – fine – but you still lived on the brink of likely destitution, internment or jail, if one of your family members got somehow involved in any troubles. Individual merits and achievements, just as individual faults and crimes, remained inescapably associated to your family background. Had someone become an enemy of the people, had someone fled the country or attempted to flee, had someone been stealing, had someone behaved unethically, … it was always the whole family who paid the price, and in the name of class struggle. But this had nothing to do with the class struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and the big landowners! Who gains by expanding the circle of enemies based on family ties, while proclaiming steel-like unity as a nation?

“The Albanian people have never been so united … as they are today. The unity of our people is as strong as steel. Our internal situation is healthy.”
(Enver Hoxha, Address to the Electors, 10-11-1982)

Cui bono? Who stood to gain from all this? Ultimately, the enemies of socialism, as it occurred in Albania since 1990-91.

Struggle, indeed, had been a constant feature in Albanian history. The country is still associated with the figure of its national hero, Skanderbeg, who some five centuries ago proved capable of safeguarding independence from the Ottoman Empire. Albanians’ fighting spirit was highlighted by Byron in his Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage:

“Land of Albania! where Iskander rose,
Theme of the young, and beacon of the wise, …
Land of Albania! let me bend mine eyes
On thee, thou rugged nurse of savage men!”

Again:

“Fierce are Albania’s children, yet they lack
Not virtues, were those virtues more mature.
Where is the foe that ever saw their back?
Who can so well the toil of war endure?  …
Their wrath how deadly! but their friendship sure,
When Gratitude or Valour bids them bleed
Unshaken rushing on where’er their chief may lead.”

It was such rebellious determination that re-emerged in the 20^th century in order to achieve independence, liberate the country from the Nazi-Fascist occupiers and then build a new, progressive, socialist society. Enormous challenges thus facing little Albania, “like a ship sailing in an ocean with mighty waves.” And the main lesson from its past history continued to be struggle, that is, class struggle under socialism.

“Life itself is struggle, and when this struggle is won life becomes beautiful and prosperous, when it is defended with struggle, it never becomes gloomy and it is worthwhile living.”
(Enver Hoxha, The Anglo-American Threat to Albania, 1982, p. 437, 439)

Yes, a brilliant definition. But if struggle is a class struggle that continues to be carried on unabated in society after four decades of socialism, speciously incited through family networks rather than gradually loosened up, you must ask questions as to the success of the undertaken strategy.

6. SOCIALIST ALBANIA AS THE ONLY ATHEIST STATE IN THE WORLD
   All its churches and mosques had been closed down in 1966-67 – this was another peculiar feature of the country. It was enshrined into the Constitution:

“The state recognizes no religion whatever and supports atheist propaganda for the purpose of inculcating the scientific materialist world outlook in people.”
(1976 PSRA Constitution, art. 37)

The total closure of churches and mosques and the subsequent, virtual abolition of religion in the country proved to be detrimental and sectarian initiatives. They must have alienated to some extent religious believers within Albania who might otherwise have been full supporters of the socialist regime. According to the above-mentioned art. 55 of the 1977 Penal Code, religious activity thus came to fall into the category of fascist, anti-democratic, war-mongering and anti-socialist activities: it was expressly stated to be liable to strict penalties under the heading “agitation and propaganda against the state”.

Indeed, such extreme anti-religious measures were clearly incompatible with the Marxist-Leninist assumption that, in a socialist society, religious institutions disappear – and must be allowed to disappear – with the elimination of religious influence itself from people’s consciousness. Furthermore, such measures were in violation of the rights of the Albanian citizens as laid down in the Constitution which had been in force during the late sixties and had provided freedom of religious worship (1946 PRA Constitution, art. 15 and 18). They were also not in compliance with the country’s international obligations since Albania, as a UN member since December 1955, had pledged itself to promote, in line with article 55 of the UN Charter, “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”

Geographic names (mainly those containing the prefix “Saint”) and personal names with religious significance were changed. Parents were then expected to choose a suitably Albanian name for their children from a list of 3.000 provided by the government. Religious holidays and ceremonies were replaced with new socialist, national, local and family festivals and customs. During funerals, in place of the clergy there began the practice of having an elderly person or a representative of a mass organization who spoke at the burial ceremony. Relatives of the deceased also stopped the former habit of sending large sums of money for the funeral. Scientific sessions dealing with atheistic, anti-religious themes were held throughout the country, while television, films, culture and art were all mobilized and required to stress anti-religious subjects. Special institutions, such as the atheist museum in Shkodra, were also established.

Finally, after all such radical ultra-left-wing initiatives, can we say that the abolition of religion was overall successful in strengthening the scientific, materialist, dialectical world outlook among the Albanian people? In eliminating “opium”, prejudices, as well as the name of the creator – the lord – from their greetings, condolences, oaths and threats? I believe so, yes, up to a certain extent.

7. STALINISM
   Adherence to Stalinism up to the late 1980s, making Stalin’s statues ubiquitous across the country – including a monumental one in Tirana’s main boulevard, opposite Lenin’s – was, in my judgement, a serious mistake that hindered the democratic and popular nature of the people’s state power.

8. THE MEHMET SHEHU AFFAIR
   Towards the end of year 1981, out of the blue, public opinion came to know about prime minister Mehmet Shehu’s suicide, committed while in bed, around midnight, on 17/18 December. A former Spanish Civil War veteran and commander of the First Brigade of the National Liberation Army, Shehu then served as interior minister between 1948 and 1954 and subsequently as prime minister for 27 years till his death. Just prior to his suicide, on 17^th December, at a Political Bureau meeting he found himself endlessly criticized for the whole day and blamed of arrogance and liberalism. This followed his approval of the engagement of his second son Skënder (at that time studying in Sweden) with a young volleyball player, Silva Turdiu, whose mother had one uncle who was the father of Arshi Pipa, professor at Minnesota University and regarded as a fugitive war criminal living in the USA since 1956.

