A Short Marxist-Leninist History of Syria – to 2016
The Class Character of Syria – From an Oriental Despotic State to Neo-Colony to A ‘Hereditary’ Fascist Dictatorship to Civil War
May 24, 2018 – web published December 2024
Introduction
Part 1 – The Rise of Hafiz Assad to power and establishing a hereditary fascist dictatorship
Table of Contents
o The Country and its People
o The Tottering Ottoman Empire
o The Zionist Seizure of Palestine – the imperialist foot in Arabia
o The French Mandate in Syria
o Classes and Major Parties in Syria Post First World War
o Military Dictatorship, The “Rule of the Colonels 1949-1954”
o Ba’ath Invites Nasser to a Union of Egypt and Syria
o The Syrian CP reneges on the second stage of the National Democratic Revolution as the Ba’ath call for Nasser’s help to defeat communism
o Hijacking the Ba’ath Party by the Military Committee
o The Reversal of the UAR Union with Egypt
o Relations with the Revisionist CPSU
o The Hama 1964 Uprising
o The Military Committee succumbs to in-fighting – Wings of the Military Committee
o Assad’s State
o Ensuring “Alawate Domination of the army
o The Agrarian reforms of Agrarian Reform Law No.161 of September 27 1958
o Assad establishes Cult of Personality and a corporatist state
o Assad Pushes Agrarian reform further
o Assad pushes large scale industrialisation
o The Muslim Brotherhood Rise Again in 1979
o Assad’s strategy to grow the economy
o Bashar Assad Continues As a Hereditary Fascist
o The state of the people of Syria by 2011
Part 2: The 2011 Uprising and the bloody aftermath of the Syrian Civil War
o The 2011 Uprising
o Some Lessons From Tunisia
o First Phase: The short lived Syrian Spring – Uprising, and Revolutionary Surge from Below to Islamicist domination – 2011-2013
o The Local Coordinating Committees (LCC)
o Syrian National Council (SNC)
o Free Syrian Army
o The Kurdish Forces
o Second Phase: Incursion by Islamic Fundamentalist Groupings
o The Strategic interests of Foreign powers inside the Syrian Civil War – Manuscript ends here
Preface Written December 1, 2024
This work goes up only to 2016. While this is an incomplete manuscript, the work for it ended in 2018. It was then published in a shorter form as: “The Class Character of Syria – From an Oriental Despotic State to Neo-Colony to Fascist Dictatorship to Civil War”; at Marxist-Leninist Currents; November 24, 2020 Written, May 24, 2018. It remains on that website.
This version here – being published today, contains the original “Part Two” extending up to 2016. That begins to deal with the entry of Islamic fundamentalists into the ‘Syrian Revolution’. That history of Syria up to 2016 thus takes in the early period of the Syrian Revolution. Frankly, the author then got distracted by having to consider the Kurdish National Question, which also intersected with the Syrian Revolution.
This work on Kurdistan – was then web published in two parts: Kurdistan Theses on, Part One July 29, 2019; and Kurdistan Part Two January 2020. These two long files remain in pdf form available at the websites as notated. The author had always intended to complete the Syrian piece as a whole. But in reality writing on this was halted in 2018. There were several reasons for that hiatus. In part simply pressures of employment. Then new world events needing self-clarification supervened. That simply left the particular task of completing the Syrian manuscript in abeyance. Completing and refining the longer work and making it more ‘readable’ seemed yet another task too far.
Frankly it also seemed of less general interest to pursue the exact details past 2016. Moreover a publication of far shorter length seemed fit enough to show the views on the Assad regime and the Syrian revolution adequately (“Doubters of Assad’s brutality are toeing the line for Russia”; Hari Kumar Berlin Left; 17 February 2021). And then the Syrian Revolution had seemed, to have been stalled for a period. But in retrospect, it was a mistake not to complete the task.
The sudden revival of the Syrian Revolution makes this evident. Thus no major rewrite has been attempted. It is left in a perhaps inadequate form. Perhaps it offers some guide, and it is offered to give a sense of the background to current events. The intention remains to complete the work up to 2024, and now of course to include the recent events of this last week in Aleppo. Since it is unclear when this can be carried out, it is best to make this document more readily available, rather than the older pdf posting. That remains on the site at Marxist-Leninist Currents with the American Party of Labor.
1 December 2024.
Introduction
Middle East politics today are a complex maze – but where is it not so? Yet the extraordinary, vindictive and destructive war launched upon the Syrian workers and peasants by Assad, demands Marxist-Leninist interpretations. As the war grinds to a conclusion – which at the time of first writing (2018), appears to favour Bashar Assad remaining in power, the landscape of the Middle East has been transformed.
Some Marxists, and even some Marxist-Leninists have had relatively little to say on the war and its forces, and in the main – some have taken the stance of a tacit or fully open support of Assad. We disagree with this and offer a counter-point.
We suggest there are four core historical features, that offer guides for Marxist-Leninists, to navigate the maze.
Firstly, is the nationalist fervour in the Middle East upon the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War. Arab or Pan-Islamic nationalism, was seen as a solution for the masses. Ultimately it failed to establish meaningful independence in any of the Arab states. Nonetheless Arab (or pan-Islamic) nationalism wore progressive colours, when aimed against imperialism. The Communist International took critical and differing viewpoints to the pan-Islamic movements.
Under Lenin’s direct supervision, the Comintern warned of the reactionary nature in the pan-Islamic content:
“It is necessary to struggle against the pan-Islamic and pan-Asiatic movements and similar tendencies, which are trying to combine the liberation struggle against European and American imperialism with the strengthening of the power of Turkish and Japanese imperialism and of the nobility, the large landlords, the priests, etc.”
(“Theses On The National And Colonial Question”; Adopted By The Second Comintern Congress; 28July 1920; Protokoll,ii, p.224;. in Degras, Jane: “The Communist International”; p.143
https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/documents/volume1-1919-1922.pdf)
However later, the Communist International took a more “flexible approach”, stating that although it could take many “varied” forms, such movements against imperialism should be supported by communists:
“In Moslem countries the national movement at first finds its ideology in the
religio-political watchwords of pan-Islam, and this enables the officials and
diplomats of the great Powers to exploit the prejudices and ignorance of the broad masses in the struggle against this movement (English imperialism’s game with pan-Islamism and pan-Arabism, English plans to transfer the Khalifate to India, French imperialism’s playing on its ‘Moslem sympathies’). But to the extent that the national liberation movements grow and expand, the religio-political watchwords of pan-Islam are increasingly replaced by concrete political demands. The struggle recently waged in Turkey to deprive the Khalifate of temporal power confirms this…. Taking full cognizance of the fact that those who represent the national will to State independence may, because of the variety of historical circumstances, be themselves of the most varied kind, the Communist International supports every national revolutionary movement against imperialism.”.
(“Theses On The Eastern Question Adopted By The Fourth Comintern Congress”; November 1922 Thesen und Resolutionen,; In: Degras, Jane: “The Communist International”; p. 385-386 at https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/documents/volume1-1919-1922.pdf)
Yet to date Arab or pan-Islamic nationalisms, have failed to alleviate the suffering of the masses. This failure followed Western imperialist attacks on the peoples and states of the Middle East on the one hand; and the fall into open revisionism of the socialist state of the USSR after 1951 on the other hand.
Secondly, the imperialist presence in the Middle East remains a major catalyst of wars. In order to firmly grip the Middle East, both Western imperialism and Putin-ite Russian neo-imperial pretensions have vied in the Middle East. They have both backed important stooges. The West has long backed Israel and Saudi Arabia, as well as Turkey. With these forces, imperialism, especially the USA, has dominated the Middle East. This domination was easier, when the USSR dropped all façade and pretense at being a socialist state, and formally dissolved on December 26, 1991. As the Syrian war launched in 2011 made clear, the role of Saudi Arabia has been very pernicious. As far as Russian growing neo-imperial aspirations are concerned, shoring up the Assadite grip upon Syria was key. But this also meant supporting Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah Shi’ite forces, which together joined forces in suppressing anti-Assad Syrian revolutionary forces.
Cumulatively, this led to a war by proxy in which the pro-Western imperil forces vied against the neo-imperial forces headed by Russia and Iran. As the Syrian war nears its conclusion, this division will continue to light more fires in the Middle East.
Thirdly, the legacy of revisionism removed any leading role for Marxism-Leninism. The communist parties in the Middle East grew fast, but were under revisionist control even at their formation. In these countries, in particular in Syria, they merely served as a left mask for the national bourgeoisie. Consistent with this, Khalid Bakdash reneged on the launch of the second stage of the national democratic revolution – the socialist stage. It may be more accurate to say that Bakdash never embarked on a revolutionary road in the first place. At a critical juncture, the party did not move forward to socialism. In the ensuing vacuum, the Ba’ath Party enlisted Gamel Nasser to assist in destroying the communists. This was an attempt by Egypt to control Syria, by forming the United Arab Republic.
Subsequently, the CPs of the area were either massacred by nationalist forces, or openly subservient to national states for governmental seats. At times both occurred as in Iraq and Syria. As shells of a meaningful CPs, they were incapable of providing any convincing communist leadership. Unsurprisingly, many young, sincere revolutionaries in Syria, nowadays profess neo-anarchic forms of ideology, and organisation. This testifies to the shallowness of available communist models in Syria.
Finally, the state repressions of the Middle Eastern states removed any possible discussion of strategy, tactics and meaningful history. Many of these – ultimately dependent upon imperialism – Arab states, adopted dictatorial and repressive policies. Their governments were just emerging from colonialism and semi-colonialism. Consequently they often had a very weak national bourgeoisie and a weak working class. In contrast they often had a large peasantry. Therefore, such struggling governments often ruled in the form of military dictatorship, reflecting their weak base, as they found the transition to democratic capitalism difficult. Moreover in their weakness, the national bourgeoisie found it expedient to use the imagery and rhetoric of ‘socialism’. They often built a ‘socialist’ façade, and a ‘mass’ party. Many such states continued to rule using a form of Bonapartist military dictatorial government. In several – where a mass base had been built – this was virtually indistinguishable from fascism.
Yet such countries, still could not break out of the strait-jacket of imperial control. This became even more impossible after the final revisionist take-over of the USSR in 1956, and the dissolution of the USSR in 1991. These governments increasingly retreated from even elementary democratic principles. Under siege at the ending of the 20th century, they were forced into the “neo-liberal” world of the new global economy.
The Case of Syria
This article places Syria today, within its history of class battles from a colonial and neo-colonial past, till 2000, when Bashar al-Assad “inherited” the state.
The 20th-21st century history of Syria, is one of a failed national democratic revolution. Following the First World War, Syria became a colony of the French in the period of the so-called French Mandate. After the Second World War Syria achieved a formal independence in 1945, but was in reality a neo-colony to France. The first post-war governments were military dictatorships.
During the neo-colonial period, Syria saw the rise of a Pan-Arab Nationalism, in the form of the Ba’ath Party, founded in 1947. Subsequently, the Ba’ath did not develop in an un-interrupted growth of a single party. In fact, the Ba’ath served as a flexible scaffold, around which three successive groupings created their own party base. This process unfolded from 1947 up to the year Hafiz Assad took sole power, in 1970, and extended till 2000. In 2000 it entered a new, fourth phase under Bashar al-Assad.
The first Ba’ath Party was a pan-Arabic pro-peasant and pro-urban trader party. It managed to form the first Ba’ath government in Syria in 1963,18 years after independence. For a brief period the Ba’ath chose to ally with Nasserism. But it accepted a subordinate position to Nasserism and its’ pan-Arabic, Wahd movement. This alliance was formed in order to crush the Syrian Communist Party and its followers.
After the Syrian Communists were crushed, the Syrian military nationalists, overwhelmingly from a peasant background, seized control of the state back from Egyptian hands. Around this period, the militarists formed the ‘Military Committee’, which hijacked the Ba’ath party, and turned it into a vehicle for the peasantry. The Ba’ath now became a cocoon for a coalition military dictatorship. The class basis for this specific Syrian form was primarily pro-peasant, explaining the important Agrarian reforms introduced.
When Hafiz Assad turned on his coalition, and took sole power in 1970, a new phase began. In this the B’ath was transformed into the mass ‘people’s’ façade – of the fascist state of Hafiz Assad. This can be described early on as a Bonapartist military dictatorship under Hafiz Assad. But the character of the state became increasingly an open fascist state. Assad had created a corporate state, using the mass base of the Ba’ath Party. Under the Land Reforms, Ba’ath Party increased the land-mass of the rich peasantry, and enabled the high landlords to transform themselves into a capitalist class. This was the consolidation of a nascent weak national bourgeoisie.
In actuality, the very weakness of the Syrian national bourgeois forces, had made a corporate state structure attractive. This state took on the burden of building an infra-structure, and allowed a shallow capitalist accumulation. Yet it had arrived late on the international stage, and remaining a weak force – the national bourgeoisie were forced into a renewed dependency. For a time the state of Syria became a comprador state to then-revisionist USSR imperialism. After the USSR formally renounced any socialist pretensions in 1991, Syria was forced to rely again on Western imperialism.
By the start of the 21st century, Syria had plunged into a globalized neo-liberalism. The corporate state under Hafiz Assad, with its pro-peasant policies, did raise living standards to some extent. But now the living standards of the people again plummeted. Small surprise that the eruptions of the so-called “Arab Spring” resonated in Syria. The spark of the Syrian Resistance, or Uprising rapidly ignited the Syrian masses. A brutal suppression inevitably led to a Civil War. But in the Middle East, no peoples are allowed to play out class battles without the intercession of foreign powers. This is what duly ensued.
The repressive nature of the Syrian state under father and son Assad, should inform the strategy for progressives. It was never – and now especially no longer – adequate to support the Assad state as being ‘secular’, and struggling against a ‘sectarian’ opposition. For that matter the secular state had long been defended by an explicitly sectarian praetorian guard of ‘Alawites created by Hafez Assad, himself an ‘Alawite. As David Hirst, historian of Lebanon pointed out:
“It is not in any real sense, the Ba’athists who run this country. It is the ‘Alawites… In theory they run it behind the party, but in practice it is through their clandestine solidarity within the party and other important institutions… Behind the façade, the best qualification for holding power is proximity – through family, sectarian, or tribal origins – to the country’s leading ‘Alawaite, President Assad.”
(Hirst , D; Guardian; 26 June, 1979; Cited by Van Dam Nicholas: “The Struggle for power in Syria. Politics & Society Under Assad & the Ba’ath party”; London 1997 p. 100).
To denigrate the Syrian Opposition, interests close to the Assad family often fling religious labels (‘Islamic’ or ‘Sunni Fundamentalists’) at their opponents. But these are often misleading. While such labels can at times be accurate, they must be evaluated carefully. As Enver Hoxha said of the Iranian revolution that unseated Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran:
“It is the progressive, anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist and anti-feudal revolutionary movement of the popular masses of the Moslem Arab peoples, whether Shia or Sunni, that is the cause of… great difficulties. The whole situation in this region is positive, good, and indicates a revolutionary situation and a major movement of these peoples. At the same time, though, we see efforts made by the enemies of these peoples to restrain this movement or to alter its direction and intensity. Hence, we must regard these situations, these movements and uprisings of these peoples as revolutionary social movements, irrespective that at first sight they have a religious character or that believers or non-believers take part in them, because they are fighting against foreign imperialism and neo-colonialism or the local monarchies and oppressive feudalism. History gives us many positive examples in this direction when broad revolutionary movements of the popular masses have had a religious character outwardly. Among them we can list the Babist movements in Iran 1848-1851; the Wahabi movement in India which preceded the great popular uprising against the British colonizers in the years 1857-1859; the peasant movements at the time of the Reformation in the 16th century which swept most of the countries of Europe and especially Germany. The Reformation itself, although dressed in a religious cloak, represented a broad socio-political movement against the feudal system and the Catholic Church which defended that system. When the vital interests, the freedom and independence of a people are violated, they rise in struggle against any aggressor, even though that aggressor may be of the same religion.”
(Hoxha, Enver, January 1980. “The Events Which Are Taking Place In The Moslem Countries Must Be Seen In The Light Of Dialectical And Historical Materialism”; In “Reflections On The Middle East”; Tirana 1984; p.369; transcribed by http://www.enverhoxha.ru Https://Www.Marxists.Org/Reference/Archive/Hoxha/Works/Ebooks/Reflections_On_The_Middle_East.Pdf)
To be quite clear: we must condemn Islamic sectarianism.
At the same time we must support the anti-dictatorship struggle of democrats and revolutionaries inside Syria.
And lastly, we reject the further penetration of imperialist powers.
Admittedly, these goals are difficult to achieve simultaneously, in the tumult of the Syrian uprising. Especially so, in the absence of a Marxist-Leninist party inside Syria.
In the following, we first summarise the history, leading up to the characterisation of the Assad regimes as, ultimately fascist. This then allows us, to detail the current civil war devastating Syria and its people.
We acknowledge documents from three defunct organisations. The more recent is Alliance Marxist-Leninist; and the older and more historically significant, are the Marxist-Leninist Organisation of Britain, and Communist League. Some of these documents can be found at the archive at Alliance ML. The third document is Alliance 51: Pan-Arabic – or Pan-Islamic “Socialism”. There are significant amendments to that earlier piece contained here.
http://ml-review.ca/aml/AllianceIssues/SYRIAALLIANCE51.html
http://ml-review.ca/aml/PAPER/2006/Summer/HezbollahFinal.html
http://www.allianceml.com/BLAND/Lebanon_WBB.htm
Bland W.B. “The War In The Middle East War Has Come Once Again To The Middle East”; in “Class Against Class” Organ Of The Marxist- Leninist Organisation Of Britain. No. 2. Special Edition October 1973. Reprinted Web Edition By Alliance Marxist-Leninist July 2003.
Part One: The Class Character of Syria From an Oriental Despotic State to neo-colony to fascist dictatorship
The Country and its people
The historic term ‘bilad al-Sham’ means “The Lands of Damascus”, and refers to an extended “Natural Syria”. This stretched from the Taurus mountains in the North, to the Western Mediterranean shores, the Eastern Euphrates, and the Arabian Southern deserts. Being so vast, it was frequently divided up during the centuries. Under the French Mandate rule, Syria consisted of both Syria and Lebanon in one administrative area (with Latakia and Jebel Druze) from 1925 to 1936. Syria later, refers to the Syrian Republic formed in 1936, from Syria, Jebel Druze and Latakia (also known as the State of the Alawis).
The population of Syria reflects a complex past, but it is now largely Muslim; by 1946 Arab speakers formed 85% of the population. Christian Maronites however always made a numerically significant minority. The population at the time of the French Mandate (1920-1946) consisted of: Sunnis (60% of the total population); ‘Alawis 11.5%; Druze 3.0 %; Ismaílis 1.5%; Christians 9.9%; Non-Arabs (Kurds 8.5%; Armenians 4.2%; plus small numbers of Circassians and Jews etc. (Malik Mufti: “Sovereign Creations- Pan-Arabism & Political Order in Syria & Iraq”; Cornell; 1966; p.45).
Both these religious grouping, and some further sub-divisions into communal sects, retarded a united ‘national’ identity Syria. These divisions included religious differences. The main division spurring rivalry was within Islam – between Shi’ia and Sunni. On top, tribal differences played important roles even down to the battles within the Ba’th Party in the 1960s.
Colonising powers used these minorities to ‘divide and rule’. The French imperialists were especially adept at using this age-old tactic:
“The French favoured recruitment from the various religious and ethnic minorities, such as the Alawi, Druzes, Ismail’ilis, Christians, Kurds and Circassians, in the ‘Troupes Speciales de Levant’ – which later developed into the Syrian and Lebanese Armed Forces. At the same time however, members of the Sunni Arab majority of the Syrian population were not encouraged to enlist”.
(Van Dam Nicholas: “The Struggle for power in Syria. Politics & Society Under Assad & the Ba’ath party”; London 1997; Ibid p. 26).
”Discord between and within religious and ethnic minorities was also provoked by the fact that the French played off one tribal leader against the another”.
(Van Dam Ibid; p. 4).
The largest group of Muslims (both in the entire Muslim world and in Syria) are the Sunni, who adhere to the sunnah (practice) of Mohammed alone, whose sayings (hadith) form the Holy Words. According to Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406) Sunni are themselves subdivided into sects: the Hanafi, Zahari’te, Shafi’ite, Malikite and Hanbalite schools of legal thought. By the time of the Mamelukes and the Ottomans, the Zhaari’te was no longer formally recognised.
The Salafi or Wahhabi sect is largely based in Central Arabia, The Wahhabis are named after a jurist from the area of Najd, who was called Ábd al-Wahhab (1703-1791). During the Ottoman expansion, Wahhab founded a Puritanical sect. While adherents consider themselves as Sunni Muslims, they are rejected by most Sunni and Shi’ia as “a vile sect”. This sect eschews idolatory and practices such as building of shrines. Wahhab became an ally of the House of Saud, and this sect is now headed by the Ibn-Saud dynasty of present Saudi Arabia. (Lewis Bernard, “The Arabs in History”; New York 1966; p. 161).
The other main group within Islam is the Shi’i (Or Shi’ia). In Syria, the ‘Alawis [or ‘followers of ‘Ali] are Shi’i Muslims; as are the Druzes and the Isma’ilis. The Shi’ia in the 8th century, claimed that ‘Ali – the Prophet Mohammed’s cousin and son-in-law – was robbed of his inheritance by the first three Caliphs. The Shi’ites also claim that ‘Ali was of divine status. They are therefore seen as ‘infidels’ by the Sunni Muslims. In Syria, the Alawi were concentrated in the mountainous areas. Previously, they tended to be dominated by the Sunni or the Christian-Maronites. The Sunnis were closely linked to the Turkish rulers of the Ottoman Empire, and oppressed the ‘Alawis and the other minorities. However the French reversed the preferences.” (Seale P: “Assad – The Struggle for the Middle East”; London; 1988; p.17).
The Tottering Ottoman Empire
The Ottoman Empire was an Oriental Despotic state, whose defining feature was the near complete absence of private property in land. Syria was central to it, under the Umayyad Caliphate of Mu’awiya in 661. But as the later Abbassi Dynasty waned in power, the Mameluke Sultans of Egypt, dominated Syria, ruling it as a single unit. When the Ottoman Turks displaced the Egyptian Mamelukes in 1516, the Osmani Sultans became the Caliphs. But as the Western democratic revolutionary winds reached the Middle East, the Ottoman Empire was challenged by Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt. He had already introduced some modern progress and education. As Ibrahim Pasha became emboldened, he wished to invade Constantinople in 1839. But he never invaded, as the ‘Great Powers’ intervened, to ‘prop up the Sick Man of Europe’ (the Sultanate of Constantinople.) Sultan Abdul Hamid occupied the throne 1876 through 1909, the epitome of a repressive monarch.