Following his death, together with his entire family and other co-conspirators, Shehu was denounced as a multiple secret agent, one of the most dangerous traitors and enemies of socialist Albania. The whole affair could not but provoke bewilderment and incredulity on the part of both Albanian public and foreign observers.

During 1981, starting in March/April, as powerful widespread demonstrations by Albanians in Kosovo demanded equal rights within the Yugoslav Federation, both Yugoslav UDB and American CIA secret services allegedly pressured Mehmet Shehu into assassinating Enver Hoxha with the aim of sensationally destabilizing Albania. And in order to prepare the vital network for such an ambitious and criminal goal, it was claimed that Shehu’s wife, Fiqret Shehu, had first gone to Paris in April (where she was given, by a UDB agent, the poison which would liquidate Hoxha) and then to Vienna, Stockholm, Gothenburg and Copenhagen, where she received relevant operational instructions from CIA agents.

According to Fiqret Shehu’s deposition at the trial, for example, she mentioned that in May she had secretly met them in Stockholm while walking to a park; and then also in Gothenburg, for a few minutes, at the Scandic Europa Hotel. It was in Sweden and Denmark, in fact, that it was decided to postpone the UDB variant (poisoning Enver Hoxha) until March 1982. In the meanwhile encouraging a spectacular split within the PLA which would attract public attention, invigorate liberalism, and discredit the party leadership. Hence the CIA-sponsored instruction given to Mehment Shehu to arrange Skënder’s engagement with Silva Turdiu. This was formalized at the very beginning of September 1981 (although the couple had been dating each other since December 1980). Such engagement was harshly condemned by the Political Bureau on 17 December 1981,  prompting Mehmet Shehu’s self-criticism and his subsequent suicide (more details in section 10). Thus, the conspiracy finally ended in December 1981 with Shehu’s death, rather than with Hoxha’s murder.

Shocking details were gradually made public (main sources: Enver Hoxha, The Titoites, 1982; Speech at the 4^th PLA CC Plenum, 24-9-1982; Address to electors, 10-11-1982). From the time he was in his early twenties attending the American Technical School in Tirana, Mehmet Shehu had been recruited as an American agent. Indeed becoming the main CIA resident in Albania all along until his death. After being sent by the American secret services to a military school in fascist Italy and then to Spain, during his subsequent three years in a refugee camp in France he was also recruited as an agent of the British Intelligence Service. He was then involved with the German Gestapo and the Italian SIM before joining Albania’s liberation movement. Not fighting as a communist and a partisan, but “as a mercenary sent by the Anglo-Americans to serve their plans for the future of Albania.” Simultaneously, during the post-war period, he became actively involved also as an agent for both Yugoslav and Soviet secret agencies.

Some of the above revelations had been hinted at the Political Bureau meeting on 18^th December 1981, that is, just a few hours after Shehu’s suicide. Then, on the following day (19^th December), the PLA CC was told that “the facts so far make it clear to us that this element was a disguised and dangerous enemy” … and that he had “fought for power in all his activities.” One wonders: how can such alarming conclusions be drawn so rapidly?!

Further details about Shehu’s secret connections were soon to reach “precise and completely proven conclusions.” His many plots, old and new, were mainly discovered on the basis of Shehu’s written documents, notes and letters which were found in his safe. Emphasis was also placed on the assumption that such a dangerous plot, like all the others which had been recurrent in Albania’s post-war history, had been discovered only thanks to the PLA leadership and its vigilance. None of them seem to have been uncovered by the Sigurimi, the Ministry of Interior or any other sections of the state apparatus.

So we have a Prime Minister (regarded as the second most prominent leader in socialist Albania and representing his country for decades at the UN and in all most important delegations abroad) suddenly exposed as enemy number one on the basis of an endless series of crimes pouring out of his safe in December 1981. Can this be credible? Assuming that all his sins, discovered retrospectively, were the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, wouldn’t the Party have had any hints or proofs at all about his dangerous and conspiratorial role and network during the forties, the fifties, the sixties, the seventies, that is, prior to his suicide? As for his wife, how had it been possible, a few months before Shehu’s suicide, for her to wander around some European capitals freely and undetected, while including in her schedule so sensitive meetings with CIA agents in order to plan criminal activities? According to Enver Hoxha, final success had been achieved since “the walls of our fortress are of unshakeable granite rock.” It may well be so. Although, from this whole story, a dysfunctional element evidently emerges within the fortress walls, badly impacting on Albania’s dictatorship of the proletariat and its image abroad.

Nexhmije Hoxha herself wrote a 378-page book on Mehmet Shehu, published in 2004, highlighting a sentimental note in its title: Betrayed Friendship: Historical Notes and Memoires with regard to the Relationship between Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu. Principally, the issue appears to boil down to a separation among former friends. As explained in the preface:

“Enver Hoxha thought that Mehmet Shehu’s mistakes stemmed from his bad temper and unrestrained character…
Enver Hoxha tried … to help Mehmet Shehu to correct his behaviour. Enver Hoxha made this effort because he valued the positive aspects of Mehmet Shehu, indispensable for a top party and state leader…
Between Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu it was established respect and mutual understanding. …
The good relations between Enver and Mehmet were also strengthened by the partnership and friendship for more than forty years between their respective spouses …
By means of his suicide, Mehmet Shehu put an end to our friendship. Through his engagement as a spy, not only did he betray friendship with Enver, but overall the highest interests of the state and people. His commitment towards the party and the affection shown towards Enver were false.”
(Nexhmije Hoxha, Betrayed Friendship: Historical Notes and Memoires with regard to the Relationship between Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu, 2004, p. 9-12)

Mehmet Shehu’s suicide inevitably affected the unhappy destinies of those anti-party elements who had effectively or allegedly been involved in his plot. As for the family, Fiqret Shehu (Shehu’s wife) died in prison in 1988, Vladimir (first son) followed his father’s footsteps by committing suicide in prison, while Skënder (second son) and Bashkim (third son) remained imprisoned for ten years until 1991.