In 1908, a revolution took place in Ottoman Turkey against the despotic regime of Abdul Hamid II. All progressive forces participated in the 1908 revolution, including part of the armed forces, led by the Committee of Union and Progress. The Committee (including army officer Enver Pasha) unseated the Sultan. Enver Pasha at first was one of a ruling triumvirate, but he increasingly sought sole power. From 1909, the new regime became more repressive, following a series of workers’ strikes and a reactionary Islamist rebellion. The Committee ensured Turkey entered the World War. Enver Pasha allied Turkey with Germany, and bombed Russian Black Sea towns. This led Russia to declare war on Turkey. Later the Committee destroyed Christian communities in Anatolia in 1915-16. Winston Churchill noted that the alliance with Germany made the Allied division of Ottoman territories much easier. However, Allied forces were defeated by Ottoman forces, at Gallipoli, by November 1915.
As imperialists continued to attack the Ottomans, they searched for new allies. A convenient imperialist vehicle was at hand. Zionism, since its inception at the end of the 19th century, was an ideology serving objectively the interests of developed capitalism, of imperialism. It presents workers and petty bourgeois of Jewish descent as members of “a Jewish nation”, as “aliens” in the countries in which they live; it tells them that, to be “free”, they must emigrate to their ancient “national homeland” in Palestine. Thus, the participation of a Zionist worker in the struggles of the working class for a better life, for socialism, can at best be only half-hearted, for he regards himself as an “outsider” whose eyes are directed towards “his own” country, which has now taken concrete shape in the state of Israel. Thus, Zionism is complementary to anti-semitism in its reactionary divisive effect.
The desire of the British imperialists to win the support of the Zionist movement for the Allied war effort in the First World War brought the Balfour Declaration of November 1917. This promised that the British Government would facilitate the setting up of “a National Home for the Jewish People” in Palestine.
The British imperialists were quite unworried that two years earlier, in July 1915, they had allied with Husein Ibn Ali, the Grand Sherif of Mecca (of the Hashemite Dynasty), They achieved this by promising to support the establishment of “an independent Arab state” in Palestine. Husein was to be made Sharif Caliph, and in this move, both religious and temporal power shifted away from Constantinople to Mecca–Arabia. Emboldened, Husein demanded an independent Arab kingdom under his rule, in the Damascus Protocol. Sir Henry McMahon, in the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence, used duplicitous wording suggesting a British commitment towards Palestine. This blithely ignored the 1916 secret treaty British imperialism had made with the French imperialists (The Sykes-Picot Treaty). Under Sykes-Picot, Palestine was to be divided between them. Palestine became “the much promised land”.
To pay off his deal with France, McMahon forced Hussein to relinquish claims on Syria, Lebanon, Basra and Baghdad. This left Husein only Arabia, an offer that he rejected. Palestine was simply placed under an “international” mandate. Meanwhile Hussein “declared” war, leading to the abortive Arab Uprising in June 1916. It did not ignite any reaction, and the Arab tribes largely ignored the call.
The Zionist Seizure of Palestine – the imperialist foot in Arabia
When the First World War was over, the British and French imperialists took over the Arab Near East, disguising their colonial rule under the cloak of “League of Nations Mandates”. As Jewish immigration continued, both legally and illegally into Palestine, Arab national liberation movements grew. This forced the imperialists to adopt new neo-colonial maneuvers of ‘independence’. Iraq was granted “independence” in 1932, Syria and Lebanon in 1941, Jordan in 1946. And in 1947 the British government announced that it was ending its rule over Palestine in May of the following year and was transferring its “responsibilities” there to the United Nations.
The United Nations envisaged the partition of Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab state, with Jerusalem as an independent city. But this scheme was never put into effect. Instead on May 14th, 1948, the Zionists proclaimed most of Palestine “the state of Israel”.
At the time of its formation, the state of Israel contained 1.3 million Arabs and 0.7 million Jews. The Zionists took steps to establish a Jewish majority. As Michael Bar-Zhchar says in his sympathetic biography of the founder of Israel:
“Ben Gurion never believed in the possibility of coexistence with the Arabs. The fewer Arabs within the frontiers of the future state the better… A major offensive against the Arabs would… reduce to a minimum the proportion of the Arab population within the state…. He may be accused of racism, but in that case the whole Zionist movement would have to be put on trial”.
(Bar-Zchar, Michael; “Ben-Gurion: A biography”; London 1979)
Thus, even before the declaration of “independence” Zionist armed gangs had begun a campaign of massacre and terror against the Arab population, driving great numbers of them to seek refuge in the neighbouring Arab states. By 1950 a million Arab refugees from Palestine were officially receiving United Nations aid, and by 1971 2.6 million of the 3.0 million population of Israel were Jews.
The establishment of a Jewish racist state in the heart of, and hostile to, the Arab world – gave world imperialism a valuable bridgehead against the Arab national liberation movement. This Israeli bridgehead depended upon the active support of world imperialism for its very existence.
At first Israel continued to depend upon British imperialism. It was Britain, together with France, which collaborated with Israel in the Suez War of aggression against Egypt, which began in October 1956. But the more powerful US imperialists were unwilling to allow their British and French rivals to extend their influence in the Middle East. The now revisionist and openly social-imperialist USSR agreed with the USA. Together these two compelled the British, French and Israeli forces to withdraw ignominiously from Egyptian territory. But they would of course then, fall out with each other.
Following the 1956 Suez Crisis, in September 1957, Kermit Roosevelt of the CIA was sent to Egypt to warn Nasser not to proceed with an arms agreement with the USSR. After the Suez incident, and the humiliation of the British and French, the USA ensured their own imperialism would dominate. This led to further USA attempts to destabilise Syria. A coup they had sponsored inside Syria had already failed in August (Dilip Hiro; “Inside The Middle East”; London 1982; p.132). So renewed anti-Syrian moves were arranged by the USA imperialists, with Iraqi and Turkish troop amassment on Syria’s borders.
Nasser pre-empted the USA by a public announcement of an impending Russian arms deal. This transformed the Middle East from a pure Western preserve into one contested by the revisionist USSR. From Suez onwards, the Israeli ruling class transferred their dependence from British to US imperialism, which supplied huge quantities of military “aid” to Israel. Correspondingly the USSR started to funnel weapons aid to both Syria and to Egypt. Usually the amounts were far less than the US was sending to Israel.
As a result of this USA military “aid”, in June 1967 Israel was able to launch its war of aggression against Egypt, Syria and Jordan, compelling these states to accept a cease-fire which left Israel in control of large areas of their territory.
Later, in the UN General Assembly, the United States representative defended the Israeli aggression as an action of “self-defence”, but in November 1967 the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution, drafted by Britain, which demanded that Israel withdraw all troops to her former boundaries and bring about a just settlement of the refugee problem. The Council appointed Gunnar Jarring, of Sweden, as UN Special Representative charged with securing the fulfilment of the resolution, but the Israeli government has always refused to carry out its terms.
The French Mandate in Syria
We return to Syria.
As pointed out, at the end of the First World War, Britain and France divided up the Ottoman territories. Sir Mark Sykes a Tory MP, who also chaired the De Bunsen Committee on the Middle East, decreed that five autonomous provinces should be created in the decentralised Ottoman Empire: Syria, Palestine, Armenia, Anatolia and Jazirah-Iraq. Now the United Nations “awarded” the French a Mandate over Syrian and Lebanon. France ‘took’ the North, which became the republics of Syria and Lebanon. Meanwhile in the South, Britain seized Palestine and Transjordan, despite the fact that:
“The inhabitants of the whole region made it clear that they wanted natural Syria to be independent and undivided: In July 1919 an elected body calling itself the Syrian National Congress repudiated the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration and demanded sovereignty status for a united Syria-Palestine”.
(Seale; Ibid; p. 15).
The Communist International made a call to the peasants of Syria to reject the imperialist machinations:
“Peasants of Syria and Arabia! Independence was promised you by the English and the French, but now their armies are occupying your country, now they are dictating their laws to you, while you who freed yourselves from the Turkish Sultan and the Constantinople Government are now the slaves of the Paris and London Governments, who differ from the Sultan’s Government only by being stronger and better able to exploit you”.
(“To The Oppressed Popular Masses Of Persia, Armenia, And
Turkey”; Extracts From An ECCI Appeal On The Forthcoming Congress Of
Eastern Peoples At Baku”; July 1920; In Degras, J: ‘Documents of the Communist International”; p.108);
In the interim, an Arab administration led by Amir Faysal established itself in Damascus. The USA, was still only a nascent force in the Middle East. But wishing to block French imperialism, the USA used the King-Crane Commission to confirm the popular rejection of France. However, Syrian armed struggle was decisively suppressed by French troops under General Geraud at the Battle of Maisaloun. The French now set up a classic colonial state. On the principle of divide and rule, they created new states, and fostered the remaining divisions between people of the former bilad al-Sham – the Ottoman territory of a Greater Syria.
The modern Syria was carved out of the State of Greater Lebanon, by detaching Tyre, Sidon, Beirut and Tripoli, the Baqa’ Valley and the Sh’i region of North Palestine. These were attached to Mount Lebanon – the fief of Maronite compradors of France. In 1921, France pulled back their troops from south and southwestern Anatolia, which included parts of the Ottoman sanjak (or province) of Aleppo. But the important city of Aleppo itself remained part of the French colony of Syria. That was true for Alexandratta (the present day Iskenderun) as well. The French then gave away Alexandratta and its environs to Turkey in 1938. This was a bribe to keep Turkey allied with Britain and France against Nazi Germany.
In further steps, Syria was divided into four parts: These were the mini-states of Damascus, Aleppo, and the “independent” Alawi mountains and the Druze mountains. Finally Northern Syria was colonized and further division fostered by encouraging settling by Christians and Kurds. Of course the purpose of all this sub-division of Syria was to ‘ensure’ French hegemony:
“The French fully understood that Syrian nationalist sentiment would be opposed to their rule. This in effect meant that the Sunnis were their principal antagonists and they thus proceeded to capitalise on the… Christians, their oldest friends, by creating a new state that stripped Tyre, Sidon, Tripoli, the Baaka valley & Beirut itself from Syria and added them to the Ottoman sanjak (administrative district) of Mount Lebanon the very backbone of Maronite Christianity. Syria was cut off from its finest ports and Damascus… was weakened at the expense of Beirut and the new Christian dominated regime”. (Fisk R; “Pity the Nation – The Abduction of Lebanon”; London 1990; p. 62).
Under colonial rule, political parties were suppressed. In 1925 the Peoples Party launched an armed liberation struggle, which was crushed within 2 years. In 1926 a great rebel uprising took place, led by Sultan Pasha el Atrash and the Jabal Druze peasantry. Many of the participants had descendants who took part in the 1960s nationalist movements. The rebellion spread widely, for instance, the Maydan suburb of Damascus (the grain trading area) joined it.
By 1928, a national assembly was allowed to convene, but was then dissolved in 1930.
By 1936, popular protests had compelled the French Government, to enter negotiations with the Syrian nationalists. The Franco-Syrian Treaty of September 1936, called for a Syrian [neo-colonial] ‘independence’ in return for French privilege in trading and military status. The National Bloc (formed in 1928) was elected to power, but the Second World War supervened. The French suspended the 1930 Constitution by the imposition of martial law. The National Bloc was dominated by land-owning compradors. It:
“was not a unitary party so much as a working alliance of individuals and groups. It including leading members of important land-owning families.. like Hashim al-Atasi, the President… individuals…”
(Hourani A.H. “Syria and Lebanon. A Political Essay”; 1968; Beirut; p.191)
It later dissolved into two smaller parties including the National Party (see below).
In 1943, the British pushed Vichy France, to hold elections in Syria. But the National Bloc was again elected. Britain recognised that unless the Syrians were allowed nominal ‘independence’, the whole Middle East was threatened from the perspective of imperialism. The British persuaded the French to adopt neo-colonialism. By April 1946, the French left Syria as an occupying colonial military power. As the ‘History of Colonial France’ puts it:
“The Syrian Affair had ushered in decolonisation at the worst possible time for France. It was under the very powerful menace of the British, and suffering from the injuries inflicted by the Arab League, that they were forced it to abandon its mandate without contradiction.”
(Thobie J, Meynier G, Coquery-Vidrovitch C, Ageron C-R: “Histoire de La France Coloniale 1914-1990”; Paris; 1990; p.360; Tr HK.).
Within the neo-colony, nationalist parties again took initiatives. The first Syrian Parliament was elected by the 1946 elections, was nationalistically inclined. It proceeded to block the so-called TAP line (Trans-Arabian Pipeline). This was a project of the Arabian-American Oil Company (Aramco) to move oil. While Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia all agreed to enable this, Syria refused. This prompted the direct entry of the USA into Syrian politics.
Syria by the time of the French withdrawal in 1946 had been whittled down to 185,190 square kilometers from 300,000 square kilometers in Ottoman times. As shown, open colonialism was replaced by a neo-colonialism. By the time of the 1946 ‘Independence:’
“Political power in Syria .. was controlled by land-owning feudal elites, many of them Sunnis with Turkish roots living in the larger cities, and by an urban elite composed of traditional families, merchants, a few industrialists,
and a small professional class, in addition to tribal chiefs”.
(Azmeh, Shamel; “ Syria’s Passage to Conflict: The End of the “Developmental Rentier Fix” and the Consolidation of New Elite Rule”; Politics & Society; 2016, Vol. 44(4) 499–523).
Classes and Major Parties in Syria Post First World War
At the time of this fragile ‘independence’, Syria was a very weak and poor country. In reality, the class character of Syria after the war, was that of a neo-colony dominated by French and British interests, with major landlord remnants. Several contending parties representing differing classes of society had arisen.
We discuss the class divisions in Syria, and the major parties they formed, before considering the temporal history.
1) The Comprador class and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP), and the Popular Party
The most reactionary class, the main force opposed to the peasantry – were the landowners who made up the bulk of the pro-French imperialist forces in Syria. They formed the comprador capitalist class.
The French created a large comprador class by fostering various sections of the ‘Alawis (eg. The Kinj Brothers; the Abbas family); and in Mount Lebanon from 1860 onwards the Maronite Christians; and other landowners throughout the former bilad al-Sham. The French showed their pro-landlord stance by assisting them to expropriate peasant land.
These compradors were feudal-type latifundia land owners, initially led and represented by the French imperialists. Later they were represented by so-called ‘Pan-Syrian’ nationalists, of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) or Popular Party (Parti Populaire) Syrien). This party was established by Antun Sa’ada. The Pan-Syrians wished that the territory of Syria and Lebanon remain undivided. They had established a management hold over the tobacco growers of the mountains, and had a monopoly with the French tobacco clearing house (regie de tabacs). They were known to be pro-Western and anti-communist. Sa’ada later on, flirted with the German Nazis.
The Popular Party was dissolved by a trial presided over by Colonel Serraj in 1955. It survived in exile in Lebanon. In 1949 Sa’da was executed for sedition by the first Lebanese Prime Minister Riad Al Solh, in concert with King Faroukh of Egypt and British intelligence.
2) The urban Petit bourgeoisie – Muslim Brotherhood or Brethren – (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen).
This reactionary current appealed especially to rural and urban petit-bourgeois traders and artisans, as well as some working-class elements. The Muslim Brotherhood was a trans-national organisation, that had first emerged in 1928. It was formed in Cairo, Egypt, by Hassan al-Banna, where it:
“Emerged partly as a response to the colonialist presence in the country but also to the end of the last Caliphate, the Ottoman Empire”.
(Pargeter A; ‘The Muslim Brotherhood. From Opposition to Power”; London; 2013; p. 8).
The leaders of the Ikhwan tried to operationalize the writings of 19th century ‘reformist’ scholars (Rashid Rida, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, and Muhammed Abdu). Its’ purpose was to overcome colonialism by a return to the “uncorrupted values” of Islamism. By this was meant explicitly a ‘pure’ form of Sunni Islam.
Based in Cairo it was led by the Murshid (Supreme Guide). It appealed to Muslims repelled by colonialism but not advanced enough to be Communists or secular democratic nationalists. It also appealed to the section most marginalised and dispossessed, and can be glimpsed in words by Al-Banna:
“Western civilisation has invaded us by force and with aggression on the level of science and money, of politics and luxury, of pleasures and negligence, and of various aspects of a life that are comfortable, exciting and seductive”.
(Pargeter Ibid; p. 21).
Such Westernisation, said the Ikhwan, was to be combatted by upholding Islamic Sharia Law. The Ikhwan set up a military wing Nizam al-Khass. They had hopes of Gamel Abdul Nasser. But after he came to power in a military coup (1952) in Egypt, he dissolved the Ikwhan in 1954. When they attempted to assassinate Nasser, he severely retaliated, executing 6 members and carrying out mass arrests.
The Syrian branch of the Ikhwan was influenced by the medieval jurist Ibn Taymiyyah – and was intensely anti-‘Alawi (Pargeter Ibid p. 66). It was first set up in 1944 by Mustafa al-Sibai, who became the first Syrian General Guide. His successor was Issam al-Attar, who won parliamentary seats for the Ikwhan in the 1961 elections.
Under the post 1963 Military Ba’athist governments, a steady increase in the influence of the Shi’ite ‘Alawi section of society took hold, coupled with a pro-peasant orientation of the state. The Muslim Brotherhood launched two waves of uprisings. Both were brutally crushed. One of the young militants who attacked the moderate leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood named above, was Marwan Hadid. He took part in both the 1964 Hama Rising and the later 1976 Rising. In the 1964 Hama Uprising, the Ikwhan was not an effective fighting force. When Hama was crushed, Hadid moved to acquire military training with the Palestinian Resistance movement. Upon his return after 1970, he organized for further rebellions.
By the 1979 rebellion led by the Muslim Brotherhood, a division was apparent between several factions. Firstly a moderate wing was rooted in the Damascus faction of Al-Attar. This was supported by the “merchants of the capital who by and large, opposed a policy of violent confrontation with the regime” (Batatu Ibid; p. 263).
An intermediate wing was that of Shakyh “abd-ul-Fattah Abu Ghuddah was based in Aleppo and obtained the international Brethren recognition.
Increasingly these first 2 factions of the Ikwhan, were opposed by the avowedly militant “Fighting Vanguard” formed in 1973, by Marwan Hadid.
Objectively the Brethren represented the urban traders. Many of them were aggrieved later by the Ba’ath moves to favour the peasantry – including setting up of agricultural cooperatives (Pargeter Ibid; p. 77). As Sunni, they built upon an anti-Alawi sentiment of the largely Sunni population, who resented the elevated status under the Ba’ath Party.
3) The Peasantry and the Arab Socialist Party
Syria was predominantly a peasant-based society with a population of about 2 million peasants of a total population of 3.5 million. The peasantry was not a unitary class – it was divided not only by religion and tribal roots, but more fundamentally by relationship to land ownership:
“Syria’s peasants are also differentiable into peasants with more or less strong clan bonds or with clan ties that are in various degrees of decomposition…”
(Batatu, Hanna: “Syria’s peasantry, the Descendants of its lesser Rural Notables and Their Politics”; 1999; Princeton, p.22)
A collective type of farming, known as musha’ had enabled the peasantry to gain a subsistence living. But after the Ottomans adopted a land code in 1858, they drew up a register of individual ownership. The musha’ system was then destroyed, replaced by the seizure of legal titles.
Increasingly, the clan-based divisions in the peasantry was transformed into one between wage labourers and small landowners (Batatu Ibid p.25). This process reflected the growth of machinery in the countryside displacing the share-croppers:
“The musha land, that is, the land collectively owned by the tribe, had been divided up under the impact of the advent of machinised agriculture , the advance of the money system and the profit motive, and the intensifying change from a subsistence to a market-orientated economy”:
(Batatu, Hanna; Ibid; p. 23)
The peasant masses were the most oppressed and their burdens were at the core of the national independence movement. As the Comintern saw it, the ‘agrarian question’ was of ‘primary importance’ in Syria – amongst other ‘eastern countries”:
“In most eastern countries (eg India, Persia, Egypt, Syria, Mesopotamia) the agrarian question is of primary importance in the struggle for emancipation from the yoke of the great Powers’ despotism. By exploiting and ruining the peasant majority of the backward nations, imperialism deprives them of their elementary means of existence. Meanwhile industry, which is only poorly developed and confined to a few centres, is incapable of absorbing the resulting surplus agricultural population, who are also deprived of any opportunity to emigrate. The impoverished peasants remaining on the land become bondsmen. In the advanced countries before the war industrial crises played the part of regulator of social production; in the colonies this part is played by famine. Since imperialism has the strongest interest in getting the largest profits with the least capital outlay, in the backward countries it supports as long as possible the feudal-usurer forms of exploiting labour power. In a few cases, e.g. India, it takes over the native feudal State’s monopoly of the land and turns the land tax into tribute to great Power capital and its servants—the zemindars and taluk-dars; in others it makes sure of its groundrents by acting through the native organizations of the large landowners, e.g. in Persia, Morocco, Egypt, etc. The struggle to free the land from feudal dues and restrictions thus assumes the character of a national liberation struggle against imperialism and the feudal large landowners. Examples of this were provided by the Moplah rising against the feudal landowners and the English in India in the autumn of 1921 and the Sikh rising in1922.
Only the agrarian revolution, whose object is to expropriate the large estates, can set in motion the enormous peasant masses; it is destined to exercise a decisive influence on the struggle against imperialism. The bourgeois nationalists’ fear (in India, Persia, Egypt) of the agrarian watchwords, and their anxiety to prune them down as far as possible, bear witness to the close connexion between the native bourgeoisie and the feudal and feudal-bourgeois landlords, and to the intellectual and political dependence of the former on the latter”;
(Jane Degras: Ibid Volume 1; p. 385-6.
https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/documents/volume1-1919-1922.pdf )
After the First World War, the division was between small landowners and murabi (sharecroppers). But steadily, the peasantry was expropriated and impoverished away from share-croppers (Seale P; Ibid p.45). As share-croppers they had been to obtain at least between 25-75% of the crop they worked, depending upon how much they provided in money for seed, and water. However the French drew up a land register allowing local notables (land-owners) and tribal shayks to seize property by legal title, to build large scale latifundia or farms. This process was accelerated after World War II:
“World War II… brought in large British and French military forces. Their heavy purchase of Syrian grain… decline in imports induced by… war… and heated speculation and inflationary pressures,, produced unusual profits for Syria’s wholesale merchants and land ownership. This new wealth was used to improve cultivation… further the application of industry to agriculture… The carrying out by the state of irrigation projects… also facilitated the growth of cotton. These changes did not redound to the advantage of the sharecroppers… (who) were forced from their huts, thus losing their prescriptive rights of occupancy and the guarantees of subsistence they had enjoyed under the traditional arrangements..”