High-ranking officials belonging to this “criminal gang” were instead executed in 1983:

– Kadri Hazbiu, defence minister in 1982 and interior minister also in charge of Sigurimi from 1954 to 1980 (Hazbiu had been instrumental in smashing and executing prominent anti-party officials during the mid-seventies: Beqir Balluku, Petrit Dume, Hito Çaku, Abdyl Këllezi, Koço Theodosi, Kiço Ngjela and others);
– Feçor Shehu, interior minister in 1980-82;
– Llambi Ziçishti, health minister;
– Llambi Peçini, Sigurimi official in charge of the Bllok’s security;
– others.

This whole conspiratorial affair, however, seemed to be soon forgotten a few years later, after Enver Hoxha’s death on 11 April 1985. On the occasion of the 9^th PLA Congress in November 1986, the then Secretary Ramiz Alia made only passing mention of Mehmet Shehu in his report by thus conveying a clear message: let bygones be bygones.

9. ANTI-PARTY AND FACTIONAL ACTIVITIES
   The Mehmet Shehu plot was linked to previous conspiratorial groups, also in connection with the struggle against Yugoslav, Soviet and Chinese revisionism. According to the History of the Party of Labour of Albania (1982, p. 608), during the period of socialist construction class struggle is meant to target two main class enemies who are often intertwined between each other. On the one hand, the remnants of the overthrown exploiting classes as well as the traitors inside the country; and, on the other, imperialism outside the country (mainly US imperialism, Soviet social-imperialism and Chinese social-imperialism).

As for Yugoslavia’s pervasive interference during the immediate post-war period, the denunciation of the anti-party pro-Tito faction of Koçi Xoxe, Pandi Kristo and others (supporting Albania’s subjugation to Yugoslavia) proved to be a straightforward affair. That took place soon after the condemnation of Yugoslav revisionism by the 1948 Cominform resolution, subsequently followed by Albania’s full re-alignment with the USSR. In his capacity as Interior Minister in charge of Security,  Koçi Xoxe was held accountable for a sort of Albanian Yezovshina: serious violations of socialist legality and workers’ democratic rights, harmful actions, people arbitrarily persecuted and falsely and unjustly declared as enemies, and so on.

A different pattern took place during the fifties, sixties and seventies while dealing with Soviet and Chinese revisionism, and concurrently with those in Albania who were presumed to be their followers.

As regards the USSR, confrontation and political clashes with Soviet revisionist politicians (often with its entire leadership) began soon after Stalin’s death. These lasted up to the abrupt suspension by the USSR of all bilateral relations with Albania (including diplomatic relations) at the end of 1961. Throughout this critical eight-year period, however, the PLA had continued to formally reiterate its support to the Khrushchevite leadership, to Khrushchev himself. They also held Stalin responsible for great errors, great harm and open violations of Leninist party norms and revolutionary legality. At the 3^rd PLA Congress in May 1956, Enver Hoxha went as far as to attack Stalin, for amongst other criticisms, for having encouraged his own cult of the personality while having infringed the principle of collective leadership, for having taken severe measures against comrades with different opinions and for having supported an erroneous line with regard to Yugoslavia. And in fact, neither the 3^rd (May 1956) nor the 4^th (February 1961) PLA congresses openly attacked Soviet revisionism.

It was only in 1962 that an unequivocal directive could be finally issued in Albania and made public:
“Let us draw a clear line of demarcation between us and revisionism in all spheres, once and for all!”
(History of the Party of Labour of Albania, 1982, p. 380)

Two top politicians, Liri Belishova and Koço Tashko, together some others, were accused of being enemies who had somehow supported Soviet anti-Albanian machinations.

A similar pattern occurred in connection with the struggle against Chinese revisionism.

First political divergences with China began in the early sixties but it would take more than fifteen years before their ultimate break, that is, China’s unilateral suspension of all economic, political and military relations with Albania in July 1978 (save for formal diplomatic relations). During this time (early sixties-1978) neither “Mao Zedong Thought” nor the “Cultural Revolution” had been publicly criticized and directly attacked. But instead, both the 5^th (November 1966) and 6^th(November 1971) PLA Congresses characterized Mao as a prominent and outstanding Marxist-Leninist, China as a powerful bastion of socialism, and the Cultural revolution as a source of inspiration for the revolutionary movement worldwide.

As late as November 1976, the 7^th PLA Congress continued to hail the Cultural revolution and Mao’s theories as successful enrichments to the Marxist-Leninist theory and practice. How to explain such a prolonged length of time before coming out openly and publicly against Chinese revisionism? According to Enver Hoxha:

 “In this struggle to defend principles our Party took account of all the economic difficulties which might be created for the country.”
(Enver Hoxha, Report to the 8^th PLA Congress, November 1981)

That was also the time when a powerful pro-Chinese conspiratorial group was unmasked within the People’s Army. This prompted a widespread purge leading to execution, prison, and internment, among army ranks and their families. In particular, the then Defence Minister Beqir Balluku, Petrit Dume, Hito Çako and others were accused of weakening Albania’s defence (particularly along the coast in case of an eventual attack from the West) by implementing the tactics of partisan warfare in the mountains. This was suggested by the Chinese leadership, whose proposals also included an Albania’s military alliance with Yugoslavia and Rumania. It is indicative of the extremist power struggle developing at that time within the Albanian leadership that Balluku, together with other allegedly pro-Chinese generals, were executed in 1975, that is, three years before the final rupture of bilateral relations between China and Albania in July 1978.

It is therefore evident that – vis-à-vis Soviet revisionism during the 1953-1961 period and vis-à-vis Chinese revisionism from the early sixties up to 1978 – the PLA did follow an “erroneous line.” (Dimitrov: Reply to a Reader, Compass, n. 117, June 1995)

Consequently, we can suppose that during those times quite a few communists and ordinary people (not necessarily conspiratorial enemies) might have felt politically confused by contradictory statements in unpredictable everyday situations, and might have committed involuntary mistakes in the absence of a clear distinction between Marxism-Leninism, on the one hand, and revisionism, on the other.

Let us resort to our imagination. Let us surmise that Bill Bland was born in Albania in 1916, fought heroically as a communist in the Albanian Liberation Army (rather than wasting his time in New Zealand!), joined the PLA and sooner or later was promoted to its CC or Political Bureau, putting forward his first research report on China and strongly defending his criticism of Maoism and the Cultural Revolution during the sixties and seventies (how stubborn he was on principles!) … Well, given the prevailing pro-Chinese stands at that time in Albania, I suppose that the one we consider as the communist historian of modern revisionism wouldn’t have survived politically there, nor would have had the same freedom of expression as he did have in his Ilford apartment in Britain!

10. SHKËNDER SHEHU’S ENGAGEMENT WITH SILVA TURDIU
    As indicated above, this engagement became instrumental in provoking a political earthquake. Additional insight on citizens’ private lives in socialist Albania can be gained. A brief chronology:

– December 1980: first mutual acquaintance. At that time, 19-year-old Silva is a student at the Faculty of Economics in Tirana, besides being a member of the Dinamo women’s volleyball team and of the national team.

– 10-18 January 1981: 31-year-old Skënder flies from Sweden to the German Democratic Republic to meet her in Schwerin, where volleyball matches take place between Dinamo Tirana and the local SC Traktor.

– February-June 1981: frequent encounters. Skënder also flies from Stockholm to Paris and West Berlin to watch football matches.

– July 1981: Skënder settles down in Durrës (at the rest house of the Interior Ministry), where Dinamo team players are trained.

– 31 August 1981: on Skënder’s proposal, Silva’s father (university professor Qazim Turdiu, who had graduated in France and had received Albania’s “Naim Frashëri” first class order), together with the family, agrees on the engagement and hosts Skender at their home. Skënder informs his father who appears to be happy about the engagement.

– 1 September 1981: the Shehu family invites Silva at their home for the first time (picture taken at lunch with Silva seated between Mehmet Shehu and Skënder). Silva’s family then reciprocates the invitation at their apartment (Fiqret Shehu is present, but not her husband).

– 3 September 1981: Enver and Nexhmjie Hoxha pay a visit to the Shehus’ apartment to congratulate about the engagement (Enver Hoxha’s photographer takes a picture of the two families together with Skënder and Silva).

– 5 September 1981: On the day of her birthday (20 years old), Silvia flies to Greece together with Skënder and the other Dinamo team players for the “Under 18” Balkan Championship of Kalamata (lasting from 9 to 13 September).

– 7 September 1981: Mehment Shehu goes to Korça for some political meetings.

– 8 September 1981: Enver Hoxha is told by Ramiz Alia that Silva’s parents’ families are “full of enemies.”

– 11 September morning: Enver Hoxha calls Mehmet Shehu in Korça, requesting him to travel to Tirana immediately.

– 11 September afternoon: during their four-hour discussion, Hoxha requests Shehu to break off his son’s engagement immediately (“that would amount to a politically impermissible marriage”). Hoxha tells him that he made a serious and reprehensible mistake in violation of the Party line and Shehu admits his responsibility in having made a serious mistake “without thinking.”

– 12 September morning: Mehmet and Fiqret Shehu enter Hoxha’s villa for the second meeting regarding the engagement. The Shehus inform Hoxha that they had already instructed their son to come back to Tirana directly from Athens (thus avoiding flying to Sweden, as originally intended) in order to find a fast solution to the case.

– 13 September 1981: Mehmet and Fiqret Shehu back to Hoxha’s villa for the third meeting (Nexhmije Hoxha also present) and suggesting three possible options for a solution. A. Skënder would recognize his and his parents’ mistake by breaking off the engagement; B. Skënder would not accept separation from Silva, marry her and taking their own apartment, outside Shehus’ home; C. Skënder would consider suicide out of despair. Obviously, it was option A the one chosen by Hoxha, who ruled out option C. As for option B, that would amount, according to Hoxha, to abandoning “the path of the Party for the path of reaction, … the path of the enemy … we will not let such a thing happen.”

– 13 September 1981 late evening: Once back in Tirana from Greece, at Ali Çeno’s apartment (Ali Çeno, Mehmet Shehu’s bodyguard/chauffeur), during a 45-minute encounter, Skënder (who had just had an inflamed encounter with his father) informs Silva that their engagement is over.

– 14 September 1981: Following Skënder’s advice, in order to confirm their separation, Silva and her father, Qazim Turdiu, go to Mehmet Shehu’s house and find no one there. So, it is the father alone that goes to meet Fiqret Shehu at the Lenin Party School where she is the Director. She mentions that one major reason for breaking off the engagement is Silva’s mother’s family connection with Arshi Pipa, about which both she and her husband did not know before.

– 17 September 1981: Skënder’s birthday: 32 years old.

– end September 1981: Skënder back to Sweden.

– 1-8 November 1981: convening of the 8^th PLA Congress (Mehmet Shehu elected to the Political Bureau).

– 17 December 1981: PLA Political Bureau meeting for the whole day, having in agenda Mehmet Shehu’s “serious mistake” for his son’s engagement with a girl “with a very bad political composition.” Despite his 39-page self-criticism, Mehmet Shehu is fiercely attacked by all other Political Bureau members. Just before the end of the meeting at around 8 pm, all members support Simon Stefani’s proposal for Shehu to be given a serious reprimand on his registration document. The meeting is adjourned to the following day.

– 17/18 December night: Mehmet Shehu’s suicide.

– 18 December 1981: At the PLA Political Bureau meeting Enver Hoxha condemns Shehu’s suicide and, for the very first time, singles him out as a treacherous enemy.

– 19 December 1981: Meeting of the Plenum of the PLA CC, having in agenda Mehmet Shehu’s suicide.

– 20 December 1981: Skënder returns to Tirana from Sweden, immediately deported and subsequently imprisoned until 1991.