(Batatu Ibid p. 129)
After the Second World War, it was the ‘mustathmirs’ (“The investor – who.. “merely brings his capital to bear upon production in the form of money and modern machines”); (Batatu Ibid p. 29) – who were:
“The chief vehicle for the progress of capitalism in agriculture… as a rule consists of the larger landowners or leaseholders, particularly in irrigated areas… that is owners or leaseholders of more than 100 hectares”.
(Batatu Ibid p. 31).
The interests of the peasants was represented by the Arab Socialist Party (ASP) of Akram al-Hawrani. This was formed in 1950. Hawrani’s family had always been non-conformists, having had a religious Sufi mystic figure in the 15th century. His father was an Arab nationalist who resented landed notables. Hawrani, a lawyer, first joined the pan-Syrian PPS (parti Populaire Syrien), but left them in 1938. He then organised armed attacks on Zionist settlements in Palestine, but failed to stop expropriation of Arab land. He reflected that the main problem for Arab nationalism was the “feudal” problem, and turned to peasant organising When the party was formed it was immediately flooded with members.
(Batatu Ibid p.128).
4) The National capitalist class
Opposing the forces who wanted to retain ties to Western imperialists were the national bourgeoisie. However, they were weak, and remained so, even right up till the period of 1980s.
Nonetheless by the Second World War and immediately after, a small industrialist class, and its corollary a weak working class – had arisen in cotton and rayon cloth, soap, cement, glass, and matches. The weak national bourgeoisie had thrown up the National Party. After 1947 and formal national independence, the national bourgeoisie began to expand rapidly. Their roots lay in the large landowners in the rural areas. With the Agrarian reforms of 1958 and later, they began to transform themselves into capitalists:
“When Syria gained its independence in 1946, it was taken for granted that the country’s economy would be based on private enterprise. The leading politicians in the independence period were pioneers of a rising bourgeois, which since the 1930s had taken the lead in establishing a relatively modern industrial base for Syria’s postcolonial economy… new agricultural entrepreneurs bought or rented land and extended cotton and grain production .. of the big landowners began introducing modern agricultural production… and new industrial and commercial companies and establishments sprang up. The leading figures of this new entrepreneurial stratum which was to become known as the “national bourgeoisie,” came mostly from the old landowning class whose wealth enabled those of its educated sons who wished to overcome the traditional parasitic life of absentee landlords and invest in modern agriculture and industry to do so. so. They were joined by a great number of craftsmen and less wealthy manufacturers and merchants who had benefited from the extraordinary foreign-exchange earnings resulting from the expenditures made by allied troops stationed in Syria during and after World War II, and, later, from the Korean War boom, during which Syrian cotton found a growing demand in foreign markets. Businessmen were thus able to import machinery and to set up or enlarge and develop industrial plants and workshops…. The state took several measures, for example, to encourage and support industrial investments and to protect them against foreign competition, such as tax exemptions for new industries, protective tariffs, government control over foreign trade, and infrastructural investments by the state or by state-private joint ventures such as the Lattakia Port Company”;
(Perthes, Volker; “The Syrian Private Industrial and Commercial Sectors and the State”; International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2 (May, 1992), pp. 207- 230).
But the fortunes of the weak national bourgeoisie went up and down. Throughout the period of the United Arab Republic (UAR) and Assad’s accession to full power in 1970, the national bourgeoisie took major blows, as discussed below. In fact the national bourgeoisie needed state help to develop into an adequately funded class to develop industry. They received this from the Ba’ath Party in its’ second and third forms:
“The Syrian national bourgeoisie was removed from political power with the Syrian-Egyptian Union of 1958. It regained it with Syria’s secession from the union in September 1961, and was removed again when the Ba’ath took power in March 1963. Economically, some elements of the bourgeoisie received three
blows. Their first with the land reform of 1958, their second with Abdel Nasser’s nationalization measures of July 1961, which in Syria comprised the complete nationalization of all banks and insurance companies and three industrial firms and the partial nationalization of twenty-four others. Abdel Nasser’s turn to “socialism” and nationalizations might not have been the only reason, but was surely one of the reasons, leading to the secessionist coup two months later. After the coup most of the nationalization orders were lifted. The third blow for the national bourgeoisie came with the wide-ranging nationalizations of the Ba’athist government in 1964 and 1965. …. the Ba’ath’s argument was, and is, that in principle these nationalizations were necessary, because the national bourgeoisie was unable to provide the foundations for future independent development. In fact, private resources were limited and state involvement was necessary to secure a national development perspective”.
(Perthes, Volker; “The Syrian Private Industrial and Commercial Sectors and the State”; International Journal of Middle East Studies, 05/1992, Volume 24, Issue 2; pp. 207-230).
5) The Working class and the Communist Party
There was a small Syrian working class, which was based mainly in Damascus and Aleppo. It was initially led and represented by the Communist Party Syria and Lebanon (founded October 1924, which was admitted to the Comintern in 1928. After Syrian territory was divided into Syria and Lebanon, the two parties formed separate organisations in 1930, leaving in Syria the Syrian Communist Party (SCP).
The Syrian Communist Party was founded by Yusuf Ibrahim Yazbak, from the paper (al-Sahafi al-T’eh or ‘The Wandering Journalist’). Fouad al-Shamli, had formed the Lebanese Communist party. The two groups united to form the first Arab communist party in 1924.
They contacted the Comintern, who sent Joseph Berger of the Palestine Communist Party (PCP) an almost exclusively Jewish organisation, established in 1923, but a member of the Communist International (Degras J: Volume 2; p. 95). Berger was assigned the responsibility of “setting up the Lebanese CP”, but insisted upon a PCP hegemony (Tareq Ismael and Jacqueline Ismael: “The Communist Movement in Syria And Lebanon”; Gainsville Florida, 1998; p. 8I).
However, the PCP aspirations were soon curtailed by the Secretariat for Oriental Affairs of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, which in December 1926:
“censured” the Palestinian communists for their “ambitious demand to monopolize work in contiguous countries” and considered it to be a malady, harmful for the further expansion of communist influence in the region.”
(Ismael and Ismael; Ibid; p. 8).
The party put forward a short term programme including labour demands, and “promotion of Lebanese industry agriculture and trade” and nationalisation; and control of religious endowments by public agencies (Ismaels Ibid; p. 10-11).
In 1925, an Armenian organisation (Spartacus League) initiated contacts with the PCP, and they fused on May Day to form the Communist Party of Syria and Lebanon (CPSL). The first Central Committee also included a representative of the Palestine CP – Jacob Tepper (Heikal M; “The Sphinx and the Commissar”; New York; 1978; p. 41). The CPSL took part in the 6th Congress of the Communist International in September 1928.
During the French mandate, the Syrian CP (SCP) functioned legally, though it was harassed, including banning of its paper – al-Insaniya (Mankind – or Humanity). At the time of the partition of Greater Syria, the CP of Syria and Lebanon (CPSL) strongly objected. In 1930, it emerged from secrecy to become public (Ismaels Ibid; p.17). Its first full programme was published in 1931.
The programme called for the national liberation of Syria and Lebanon and a democratic revolution to include land reform and abolition of feudalism. However, its programme even at the beginning, was strongly influenced by an Arab Nationalist position. It did not adopt an unequivocal and explicit communist position. Yet it did initially serve the interests of the working class. Steadily as its’ revisionist role became more overt, it became more obviously subservient to the national bourgeoisie.
Khalid Bakdash became the party Secretary-general in early 1932. The Comintern rejected the formation of a federation of Arab communist parties, on the grounds of security. However the CPCL was accorded in effect the guardianship of the region. Under Bakdash, the Party adopted several incorrect, or openly revisionist steps over the ensuing years. Moreover over the next years his leadership was marked by major swings in policy, and a general refusal of principled debate or criticism.
In fact it never went beyond the demands of nationalism:
“the party never went beyond the rightist positions of support for the national bourgeoisie, as is borne out by a programe which speaks only of independence and social justice, without daring to propose an agrarian reform. For fear of alienating the bourgeoisie”.
(Amin, Samir: “The Arab Nation. Nationalism and class struggles”; London; 1983; p.46).
“In the last analysis it is thus Arab communism, in its weaknesses which is responsible for petty bourgeois hegemony.”
(Amin, S; ibid; pp. 85-6).
By 1942 Bakdash was making goodwill moves towards the landlords:
“We assure the owners of the land, that we do not and shall not demand the confiscation of their poverty.. All that we ask is kindness toward the peasant and the alleviation of his misery”. The rationalization… involved the premise that Syria was still in “the stage of national liberation”…. The new line was ill received by communists in the provincial party organisations who knew about rural problem at first hand”.
(Batatu, Hanna: “Syria’s peasantry, the Descendants of its lesser Rural Notables and Their Politics”; 1999; Princeton; p. 119).
In 1943, Bakdash assisted the French colonists, by weakening the party. It did this by splitting the party into separate organisations for Syria and for Lebanon. It argued that the:
“national movement in Lebanon was less developed than in Syria”, and that “democracy is more deeply rooted in Lebanon than in Syrian, where the feudal landlords still continue to rule.”
(Ismaels Ibid; p.35).
The CPSL supported the Leon Blum Popular Front government in France, and hoped it would lead to the independence of Syria. During this time, the first legal organ of the Syrian CP (SCP) was formed – Sawt-al-Sha’b (People’s voice). However the SCP remained small, in the range of 200 members, rising to 2000 by 1939. In the mid-1930’s an internal purge was undertaken of those calling for collaboration with Arab Nationalists (Ramet, Pedro: “The Soviet Syrian Relationship Since 1955 – A Troubled Alliance”; Boulder; 1990; p.65).
When German fascists invaded the USSR, the CPSL correctly came to the aid of the Allied efforts against fascism. During the war, significant steps towards downplaying the revolution were taken. In the elections of August 1943, the CPSL declared:
“We assure the national capitalist, the national factory owner, that we do not look with envy or malice on his national enterprise. On the contrary, we desire his progress and vigorous growth. All that we ask is the improvement of the conditions of the national worker. We assure the owner of land that we do not and shall not demand the confiscation of his property… All that we ask is kindness towards the peasant and the alleviation of his misery.”
(Ismaels Ibid; p. 32).
While it was correct to fight for a national democratic revolution – such promises went too far – and violated a principled united front. Similarly, Bakdash was prepared to accept the leadership of the National Bloc. Bakdash went so far as to state that the CPSL was:
“Above all, and before every consideration, a party of national liberation, a party of freedom and independence.”
(Ismaels Ibid; p. 33).
He completely negated the leading role of the admittedly small, proletarian elements:
“What is new in this process (ed-of the non-capitalist path’) is that the transition from the national to social emancipation began before leadership of the movement passed into the hands of the working class In fact it is still led by non-proletarian elements.”
(Cited Ramet Ibid; p. 50).
Furthermore he traced the attraction of the party to the USSR, in a nationalist perspective:
“We approach this [issue of relation with the USSR] as patriots and as Arabs… not because the Soviet Union has a particular social system”; (Ismaels Ibid; p. 33).
Over the next years Bakdash and the party continued to vacillate dramatically on the role of the CP in the national democratic and socialist revolutions (See Alliance 51). Clearly, this could have been only either due to a failure of understanding or a rank sabotage. At best, it can be concluded that quite early on, Bakdash was a representative of the national bourgeoisie.
In the post-Independence year of 1947 – the new Syrian government again banned the CP – the two sections of Lebanon and Syria amalgamated again, up to 1958.
From its inception, the Syrian CP had been anti-Zionist. However, the hidden revisionists dominated the diplomatic corps of the USSR. Consequently, the USSR voted at the United Nations for the creation of Israel. This led the Syrian CP to reverse itself (See Alliance 30). As a result of this the Syrian party rapidly lost public support, and membership sank from near 35,000 in both Syria and Lebanon to “several hundreds” (Ismaels Ibid; p.39; Batatu Ibid p.120). Bakdash refused any criticism of this position within the party, which was purged. At the Central Committee meeting of 1951, he reasserted control.
By 1951, Bakdash had swung again, and was now calling for the break-up of the big landowner estates. Yet in 1958 he did not support the Agrarian Reform Law, bizarrely arguing that “it supported the Egyptian upper bourgeoisie” (Batatu Ibid p.121).
In the 1954 general election, in Damascus Khalid Bakdash became the first Communist deputy to be elected, his margin was 11,000 votes. (Mohamed Heikal “The Sphinx and the Commissar – The Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Middle East “; New York; 1978; p. 48).
At the same 1954 elections, the Arab Ba’ath Party also won several seats, and were cooperating with the Syrian CP in the control of the streets (Hiro Ibid; p. 131).
The correct Marxist-Leninist policy for the Syrian CP, would have been to move from the first stage towards the second stage of the National democratic liberation struggle – for socialism. Yet one year after, after the USSR 1956 20th Party Congress, Bakdash again steered the party towards purely national goals rather than a stage to the socialist revolution.
Despite its weak understanding and implementation of the revolutionary process, by 1957, the Syrian party was one of the strongest in the Middle East. At the same time, the alliance with the Ba’ath party, was stronger than ever (Mohammed Heikal; Ibid; p.76-78).
6) The Ba’ath Party – primarily a peasant party until 1970
Ba’ath means “re-birth”, meaning the renaissance of the Arab movement.
This Party would wield decisive power in Syria during the late 20th and early 21st century, but it took a complex path. This went through several ‘re-births’ of its own.
Batatu explains that there were in reality, three distinct Ba’ath Parties, though sharing the same name and history. Indeed they also served the interests of the same class by and large, the peasantry. Importantly however, support of the Ba’ath moved at an early stage, from the strata of poor peasantry to the rich peasant or landed peasantry or rural notables. The Ba’ath also served the urban traders as a secondary class role.
The three forms taken by the Ba’ath are described by Batatu:
“In the modern history of Syria, Ba’athism has not been one force acting in a single direction.. but a mantle for ,,, three Ba’ath parties, which thought interlinked in a complex way, have been quite distinct in their social base.. and the interests served.
The earliest Ba’ath formed its first executive bureau in 1945. … The party came to the political foreground. Only after its merger in 1952 with the Arab Socialists. By 1958, with the creation of the short-lived United Arab Republic, its role had been played out.. it was reduced to insignificance.. in 1966. The Ba’ath that succeeded it was in essence a transitional formation and received its impulse from the secret Military Committee that took place in Cairo in 1959. It did not outlive the ‘corrective” coup of 1970 (Ed of Hafiz Assad) but many of its followers were coopted into the new Ba’ath.. to the retrospective eye, the old Ba’ath, at least in its first decade, was powerfully moved by ideals,,,, For the new Ba’athists, pan-Arabism has never been at bottom a live issue .”
(Batatu; Ibid p,133).
Originally in 1943, the Arab Ba’ath Party (or Baath), was secretly created out of two small groups. The legal establishment of the Ba’ath Party in Syria came only in 1947, after the French military departure in 1946.
At the time of formation, the party was created in order to weld a party for Arab nationalism, that avoided Marxism-Leninism. A completely reactionary Islamism – a mystical Pan-Arabism was invoked. This appealed to the petit bourgeoisie, and the traders. It was led by Damascenes Michel ‘Aflaq, Salh al-Din Bitar and Midhat al-Bitar, and Jalal as-Sayyid from the nearby trading center Dayr az-Zur. They were all either sons of the urban small traders and merchants or traders themselves:
“Born to wholesale grain dealers (bawaykiyyah) in the outlying Damascus quarter of al-Maydan, the chief center for the grain trade of Southern Syria… the world of merchants. From the standpoint of this class, the fragmentation after 1917 of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire constituted an abiding hindrance to the old trade channels and the free flow of commerce. It members resented being confined within narrow borders and favoured large and expanding markets, unhindered by tariffs and custom duties or by a multiplicity of economic rules and regulations. In brief, to no other element of the population was a pan-Arab horizon more natural, .. scions of some of the mercantile families who were or had been involved in long-distance trade.. gravitated towards the Ba’ath Party in the 1940s, when it had not yet shifted to a pronounced ‘leftist’ orientation.”
(Batatu Ibid; p.134)
“urban bawaykiyyah – or whole sale grain dealers.. that fostered receptivity not only of the urban intelligentsia but also of the mercantile class, to whom the break-up after 1917 of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire entailed a grave impediment to the free flow of native commerce.”
(Batatu Ibid; p.325.)
These leaders were intellectuals, mostly educated in Paris. But they repudiated Marxism, and were explicitly anti-communist. The Ba’ath movement adhered to a religious interpretation dominated by the Sunni sect. This alienated some non-Sunni Muslim Arabs. However the Ba’ath ideology was supposed to be secular and based itself on all Arabs irrespective of sect of Islam, or even of Islam itself.
‘Aflaq viewed Ba’ath nationalism as comprising ‘Unity, Freedom, Socialism’ (Seale Ibid p.31). Shortly afterwards, the ‘Alawi dominated Arab Nationalist Party (formed 1939 by Zaki al- Arsuzi) merged into the Ba’th, brought over by Wahib al-Ghanem. At this stage the active members were largely urban intelligentsia, and a predominance of schoolteachers and physicians, bringing them a large student base.
The Ba’ath Party intended to embrace all Arab countries, not just Syria. In the first pan-Arab Congress of 1947, the programme called for land reform and nationalisation of major parts of the economy, and a constitutional democracy:
“In Damascus… delegates from Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Transjordan, and Morocco adopted a constitution and a programme. The party’s basic principles were described as: the unity and freedom of the Arab nation within its homeland; and a belief in the ‘special mission of the Arab nation’, the mission being to end colonialism and promote humanitarianism. To accomplish it the party had to be ‘nationalist, populist, socialist and revolutionary’. While the party rejected the concept of class conflict, it favoured land reform; public ownership of natural resources, transport, and large-scale industry and financial institutions; trade unions of workers and peasants; the cooption of workers into management, and acceptance of ‘non-exploitative private ownership and inheritance’.” It stood for a representative and constitutional form of government, and for freedom of speech and association, within the bounds of Arab nationalism.”
(Hiro; Ibid; p. 130).
As the Ba’ath Party appeal was mainly to sections of the urban petit-bourgeois, the mass peasant base of the Arab Socialist Party was attractive. As it shifted to embrace the peasantry, it lost some of the appeal to the traders (Batatu Ibid p.134). Nonetheless it adopted a peasant orientation.
The two parties fused, forming the Arab Socialist Ba’ath party (ASBP) in 1953. Its’ leaders, were Michel ‘Aflaq, Salh al-Din Bitar, and Akram al-Hawrani. The Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party restated the Ba’ath’s founding aims, stressing ‘socialism’ more prominently:
“Drawn together by their opposition to the dictatorial regime of Colonel Adib Shishkali, the leaders of the Baath and the ASP decided in September 1953 to form the Arab Baath Socialist Party… The new party re-stressed the Baath’s central slogan: ‘Freedom, unity, socialism’.”
(Hiro, Ibid p.131)
This combined party therefore, now represented both the rural peasantry, and the urban petit bourgeoisie (white-collar urban workers school-teachers, government employees, large sections of the army and the air force). Initially the section of peasantry the Ba’ath most appealed to was the poorest and smallest peasants, By the 1960’s the Arab Baath Socialist Party:
“Accorded from the outset a high priority to peasants and their concerns. They markedly raised the share of the produce due to the landless underclass, reduced further the permissible size of private landholdings, speed up the redistribution of the land expropriated under agrarian reform laws and freed peasant beneficiaries from ¾ of the price and the land.. they also intensified the organising drive among the peasants… (giving) peasant unions in more than 1,500 villages… Until 1967, the… Ba’ath rested uneasily on an uneasy alliance within the armed forces between varying groups that shared similar rural roots..”
(Batatu Ibid; pp. 325.)
The Arab Baath Socialist Party retained a mystical Pan-Arabic vision, as illustrated by their Constitution:
“The Arab nation constitutes a cultural unity. Any differences existing among its sons are accidental and unimportant. They will disappear with the awakening of the Arab consciousness … The national bond will be the only bond existing in the Arab state. It ensures harmony among the citizens by melting them in the crucible of a single nation, and combats all other forms of factional solidarity such as religious, sectarian, tribal, racial and regional factionalism.”
(Bashir al-Da’uq ed; Nidal al-Ba’ath; Volume 1; Beirut 1970; pp172-6; Cited by: Van Dam Ibid; p. 15).
What did “socialism” mean for the Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party? It was a very vague and imprecise ideology:
“Socialism, which comes last in the Baath trinity, is less a set of socio-economic principles than a rather vague means of national moral improvement. . . . All they [Ba’athist leaders] said was that socialism was a means of abolishing poverty, ignorance, and disease, and achieving progress towards an advanced industrial society capable of dealing on equal terms with other nations.”
(Hiro Ibid; p.131).
As the Ba’ath acquired a mass peasant base (primarily appealing to the small peasantry at this stage), initially large sections of urban traders were alienated. In the 1954 elections following Shishakali’s fall, the Ba’ath gained a parliamentary base. Only very much later, well after Assad’s accession to power in 1979, would sections of the urban merchants again cautiously follow the Ba’ath. However an especial appeal of the Ba’ath was to army personnel:
“In Syria, the party drew its initial support either from the urban Sunni (Muslim) and Orthodox (Christian) petty bourgeoisie, or the rural notables, particularly those in the Alawi and Druze areas of Latakia. ‘The party’s social base remained the petit bourgeoisie of the cities, and in the countryside middle landlords with local social prestige,’ notes Tabitha Petran. ‘However, the Ba’ath did not develop much in the cities. Most of the Sunni petit bourgeoisie, even in Damascus, was influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood and later also by President Nasser. But the Ba’ath won a following among students and military cadets: future intellectuals and army officers.”