– 27 December 1982: Silva testifies before the investigators at the Kadri Hazbiu’s trial, outlining her previous relationship with Skënder. She is expelled from the university and from sport activities, left unemployed for some time before being sent to earn a living by knitting socks. Married with Agim Kubati in 1987, they both go by boat to Italy in 1991 and then emigrate to the USA (where she currently resides). All her relatives (including cousins) are also severely discriminated against during the 1980s.

Silvia was categorical in 2004:

“It is not true that my engagement with Skënder Shehu was imposed. It is not true that we had pressure from the Shehu family or their emissaries to accept the engagement.”

As for Skënder, only once did he embrace the official version according to which

“… my father … told me that the Americans wanted to influence the mitigation of class war … he told me that he had instructed the Minister of Interior to find me a girl with a bad biography and Feçor Shehu [Minister of Interior in 1980-82, then co-defendant, executed in 1983] recommended me Silva Turgiu.”

He gave such a deposition (most likely, he was forced to give it) only on the occasion of his trial in Albania in 1982. We can therefore assume it was true love, blossomed spontaneously between them two, but so soon interrupted by a sad sequence of bigger events!

In conclusion, it is also from this short-lived love story that we can glimpse Albanian life during the 1980s. On the one hand, you have the spoiled child grown up in the safe Bllok quarter, studying in Western Europe but also going back home at his will, freely settling down in Durrës next to his girlfriend and occasionally flying to Paris, West Berlin, East Germany and Greece for fun (at state expense).

On the other, you have thousands of not so lucky peers permanently living in their isolated villages, dreaming of crossing the border into Greece or Yugoslavia but afraid to do so, being fully aware they would risk to be shot dead. In order to discourage potential escapees, in fact, the bodies of those who had been murdered while attempting to flee were occasionally wrapped up in barbed wire and driven around in an army track for all to be seen!

Are such divergent destinies congruent with a socialist society claiming to implement the purity of Marxism-Leninism, the correct anti-revisionist, revolutionary line with the ultimate goal of a classless, communist society? We need to re-emphasize Marx’s unequivocal lesson, according to which “in practice man must prove the truth.” And it is on that basis alone, in order to present a true picture of reality, that a thorough political assessment must be made on socialist Albania in retrospect.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abrahams, F.C. Modern Albania, 2015

Albanian Life, Journal of the Albanian Society

Albanian Telegraphic Agency

Bland, William. Various articles and publications

Byron. Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage, 1812

Charter of the United Nations, 1945

Compass, Journal of the Communist League

Constitution of the PSRA, approved on 28-12-1976

Constitution of the People’s Republic of Albania, approved on 14-3-1946

Constitution of the PLA, 1977

Fevziu, B. Enver Hoxha: The Iron Fist of Albania, 2016

History of the Party of Labour of Albania, 1982

Hoxha, Enver. Various publications

Hoxha, Nexhmije. Betrayed Friendship: Historical Notes and Memoires with regard to the Relationship between Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu, 2004

Hoxha, Nexhmije. My Life with Enver: Memoirs (2 vol.), 1998

Koleci, M. Shame among the Shameless, 2020

Kongoli, F. Illusioni nel Cassetto, 2017

Lenin. Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, 1908

Lenin. Tenth Congress of the R.C. P. (B.), 15 March 1921

Lubonja, F. Second Sentence, 2009

Manca, L.  Enver Hoxha e la Cina, 2019

Marx, K. Theses on Feuerbach, 1845

Merlika, E. Una Vita in Dittatura, 2005

Mëhilli, E. From Stalin to Mao, 2017

Mernacaj, N. Growing up in Communist Albania, 2021

Penal Code of the PSRA, 1977

Plaku, L. Cronaca di una Condanna a Morte, 2019

Rejmer, M. Mud Sweeter than Honey: Voices of Communist Albania, 2021

Woodcock, S. Life is War, 2016

www.memorie.al/en

OPEN REVISIONISM (part II) Conclusions on Ramiz Alia

“The new political forces that came on the scene after Gorbachev’s elimination, changed the road of political and economic reforms and proceeded along the one of the free market economy, thus prompting the end of the former Soviet Union and the creation of Russia and all other republics. . . .

Obviously, such major upheavals changing the appearance of the whole of Europe could not but affect developments in Albania as well. We also felt the heavy influence of the propaganda conditioning developments in the East as well as the pressure originating from all sides and with all political, cultural and economic means. It was not we, Albanians, who came up with the well-known slogan of the ‘final domino’ with regard to Albania as the ultimate socialist country in Europe. This came up in the outside world which was looking forward to the time when Albania would also collapse, thus continuing the fall of the ‘other dominoes’.

Clearly, these situations, in particular during 1989-1990, could not avoid stimulating the necessity of changes. Naturally (from our viewpoint), not with the aim of overthrowing socialism, but with the aim of saving them from the looming threat. In line with such conviction and such purpose, measures for the further democratization of society were undertaken.”
(Ramiz Alia, My Life: Memoirs, 2010, p. 324)

The above is quoted from Ramiz Alia’s autobiography, which is only available in the Albanian language.

Can we draw the conclusion that Ramiz Alia was the revisionist traitor who guided the transformation from socialism to capitalism in Albania?

Yes, from a Marxist-Leninist perspective, Alia was the one who – in his position as both First Secretary of the Party of Labour of Albania (PLA) and President of the People’s Socialist Republic of Albania (PSRA) – artfully prompted that major switch in a very short period of time.

Enver Hoxha had passed away on 11 April 1985 and at the memorial meeting, prior to the burial, Alia swore unwavering adherence to Hoxha’s teachings and to his struggle against revisionism (in the written version of Alia’s address, all pronouns referring to Hoxha were published in capital letters). In November 1986, the IX PLA Congress was then held in the name of continuity, and in order to preserve Hoxha’s cult of the personality.  Two years later Alia presented his 482-page hagiography on “Our Enver”. As late as September 1989, at the VIII CC PLA Plenum, we still find Alia resolutely condemning Gorbachev’s perestroika while reiterating strong support for the dictatorship of the proletariat, for Stalin, for the struggle against revisionism, for the rejection of political pluralism, with no concessions made to religious ideology and bourgeois ideology in any fields.