(Dilip Hiro; Ibid; p. 130).
In fact with the ‘leftist’ orientation of the Ba’ath, the enemies of the Ba’ath were:
“Merchants, landowners, and city notables”;
(Seale Ibid; p. 60).
But the party was hijacked after the episode of the United Arab Republic (See below), in the militarist period. The Ba’ath initially enabled small peasants to regain a measure of control and their own land. But this proved insufficiently large to obtain a subsistence living.
Ultimately the Ba’ath apparatus came to increasingly support the entry of capitalist relations into the countryside. The Ba’ath now helped mainly the rich peasantry. Through to 1956, reforms benefiting this class layer took place, under the influence of the Ba’ath. This continued right up to the period of the 1960s, under the Militarist Ba’ath governments (described below):
“The abolition of the tribal law by the state in 1956 and the implementation of the Agrarian Reform Law of 1958 and the related decrees of 1963-1964 undermined the power of the wealthy shaykhs, and led after 1966 to the demise of their political influence, at least at the national level. The same measures contributed to a further weakening of tribal bonds. The division of property also decreased the cohesion of the extended family”.
(Batatu Ibid p.23).
By 1970-1971, class relations in the countryside had been thoroughly capitalised:
“Even though the number of landowners increased from an estimated 292,273 in 1958 to 468,539 in 1970-1971, that is by more than 60%, the emerging tenurial systems continued to reveal glaring inequities. .. Owners of fewer than 10 hectares.. formed 75.4 % of all landowners in 1970-71 but had title to only 23.5% of the total area of private fully owned agricultural land. Land under lease was even more unevenly distributed: 1.9% of all leaseholders controlled 35.5% of all land held by lease.. After 1970 the fortunes of the capitalised middle size and large farmers and mustathmirs waxed, even as the position of the small-scale land owning peasants became less secure. … Agricultural employers increased form 25,850 in 1972 to 49,690 in 1984, and 137,004 in 1989, but dropped slightly to 131,282 in 1991. The reasons are fairly clear. By dint of their possession of money, agricultural capitalists were before 1958 and have been since 1970 more able that any other class to make efficient use of artificial manures and modern machinery, extract form their land greater produce with less labour and at a smaller cost…. The mustathmirs and the middling and rich landed peasants have improved their holdings, or purchased more machines… gained control of small peasant lands that have been thrown together and exploited along capitalist lines… Their increasing weight after 1970,.. accords with the interests of powerful elements in the state apparatus””.
(Batatu Ibid; p.35; 37).
Having now described the class contours and the parties in those contours, we can describe how the class struggle played out in temporal history.
Military Dictatorship: The CIA led coup to the “Rule of the Colonels 1949-1954”
Between 1946 to 1956, there were a total of 20 cabinets and 4 separate constitutions (Wikepedia 2017).
The first independent government of 1946, as we saw, had blocked the TAP line. This led to a CIA sponsored coup, which was carefully incubated by Miles Copeland Jr. It signaled a switch of neocolonial masters – from France to the USA. Opposition was shut down by a military coup led by Colonel Husni al-Za’im in March 1949. It came after the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948 in which the Syrian army was defeated. After the coup, Za’im resumed peace talks with Israel and signed the Syro-Israeli Armistice and pledged to resettle Palestinians. Conveniently for his paymasters, he now ratified TAPline. His brutal regime banned the Communist Party (See below) and jailed dissidents. He was succeeded within months by Colonel Sami al-Hinnawi in August, who also did not last long. However his successor Colonel Adib al-Shisakli – lasted till 1954. He launched an incomplete land reform.
But a growing United Front for reforms developed. It held a large United Front meeting at Homs in July 1953. Here the National Party, the People’s Party, the Arab-Socialist party, the Ba’ath party and the Communist Party signed a National Pact to overthrow the Shishakli dictatorship. In 1954, after continued unrest, Shisakli was overthrown by a further military coup. At this time, parliamentary democracy was restored.
The ensuing poll in September 1954 was the first in the Middle East undertaken with full women’s suffrage, and was generally ‘free’. At this election, the Ba’ath won 22 of 142 seats. The Communist Party of Syria, saw its first Arab Communist to be elected to parliament in the Middle East – Khalid Bakdash (See below). The Ba’ath extended their power, helped by the head of Security, Lt. Colonel Serraj, who had joined the Ba’ath. The Popular Party who had won 28 seats, were suppressed by Serraj.
Ba’ath Invites Nasser to a Union of Egypt and Syria
After the fall of Shishkali, the 1954 free election discussed above, resulted in several parties winning seats. But as seen, the Ba’ath allies controlled the Security forces.Over the next years the Ba’ath came to struggle for the same social class base as the Communists, who became their main rivals.
Shortly after the election, a member of the SSNP or Popular Party, assassinated Ba’athist Colonel Adnan al-Malki. Upon this trigger pretext, the Ba’ath launched a purge to eliminate the SSNP.
Since the political programmes of the Syrian CP and the Ba’ath agreed upon Syrian nationalism, they now entered a united front. By this time also, several barter agreements were made between the USSR and Syria, and in 1956 an arms deal was signed. The Syrian CP now also held positions in the army, rivaling the Ba’ath army followers.
Inevitably, as the Ba’ath domination became threatened, an intense struggle developed:
“By the end of 1957, they (the Syrian CP) threatened Baathist domination of the radical alliance. Moderates in Syria and abroad feared an imminent Communist takeover. The Baathists became alarmed when a new radical party was formed to counter their influence and to cooperate with the Communists. The last months of 1957 saw a fierce behind-the-scenes struggle for supremacy within the radical camp”.
(Thomas Collelo, ed. Syria: A Country Study. Washington: US Government Publishing Office for the Library of Congress, 1987. At: http://countrystudies.us/syria/13.htm)
This struggle with the communists inspired the Ba’athist search for new allies. In addition, the Syrian Ba’athists were feeling threatened by the USA imperialists and Israel. Their gaze was drawn to Egypt. When Gamel Abdul Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company, in July 1956 against the British and French interests, he won the respect of all Arab nationalists. The Syrian Ba’athists were among Nasser’s admirers.
Accordingly, the Ba’athist Party initiated a Union with Egypt. They pressed for an immediate union, to be called the United Arab Republic (UAR):
“Fearing that without Nasser’s weight they would be out-manouevred by the Communists, who were then enjoying a moment of unprecedented popularity because of Soviet arms deliveries to Syria and promises of economic aid.”
(Seale Ibid p. 54).
“The SCP weakened the Ba’ath Party to such an extent that in December 1957, the Ba’ath Party drafted a bill calling for a union with Egypt, a move that was very popular. The union between Egypt and Syria went ahead and the United Arab Republic (UAR) was created, and the Ba’ath Party was banned in the UAR because of Nasser’s hostility to parties other than his own. The Ba’ath leadership dissolved the party in 1958, gambling that the legalization against certain parties would hurt the SCP more than it would the Ba’ath.”
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_Socialist_Ba’ath_Party_–_Syria_Region)
Nasserism was a specific form of Pan-Arabism, named for Nasser. Starting in the context of a nationalist movement in Egypt alone, Nasser struck a renewed hope for liberation from imperialism throughout large sections of the Middle East. Nasserism used instead of Ba’ath – the notion of Wahda – to mean ultimately the same. Wahda (Arabic for union – and the name of Nasser’s nationalist movement) was to be a renewal of Arabic “culture”, under the twentieth-century guise of nationalism. It was a strategy of the national bourgeoisie, similar to that of the Ba’ath. Both aimed to contain the mass movement, emphasising the ‘Arab peoples’, at the expense of class content.
Revisionism in the parties of the entire Middle East had by 1956 deprived the working class of capable genuine leadership. Nasserism was only able to consolidate itself because the Egyptian Workers Party, the Communist Party, was itself under the influence of the now Soviet-revisionist leaders.
Despite their strong statements, the weakness of the Middle Eastern individual state’s national bourgeoisie was palpable. Accordingly, Wahda called for unity of several different struggling national bourgeoisies against imperialism. It hoped to avoid the social revolution, by using nationalistic demagogic slogans. Effectively a United Front of all the national bourgeoisies, was supposed to lead a class coalition including the working classes and peasantry of the different countries.
It was hoped, this would enable the singly weak national bourgeoisie, together to be strong enough to fight imperialism, and yet able to contain the social revolution. Until the Ba’athist request, Nasser had been primarily thinking in a limited fashion, of a cross-national solidarity (Seale P Ibid p.54). But the Syrian overture appealed to him.
Ultimately Pan-Arabism in the forms of Ba’athism and Wahda, failed. The main reason was the power of the single dominant Egyptian national bourgeoisie, which itself tried to suppress, or create “comprador” relations with the other weaker national bourgeoisie. The possibility of Egypt and Syrian unity was started in 1955. This created the United Arab Republic, consisting of Egypt and Syria. However the dominant Egyptian bourgeoisie, could not entirely suppress the Syrian national bourgeoisie of the coalition.
The Syrian CP reneges on the second stage of the National Democratic Revolution as the Ba’ath call for Nasser’s help to defeat communism
From the beginning the Syrian SP had always tended to an Arab nationalist – rather than a communist position. Communists had been poised to likely gain control of the leading positions in the coalition government with the Ba’athists. But when the Ba’athist leaders called for Union with Egypt – they were in reality seeking Nasser’s aid in fighting off the communists. The Syrian CP had a choice.
A situation analogous to the Shanghai massacre of the peasants and workers during the 1928 Chinese Revolution, was in the making. (See Alliance Notes on “Stalin & the 1928 Chinese Revolution“). Stalin had repeatedly urged the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), through 1926 and early 1927 to break the bloc with the right KMT and move to a militant revolutionary struggle. The CCP did not heed this. Stalin’s assessment was the “independence of the CP must be the chief slogan”:
“The victory of the revolution cannot be achieved unless this bloc is smashed, but in order to smash this bloc, fire must be concentrated on the compromising national bourgeoisie, its treachery exposed, the toiling masses freed from its influence, and the conditions necessary of the hegemony of the proletariat systematically prepared… The independence of the Communist Party must be, the chief slogan of the advanced communist elements, of the hegemony of the proletariat can be prepared and brought about by the Communist party. But the communist party can and must enter into an open bloc with the revolutionary part of the bourgeoisie in order, after isolating the compromising national bourgeoisie, to lead the vast masses of the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie in the struggle against imperialism.”
(J.V.Stalin “Stalin’s Letters to Molotov”; Edited Lars T.Lih; Oleg V. Naumov; and Oleg V. Khlevniuk; Yale 1995; p.318-9.” at: Stalin & China)
The situation of the Syrian Ba’ath and the Syrian CP – was similar. The Ba’ath were preparing to renege, and the Syrian CP were aware of this. Yet the Syrian CP refused to take the struggle forward, instead they tried to preserve the united front.
This was especially astonishing, since it was already well known that Nasser had brutally suppressed Egyptian communists.
The Syrian army strongly supported the offer to Nasser, made by the Ba’ath leadership. But the Syrian CP refused to go beyond their “national front”. The Syrian CP refused to launch the second stage of the national democratic revolution. They were therefore faced with the Ba’athist and Nasser-ite embrace. Now in an extraordinary reversal, the Syrian CP rather than oppose Nasser, abandoned their prior insistence on a loose federal formula with Egypt. They now outdid the Ba’ath, and insisted on a “total union” with Egypt (Ismaels; Ibid; p. 50). Belatedly they had again changed tack, but it was now too late.
Nasser seized the invitation to form the disastrous (For Syrian workers and peasants, and national bourgeoisie) United Arab Republic (UAR) in February 1958. This was the formal amalgamation of Syria and Egypt, and represented an expansionist phase of Egyptian national capital.
After the UAR was formed, the Arab Socialist Ba’ath party was completely dissolved by its leaders on Nasser’s insistence. (Seale Ibid; p. 60). Naturally, the first target were the Communists, who were duly purged when the Syrian CP refused to dissolve. The Egyptian suppression extended, and both Ba’athists and communists were targeted. Syria’s government lead was transferred to Nasser’s aide, Marshall ‘Amer (Seale Ibid; p. 59).
In Iraq, related contemporary developments saw General Abdul Karim Qassem, toppling the Iraqi monarchist regime. Qassem was supported by the USSR military. Nasser tried to entice Qassem into the UAR also. However Iraq, was effectively now a client state of the USSR. The military dictator Qassem turned instead, to the Iraqi CP, and refused Nasser’s offer to join in the UAR. Correspondingly, Nasser sponsored a rebellion of Iraqi nationalist officers, which was resisted by the Iraqi Communist Party and defeated. Later on, in 1963, Qassem was deposed by the Iraqi Ba’ath Party coup. In the short term, Syria, the situation became worse for Syrian communists, as the Syrian CP openly supported Qassem
The Reversal of the UAR Union with Egypt and the Rise of the ‘Military Committee’
It was not only the Syrian communists who found the Egyptian domination in the UAR intolerable. The Ba’ath had been forced by Amer and Nasser, to dissolve themselves in a Congress in August 1959. But in 1960 this was reversed, by the newly secretly formed “Military Committee”, whose undercover envoys took part in the new congress. Considerable confusion reigned within the Ba’ath party, as discussed below..
Meanwhile, still in 1961, Nasser promulgated wide sweeping nationalisation measures in the UAR. This would have amounted to an Egyptian expropriation of native Syrian capital. So blatant was the demand, that right wing Syrian nationalists in the army (Lieut Col ‘Abd al-Karim Nahawi), launched a new coup. The coup was strongly supported by Jordan and Saudi Arabia, fearful of growing Egyptian power. Of course Syrian national capitalists supported this also:
“Jordan and Saudi Arabia and by Syria’s disgruntled business community”:
(Seale Ibid p. 67).
This coup now once again separated the states of Egypt and Syria.
Because the key Ba’ath leading politicians (‘Aflaq and Bitar and Hawrani), had initiated and supported the Union with Egypt, they were now discredited. This was sealed by a new condemnation of the UAR, signed by Akram al-Hawarani and Salah al-Din Bitar. This 180-degree turn from their prior support for the UAR, viewed as hypocritical. But a vacuum developed as these previous leaders were disgraced.
Into the vacuum, other non-Ba’ath nationalists took control of the state, led by Dr Ma’ruf al-Dawalibi, then Dr. Bashir al-‘Azmah, and finally, Khalid al-‘Azm (Seale Ibid p. 72). On 1 December 1961, new elections brought Nazim al-Qudsi to the presidency.
But there were by now many wings of Ba’ath discontents. Some Ba’ath discontents in the army, had as discussed above, secretly formed a “Military Committee”. Initially, this was composed of 5 (Captain Hafiz Assad, Lieut.Colonel Muhammed ‘Umran, Captain ‘Abd al-Karim al-Jundi, Major Mir, and Major Salah Jadid). Importantly, all came from national minorities: three were ‘Alawai Shi’is and two were Isma’ili Shi’is. Moreover they were all originated from the class of middle or lesser notables, but were not from small or landless peasantry or share-croppers.
The ‘Military Committee’ was collectively antagonistic to the political wing of the Ba’ath that had fostered the UAR, and especially did they suspect ‘Aflaq. They actively recruited young military cadres of peasant origin, who had been inspired by Hawrani to become educated via the army.
Over the next 3 years a confusing series of coups and counter-coups took place during which the Military Committee continued to work in secret. By 1962 a six-man junta composed of 3 of the Military Committee (Assad, ‘Umran and Jadid) joined with 3 other army leaders – to seize power. Their programme was to restore formally the Ba’ath party to power. But the Committee did not step into the open.
The secret Committee became expanded to six members. Several of the Military Committee members were jailed first by Egypt, then by Lebanon, and then by Syria. Yet they finally built a coalition of army officers to take their steps to full power.
Hijacking the Ba’ath Party by the Military Committee
In an initial step, the still secret Military Committee temporarily and uneasily, took advantage of a weakened Michel ‘Aflaq. They united with the political founders of Ba’athism under ‘Aflaq. In the 1962 Congress of the Ba’ath, ‘Aflaq officially rescinded the prior dissolution of the Ba’ath, that had been forced by Nasser. “Aflaq reformed the party, while making secret promises to the Military Committee to support a coup.
Over the border, in February 1963, the Iraqi Ba’ath Party unseated the dictator ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim. The leaders who were a combination of the army (‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif ) and Ba’athists (‘Ali Salih al-Sa’di), now slaughtered the Iraqi communists.
The Syrian Military Committee launched their own coup in March 1963 and took power. At this stage, they still hid behind a complex coalition with both party Ba’athists and elements of ex-Nasserites. Assad was still very much in the background.
Confusingly a Nasserite wing remained in the Ba’athist party. They joined with yet other military elements, and were prompted by Egypt to seize power. But in a pitched battle on 18 July 1963, the Ba’athist loyalists of the army won.
Increasingly from now on, the ‘Military Committee’ of the Ba’ath elements came more openly into conflict with the Ba’ath political leaders. The military Ba’ath repeatedly used the accusation that the latter had first urged fusion with Egypt.
By the 1963 post-coup Congress, the Ba’ath had effectively sidelined ‘Aflaq from leading positions in the Ba’ath. The army officers of the ‘Military Committee’ undertook a purge of the officer corps, to remove non-‘Alawi officers which ensured a strong rural middle to upper landed nobility representation.
As Batatu says, this ensured:
“the “political dominance of ‘Alawi officers in the second half of the 1960s and in subsequent decades”
(Batatu Ibid p. 157).
At the same time an ideological mask of ‘socialism’ was maintained. But this was enclosed within a corporatist framework. A key ideological document to depict this was drafted by Yasin al-Hafiz – an ally of the Military Committee who posed as a Marxist. This was entitled ‘Some Theoretical Propositions”. In it – the army’s hijack of ‘Aflaq’s party was defended as follows:
“The organic fusion of the military and civilian vanguard sectors is an urgent prerequisite for … socialist reconstruction”.
(Seale Ibid p. 88).
The military leaders formulated the leading role of the Ba’ath in Syrian public life in a:
‘genuine popular democracy’ – as opposed to a parliamentary democracy which would be a “front for feudalism and the grande bourgeoisie, incapable of ushering in socialist transformation”;
(Seale Ibid p. 89).
Meanwhile, in Iraq, the Iraqi Ba’ath Party was displaced by a coup led by ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif. Very shortly, Arif called for unity again with Nasser. Now the Ba’ath and Michael ‘Aflaq lost even more credence in Syria. The erst-while Syrian ‘semi-Marxist’ theoreticians such as Yasin al-Hafiz were also discredited and were expelled or sought exile.
Relations with the Revisionist CPSU
After the 1963 coup returned the left wing of the Ba’ath to power, there was a turn towards Russian revisionism for funding and support. But Khruschev imposed some conditions. Bakdash, the leader of the Syrian CP, had been previously expelled from Syria. The Khruschevites demanded his return in lieu of payment for the construction of the Euphrates Dam (Ramet Pedro: Ibid; p. 38). Bakdash was now allowed back to Syria in 1966, although under severely restricted conditions.
As the revisionists of the USSR took a more pro-Ba’ath position, Bakdash took another theoretical turn, he suddenly appeared to take a “correct Marxist-Leninist line”. He took an apparent position against the Russian revisionist positions on the national liberation struggles. These were led by R.A.Ulianovsky, Boris Ponomarev, and Mikhail Suslov. It is likely that the opportunist Bakdash was simply reacting to the USSR revisionists who were now favouring the Ba’ath Party, rather than the Syrian CP. The official answer to Bakdash came in an article by R.A.Ulianovsky entitled: “Some problems of the Non-Capitalist Development of liberated Countries” – which appeared in the Soviet monthly magazine “Kommunist” for January 1966. Here Ulianovsky repudiated these points on behalf of Khruschevite revisionism. (Heikal Ibid; pp.158-161). These events are covered in depth in prior Alliance articles.
The Hama(h) 1964 Uprising
As seen above, the minority (non-Sunni – i.e “Alawi and Druze) peasant access to the army, was supported by the Hawrani wing of the Arab Ba’ath Socialist Party. In 1964 a major revolt occurred in Hama. Hama was:
“the citadel of landed power and the capital of rural oppression”:
(Seale Ibid p. 42.
The revolt was led by the Muslim Brothers. In 1958, a partial Agrarian Reform had challenged the power of the town notables and the large landowners in the countryside. Class tensions rose steadily:
“The influence of the Damascne merchants and creditors which had permeated local society down to the late 1950s had also been broken. Busra’s shopkeepers are not longer, as formerly Damascenes but native Busrites… In the 1940s and 1950s Hamah was sharply divided: one one side stood the dhawat – the notables of families of distinction – and on the other the people.”
(Batatu; Ibid; P.25; 124).
The revolt was sparked by militants of the Muslim Brotherhood, who attacked a person they had assumed to be an ‘Alawi. A brutal suppression led by the Druze Ba’athist Colonel Hamad ‘Ubayad, bloodily put down the rebellion. He was driven partly, by revenge for the Sunni officer suppression of a prior Druze uprising in 1952 (Van Dam Ibid p.20). The suppression leveled Hamah:
“Funded by the old families and the merchants and egged on by Shakyh Mahmud al-Hamid form the pulpit of the Sultan mosque, the Muslim rebels .. underwent 2 days of street fighting. The National Guard Commander Hamad “Ubayad .. shelled the mosque .. some 70 Muslim Brothers died”.
(Seale Ibid; p.93).
The position of the small scale traders became even worse. Later on in 1982, another bloody uprising here was also brutally suppressed. Again, it was led by the Muslim Brotherhood.
In-fighting – Wings of the ‘Military Committee’ and their objective basis
By 1966 the leading lights of the political section of the Ba’ath had been summarily dealt with: Amin al-Fafiz was arrested, Michel Aflaq & Salah al-Bitar were expelled (Seale Ibid p.102). Hence the original ‘idealist’ leaders of the Ba’athism were gone. Effectively the party had been hijacked by the military, and the still secret Military Committee.
Meanwhile, counter-revolutionary events led by Khrushchev had eliminated Marxist-Leninists from leadership positions in the USSR. Shepilov, Molotov, Kaganovich, were all removed from any control in the party of the USSR by July 1957.
The Syrian state was now a client state of revisionist USSR imperialism. In Syria, the USSR had two potential vehicles for the USSR. Firstly, the Syrian CP, but this was small and less important. Moreover the SCP had been severely purged during the UAR, and had by 1963 lost ability to move to power.
Now, increasingly important to the USSR, and over-taking the SCP was the Ba’ath. In particular one wing of the Ba’ath was in favour of using the USSR to achieve modernisation.
Although the secret Military Committee had fought together for many years, by 1967, some clear fault-lines had developed. There had always been personal rivalries, displayed as greed for power. Now however these became expressed as ideological differences between two wings.
One wing was objectively a pro-USSR comprador faction, who posed as ’socialists’; and was led by Jundi and Jadid. Opposing them was a ‘nationalist’ wing led by Assad:
“During 1967 the factionalisation within the Syrian ruling elite assumed clear contours as two distinct currents emerged: “radicals” (Whose top priority was the socialist transformation of Syria and who viewed that transformation as a prerequisite to effective struggle against Israel), and “nationalists’ who (whose top priority was the struggle against Israel and who believed that socialist transformation would draw resources away form that struggle). This factionalisation also had the character of interest groups polarization to the extent that the radical’s base was largely in the Ba’ath Party and the civilian apparatus, while the nationalist’s strength lay in the army. However the radical faction was itself further factionalised. The first radical sub-faction was led by Minister of Information Zu’bi and Chief of Staff Ahmad as-Suwaydani. (By February 1968) they were replaced by Mustafa Tlas (a ‘nationalist). The second radical subfaction- the “Dayr al-Zur group” was headed by Prime Minister Zu’ayyin and Foreign Minister Makhus, and enjoyed the support of Abd al-Karim al-Jundi (Editor: one of the Military Committee).. they were removed from power in October 1968. … The third and largest faction was Salah Jadid’s group. As Deputy Secretary of the Ba’ath Party Jadid had considerable control of the Ba’ath Party apparatus. After the Ba’ath Party Congress of Sep-Oct 1968, it was the last surviving radical faction, now clearly locked in a power struggle with the nationalist faction headed by .. Hafiz Assad.”
(Ramet Ibid p, 52).
“Differences of political opinion between Jadid and al-Assad became obvious at the Regional and National Bath Congresses held in Damascus in Sep. and Oct 1968 where two main political trends were manifest.
One trend advocated top priority for the so-called ‘socialist transformation (tahwil ishtiraki) of Syrian society and was dominated by civilians including Salah Jadid, ‘Abd al-Karim al-Jundi, Ibrahim Makhus.. and Premier Yusuf Zu’ayyin… This socialist-orientated group openly rejected the idea of political or military cooperation with regimes it braded as ‘reactionary, rightist or pro-Western; such as Jordan, Lebanon or Iraq, even if this should be at the expense of the struggle against Israel This group had objection to increased dependence on the Soviet Union and other Communist countries of the Eastern Bloc, as long as this would benefit socialist transformation.
The second trend showed strong Arab nationalist leaning and demanded top priority for the armed struggle against Israel is a strengthening of the Arab military potential, even if this should have temporarily negative effects on Syria’s socialist transformation. A policy of military and political cooperation and coordination was advocated with other Arab states such as Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, without much concern for their respective political colour, as long as this would be in the interests of the Arab struggle against Israel. This nationalist trend was represented at the Congress by most of the military delegates, the most important being Hafiz al-Assad minster of Defence and Mustafa Tals, chief of staff of the Syrian Army”;
(Van Dam N; Ibid; p.63)
Assad and his grouping objected to the pro-USSR tendency, using the grounds that the struggle against Israel was being compromised:
“Assad’s nationalists argued… that Syria was becoming too dependent on the USSR and that socialist transformation had to take back seat to recovery of the Golan Heights and the achievement of a satisfactory peace in the Middle East… Not surprisingly, the USSR supported Jadid’s faction. In October 1968, at the 10th national Congress of the Ba’ath Party, Assad accused P Zu’ayyin of “behaving like a Soviet agent”… he was relieved of office of PM)”.
(Ramet Ibid p, 32).
As Assad moved steadily to control the party press, he removed communist sympathizers. In response, Jadid tried to use the Syrian-dominated “Palestinian” guerrillas organisation al-Saiqa to counter Assad’s control of the regular armed forces.
To capture a dominat position, Jadid urged on by the USSR, tried to invade Jordan to overthrow King Hussein – who had been attacking the Palestinian Fedayeen. Between September 19-30 1970, 300 Syrian tanks, disguised as those of the Palestinian Liberation Army invaded Jordan. But at a crucial point, Assad in control of the air force, denied air support against the Israeli air force. The Israelis were able to fly to the support of King Hussein. ((Ramet Ibid p, 54-6).
At end October, at the 10th Extraordinary Congress of Ba’ath, Jadid demanded the resignation of Assad and Tlas. But on November 13 1970, Assad seized power and arrested Jadid, who lay in jail until a much later death. (Ramet Ibid p, 56). All his comrades of the Military Committee were vanquished.
Assad’s State
Assad’s takeover of the Ba’th was designed to take the mass base of the Ba’th, weld it with corporatism (such that no independent worker organisations can be formed) – in order to build a fascist state.
The creation of a fascist state (defined here simply as an authoritarian non-parliamentary democratic state, but with a mass base) would assist the capitalist class. In this instance, this was the small weak national capitalist class.
This weak national capitalist class arose from the rural notables, who were enriched by Land Reforms of first, the pre-Assad Ba’thists, and then Assad. In addition, the Assad state used state financing, to further help the weak national bourgeoisie – to create an industrial base. His first moves were rapid:
“Assad started consolidating his position at once. A new constitution affirmed the role of the Ba’ath Party as the “leading party in state and society” and gave the president very wide legislative and executive powers. Overall, Assad aimed at representing a more moderate face of the Ba’ath both internally and externally”.
(Azmeh, Shamel; “ Syria’s Passage to Conflict: The End of the “Developmental Rentier Fix” and the Consolidation of New Elite Rule”; Politics & Society; 2016, Vol. 44(4) 499–523 )
Ensuring ‘Alawi Domination of the army
During Assad’s rule, the rural and ‘Alawi character of the B’ath became steadily more accentuated. As well as packing the army officer corps with ‘Alawites, party members were 87.4 % were from rural areas (village or small town) (Batatu Ibid p. 162). Moreover the state bureaucracy was filled with recruits from rural backgrounds and of middle to high landowning status:
“Many if not the bulk, of the new bureaucrats were from rural backgrounds. Indeed at the bottom of much of the recurring discontent of the urban traders in the post-1963 period – apart from the adverse events upon them of the … nationalization decrees – was the fact that they frequently found themselves compelled to deal with state employees … of rural original, and if not hostile to the urban trading community, had little understanding of the intricacies of trade…”
(Batatu Ibid p. 160).
The Agrarian reforms of Agrarian Reform
Under an Agrarian Law No.161 of September 27 1958, there had already been a lowering of size of landholdings. Maximal ceilings were to 300 hectares of rain-fed land or 80 hectares of irrigated land. But by Decree No.8 of June 1963, the land ceilings was lowered further, to 15-55 acres on irrigated land and 80-300 hectares on rain fed land.
Excess holdings became seized estates, which were re-distributed to small peasants. Initially, they had to purchase these at easy installments, but this re-distribution was then made free (Batatu; Ibid p. 163). Moreover, by 1969, the pace of redistribution was dramatically increased such that:
“More reform and state lands were distributed to the peasants in the course of 6 months in 1969 than in all the preceding years of Ba’ath rule.”
(Batatu Ibid p. 169).
Assad establishes Cult of Personality and a corporatist state
As seen, by 1970, Assad first ensured the fall of Jundi, who committed suicide as Assad’s forces encircled him. Subsequently, Jadid was imprisoned for decades to rot in jail, until his eventual death. So, this left Assad in sole control of the military dictatorship, the last of the old Military Committee to survive the pruning on the road to power.
Already in 1969 he had wanted to diminish the urban-rural divide. Now:
“Assad.. built bridges with the urban merchants and industrialists, and gave them a stake in his regime. He thus allowed them to rise to a greater role in the country’s economy, at first in a moderate way but more meaningfully since the middle 1980s. He also supported the enactment of laws in the early 1990s encouraging private investment and markedly scaling down the tax liability on net profits from business” (Batatu Ibid; pp. 326)
“When Assad took the presidency in November 1970, he gave the communists a second cabinet post and 8 seats in the 173 member People’s Council.. the CP’s adhesion to the national Progressive Front in March 1972 brought the party de facto legality”:
(Ramet Ibid p. 74)
He proceeded to rapidly build a Bonapartist leadership cult.
“As early as May 1971, the new Ba’ath Command hailed its chief as Qa’id-ul-Masiah or “the Leader of the Nation’s March”, thus initiating the Assad cult. In the next two decades the party congresses and commands would, on appropriate occasions, profess feelings of elation for the “exceptional historical leadership” personified by Assad.. in 1985.. the watchword (became) “Our Leader Forever the Faithful Hafiz al-Assad!”.
(Batatu Ibid p.177)
A security apparatus was erected:
“under Assad the (security forces) became .. sheer instruments of the ruler with their forces harnessed to his needs and their chiefs ultimately accountable to him alone. .. In posthumously published observations made prior to his assassination (Ed- By Assad agents) in 1977, the Druze leader of the Lebanese National Movement Kamal Jumblatt described Syria in that year as a “big prison in which pullulate the agents of the secret police (they have attained according to some reports, the extravagant number of 49,000).”…. four major security and intelligence networks namely, Political Security, General Intelligence, Military intelligence and Air Force Intelligence, All answer ultimately to the Presidential Intelligence Committee.”
(Batatu Ibid. p. 239)
As well, he built an even larger mass base to the Ba’ath, surpassing prior membership numbers:
“Under Assad the character of the Ba’ath changed. For one thing it became, in a numerical sense, a mass party, its total membership greatly increased, rising to 1,008,243 in 1992. It auxiliary organizations also spread out widely, Its peasant association for example, had by 1992 taken roots in 5,061 villages and by 1995 incorporated 801,230 members, that is … no fewer than 95% of all Syrians active in agriculture, excluding employers.. the party became in effect another instrument by which the regime sought to control the community at large or to rally it behind its polices… only at the top level of the present political structure (is) power primary. Here Assad alone holds the sinews of real authority”:
(Batatu Ibid; pp. 326-7.)
As a device to ensure that all political activity was taking place within the Ba’th Party, and thus state purview – he allowed limited opportunities to non-Ba’athists to join the ‘Peoples Assemblies’. This effectively formed the basis of his corporatization:
“In the 1990s he used a new watchword, that of at-ta’addudiyyah-s-siyasiyyah or ‘political pluralism’.. “which we have been practicing for more than 20 years” .. an obvious reference to the circumscribed role that independent elements and non-Ba’athist parties such as the Nasserites, the Communists, and the Arab Socialists have been allowed to play in the government, the People’s Assemblies and the system of local administrative councils”;
(Batatu Ibid p. 205)
Assad Pushes Agrarian reform further
The party tilted towards the class that Assad had been born into, to the middle peasantry, who benefited the most from the land reforms:
“As for the distribution of the private landholdings, the available figures – those for 1970-1971 – indicate that the main beneficiaries of the major agrarian reform measures were not the small but the middle peasants, from whom stemmed many of the chief figures of both the Assad regime… middling landowners, that is, owners of 10-100 hectares, constituted in 1970-71 only 23.8 % – and owners of less than 10 hectares, constituted in 1970-1971 only 23.8 % of all landowners. (But) the former had title to 58.7 %, and the latter to only 23.5% of the entire area of fully owned agricultural land. Disparities in lease holdings were even more glaring: 1.9% of all leaseholders held 35.5 % of all land under lease”.
(Batatu Ibid; pp. 328-9)
This class preference adversely hit the small-scale manufacturing or artisans, and associated traders – of Hama(h). Hama had long been a center of cotton and agricultural good processing, based on artisan manufactures. The rural notables were tied into this matrix from their cotton production. At the same time the small artisans acted as money-lenders to the poorer sections of the peasantry:
“Hama has a long history as a center for both small-scale manufacturing and the processing of agricultural goods. Cotton ginning, cloth-weaving, leather working, tobacco processing and sugar refining are the major economic activities carried on within the city. Twenty percent of cotton gins and butter factories are located in Hamah province, as are 10 of Syria’s 52 cheese factories. These industries are relatively small compared with those in Damascus, Aleppo and Latakia. In 1965, there were 4,603 unionized workers in Hama, divided among 22 separate trade unions unions. By contrast, Damascus had 23,827 workers and Aleppo, 23,899 workers among 28 unions. The government unionized Syria’s workers during the mid-1960s, primarily at the expense of manufacturers in the larger cities. The persistence of small-scale units within the official trade union organizations of Hama at that time indicates the degree to which independent artisan operations remain predominant in the city’s economy. As late as the 1970 census, 31.5 percent of this province’s urban workers were considered to be self-employed. This compares with 26.0 percent of those in Homs and 20.5% of those in Damascus”:.
(Lawson, Fred H: Middle East Research and Information Project; MERIP Reports, No. 110, Syria’s Troubles (Nov. – Dec., 1982), pp. 24-28).
“Whereas Syria’s urban traders and artisans had long formed the backbone of the economy in Syrian cities, and particularly in Hama, traditional economic and social structures were eroded under the Ba‘th. This led to a recalibration of the socioeconomic hierarchy in Syria and an elevation of Syria’s peasants at the expense of urban populations. Hama’s long-time urban dwellers became the new poor in Ba‘thist Syria, brewing a deeply felt sense of grievance that led to the protests, riots and strikes in the early 1980s.” (Conduit, Dara (2017) The Patterns of Syrian Uprising: Comparing Hama in 1980–1982 and Homs in 2011, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 44:1, 73-8)
These tensions in part, fueled the resentments. These would result in the Hama uprisings as discussed above, when we outlined the rise of the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Assad pushes large scale industrialisation
But as well as wanting to promote the peasantry, as time went on, Assad wanted to also develop industrialisation (Lawson FH; Ibid). His policies were to culminate in a stronger urban national bourgeoisie. This would be an additional source of discontent that spurred Hama discontent.
In the 1970s, the Assad government began a policy of industrialization. This also had several negative effects on the artisan manufacturers. One in especial was the proletarianisation of many seasonal agricultural workers, with jobs in these capital-intensive large industries raised their wages. This coupled with a new minimal wage standard, led them to lose their older reliance on the urban small traders who had been the money-lenders that they had relied upon. At the same time, the cotton farms were deprived of their seasonal agricultural workers, who were sucked into the factories by the larger pay.
It was the middle-large landowners who formed the bulk of the growing capitalist class. The capitalized machine owning landed farmers and ‘mustathmirs’ were dominating the countryside.
“In 1976 when the Muslim Brotherhood launched out against Assad’s rule, and again in 1980 when its activities were approaching their peak, Assad eased matters for the merchants by sharply increasing their import quotas for consumer goods, The value of their registered imports rose form 1.72 billion Syrian pounds in 1975 to 3.63 billion pounds in 1976 and 4.17 billion pounds in 1980… (but) the business class as a whole, having steered clear of formal affiliation with any political party has had no footing in any of the Ba’ath commands since 1963, and occupied only 3 out of the 186 seats in the 1973-1977 sessions and 18 out of the 250 seats in the 1990-1994 sessions of the largely ceremonial People’s Assembly… Things have been going the way of the business leaders… uninterruptedly since 1970, and increasingly more meaningfully since the middle 1980s, in matters affecting not only commerce but also other parts of the economy’s private sector… The 50% increase in the “special” membership of the Damascus Chambers of Commerce and he tripling of its ‘first class’ membership between 1971-1990…The maximum tax liability on net profits from business fell from 70.74% in 1974 to 45% in 1992. Even more favourable from their standpoint, is Law Number 10 of May 5 1991, for the Encouragement of Investment. Under this law, investment projects with tangible assets of more than 10 million Syrian pounds… and duly approved by the Supreme Investment Council headed by the PM, enjoy other among advantages exception from all taxes for a period of five years, if undertaken by mixed companies with a public sector participation of at least 25%. If more than 50% of project’s output is exported and the proceeds are transferred in hard currency through Syria’s banks, its tax holiday may be extended by two years.”
(Batatu pp. 208; 209; 211)
In addition, smuggling and illicit trade also expanded, often in association with corrupt bureaucrats. All this also fostered burgeoning trade.
The Muslim Brotherhood Rise Again – the Hamah revolt of 1982
As seen ‘Alawite domination had been ensured. However, the Sunni presence could not be forgotten entirely. After all as shown above, they remained the bulk of the population.
Especially after the Hama Rising, the Ba’ath leaders of all factions tried to ensure Sunni “buy-in”. After his 1970 coup, Assad made it a point every year, to break his fast at a time during Ramadan with the principal ‘Ulama. In 1973 the Constitution dropped the phrase “That Islam is the religion of the state”. The resulting furorse form the Sunni populace, quickly led Assad to amend this to “The religion of the President of the Republic is Islam”.
While some of the Ulama were prepared to support Assad, especially those who were elevated to positions such as “Mufti of the Republic” – more were not. Many other Ulama were petty traders or handicraftsmen, as they were unable to support themselves only by religion (Batatu Ibid pp.260-262).
Nonetheless, Assad had effected a new ‘Alawaite domination. We saw how both the peasant reforms, and the promotion of large-scale industry, had both adversely affected the power of small traders, urban petty-bourgeoisie, and lenders. Moreover there was a move to development of production for foreign export. This accentuated the rise of a connected, “parasitic class of state contractors”:
“After 1975… the flow of Arab oil money which had been copious diminished sharply; the heightened scale of peasant migration and a mounting rate of inflation deepened the injury… rents became impossibly high for the middle and humbler classes… (in the city)… the small scale trading class from which the Brotherhood drew part of its membership was adversely affected by the rise of agricultural cooperative in rural districts and consumer’s cooperatives in urban sellers. Sellers who travelled from village to village and constituted a large group at Hamah… known as al-muta’iyyishin)… were apparently similarly hurt. The growth of a parasitic class of state contractors, the rampant corruption in the upper layers of the bureaucracy and the fat commission made on government contracts by men close to the pinnacle of power added to the popular discontent”.
(Batatu Ibid p. 264).
“The regime’s programme of large-scale industrial development… involved opening Syria’s domestic market to foreign investment and imported goods, and encouraging large- and middle-scale landholders in the countryside to expand cash crop production for overseas markets”.
(Lawson, Fred H: MERIP Reports, Ibid).
These various forces– the empowerment of the poorer and middle peasants, the large-scale factory developments, the opening of production for export – all depressed the artisan cotton-based industries of Hama:
“The February revolt was primarily a reaction by small manufacturers and tradespeople in Hamah to the regime’s programme of large-scale industrial development. …These (ed-Government) policies have led to a decline in the importance of small-scale cotton police manufacturing within Syria’s economy. At the same time, they have given richer peasants in the north-central part of the country incentives to consolidate their holdings, enabling these farmers to threaten the social position of regions of already-disaffected artisans and traders”.
(Lawson, Fred H: MERIP Reports, Ibid).
As Lawson concluded in 1982:
“In present-day Syria, the most compelling elements of “Islamic thinking” are anti-statist. They are not very tolerant of heterodoxy. As in Algeria, they help to set small-scale manufacturers “both against rustic ignoramuses” and “against those who aspire to or possess privileges in virtue of their ties to the West. Hamah’s artisans and shopkeepers, urban-based large landholders and more or less peripheral cotton and textile merchants can best use these aspects of Islam in their struggles against the coalition of state officials, industrial managers and rich Damascus import-export merchants who buttress and benefit from the present regime”.
(Lawson, Fred H: MERIP Reports, Ibid).
All these factors fostered the Hamah Revolt. The Muslim Brotherhood had not been completely destroyed in the post-1964 Hamah rising suppressions. Their resentment grew:
“But from the standpoint of the Muslim Bretheren, the most aggravating factor was the sharpened ‘Alawi bias of the regime and the deepening erosion of the power of the Sunni community”.
(Batatu Ibid p. 265).
“Popular unrest took place primarily in the souks and commercial districts of the old city, rather than in the countryside. …. Syria’s shopkeepers formed ‘the most important private sector in this largely socialized country’. Shopkeepers and small traders played an integral role in strikes elsewhere in the country too—in Damascus, the government had to send its own militias into the souks to force shops open. But the trend was even more noticeable in Hama, where shops were closed for months. According to a Syrian Muslim Brotherhood report that was published in the aftermath of the Hama uprising, the Syrian government was aware of the demographic challenge and specifically targeted shops in the old quarters of the city during the 1982 uprising, destroying more than 500 during a single phase of the operation.”
(Conduit, Dara (2017) The Patterns of Syrian Uprising: Comparing Hama in 1980–1982 and Homs in 2011, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 44:1, 73-87; p. 79)
Assassinations of army officers began. While an important Muslim Brotherhood leader, Marwan Hadid was killed in jail, his successor ‘Abd-us-Sattar az-Za’im took over his leadership role. However the leaders were split into factions counseling an uprising, opposed by those urging militant violence. Tensions rose steadily, as the moderate wing of the Brotherhood could not effectively control rising discontent. Finally, in June 1979, a militant section – the Fighting Vanguard, shot 32 ‘Alawai cadets of the army, at a military academy. In the ensuing crisis, all factions (moderate to militant) of the Muslim Brotherhood now joined in a Joint Command.
To defuse the situation, Assad appointed more Sunnis to government high-profile posts. But by 1980:
“The scale of unrest widened and strikes and demonstrations – .. but not in Damascus.. increased in extent and intensity”.
(Batatu; Ibid; p. 272)
In response, the favouritism towards the ‘Alawites in the army was partially curbed. In February 1980 the proportion of Sunnis at the Ba’ath Regional Command level was increased from 57.1% to 66.7%. Also the proportion of ‘Alawis was decreased from 33.3% to 19%.
An attempted assassination of Assad in June 1980, failed. Assad’s brother Rif’at Assad – who had considerable Army power – in reprisals, led a massacre of 500 prisoners from the Muslim Brothers in a jail in Palmyra.
Yet, this repression did not prevent further resistance to Assad’s regime by the Muslim Brotherhood. During the months of March-April 1980, Aleppo was for several weeks out of state control. Following this:
“A particularly bloody retribution … was wreaked on Aleppo in August 1980.” (Seale Ibid. p. 329).
In February 1982, Hama, the site of the 1964 rising, saw a new but wider, general insurrection. Again a major counter-assault by Syrian Army killed considerable numbers. The brutality of the battle in April presaged the destruction of Syria by Hafiz’s son, a generation later:
“scores of males over the age of 14 were rounded up almost at random and shot out of hand… The battle of Hama raged for 3 weeks… Altogether Hama was besieged by some 12,000 men (Government troops)… it was more of a civil war..