It was only a matter of a few months, at the very beginning of 1990, for such radical above-mentioned stands to be completely reversed in favour of major deliberations of a revisionist character, in evident discontinuity with the formerly implemented policies under the leadership of Enver Hoxha.

These changes, as compared with the policies previously pursued in the fields of politics, economics, and foreign policy, were detailed by the Communist League, Britain, in Compass, n. 79B, August 1990 (Revisionism Raises its Head in Albania).

The metamorphosis towards ideological degeneration and the country’s disintegration – presented as democratization of life in socialist Albania – proceeded quite quickly.

Briefly, in chronological order during 1990:

– Demonstrations in Shkodra attempt to topple the bust of Stalin (14 January).

– IX CC PLA Plenum: Reduction in the role of centralized economic planning and limited introduction of price determination on the basis of supply and demand. Re-establishment of the Ministry of Justice (previously abolished in 1965). The right to pass sentences is withdrawn from the courts of villages and town wards. “In evaluating an individual, more attention should be devoted to the figure and personality of the individual, and less to family background.” (22-23 January).

– Authorization granted for acceptance of foreign investments (February).

– 5^th anniversary of Enver Hoxha’s death commemorated in the Martyrs’ Cemetery. Editorial of Zëri i Popullit entitled “Enver Hoxha’s name and deeds are immortal.” (11 April).

– X CC PLA Plenum: Relative reduction of PLA members in directing posts. Freedom for cooperative farms to sell off their herds to individual cooperative peasants. Application to join the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Application to establish diplomatic relations with the European Community. Willingness to normalize relations with the United States of America and the Soviet Union (17 April).

– People’s Assembly approves further measures of liberalization, significantly amending the penal code, reforming the court system, re-introducing the right to advocacy, and lifting restrictions on freedom of worship. Enterprises allowed to retain up to 90% of their profit as self-financing and to take out bank credits (8-9 May).

– Alia declares the process of “democratization” as irreversible (12 May).

– UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar visits Albania. At Tirana airport, before departure, Pérez de Cuéllar stated: “The Albanian authorities told me that they have entered a process which will continue.” (12-13 May).

– Decree 7393 providing that passports have to be granted to all adult Albanian citizens who request them within four weeks of their application (12 June).

– Invasion of foreign embassies in Tirana. Demonstrations in Tirana culminate in a number of people rushing into various embassies and requesting asylum (numbers swelling from an initial 200-300 to an estimated 4.500). Numerous reports of unrest in other towns throughout the country (2-7 July).

– XI CC PLA Plenum: Reshuffling of various party, ministerial and other positions, continued over the next two weeks. Alia indicates the existence of a new class struggle, carried out by internal and external reactionary forces that intend to hinder the democratization process (6-7 July).

– The Council of Ministers ratifies decisions on stimulating growth of private production and trade (11 July).

– Ferries carrying Albanian émigrés arrive at Brindisi, Italy (13 July).

– The PLA Political Bureau announces further measures for privatization in the agricultural sector (26 July).

– Announcement of restoration of diplomatic links with the Soviet Union (30 July).

– Alia meets with representatives of the Albanian intelligentsia (8 August).

– “Day of Enver” proclaimed, encouraging workers to increase production (16 August).

– Alia addresses the UN General Assembly in New York and the Albanian community in Boston, dealing at length with the history of the Albanian people but without ever mentioning the name of Enver Hoxha (end September).

– “Week of Enver” announced, with various activities to commemorate the anniversary of Enver Hoxha’s birth (10 October).

– Alia and other officials lay wreaths at Enver Hoxha’s grave (16 October).

– Ismail Kadare defects to France (24 October).

– XII CC PLA Plenum: Alia argues for changes in the 1976 Constitution and admits that the economy is “on the verge of an emergency situation.”  (6-7 November).

– Prime Minister, Adil Çarçani, admits non-fulfillment of quotas for “bread grains, potatoes, industrial plants, etc.” and announces importation of “electricity, bread grains, beans, etc.” (9 November).

– Disturbances at the university campus in Tirana over living conditions begin late in the evening. Police intervention to disperse demonstrators (8 December).

– 5-6.000 students boycott classes and gather in front of the university in Tirana. Some clashes between students and police are reported. Alia subsequently meets with a delegation of student activists (10 December).

– XIII CC PLA Plenum: Authorization for the formation of independent political parties. Major reshuffling of various party, ministerial and other positions (11 December).

– Formation of the Democratic Party of Albania (12 December).

– Unrest in several towns, including Shkodra, Elbasan and Kavaja (13-14 December).

– Nexhmije Hoxha resigns from her position of President of the Democratic Front and is replaced by Adil Çarçani, who in turn steps down from the office of Prime Minister (20 December).

– By decision of the Council of Ministers, the statue of Joseph Stalin in removed from its prominent position in central Tirana (21 December).

– Major ministerial reshuffling (23 December).

– Alia announces that the PLA must “deviate from many principles of Socialism” and that the reform process must continue. As he points out, “let us leave Enver Hoxha to the historians, and let them deal with history without passion.” (26 December).

This was the 1990 timeline. Soon afterwards, Albania would turn into a corrupt Wild West with traumatic effects on its population, falling from 3.3 million in 1991 to 2.8 million in 2023 because of emigration. Ramiz Alia remained in office as PLA First Secretary till June 1991, subsequently resigning as President in early April 1992. He died on 7 October 2011 (aged 85), shortly after completing his memoirs. Inevitably, following the dissolution of the “People’s Socialist Republic of Albania”, the “Republic of Albania” was officially proclaimed on 29 April 1991.

Personally speaking, as I visited the country in both 1989 and 1990, I could witness the degree of its radical transformations on the spot and, essentially, it was such an abrupt termination of socialism that prompted my resignation as Acting Secretary of the Albanian Society in Britain in September 1990. Bill Bland had already resigned a few months earlier as both Secretary and Committee member.

For 30 years, almost with no interruption, Bland had tirelessly and unselfishly worked for the Society and for the cause of British and Albanian understanding – quite an extraordinary and unique service! Thus, we both shared discomfort and disappointment to see Albania proceeding so much away from its former socialist identity. During my visit to the country in August 1990, I was able to gather a comprehensive picture of the deteriorating situation there, having the opportunity to meet with Albanian friends, writers, journalists, diplomats, professors and students, as well as with the President and other officers of the Albanian Committee for Cultural and Friendly Relations with Foreign Countries. Excerpts from the notes I had taken at that time follow below.

“I know quite a few people and, in all conversations, I never put to them any embarrassing or provocative questions. Nor did I intend to lecture anyone about their new policies. But – as in the past – I tried to understand as much as I could. In contrast with my previous experiences, this time I was rather shocked and disappointed, since we are now clearly witnessing a new, different Albania, an Albania transforming radically and very quickly. . . .
Meeting with Jorgo Melica, President of the  Committee for Cultural and Friendly Relations with Foreign Countries: . . .
– Regret for Bill Bland’s resignation and congratulations for my appointment;
– All changes in Albania are in line with three principles: freedom, independence and socialism; . . .
– Offer of a 10% profit to the Albanian Society for any tourist groups we organize in order to visit Albania; . . . – Full support was given by Melica to the Albanian Society, emphasizing that our association should clarify and explain to the British public Albania’s new changes so that “everybody understands why these current changes are taking place”. I did not express my viewpoint on the issue – one thing is to understand the changes, another is to be in agreement with them. At the moment, they seem to be willing to maintain a preferential relationship with official and semi-official bodies abroad, particularly businessmen, investors, politicians from various parties, etc. (so-called new friends of Albania), but obviously without severing relations with the Friendship Associations, that is, with the traditional friends of Albania. . . .

The economic crisis has dire consequences. It is admittedly more serious than in the past. Some basic commodities are simply not available anywhere, meat and now cheese have been rationed. This situation can be easily exploited from abroad, since foreign capitals and credits are now allowed into the country. . . .

The new economic mechanism (by which decentralization is replacing the previous system of democratic centralism) is viewed as an experiment . . .

What unexpected consequences these new economic changes will bring about, it’s not clear at all. The absence of a clear perspective provokes signs of dissatisfaction, indifference, and anxiety among ordinary people. Demonstrations did take place this year in Shkodra, Kavaja and Tirana. . . .

The principled struggle against imperialism and revisionism, together with Enver Hoxha’s book The Superpowers, have all become redundant because the current Albanian stand on this issue goes beyond diplomacy, beyond the mere establishment of diplomatic relations with Washington and Moscow. . . .

Albania’s leaning towards American imperialism has certainly become more apparent. . . . As Alia pointed out, now “Albania responds to friendship with friendship” also in its relationship with Washington. . . .

In line with the new Albanian thinking, Marxist-Leninist principles are now regarded as dogmas. So, a new vision of international socialism is now upheld: according to reliable party sources with whom I discussed the issue, socialism now comprises all the traditional humanitarian ideals for freedom and social justice, ideals which find expression in various ways in different countries – such as social-democracy in Sweden, the labour movement in Britain, etc.! . . .

A liberal stand towards cultural issues seems almost unanimous among Albanian intellectuals. Kadare’s positions seem to be accepted by all professional writers . . . This new commonly accepted line is clear: all past and present Albanian literary production must be made accessible to people. The same would apply to all literary and artistic trends outside Albania – whether they are reactionary or progressive, it is no longer a problem. Such a cultural liberalization will provoke – and is provoking – a significant impact on political life, particularly among the youth. . . . As I was talking to a writer about Bill Bland’s strong opposition to Albania’s current reforms, ‘Oh no! – he suddenly commented – He must be a communist!’ . . .

There is almost total freedom of movement for foreigners (including Americans), in groups or individually, and with their own means of transport. . . . Reactionary elements have now total freedom to establish contacts with anyone inside the country, just as they are able to import all sort of religious and anti-socialist propaganda. . . .

Foreign Western capital has now all the possibilities to destroy the “last bastion of Stalinism in Europe” peacefully, gradually and, most ironically, in compliance with Albanian laws. . . .

The Albanians’ attitude towards foreigners, in general, has completely changed from the past. One was asking me for an invitation in order to settle down abroad, another requested some books for his doctoral degree, others requested foreign-made watches and TV sets, and the one in Gijrokastra was asking for both an electric stove and a washing machine! Lot of competition within Albtourist in order to become unpaid guides to foreign groups and visitors. . . .

Following the occupation of the embassies in Tirana last month, higher walls have been erected around foreign embassies, which are now performing their services only partially. . . .

Stalin’s statue in Shkodra has been removed . . . a reliable source informed me that a critical revision of the figure of Stalin is being made within the PLA on the basis of Western and Soviet reports on Stalin’s crimes, “previously unknown to the Albanians”! . . . Will the statues of Marx, Engels and Lenin follow suit? Shall we keep on supporting Albania until the statue of Enver Hoxha is also toppled in the center of Tirana?”(Norberto Steinmayr, Notes from my visit to Albania, August 1990)

That was Albania in 1990 and that was the outcome of revisionism, that is, the outcome of an organized treachery deviously undermining socialism by restoring capitalism in the interest of international capital. There appeared a striking contrast with its recent past.  Until the eighties, in actual fact,  Albania had proceeded as the only socialist country left in the world, courageously defying the two superpowers and consistently opposing revisionism. A small state in Europe, fully independent, outside any economic, political and military blocs, upholding proletarian internationalism. A dictatorship of the proletariat that had rejected the various revisionist trends prevailing elsewhere, from Eastern Europe to China, from North Korea to Cuba, etc.

The fast speed of Albania’s transition to capitalism is quite astonishing:
Voicing radical policies up to September 1989, while reversing all of them four months later. In order to justify such a sudden about-turn, in his autobiography Alia refers to the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. From that time onward, he writes:

“I personally became aware that it was not possible to carry on like before.”