After heavy shelling.. whole districts were razed…
Entire families were taken from their homes and shot.. The price of rebellion was paid by Hama as a whole: large numbers died in the hunt for the gunmen (Ed-Of Muslim Brothers)..a figure of between 5,000 and 10,000 (deaths) could be closer to the truth.. the pounding of the town.”
(Seale, P: Ibid p.329; 333-334).
The leader of the Aleppo uprising, ‘Adnan ‘Uqlah – was disowned by the Joint Command.
Assad’s strategy to grow the economy
The Assad state set out to build a ‘modern state’. To do this it had to build a fascist type state which would use the resources of the state to build an industrial state. In the beginning its policies were land reform and nationalization of the small industrial forces there were. Naturally the latter upset those capitalist owners.
To build its state, the Assad forces established a class alliance of the middle peasantry and those elements of the larger commercial bourgeoisie prepared to cooperate:
“We can speak of a social alliance formed by the military-bureaucratic state bourgeoisie with the new commercial bourgeoisie that emerged after 1963. This alliance mainly relies on the security forces and, throughout the 1970s at least, on the growing salaried middle classes and the intermediate stratum of the peasantry, which is the main source of recruitment for the bureaucracy and the military”.
(Perthes Ibid; p. 210)
After the Hama Revolt of 1982 in particular, Assad assiduously tried to build a coalition to involve the Sunni commercial trading class and its leaders. Conveniently, this was also of benefit to building the industrialised sector:
“This situation slowly developed into … a low-trust alliance between the Alawite dominated state-elite and certain Sunni capital holders. The state-elite, …. needed the entrepreneurship and capital of the business class, while the business class needed state protection to operate. Furthermore, the regime needed the support of certain Sunni business and religious figures to counter accusations by Islamists, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, that it was an Alawite regime oppressing the Sunnis.”
(Azmeh, Shamel; “ Syria’s Passage to Conflict: The End of the “Developmental Rentier Fix” and the Consolidation of New Elite Rule”; Politics & Society; 2016, Vol. 44(4) 499–523).
While wanting to establish a powerful national capitalist class, the Assad forces were not able to keep free of foreign capital penetration. But in contrast to an exclusive dependence upon the revisionist Khruschevite USSR, Assad adopted an ‘infitah’ – an opening to the West. This was a juggling act to try to balance opposing imperialisms. The Syrian State – attempted to retain the ‘leading role”:
“In the early 1970s, and after the war in October 1973 in particular, Syria, like Egypt followed a political strategy described as infitah, which involved growing political and economic cooperation with the West and greater freedom for private business. Compared to Egypt, the Syrian version of infitah was far more state-capitalist: the state continued to control strategic areas such as foreign trade, it played the leading role in industry and state expenditure programs directed the course of development.”
(Perthese V; Ibid; p. 209)
In addition, Syria had started to export oil as a commodity from 1968:
“Starting in 1968, following the completion of the pipeline that connected producing regions in northeast Syria to the port of Tartous on the Mediterranean, Syria became an oil exporter, and growth in oil rents was subsequently rapid (Figure 1 below)
(Figure 1: Oil Rents as a percent of GDP; from World Bank, World Development Indicators (http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators). Azmeh, Shamel; “ Syria’s Passage to Conflict: The End of the “Developmental Rentier Fix” and the Consolidation of New Elite Rule”; Politics & Society; 2016, Vol. 44(4) 499–523).”
It is not that the revisionist USSR was ignored – to the contrary. Because the Syrian industry was still producing goods of ‘relatively low quality’, it was exporting to the USSR market heavily, as Western countries did not accept this lower quality:
“Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, specific opportunities for Syria’s private industry lay in exports to socialist countries. Since 1973, Syrian payments on its military and civil debt to the Soviet Union had to be made partly in goods. In practice, payments were almost entirely made in goods; no cash payments were made, at least not from Syria directly. The USSR and, on a smaller scale, Iran, as well as other socialist countries that temporarily had similar payment agreements with Syria would simply buy from the Syrian market, and the cost of these purchases was subtracted from Syria’s debt. The producers would be paid in local currency from the Syrian Central Bank. In the 1970s, profits from such deals could be extraordinary. The Soviets would buy large quantities, offering a vast market with relatively low quality standards. Because of the structure of Syrian industry, the Soviets were practically forced to buy out of a limited assortment and often paid over price. Clothes manufacturing benefited the most, though because Soviet buyers placed huge orders, only fairly large establishments could deal with them. Several factories were set up for the sole purpose of exporting goods to the USSR. Over years, more and more manufacturers lined up for Soviet orders, and the Syrian assortment of modern import-substitution commodities grew considerably. Several Syrian industrialists producing foreign license goods obtained marketing rights for the East European countries-as they did for Iran and the Gulf states-and Syrian-made “French” and “German” perfumes and cosmetics made up a considerable part of Soviet purchases. As Syrian production now offered greater choices, Soviet buyers became less willing to pay exaggerated prices. According to industrialists profit margins decreased from over 100 percent to somewhat between 20 and 30 percent. Still, these deals on the Syrian debt remained highly attractive and important for private industrialists. Private-sector exports to the USSR alone constituted an estimated 20 percent to 30 percent of all Syrian exports to that country, and to a third or more of all private exports.”
(Perthes Ibid p. 221).
But, the net influx of foreign capital in the 1970-1980 period came to dominate. This can be seen in the Figure 2 below, stated as external debt. It also shows how this fell off dramatically after 1988.
(Figure 2 – Net Annual Flows of External Debt (US $ Millions) from World Bank Developmental Indicators Ibid; as Cited by: Azmeh, Shamel; “ Syria’s Passage to Conflict: The End of the “Developmental Rentier Fix” and the Consolidation of New Elite Rule”; Politics & Society; 2016, Vol. 44(4) 499–523).
That considerable fall in from the late 1990s onwards, underlies the crisis for the state as the Syrian working and unemployed peoples suffered intense privation. Initially, the Syrian economy had experienced an impressive growth of the economy, but this had stagnated by the 1980s.
This stagnation was due to several factors: the lower influx of ‘petrodollar’ aid from the Gulf States; the inflexible authoritarian and bureaucratic state apparatus; and, the ultimate inability to build a substantial heavy industrial base, the only method that could have ensured true ‘independence’:
“During the 1970s, the Syrian economy realized considerable growth in all sectors; real GNP increased more than 150 percent. In the 1980s, however, growth was placed by stagnation; at the end of the decade real GNP hardly exceeded the 1980 figures; per capita it even decreased about 20 percent. The commodity-producing sectors were particularly hard hit: construction, trade, and services still grew until at least 1985, but income from agriculture and industry was declining in real terms. The crisis of the 1980s was mainly an effect of the development strategies of the foregoing decade. Agriculture had been neglected. Industry, on which development efforts had concentrated, had not become the basis for further self-sustained growth. Industrial plants purchased in the 1970s, when development budgets soared as an effect of petrodollar assistance, Syria’s own oil revenues, and foreign credit, were often ill-fitting to the country’s economic structure and needs, and for the most part highly import dependent, while their contribution to exports was almost negligible. Syria’s balance of trade became increasingly negative. In addition, foreign aid, which had disguised structural weaknesses in the economy, substantially decreased after 1983………
In fact, the Syrian economy’s low performance was caused not only by economic and technical problems, but also by social and political factors such as authoritarian and bureaucratic structures, lack of public participation, and growing social equalities.”.
(Perthes Ibid p. 210).
This economic crisis led to ‘liberalization’ or ‘privatization’. Now the state resources to investment were curtailed in favour of private investment. These private investors included local capitalists:
“In facing the crisis of the 1980s, the Syrian regime embarked on a course of austerity-including reduced public investments, restrictive wage policies, and subsidy reductions -and, since the mid-1980s in particular, of step-by-step liberalization or privatization. Referring to these policies, Syrian merchants frequently speak of a new infitah”.
(Perthes Ibid; p. 210)
“Gross private investments, which had counted for more than 40 percent of the country’s entire investments in 1963 and had dropped to less than 30 percent under the Ba’athist governments of the 1963-70 period, ranged around one-third in the 1970s, realizing a 16-fold increase in absolute terms and a 400 percent increase in constant terms between 1970 and 1980. In the 1980s, the private sector’s contribution to gross investments further increased, amounting to almost 50 percent by the end of the decade. In real terms, however, the value of annual private investments remained almost unchanged from 1980 through 1987, while the value of public investments decreased. In 1986, for the first time since the early 1970s, the private sector’s share in the Syrian economy’s gross output-as far as this can be determined-exceeded that of the public sector.”
(Perthes Ibid; p. 211)
These new private investors – the Assad-ite commercial capitalists – were still intimately tied to the state. In fact they utilised the state’s contacts and bureaucracy in an enriched nepotism:
“The emergence of a new commercial bourgeoisie, and in particular an elite group of new businessmen often referred to as al-tabaqa al-jadida (the new class) was closely connected to all sorts of business with the state. In wealth and influence they soon outgrew Syria’s mainly petit-bourgeois trade sector and the remnants of the old, pre-Ba’ath, commercial bourgeoisie. They prospered from imports and other transactions related to foreign trade, services, and construction. A handful of Syrian businessmen, for example, obtained contracts to build pipelines, grain silos, motorways, and hotels, and for the modernization of Syria’s telephone network. … Transactions with the state generally secured high profits and it was not surprising that corrupt practices to obtain or mediate contracts with the public sector be widespread”.
(Perthes Ibid p. 240).
By the late 1980s the Syrian economy had revived. Some larger industrial centers had been established. But at the same time, there had been a serious penetration by either foreign or Syrian expatriate capital:
“On the whole, the private industrial sector has recovered from the setbacks of the 1983-86 period. With the continuing crisis of public-sector industries, political encouragement for private industrial activities has been increasing. Among other things, the scope of industrial activities open to the private sector has gradually been expanded. Bureaucratic procedures were -according to businessmen – remarkably simplified, and formerly unlicensed establishments have been legalized. The liberalization measures mentioned – allowing Syrian expatriates, Syrians, and other Arabs to rather freely import goods and capital – seem to have been effective. Since 1985, there has been a substantial increase of private industrial investment. In addition, for the first time since the 1960s, a considerable number of relatively large industrial establishments – in terms of capital – have been set up, many of them with foreign or Syrian expatriate capital.”
(Perthes Ibid p. 223).
This recovery of Syrian industry, was ‘marginal” to any meaningful development of note for the Syrian people. The industries were aimed at export of consumer goods:
“In contrast to Syrian industries established in the independence period, these new, bigger projects almost exclusively comprise finishing industries, producing – under license for the most part – certain previously imported higher-standard consumer goods. Private industrial projects set up between 1985 and 1988, with a capital investment of Sy Pound 5 million or more (approximately $450,000) include some outerwear factories, establishments for the production of ice cream and cardboard; for the assembly of air conditioners, solar collectors, and washing machines; and for the licensed production of shaving cream, shoe polish, toothpaste, cough medicine, meat preserves, disposable diapers, and tissues. The two largest establishments on this list, with a capital investment of up to Syrian Pounds 40 million, are a factory producing French perfumes under license and another producing biscuits.
These industries are largely marginal in their contribution to the country’s development. They are organized for export markets mainly in the USSR and the Gulf, but they import up to 100 percent of their raw material and all their machinery and spare parts. Production techniques are in no way adapted to the Syrian capacities. These industries create little employment, and they attract scarce capital away from sectors where it is urgently needed.”
(Perthes Ibid p. 223).
Even though the aim was to build large-scale enterprise, the scale of enterprise was still rather small:
“As in the 1970s, the vast majority of private manufacturing establishments remain rather small scale, and the distance in size between this majority and the group of new big establishments has been increasing rapidly. Out of the 85,000 industrial establishments registered at the Ministry of Industry at the end of 1987 62,000 counted as artisan (hiraf sinf’iyya), with a total registered labor force of not more than 130,000, owners included. In industry as a whole, the average number of registered persons employed-excluding, however, public-sector employees moonlighting for private employers, children employed illegally, and other registered to avoid social security payments-does not exceed 2.5 per establishment. Investments remained low for the most part. In contrast to the 1970s, the 1980s only a few small producers have been able to modernize machinery and appliances; even spare parts for imported machinery were in short supply”;
(Perthes Ibid p. 224).
Of course, the Syrian capitalist class is not homogenous. By the late 1980s two factions of bourgeoisie had appeared. An older industrial element that had never been reconciled to Ba’th the state-led industrialization; and the commercial class. It was this commercial class who had in particular been ‘state’ made and who now, in reciprocity – could be said to in fact, be the state:
“The Syrian bourgeoisie is uniform neither in its appearance nor in its attitude towards the Baathist regime. Remaining members of the old industrial bourgeoisie, which has been seriously affected by the nationalizations of the 1960s, as well as certain new industrialists are generally more opposed to the regime and less eager to cooperate with it than the commercial class. They complain about the burdens of dictatorship and bureaucracy and criticize the government’s bias in favor of commercial activities. The material interests of the commercial bourgeoisie were less affected than those of the industrialists by the egalitarian policies of the 1960s. The disdain some of its elements felt towards the regime was soon to disappear, or to be disguised, behind economic interests that led them to respond positively to the demonstrative friendliness the new regime displayed towards the merchants in general and the Damascus Chamber of Commerce in particular.
It is the new commercial bourgeoisie, and especially its top group or “class”, who, having profited the most both from the state-led opening of the 1970s and the privatization of the 1980s, supports the regime and cooperates with it actively. The alliance between the commercial class and the state bourgeois been strengthened by a variety of economic, social, and even family relationships and it is likely that in the coming years these two groups will gradually amalgamate. Some of the bureaucratic, political, and military elite, and a growing number of their sons and daughters, have already begun to commit themselves, and the wealth acquired in the past two decades, to various commercial ventures. Several prominent merchants have recently entered the Syrian parliament, thereby combining political and commercial interests and demonstrating “bourgeois” support for the president. As noted above, the mutual interests of this alliance have donated Syria’s development under Assad, especially”.
(Perthes Ibid p. 225-6).
Bashar Assad – a Hereditary Fascist
In June 2000, Hafiz Assad died. By the time of his death, Hafiz had built a fascist state. This cracked down on any political dissent. Its most notorious prison was Tadmor:
“In the 1970s, under the rule of Hafiz al-Assad, the state expanded the prison with the addition of new buildings. According to a 2001 Amnesty International report, the military prison was “designed to inflict the maximum suffering, fear and humiliation on prisoners and to keep them under the strictest control by breaking their spirit.” Prisoners were isolated from the outside world and forbidden to communicate with each other; death could come at any time.
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, much of the prison’s population consisted of those charged with political crimes. Between 1980 and 1990, again according to Amnesty International, the regime imprisoned an estimated 20,000 people in Tadmor” .
(Shareah Taleghani R.: ‘Breaking the Silence of Tadmor Military Prison; MER275; Middle East Research & Information Project Reports)
The level of people’s suppression went far beyond the proscription of political activity. The Syrian Human rights Committee (SHRC) estimated from a proposed amnesty (which never took actual effect) that 11% of the population were incarcerated for mere ‘economic, conscription crimes’ and ‘juvenile delinquencies”. The degree of tyranny over daily life was described, when effects of a proposed amnesty were considered:
“Official Syrian Newspapers said that citizens benefit from this amnesty would be tens of thousands. Tishrin newspaper said that the number would total 120,000, while Routers reported from authorised Syrian sources that more than 200,000 Syrian citizens would benefit from this presidential amnesty. This means that economic and conscription crimes, and juvenile delinquencies total 7.50% among Syrians as a whole, rising to 11% when children and elderly people are excluded. Both rates constitute an appalling indicator to the abyss Syria plunged into under President Assad’s regime… The rise of a new class in Syria, who came to power in destitute situation, but grew millionaires in no time.
This parasitic class resorted to the worst abuse of authorities. Citizens who refuse to deal with members of this corrupted class will be outlawed and forwarded to exceptional courts, or a deliberate trap could be lain to them and consequently prosecuted. This evil methodology planned and practised by influential ruling elite and individuals posed many Syrians to dangers of punishment, bankruptcy and imprisonment. …
It is the misfortune of Syrian people that all corruption files and cases throughout the long rule of president Assad have been supervised by and dealt with corrupted high-ranking individuals involved in embezzling public funds and properties. The majority of their victims are citizens, dealt with them on good faith or those who just come to be familiar with them, so that they have been criminalised while the true perpetrators escape justice.
In such deteriorating economic circumstances and domination of parasites, many Syrian citizens were obliged to do more than one job, so that many people spend about 16 hours at work a day. These long hours at work have their negative and counterproductive implications on their psychology, health and families, but have never been for the benefit of citizens or the country.
Syrian jurisdiction was among the best and most neutral justice institutions in the world, however under the solitary party rule and the harsh security corpses grip, it was converted into an instrument to serve the influential, but depriving people from their natural rights. Therefore, overnumbered punitive sentences and condemnations have been witnessed in Syria under President Hafez Assad’s rule”.
(“Human Reading in The Amnesty decree issued by President Hafez Assad on 3/07/1999”; 13-FEBRUARY-2004 BY SHRC_ADMIN. At: http://www.shrc.org/en/?p=19882)
Within days of Hafiz’s death, his son, Bashar was appointed president. In ‘Syria: a family business’ – Derek Brown explained the rapid events:
“Syria’s ruling clique has moved swiftly to fill the power vacuum created by the death of Hafez al-Assad. On Saturday, when the old dictator died, the country’s complaisant parliament rushed through a constitutional amendment reducing the minimum age required of a president from 40 to 34. That, conveniently enough, is the age of Assad’s oldest surviving son, Bashar. Bashar al-Assad has also been declared head of Syria’s armed forces. He is, effectively, acting president….” Bashar is an opthalmologist by profession, …. He was catapulted into the heir-apparent role when his elder brother, Basil, was killed in a road accident in 1994.
Basil had been groomed for the succession virtually from birth. Bashar seemed apolitical until his brother died…”
(Derek: Syria: a family business ;12 June 2000; The Guardian, London; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/jun/12/comment.israelandthepalestinians)
There were high hopes for better times, as he promised ‘reforms’. They quickly faded. Economically Syria was in retreat as the oil reserves were depleted and foreign investment had further re-structuring Syria’s economy. Syria’s economy faced serious concerns as follows:
“When Bashar replaced his father in 2000, it was clear that economic
changes were needed if the regime was to maintain its power. By 2005 and 2006, Syria’s non-oil budget deficit stood at 22.7 percent and 27.4 percent, respectively, of GDP and Syria was expected to become a net oil importer by the end of the decade. Reflecting that most of the agricultural production was for domestic consumption, Syria had a highly undiversified exports structure with minerals, mostly oil, accounting for almost 70 percent of exports. With declining oil reserves, Syria was becoming an oil-based political, economic, and social system but without the oil. Parts of the regime were aware of these trends. In 2004, Nibras Al-Fadel, an economic adviser to Assad, told the Arabic newspaper Al-Hayat:
‘The factors that make economic reforms in Syria inevitable are mainly internal… the exhaustion of oil reserves and Syria becoming a net oil importer will mean, with other factors remaining equal, a drop in GDP, living standards, and in the revenues of the state. Thus, the current economic trends are going in a direction that is… a time-bomb in the heart of the Syrian economy and society. We only have few years to dismantle this bomb.”
(Azmeh, Shamel; “ Syria’s Passage to Conflict: The End of the “Developmental Rentier Fix” and the Consolidation of New Elite Rule”; Politics & Society; 2016, Vol. 44(4) 499–523)
Instead of dismantling this ‘time-bomb’, Bashar al-Assad chose the path of profiteering for a narrow cadre of his families and members of the top levels of the army and bureaucracy. He instituted even further waves of privatization and foreign capital imports. In essence, these removed any progressive features of the prior era of state led nationalisations:
“President Bashar al-Assad came to power in 2000 promising political reform and the liberalization of the Syrian economy.… By 2000, Syria’s ageing economic system was holding back the country’s growth, with bloated government departments and inefficient state-owned enterprises putting pressure on the government treasury. Thus, even though Syria’s state-driven economic system had formed a major part of the Syrian social contract, it became unsustainable. The depletion of Syria’s oil reserves also put significant pressure on government income, with oil revenue decreasing from 14 percent of GDP in the early 2000s to just four per cent by 2010. This led to a winding back of the state subsidies that had long bolstered the livelihoods of many citizens. In addition, the Syrian economy opened up to foreign investment, with Western businesses such as Costa Coffee and KFC flooding into the market. State assets were privatized, banking and lending laws were relaxed and a consumption tax was implemented. Western construction companies led a construction boom in Damascus and Aleppo. Consequently, Syria displayed strong macroeconomic indicators and sustained an average annual growth rate of five per cent in the second half of the decade before the uprising. The reforms fundamentally changed the way that the Syrian economy operated. One government advisor remarked in 2011, ‘the last five years have been about deconstructing the socialist ideology in favour of the market’. The changes also unravelled the government’s economic relationship with its rural constituents, because the economic reform fomented increased inequality, particularly in rural areas”;
(Conduit, Dara (2017) The Patterns of Syrian Uprising: Comparing Hama in 1980–1982 and Homs in 2011, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 44:1, 73-87; p. 81)
An intent to reverse state led progressive gains was announced very early on. Within 6 months of his rule, Bashar re-erected private property relations in the countryside, reversing the whole history of Ba’thist land Reforms. It was a “counter-revolution” against a progressive aspect of the Ba’th peasant land reforms:
“Under Bashar al-Assad, the deepening of economic liberalization spread to the agricultural sector. Combined with a severe decline in agricultural production and extensive corruption in the state farms, the new policy led to the privatization of all Syrian lands by virtue of Decision 28 on December 16, 2000. According to this decision, the state farmland was parceled out in shares of 3 ha for irrigated land and 8 ha for non-irrigated land. The decision formally allocated “right of use’, and not property. It also called for land to be distributed to, in order of priority, the former owners, the farm workers, and employees of the General administration of the Euphrates Basin.. Thus the change in the property structures and the nature of exploitation was radical, Land passed from state farms to large private domains, which the Ba’th Party ideology had wished to limit. It was indeed a form of counter-revolution”. (Ababsa, Myriam: “The end of a World. Drought and agrarian transformation in North Eastern Syria 2007-2010; Contained in: Raymond Hinnebusch and Tina Zintl, titled “The End of the World: Drought and Agrarian Transformation in Northeast Syria (2007-2010)
This climate of privatization provided a bonanza for the leading families including Bashar’s cousin Rami Makhlouf, or ‘Mr. Ten Percent’:
“Privatization and the opening up of the economy presented an opportunity for entrepreneurship across the Syrian population, but in practice saw state assets and contracts snapped up by a small group of economic elite with close or familial relationships with political leaders. President Assad’s cousin Rami Makhlouf was one of the best-known members of this cohort, becoming known as ‘Mr. Ten Percent’ because he was rumoured to control up to one-tenth of the Syrian economy. The ostentatious show of this wealth in the cities, especially in Damascus, became a hallmark of Bashar al-Assad’s regime.”
(Conduit Ibid; p. 81-82)
“Political control over the new urban economic boom remained a concern to the regime both for self-enrichment and to prevent the emergence of an elite that is not linked to the regime. As a result, regime insiders were at the heart of the new business boom and the first to benefit from these opportunities. The key figure in this process was Assad’s cousin, Rami Makhlouf, who became a symbol for Syria’s economy in the 2000s”.
(Azmeh, Shamel; “ Ibid )
The net result was a catastrophic poverty for the people and a rising inequity. But the Syrian Government was “in denial”, as a Cabinet minister declared “poverty is not very deep”:
“In 2005, a UN poverty report noted that while overall poverty declined in Syria between 1996 and 2003, the gap between rich and poor increased. Landis noted in 2012 that ‘since then, both the wealth gap and poverty have been on the rise’. In addition, despite healthy economic growth, unemployment rates skyrocketed. Although official estimates suggested that unemployment sat at 8.9 per cent, some observers argued that it could have been as high as 22 per cent, with youth unemployment around 26 per cent. Despite five per cent annual GDP growth, jobs were not being added to the market. Moreover, there were no unemployment benefits to support those without work. Rapid inflation compounded these difficulties, with food prices increasing 20 per cent in 2010 alone, well above wage rises. The Syrian Central Bureau of Statistics acknowledged that between 2004 and 2007, the rate of Syrians living in ‘extreme poverty’ increased from 11.4 per cent to 12.3 per cent of the population. In real terms, this meant that more than two million Syrians in the 2000s were unable to afford their basic needs, and by 2007 one in three Syrians was living in ‘poverty’. Data for later years are not available, but it seems likely that poverty levels worsened following the cessation of fuel subsidies in 2008, which led to diesel prices tripling overnight. In 2010, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter, estimated that up to three million Syrians were living in extreme poverty. In the face of this increased socioeconomic deprivation in parts of the population, the Syrian government remained in denial, with the chief of the economic technical team in the Syrian Cabinet, Joma’a Hijazi, saying that ‘poverty is not very deep’ in Syria.”
(Conduit Ibid p. 82).
Compounding the problems for the state, were the numbers of Iraqi refugees from the USA imperialist led war of aggression in Iraq; and Syrian-Lebanese refugees after the murder of Lebanon’s PM Hariri; and finally a drought:
“Other factors… (included) the more than one million Iraqi refugees who flowed into Syria during the Iraq War, adding to employment pressures and raising housing and living costs. Unskilled Syrians, who had long worked as labourers in Lebanon, also lost their jobs after the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and the subsequent Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005. In addition, the drought that rocked Syria between 2006 and 2010 saw a 25 per cent decrease in agricultural output. Given that 20 per cent of Syria’s labour force worked in the agricultural sector, Syria experienced another mass urban migration, similar to that in the lead-up to the 1980–1982 unrest. In 2003–2004 alone, between 1.2 and 1.5 million rural residents moved into Syria’s cities. As a result, the largest cities, including Homs, developed sprawling suburbs on their urban fringes, where rural migrants—Syria’s new urban poor—lived in slum-like conditions. By 2011, Syria was facing considerable economic difficulty, particularly in rural and new urban areas. Citizens from these demographics played a leading role in the unrest. Syria’s poor, young and unemployed, those with ‘little stake in the status quo’, initially drove protests in villages and medium-sized cities, rather than in the Syrian capital.
(Conduit Ibid p. 83)
The murder of Hariri has been well described from a Marxist-Leninist viewpoint by Garbis Altinoglu who was incarcerated by Turkey and tortured, for years. See: “Reactionary terror continues in Lebanon ” Garbis Altinoglu 25.06.2005 in Alliance ML.
Yet, through the first decade of the 21st Century, Bashar’s twin policies, of privatization and opening the doors to foreign ‘development’ continued to hold:
“At the same time, the government implemented a range of policies that aimed to boost private investments and to integrate Syria into the global economy. These policies included a comprehensive trade liberalization process and a free trade agreement with Turkey in 2004 in addition to negotiating with the European Union for a free trade agreement. As a result, Syrian non-oil imports increased from US$ 4.3 billion in 2001 to US$ 14 billion in 2010 with a rapid increase in garments and textiles, simple electronics, food products, shoes and leather products especially from Turkey, China, and Arab countries. …. Syria’s non-oil trade deficit increased to US$ 8.4 billion by 2010, around 15–20 percent of Syria’s GDP. These economic policies opened up more opportunities to private investors. New laws opened sectors such as telecommunications, banking, insurance, real estate development, and education to private investment, followed by the launch of the Damascus Stock Exchange in 2009. The government made a strong attempt to attract
foreign investors, particularly from the oil-rich Gulf States. The dramatic increase in oil prices in the 2000s (up to 2008) meant that these countries had capital surpluses and foreign direct investment to Syria did indeed increase in the 2000s. The majority of these investments went into tourism, real estate development, leisure activities, and financial services.”
(Azmeh, Shamel; “ Syria’s Passage to Conflict: The End of the “Developmental Rentier Fix” and the Consolidation of New Elite Rule”; Politics & Society; 2016, Vol. 44(4) 499–523)
At the end a very narrow circle of a new ruling class – numbering about 100 – who stand with Bashar:
“Under Bashar al-Assad, state-business networks were established or modern- ized, a stock exchange was introduced in 2009, and joint ventures in 2010. The main economic beneficiaries of Syria’s political system under Bashar who alluded to a ‘New Syria’, have been a small core of about 100 individuals which includes political leaders, entrepreneurs, senior army and intelligence officers (or retirees) followed by a second strata of their own sons and relatives and a third strata of business tycoons (and other politicians) All stand to lose substantially should Assad fall”.
(Zuhur, Sherifa; The Syrian Opposition: Salafi and Nationalist Jihadism and Populist Idealism Contemporary Review of the Middle East 2(1&2) 143–163 2015
The state of the people of Syria by 2011
What did Bashar’s policies lead to for the people of Syria?
The initial benefits to the poor from the pseudo-socialism of the early Ba’th, were rapidly dissipated. After 2005 unemployment rocketed. By 2004-2007 1 in 3 families were in poverty:
“In 2005, a UN poverty report noted that while overall poverty declined in Syria between 1996 and 2003, the gap between rich and poor increased. Landis noted in 2012 that ‘since then, both the wealth gap and poverty have been on the rise’. In addition, despite healthy economic growth, unemployment rates skyrocketed. Although official estimates suggested that unemployment sat at 8.9 per cent, some observers argued that it could have been as high as 22 per cent, with youth unemployment around 26 per cent. Despite five per cent annual GDP growth, jobs were not being added to the market. Moreover, there were no unemployment benefits to support those without work. Rapid inflation compounded these
difficulties, with food prices increasing 20 per cent in 2010 alone, well above wage rises. The Syrian Central Bureau of Statistics acknowledged that between 2004 and 2007, the rate of Syrians living in ‘extreme poverty’ increased from 11.4 per cent to 12.3 per cent of the population. In real terms, this meant that more than two million Syrians in the 2000s were
unable to afford their basic needs, and by 2007 one in three Syrians was living in ‘poverty’. … In 2010, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter, estimated that up to three million Syrians were living in extreme poverty.”
(Conduit, Dara (2017) Ibid)
It was especially bad in certain parts of the country. Since Homs figured early in the Syrian uprising of 2011, it is worth discussing this in a little bit more detail:
“There were a number of indicators prior to the uprising that showed the extent of economic strain in Homs, both in the city and the province. The UN reported that between 2008 and July 2009, the Syrian government provided 3037 ‘severely affected households’ in Homs province with food assistance. … Another indicator of economic pressure appeared in statistics of ‘minimum caloric requirement’ published by a Syrian research institute, which identified the relationship between average income in each region and the cost of purchasing enough staple foods to meet the minimum daily food intake. The research found that six per cent more residents in Homs Governorate were unable to cover basic food expenses than the average Syrian rate, making Homs the third poorest province in the country. Accordingly, Mousab Azzawi from the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights argued that poverty and government corruption were key factors behind Homs’ participation in the unrest. This was underscored by a Homs resident who told The Economist that ‘this poverty was in part what inspired people to take to the streets’. (Conduit, Dara (2017) Ibid).
Part 2: The 2011 Uprising and the bloody aftermath of the Syrian Civil War
All accounts of Bashar al-Assad’s approach to the state apparatus agree, that initially as he took power, there were hopes for a freer political climate. However only a very brief flirtation with non-party discussants took place. Assad quickly showed that he would not tolerate criticism of state institutions. Indeed the state’s repressive apparatus, and its corporate control of all political activity including the trades unions, was kept intact.
It remained then a fascist state.
This informs how Assad and his forces approached the people’s uprising. The Syrian people, in their uprising, were spurred by their declining economic status – as described in the preceding section.
The events of 2011 in Syria, were labeled the ‘Syrian Spring’. Of course this refers to the prior wave of events the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ of 2010-2011. The eruption of the people’s wills in the Middle East, had followed the uprising inspired by the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi. He had been a poor street-vendor in Tunisia who had been persecuted by police.
It is unclear why there has been confusion amongst some Marxist-Leninists about the events in Syria. To some the notion of collaboration with Islamist forces may have been problematic. But this was a problem also faced in Tunisia – where resolute Marxist-Leninist leadership adopted a non-sectarian path.
It may help to consider that there are clear parallels between Tunisia and Syria: both were repressive authoritarian regimes. In Tunisia the ‘Uprising’ became rapidly generalised into a ‘Revolution’. The distinction is discussed below.
The Tunisian Revolution then quickly spread hope and inspiration around the Arab states, and a frank emulation. Similar events flared across the Middle East, right up to 2012. Syria erupted in 2011. We will draw on some aspects of the Tunisian example to guide us. As far as we know most parties calling themselves Marxist-Leninist supported the Tunisian Arab Spring.
Lessons for the Syrian Spring from the Tunisian Precedent
We cannot here provide a detailed analysis of the Tunisian example. But we will draw out some relevant points for Syria, to be made. Tunisia is important to consider as, undoubtedly a significant factor in Tunisia is the presence of a Marxist-Leninist party. This was a leader of events. Hamma Hammami (Secretary-general of the Tunisian Workers Party [PCOT]) has given a sober appraisal of events. These suggest some similar observations and parallels can be made about Syria, which regrettably lacks a ML-ist party.
i) Revolution or uprising?
Hammami characterises events in Tunisia as “revolution, not just an uprising or just a spontaneous popular movement”, because “the people who heavily participated in this revolution, targeted the regime”:
“As-Safir: This question is about the transitional period. Amid developments that occurred during the last period and which coincided with the several successes of the Ennahda Movement in imposing their conditions, do you think that the transition period is over and that we have entered into a new political era?
Hammami: No, we are still at the stage of democratic transition, and it is only normal at this stage that we face many difficulties. The origin of these difficulties must be pointed out. What happened in Tunisia was a revolution, not just an uprising or just a spontaneous popular movement. It was a revolution because the people, who heavily participated in this revolution, targeted the regime. These popular movements were led by general principles and objectives: job opportunities, freedom and national dignity. That is what made it a revolution.” Tunisian opposition head: Progressive forces in Arab world must coordinate.” (Interview with Hamma Hammami, by al-Monitor; Nov. 2, 2013; at: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2014/01/tunisia-opposition-leader-interview.html#ixzz4WWsPXrF2
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2014/01/tunisia-opposition-leader-interview.html#ixzz4WWs6iSsK)
ii) Was it ‘spontaneous’?
As defined by a long pre-history of consciousness of the need to revolt, the Tunisian rising was not ‘spontaneous’:
“Q: Some people present the revolution in Tunisia as a spontaneous event…
A: Hamma Hammami. This is false. They say that in order to discredit and deny the role of the revolutionary and progressive forces in the opposition during the last years. This is also a way to say that one should try to find a way out of this revolution with the former party in power, that the traditional politicians must regain the leadership of a movement which does not have one. This movement was not spontaneous except to the degree that it was not organised at the national level. It did not have a single leadership or a common program. But this does not mean that it lacked consciousness or organisation. The consciousness exists, since the actors in this movement are above all members of the left, progressives, trade unionists and human rights activists. They are young unemployed graduates who belong to the student movement. Our party is there, our forces are present. The Islamists, on the other hand, have not really participated. This is why, in this revolution, there were no religious slogans. But politically, the Islamists supported the movement”.
(‘The Dictator Has Been Defeated, But Not Yet the Dictatorship’ Hamma Hammami: Interview with the spokesperson of the Communist Party of the Workers of Tunisia (PCOT) by Baudoin Deckers, the Party of Labour of Belgium (PTB), and posted at http://solidarite-internationale-pcf.over-blog.net/ Accessed at: http://www.revolutionarydemocracy.org/rdv17n1/hammami.htm
(ii) How organized was it?
There was a lack of a national organizing leadership, which was a “strong deficiency” that “plagued” the revolution:
“But the strong deficiency that plagued this revolution was the absence of a centralized national leadership that was supposed to take over after the fall of former President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. The absence of this leadership is what left us stuck in the middle of the road. In other words, the head of tyranny fell, but the system continued as is, and we have been in conflict with this system ever since. The Constituent Assembly was imposed, the dissolution of the ruling party was imposed, the dissolution of the political police (security) was imposed, and freedom, freedom of political parties, freedom of the press and freedom to demonstrate were all imposed, but the process did not take place”. (Interview with Hamma Hammami, by al-Monitor; Nov. 2, 2013; Ibid).
“This movement was not spontaneous except to the degree that it was not organised at the national level. It did not have a single leadership or a common program. But this does not mean that it lacked consciousness or organisation.” (‘The Dictator Has Been Defeated, But Not Yet the Dictatorship’); Hamma Hammami: Interview by Baudoin Deckers; Ibid
“A weak point has been the lack of a nationally unique address. It has been much speculation about the spontaneous nature of the revolution, but it was really something spontaneous in the sense of a lack of awareness or a total lack of organization. This revolution took a very broad popular character, and in each region and locality were political activists, trade unionists, human rights fighters … who have led and participated in the fighting, as did our party. There was a degree of awareness, organization, which has enabled the movement to resist repression, which has enabled the movement to find each time the appropriate instructions and forms needed. But again, at the national level that has been on the lack of a firmly established political force, and this applies to us and the other forces, as we are concerned by the severe repression suffered in recent years that we were hit hard”.
(Interview Hammammi with R.Marco; with Partido Comunista de España (marxista-leninista) PCE ML; March 5, 2011. Tunisia.
Accessed at: https://espressostalinist.com/2011/11/25/pce-m-l-hamma-hammami-interview/
(iii) Can revolutionaries work with Islamists?
The revolution was a united front that was supported by Islamists, but who were not able to raise Islamic slogans as they ‘have not really participated’:
“The Islamists, on the other hand, have not really participated. This is why, in this revolution, there were no religious slogans. But politically, the Islamists supported the movement”.
(‘The Dictator Has Been Defeated, But Not Yet the Dictatorship’ Hamma Hammami: Interview by Baudoin Deckers; Ibid)
(iv) The form of revolution taken was as “committees”.
The form that the revolution took, was one of “committees” or “popular assemblies”:
“At the organisational level, the militants are very quickly organised into committees. From the first day of this revolution, in some villages there was a lack of real power. Together with the democrats, we called on the people to organise. That is what they did in the villages and regions, sometimes in assemblies, which are called ‘popular assemblies’ or ‘assemblies to safeguard the revolution’, sometimes in committees or leagues. Here in Tunis, the people are organised into popular or neighbourhood committees. They choose their leaders from among the most active militants in the course of this revolution. Their structure is still weak and embryonic. There is not yet real centralisation at the national level. But, little by little, these committees are being transformed into committees that are discussing the situation and the future, and what the people can do.
(‘The Dictator Has Been Defeated, But Not Yet the Dictatorship’ Hamma Hammami: Interview by Baudoin Deckers; Ibid)
(v) United Front
These Committees were effectively a united front of “liberals, Islamists, independents, and of course our party (PCOT)” :
“I must say that the efforts of our Party and other opposition parties, for more than six years, have created a Committee for Freedom and Rights. Is a group in which there are liberals, Islamists, independents, and of course our party”.
(Interview Hammami with R.Marco; March 5, 2011; Ibid)
(vi) Key element of non-sectarianism
The implementation to wield this unity was through non-sectarianism. This approach of ‘flexibility’ as the National Guild of Lawyers put it after interviewing Hammami, was long standing – “in the early 1990s” – and built a “collaborative stance against repression”. In Hammami’s own words the POCT and the Islamists: “came to a very important result with commonalities”:
“Parti des ouvriers communistes tunisiens (POCT) – The Tunisian Communist Workers Party is a Marxist–Leninist political party founded in January 1986. The POCT has had an interesting history of cooperation with the moderate Tunisian Islamists which reveals a process of on-going analysis and a capacity for policy adjustment. Whereas other leftists supported or at least did not organize against the government’s suppression of Islamists, starting in the early 1990s the POCT abandoned its previous political isolation in favor of a collaborative stance against repression. In 2005, as government repression increased, the political alliance between Islamists, leftists, liberals, and human rights activists was formalized with the formation of the October 18 Coalition for Liberty, Freedom and Human Rights (October 18 Coalition). The agreement reached by the Coalition was set out in two main official documents. The first addressed the role of religion in Tunisia, supporting freedom of religion because religion is a personal matter, calling for equal treatment for women, and condemning polygamy. The second dealt with the nature of Tunisia’s future civil democratic regime as one which has the people at its source and respect for private and public human rights as its guiding principles. These documents and the coalition formed around them contributed to the fading of ideological disagreements and eventually facilitated an atmosphere of revolutionary unity that centered on basic shared demands for multi-party democracy, freedom of expression and belief, and equality. While the POCT opposes capitalism and globalization, given the current stage of development of Tunisian society, these shared demands remain at the forefront of its program for the immediate future”.
(Delegation of Attorneys from National Lawyers Guild (US), Haldane Society of Socialist Lawyers (UK), and Mazlumder (Turkey): ‘Promises And Challenges: The Tunisian Revolution Of 2010-2011’; National Lawyers Guild p.142, Volume 68 Number 3 Fall 2011; pp 129-174. At: https://www.nlg.org/nlg-review/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2016/11/68-3-final-digital-1.pdf
“There is a political unit within the popular movement, they shout the same slogans, which can be summarized as “freedom and national dignity.” Unit slogans are left Tunisia, unity among our party, the TCO, and other leftist forces. It should be emphasized that the actions undertaken, there has been no sectarian slogans, religious, for example, or of a partisan nature. Always seek unitary political slogans, socio-economic and anti-imperialist…… Until late 2005, when the left was proposing something, Islamists boycotted it, and when the proposals came from the Islamists, it was the left that boycotted. That is, there was a clear division. After 2005, we achieved a common work around the axis of freedom for the political forces work together to reflect on the differences with the Islamists, women’s rights, freedom of conscience, on the design of a system democratic, or a regime based on popular sovereignty. With the Islamists came to a very important result with commonalities that led to a democratic platform on the right of women, freedom of conscience, and created an intellectual and political climate favorable. Since 2008, with the demonstrations in the mining area of Gaza, ideological tensions subsided within Tunisian political opposition, to make way for agreements on political and socio-economic problems, in the revolt in the mining, all left opposition, all, including Islamists, supported the motion. From then on all issues of the Tunisian political scene, were reached with the Islamists, the liberal reformers, and so on., Which helped create a favorable climate”. (Interview Hammami with R.Marco; March 5, 2011; Ibid)
We submit that very similar analyses – and hence strategy – can be applied to Syria – in the opening salvoes of the Syrian Spring – at least up till 2013.
In all his analyses, Hammami points out that the danger of sectarian strife would split the united progressive movement. A sectarian drive was to be used. The Syrian rulers knew that their only hope was that of the old imperialists – to once more – divide and rule the working classes. Early on, the Syrian government stalwart Rami Makhlouf warned that the ruling elite would not hesitate to pull the sectarian trigger:
“An interview with the business face of the new elite, Rami Makhlouf, by Anthony Shadid of the New York Times, two months after the start of protests captured this outlook. Shadid writes:
Troubled by the greatest threat to its four decades of rule, the ruling family, Rami suggested, has conflated its survival with the existence of the minority sect that views the protests not as legitimate demands for change but rather as the seeds of civil war… He warned the alternative—led by what he described as Salafists, the government’s name for Islamists—would mean war at home and perhaps abroad.
“We won’t accept it,” he said. “People will fight against them. Do you know what this means? It means catastrophe. And we have a lot of fighters. Considering the history of Alawites in Syria and the discrimination against them in pre-Ba’ath (and pre-Assad) Syria, it is not surprising that mobilizing them was relatively easy. Calling protesters Islamist radicals who wanted to establish Islamic rule was a major element of this mobilization. The decision to use excessive force to crush the protest movement was another crucial factor in effectively locking Alawites behind the regime.”
(Azmeh, Shamel; Ibid).
Very shortly, Makhlouf’s threat was realized. The Syrian government released hundreds of Middle Eastern Fundamentalists into freedom. There was never any doubt that these released zealots would move to organize their ‘Caliphate’ – and serve to alienate secular forces from the events in Syria.
Differences between Tunisia and Syria in the conduct of their ‘Springs’
We have pointed out, that one key difference between the experience of the working and toiling classes in Tunisia – from those of Syria – was the presence of a Marxist-Leninist party. This was absent in Syria.
Another key difference was the relative freedom in Tunisia from the interference of foreign powers. The ‘Arab Spring’ at its start in Tunisia was especially free of foreign imperialist interference. This was decidedly not so in Syria where a number of other foreign powers had ample time and wish to foster spurious and diversionary paths. Both the USA and Putin’s Russia, and many of the bordering Middle Eastern reactionary countries had their fingers in the pie.