Therefore, by his own admission, changes of policies at that time were not random, but reflected a clear and conscious scheme to restore capitalism as soon as possible. It is within this framework that the so-called democratization process was speeded up.

Moreover, it is not purely coincidental that Alia associates the destiny of Albania with the destiny of all other Eastern European countries, including the Soviet Union, by intentionally ignoring the PLA’s decade-long struggle waged against Soviet revisionism. According to him, it was principally Western pressure and interference against the “European socialist countries” that brought about the end of socialism, rather than their “internal decomposition”. As a consequence, Albania followed suit for the sake of “integration” and in order to avoid “isolation” and “economic stagnation”.

A candid admission comes up in the introduction of Alia’s memoirs:

“Surely, socialist Albania was not perfect”!

And here comes a long enumeration of its “various mistakes, defects and failings”:

– Restrictions of individual rights.

– Unjustifiable repressive measures in the name of a fierce class struggle.

– Arbitrary arrests of innocent people by the Sigurimi, involving family members as well.

– Admission that Albanians had to queue up for “milk”, “eggs” and other basic commodities, “negatively affecting the moral-political conditions of the people”.

– Extremist collectivization measures in agriculture, prompted by ideological rather than economic considerations.

– Negative consequences stemming from autarchic policies and limited exchanges with abroad.

– “Self-isolation” following China’s cessation of trade with Albania (1978).

– Constitutional prohibition of obtaining credits from abroad in order to implement economic “self-reliance”.

– Closure of religious institutions and abolition of religion.

– Abolition of both the Ministry of Justice and the right to advocacy (1965).

– Non-realistic “acceleration” in some fields (i.e., defence) vis-à-vis external capitalist pressure.

– Promotion of the cult of the personality of Enver Hoxha.

– Enver Hoxha’s “detachment,” because of his medical conditions, from peasants’ and workers’ lives:

“Even Enver Hoxha himself was not thoroughly informed about the real development in the life of the country. . . . Often he was not fully told of the economic reality of the country”.

My comment:

Couldn’t most of the above anomalies have been tackled during the period of socialist construction, thus strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat rather than facilitating its demise? This is shameless opportunism – keeping quiet for decades as long as you can, to maintain your top position with all related privileges in the sealed Leaders’ Block environment. And when all this comes to an end, you then speak up about mistakes so that you can partly justify yourself for your former actions.

In addition, while outlining his version of events during 1990, Alia states that:

1. in connection with the invasion of the foreign embassies in July, his major objective was to avoid an “internal conflict” which would eventually turn into a Romanian style “bloodbath;” and
2. likewise, in connection with the students’ protests in December, he did his best to keep the confrontation away from “extremes, fratricidal clashes and further exacerbation.”

Definitely, this is factually correct on both counts.

One final consideration:

Was Albania’s transition from socialism to capitalism, passing through a brief revisionist spell, inevitable?  Rather than resorting to theoretical disquisitions, I prefer to stick to examples in real life. After all, it was Lenin himself who, by quoting Goethe, pointed out that

“Grey is the theory, my friend, but ever-green is the eternal tree of life.”
(Lenin, Letters on Tactics, April 1917)

Let us put ourselves into a peasant’s shoes, a peasant living in a cooperative farm somewhere in the Albanian mountains during the early eighties. I have a family to support, our diet can hardly be diversified, there are evident malnutrition cases among children in the village. I have no vegetable garden around my home. I cannot possess any cows, sheep or goats and, since the VIII PLA Congress in 1981, I cannot even have one chicken because, as we were told by Comrade Enver, we are now further consolidating socialist collectivism in parallel with our small personal plots soon withering away completely.

However, since April 1990 we are now allowed to possess a personal plot for vegetables as well as personal livestock, besides being able to sell some of our produce in the local market. Should I welcome this improvement in our living standards? Or should I instead raise my voice against those petty bourgeois and liberal reforms put forward by the revisionists?

In another scenario, I am a young Albanian guy who loves his socialist country but is also interested in visiting other neighboring states. I do know that a few of my peers residing in the Block area can do so. The Prime Minister’s second son, for instance, is studying in Sweden and can also travel from one European destination to another for personal pleasure. I can not! Shall I risk crossing the border with Yugoslavia or Greece? I am not so sure, but I know what I might expect: being shot dead by border guards. Thereby increasing statistics of those who had encountered that kind of assassination  (that is, 988 Albanians out of 13,692 persons attempting to flee from 1944 to 1990). Should I risk being injured and languishing more than 10 years in prison, and what about my family being punished as well? I don’t know, let me have some glasses of wine, and I will re-consider these fantasies another time! But why don’t we assemble some friends and try to get into a foreign embassy compound? What will come next?

Facts are stubborn things. And with regard to Albania, it is a fact that socialism imploded there. It is a fact that capitalism rapidly replaced socialism. It is a fact that alliance with American imperialism soon replaced proletarian internationalism. It is a fact that Albania’s freedom and independence were sacrificed for the sake of its integration into capitalist Europe. It is a fact that Alia’s personnel reshuffles were met with almost no opposition. It is a fact that no popular resistance was attempted to safeguard the dictatorship of the proletariat, nor were workers mobilized in defence of Enver Hoxha’s policies. In Albania, revisionism became consequential to more than four decades of socialism.

For revisionism to have been able to raise its head, in fact, the ground must have been paved before. The dialectical interconnection is clear: from socialism to revisionism, and from revisionism to capitalism.

Definitely a historical setback, but a setback that prompts us to delve deeper into its causes. Anomalies and mistakes during Albania’s socialist construction, as detailed in part I, should be assessed rationally, unemotionally and meaningfully. And not on the basis of nostalgic affection for the good old days that are no more. History is thus teaching us lessons that are to be incorporated into today’s and tomorrow’s struggle for an ultimately classless, communist society.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alia, Ramiz. My Life: Memoirs, 2010

Lenin. Letters on Tactics, April 1917

Steinmayr, Norberto. Notes from my visit to Albania, August 1990 (unpublished)