Many fast moving events have taken place since the start of the uprising in Syria in 2011. By November 2011 alone, UN estimates totaled 5,000 people had died. This work can only provide a brief reprise of those events. In the Appendix we provide a shortened timeline of key events in Syrian uprising, drawn from several sources. Since we are unable to provide a blow-by-blow account of the Syrian conflict, we recommend a source of information: https://syriasources.org/
Here we will only distill events characterizing some key players, in order to enable a preliminary broad Marxist-Leninist concluding thesis. We divide up the period from 2011 to 2018 in 5 broad phases. These phases overlap in time, as processes may have begun in earlier phase. We suggest these may be helpful markers in the confusing turmoil of events.
Phase 1: The short lived Syrian Spring – Uprising, and Revolutionary Surge from Below to Islamicist domination – 2011-2013
The initial uprising from below, that shook both the city of Daara and Syria as a whole, was first a loose, and angry, spontaneous uprising. Daara and other peripheral parts of Syria, around the countryside – were the start of the movement”
“in Syria it was chiefly a revolt of the peasantry-a protest by the Sunni periphery against what was perceived as the Ba’ath regime turning its back on the country’s rural population. This explains why the earliest sites of the insurgency were in smaller towns and cities located in impoverished regions, from Daraa in the south to Idlib in the north. It was Daraa that would become the epicentre of opposition to the regime in early 2011: first ignited by the detention of schoolchildren for anti-regime graffiti, before morphing into demands for both their release along with that of other political prisoners, and then fully-fledged anti-regime protests targeting emergency laws, poor socio-economic conditions, corruption, police brutality, and arbitrary detention. Further highlighting its economic vulnerabilities, there was an insistence on also curtailing restrictive laws that forbade buying and selling of property and measures to alleviate poverty in the area “From these rural towns, the revolt would spread to the countryside. By mid-2012, the revolution came to the major cities, Damascus and Aleppo”.
(Amar Diwakar; “Affirming the Syrian Revolution: Experiments in Autonomy”; Economic & Political Weekly; May 27, 2017)
By Hammami’s definitions and terminology, this Syrian uprising quickly became a revolution with a conscious direction forming pre-revolutionary committees, adopting the name of “Local Coordination Committees (LCC)”:
“When the Syrian uprising began in March, local committees emerged in towns and cities across Syria. These committees took responsibility for meeting, planning and organizing events on the ground within their own communities. Over time, the committees have sought greater coordination between themselves, in order to synchronize their activities, movements on the ground and political positions. Together the committees formed the Local Coordinating Committees of Syria, an umbrella organization with members from most cities and many smaller towns across Syria”. “About the LCCS”; https://www.webcitation.org/65EV9Q1sK?url=http://www.lccsyria.org/about
The Local Coordinating Committees (LCC)
As observers pointed out the LCC arose “from the streets”:
“An opposition drawing its strength from Syria’s restive streets has begun to emerge as a pivotal force in the country’s once-dormant politics, organizing across disparate regions through the Internet, reaching out to fearful religious minorities and earning the respect of more recognized, but long divided dissidents. The Local Coordination Committees… have become the wild cards in what is shaping up as a potentially decisive stage in Syria, with some protests spreading Thursday to Aleppo, Syria’s second-largest city… Their success has stemmed from an ability to stay decentralized, work in secret and fashion their message in the most nationalist of terms. … The youthful demonstrators who make up these coordination committees have bridged divides of sect, religion and class to try to formulate a leadership. … Rami Nakhle, an activist in Damascus who fled to Lebanon this year… said the first committee arose in Daraya, a restless suburb of Damascus, and the best-organized are in Syria’s third-largest city, Homs, which has emerged as a nexus of the uprising. There, activists came together in committees in the revolt’s second week… nationwide, 100 to 200 people are fully engaged in the committees, with the majority of them overwhelmingly young. … Committees have charted different directions: in Hama, activists have occupied the city’s Aasi Square in nightly protests; in Duma, a Damascus suburb, the committee has sought to begin a campaign of civil disobedience, urging residents to stop paying water, electricity and phone bills… In statements.. the committees have reached out to minorities in a remarkably diverse country. The coordination among cities has created solidarities that never existed — with a poor and neglected region in southern Syria known as the Houran or between cities with historic rivalries, like Homs and Hama.” (Anthony Shadid, Coalition of Factions From the Streets Fuels a New Opposition in Syria, New York Times, June 30, 2011 https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/world/middleeast/01syria.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all)
However ardent, they were tragically devoid of sensible strategy. Of course, they were also devoid of Marxist-Leninist leadership. The LCC adopted naïve positions eschewing the role of armed struggle. True they also eschewed ‘foreign international military intervention’, But the initial refusal to consider arms condemned them to early confusion, from which they would lose the initiative to various Islamic fundamentalists. This was presaged from the strategically incorrect analysis and wording in this “Statement to the Syrian People”:
[The following statement was issued by the Local Coordinating Committees in Syria on Monday August 29, 2011, on their Facebook page.]
“In an unprecedented move over the past several days, Syrians in Syria and abroad have been calling for Syrians to take up arms, or for international military intervention. This call comes five and a half months of the Syrian regime’s systematic abuse of the Syrian people, whereby tens of thousands of peaceful protesters have been detained and tortured, and more than 2,500 killed. The regime has given every indication that it will continue its brutal approach, while the majority of Syrians feel they are unprotected in their own homeland in the face of the regime’s crimes.
While we understand the motivation to take up arms or call for military intervention, we specifically reject this position as we find it unacceptable politically, nationally, and ethically. Militarizing the revolution would minimize popular support and participation in the revolution. Moreover, militarization would undermine the gravity of the humanitarian catastrophe involved in a confrontation with the regime.
Militarization would put the Revolution in an arena where the regime has a distinct advantage, and would erode the moral superiority that has characterized the Revolution since its beginning.
Our Palestinian brothers are experienced in leading by example. They gained the support of the entire Palestinian community, as well as world sympathy, during the first Intifada (“stones”). The second Intifada, which was militarized, lost public sympathy and participation. It is important to note that the Syrian regime and Israeli enemy used identical measures in the face of the two uprisings.
The objective of Syria`s Revolution is not limited to overthrowing the regime. The Revolution also seeks to build a democratic system and national infrastructure that safeguards the freedom and dignity of the Syrian people. Moreover, the Revolution is intended to ensure independence and unity of Syria, its people, and its society.
We believe that the overthrow of the regime is the initial goal of the Revolution, but it is not an end in itself. The end goal is freedom for Syria and all Syrians. The method by which the regime is overthrown is an indication of what Syria will be like post-regime. If we maintain our peaceful demonstrations, which include our cities, towns, and villages; and our men, women, and children, the possibility of democracy in our country is much greater. If an armed confrontation or international military intervention becomes a reality, it will be virtually impossible to establish a legitimate foundation for a proud future Syria.
We call on our people to remain patient as we continue our national Revolution. We will hold the regime fully responsible and accountable for the current situation in the country, the blood of all martyrs – civilian and military, and any risks that may threaten Syria in the future, including the possibility of internal violence or foreign military intervention.
To the victory of our Revolution and to the glory of our martyrs.
The Local Coordinating Committees in Syria”. At: http://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/24360/Syrian-Local-Coordinating-Committees-on-Taking-Up-Arms-and-Foreign-Intervention
As voices from below, the LCC were keen to point out the foreign dependence of other dissidents:
“But in past weeks, the committees’ profiles have grown sharply, as they seize a mantle of dissent that a divided exiled opposition, sometimes tainted by links to the United States and other countries, cannot claim. Prominent dissidents in Damascus like Louay Hussein, Aref Dalila and Faez Sara are respected but speak largely for themselves.” Anthony Shadid, Coalition of Factions From the Streets Fuels a New Opposition in Syria, New York Times, June 30, 2011 https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/world/middleeast/01syria.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all
But as the revolution from below proceeded apace, of course pressure from the armed might of the Asaad state was intense. As the LCC refused the inevitable need for arms, various other forces arose, and seized credibility. As elements of the LCC were drawn away, belatedly – the LCC shifted on both arming, and on the role of foreign intervention:
“At the start of the revolution, the LCC was opposed to foreign military intervention and the arming of the opposition. However, its position gradually shifted as regime violence escalated. With the formation of the Free Syrian Army in late 2011 and its expanding role in early 2012, the LCC began calling on the international community to take a stronger stand against the Assad regime while recognizing the role of the Free Syrian Army. On August 8, 2012, the LCC urged leaders of various military councils and battalions across Syria to sign a code of conduct that established the moral and political principles for military action. The LCC also provides logistical and technological support to the Free Syrian Army as well as intelligence regarding regime activities and the Syrian army’s movements and whereabouts.
Due to the militarization of the Syrian conflict, however, the LCC has lost ground among civilian activists and is being sidelined by groups that are actively involved in the armed rebellion. Unlike other grassroots networks—such as the Syrian Revolution General Commission and the Supreme Council for the Leadership of the Syrian Revolution—the LCC refuses to provide financial support or weapons to the Free Syrian Army or any armed groups, as that would betray its ethos and policy of nonviolence. In fact, despite being one of the largest and best-organized opposition groups inside Syria, the LCC receives the least amount of funding due to its nonmilitary stance and lack of religious affiliation. This has become a source of tension within the organization with some local committees now quitting the LCC in order to take part in the armed struggle”. (Diwan: Middle East Insights from Carnegie; Local Coordination Committees of Syria http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/50426?lang=en
As they shifted under fire (literally) to understanding the need for a broader organization, the LCC supported the Syrian National Council (SNC). But subsequently the LCC withdrew attacking the SNC for “being under Muslim Brotherhood control” and for not enabling women:
“In October 2011, the LCC supported the formation of the Syrian National Council (SNC), recognizing it as the legitimate representative of the Syrian opposition, and placed a number of LCC representatives in the SNC’s Revolutionary Movement. However, relations between the LCC and the SNC have gradually deteriorated, and on May 17, 2012, the LCC issued a statement accusing the SNC of betraying “the spirit and demands of the Syrian Revolution” and marginalizing its representatives. Since August 2012, the LCC has backed the call for the formation of a national transitional government. According to the LCC, this government must be formed in close consultation with the LCC and the Free Syrian Army and other opposition groups and should represent the Syrian nation in its entirety. … In early November 2012, the Executive Committee of the LCC announced its formal withdrawal from the SNC on November 9, accusing the council of being under Muslim Brotherhood control and of failing to reform into a truly representative structure. LCC spokesperson Rafif Jouejati additionally condemned the SNC’s failure to elect any women to its new General Secretariat. However, a number of LCC representatives within the SNC’s Revolutionary Movement bloc, including Manhal Bareesh, Zeina Bitar, and Homam Haddad, rejected this decision and retained active membership. On November 12, the LCC issued a statement recognizing the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces as the legitimate representative of the revolution and the Syrian people, affirming its participation in the new structure”.
(Diwan: Middle East Insights from Carnegie; Local Coordination Committees of Syria http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/50426?lang=en)
The SNC would effectively usurp the potential longer term role of the LCC – before it itself was made redundant in Syria’s maelstorm. Who made up the SNC and when was it formed?
Syrian National Council (SNC)
As foreign imperialist nations squirmed as the raw brutality of the Assad counter-attack unfolded, they nonetheless did not wish to de-throne Asaad. Least of all did these imperialists wish to assist the empowerment of the ‘street’ LCCs. Their convenient compradors – the face of an ‘acceptable’ opposition – to Assad – were to be the SNC:
“The SNC was announced in Istanbul on October 2, 2011. …. the SNC was set up by a coalition of groups and individuals, including signatories of the Damascus Declaration (2005), The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, various Kurdish factions, representatives of the Local Coordination Committees, other political parties or platforms including Damascus Spring, and the National Bloc, representatives of the Alawi and Assyrian communities, and some independent figures. By March 2012, the SNC claimed it comprised 90 percent of the opposition parties and movements”.
(Diwan: Middle East Insights from Carnegie;”Syrian national Council”; at http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/48334?lang=en)
But the internal divisions within, and the lack of internal Syrian credibility for these largely expatriate forces remained a problem. As we saw above, by November 8th 2012, representatives of the LCC in the SNC withdrew stating there had been a failure to make “serious” reforms (Diwan Ibid). All this lack of credibility led the imperialists to withhold full support, until a reorganization:
“On October 31, 2012, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that the United States no longer considered the SNC to be “the visible leader of the opposition” and called for a new opposition leadership that would more effectively represent “those who are in the frontlines, fighting and dying today to obtain their freedom.” After reorganization talks on November 7, 2012, the council elected George Sabra as president”. (Diwan: Middle East Insights from Carnegie;”Syrian national Council”; at http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/48334?lang=en)
Accordingly a new formation on November 11th , 2012, appeared – the Syrian National Coalition for Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (SNCROF), in Doha – capital of Qatar. As the Economist commented, the members were “in contrast to the long-exiled men who have been leading the SNC”:
“The make-up of the new 63-member body certainly improves on the Syrian National Council (SNC), previously promoted as the opposition’s main umbrella group. Now led by a Christian politician, George Sabra, the council was folded into the national coalition after being offered 22 seats. In contrast to the long-exiled men who have been leading the SNC, the new coalition is headed–for the time being–by Ahmed Moaz al-Khatib, a moderate imam from one of Syria’s grandest religious and national institutions, the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus. Banned from preaching under the Assad regime, he left the country only in July. Mr Khatib has been given two impressive deputies: Riad Seif, a prominent businessman and former parliamentarian, and Suheir Atassi, a noted female activist, both of them former political prisoners widely respected by Syrians of all hues.
(“Higher hopes; Syria’s opposition” The Economist. (Nov. 17, 2012), p.48).
Free Syrian Army
Some army officers and junior ranks in the Syrian Army of Assad had doubts, when they saw the brutality expected of them, in putting the Syrian people back into their place. A certain number of them defected to the ranks of the people. They formed the FSA. However, this was always stymied from lack of money and lack of arms. Even though defectors brought at times Assad arms to the FSA, this was a chronic shortage. Moreover, their relationship to the SNC was always fraught. Ongoing disagreement about the extent to which there should be warfare (an armed resistance) against the Assad regime, made it quite unclear as to how firmly the SNC would support the FSA. Moreover, the extent of the SNC’s reliance on foreign powers was another potential source of contention:
“The SNC’s unity and cohesion have also been strained by disagreements over how to respond to the regime’s increased resorting to violence and to the council’s initial reluctance to back armed resistance, arm rebels inside Syria, or support demands for outside intervention to protect civilians.
On March 12, 2012, the SNC announced a clear position, demanding the establishment and protection of humanitarian corridors and the imposition of a no-fly zone over the whole of Syria. It also said it was setting up a coordination bureau to channel arms from unspecified foreign governments to the Free Syrian Army (FSA).
Despite these policy shifts, the SNC’s relations with the Free Syrian Army have fluctuated. The announcement after the April 2012 Friends of Syria meeting in Istanbul that Gulf Cooperation Council member states would channel funds through the SNC to pay the salaries of the Free Syrian Army did not lead to a more effective relationship between the two bodies nor to the emergence of a unified military command structure. Free Syrian Army commander, Colonel Riad al-Asaad remained outspoken in his criticism of the SNC, although the council has enjoyed a somewhat smoother relationship with the head of the military council, Major General Mustafa al-Sheikh. The decision to adopt a military strategy against the regime also exacerbated differences between the SNC and some of the other opposition factions, in particular the National Coordination Body for Democratic Change. “
(Diwan: Middle East Insights from Carnegie;”Syrian national Council”; at http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/48334?lang=en)
But the FSA suffered from the same problems as the SNC. Namely that it was largely based on an exile force, and that it was reliant on foreign imperialists or their puppets (European countries, USA, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar):
“Although the Free Syrian Army (FSA) emerged in the summer of 2011, appeared to… to herald the formation of an organised and moderate armed Syrian opposition, it quickly fell victim to the fact that its leadership was based outside Syria, in refugee camps in Southern Turkey. Not only was its command-and-control potential thus hampered from the start, but its financial support was divided according to the respective interests of regional countries such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar as well as governments in Europe and the US”;
(Lister, Charles R. “Al-Qaeda, The Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency”; N.York 2015; OUP; p. 2)
“The few FSA groups that did evolve into genuine insurgent organisations with a broad geographical reach, such as Kataib al-Farouq, soon fell victim to government siege and a divided, external opposition-support structure, headed by Gulf states whose individual interests meant their actions too often proved contradictory and divisive, rather than mutually productive”.
(Lister, Charles (2014) Assessing Syria’s Jihad, Adelphi Papers, 54:447-448, 71-98
But the FSA was becoming dwarfed, and would ultimately be eclipsed:
“The FSA was only one of many armed insurgent movements to emerge in mid-2011. From June 2011 a number of more Islamist-minded factions were coming together and setting up bases outside Damascus in Homs and in Syria’s North. These were groups such as Kataib Ahrar al-Sham – which would become one of the largest and arguably most powerful Syrian insurgent group – Suqor al-Sham and Liwa al-Islam, as well as the al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra.”
(Lister, Charles R. “Al-Qaeda, The Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency”; N.York 2015; OUP; p. 3)
The Kurdish Forces
As had already become evident, the SNC and the SNCROF, were riven by dissension. Ultimately, the SNC and its progeny the SNCROF were totally reliant on foreign imperialism, and did nothing within Syria. It is necessary now to consider the position of major blocs within the SNC, and of these the Kurdish forces are pre-eminent. The Kurds had been moving to fulfilling their historic mission of nationhood, and naturally saw the Syrian crisis as a step to this.
This made both the SNC itself and the Brotherhood, very suspicious and determined to resist Kurdish demands for federalism. External forces were always critical to forming the policy undertaken, and Kurdish representative of the SNC saw the hand of Turkey – in resisting the demands for federalism. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood had ties with the Turkish ‘Justice and Development Party:” of Erdogan. Finally under much discussion:
“The SNC sought to mend this rift by publishing the National Charter: the Kurdish Issue in Syria on April 2, recognizing “the national rights of the Kurdish people.” This document fell short, however, of meeting Kurdish demands and prompted the Kurdish National Council to break with the SNC. Kurdish representation in the SNC is now limited to Executive Committee member Abdul Basit Sida and the Future Party.”
(Diwan: Middle East Insights from Carnegie;”Syrian national Council”; at http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/48334?lang=en)
We will return to the Kurds in more detail, later.
Second Phase: Incursion by Islamic Fundamentalist Groupings 2012-2016
Since the phrase is used frequently, we must first ask what is Islamic Fundamentalism? One French self-identified Marxist – Maxime Rodinson – defined it as follows:
“We can subsume under the term “Islamic fundamentalism” all those movements that think that an integral application of Islamic dogmas and practices including in the realms of politics and society, would lead a Muslim community or even the whole world back to a harmonious, ideal state, a duplication of the first, Muslim community in Medina between 622 and 632 of the Christian era….. Islamic fundamentalism is a temporary, transitory movement, but it could last another 30 or 50 years-I don’t know how long. Where fundamentalism isn’t in power it will continue to be an ideal, as long as the basic frustration and discontent persist that lead people to take extreme positions”.
(Maxime Rodinson on Islamic “Fundamentalism”: An Unpublished Interview with Gilbert Achcar
Author(s): Gilbert Achcar and Peter Drucker
Source: Middle East Report, No. 233 (Winter, 2004), pp. 2-4).
The failure of effective fighting forces of the LCC, and then the FSA – led to a slide towards more well organized groupings.
“It was within this context of insurgent proliferation, moderate failures to unify and escalating violence and brutality that Jihadists found and established .. solid foundations”.
(Lister, Charles R. “Al-Qaeda, The Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency”; N.York 2015; OUP; p. 3)
In this section we highlight the responsibility of both the Syrian state and the imperialists – most especially the USA – in fostering a situation where the Islamic fundamentalists forces captured the narrative, and thereby out-numbered and out-gunned the secular resistance.
As Charles Lister, probably one of the best authorities on the myriads of fighting forces in Syria puts it as follows:
“The conflict in Syria has changed significantly since the first signs of an armed insurgency began to emerge in late May 2011. While the largely nationalist-minded Free Syrian Army (FSA) gradually devolved into an amorphous gathering of locally focused militia units with minimal command links to a leadership in Turkey, the capabilities and influence of Salaist and Sunni jihadist groups expanded considerably”.
(Charles Lister (2014) Assessing Syria’s Jihad, Adelphi Papers, 54:447-448, 71-98)
“The rapid proliferation of armed factions meant that by mid-2013, the Syrian insurgency contained at least 1,000 operationally independent insurgent units, some of which were entirely dependent upon external support, while others remained limited to extremely localised theatres. …. As such, the Syrian jihad has become a truly international phenomenon, with at least 15,000 foreign nationals from at least 90 countries having engaged in combat in the country since 2011. This represents a rate of foreign fighter influx into a civil conflict that is unprecedented in modern history”.
(Lister, Charles (2014) Assessing Syria’s Jihad, Ibid.
The scale of foreign fighter flooding into Syria from the West, where they were alienated by a racism, has been extraordinary:
“Intelligence officials from the UK… estimated that that country’s citizen flow into Syria from 600-700 in March 2015 (grew to) 1,600 the following month with an additional 5 citizens leaved for Syria every month.” (Lister, Charles R. “Al-Qaeda, The Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency”; New York 2015; OUP; p. 2)
We recognise that Lister has had links with academic outposts of American imperialism. As the ‘Angry Arab’ puts it:
“In addition to his work with Brookings and subsequently the Middle East Institute, Lister is also a part of the ‘Track II Syria Initiative’. During the course of this work, which in his own description has been “100 percent funded by Western governments”, Lister has evidently formed close links with members of a number of armed groups inside of Syria. At times, his role appears to have been effectively to act as a West-facing public relations agent for these groups, announcing their name changes and mergers and carrying out damage limitation exercises in the wake of their frequently brutal violence. No incident revealed this more starkly than the horrific beheading of a young Palestinian boy by the Nur al-Din al-Zinki Brigade in July 2016. Lister had previously championed al-Zinki — a recipient of both funding and arms from the US Government — as one of the groups that formed the 70,000 supposedly ‘moderate’ fighters in Syria that David Cameron claimed existed in November 2015. When footage of the beheading emerged online, Lister tweeted almost immediately that he had just spoken to the group and that it would issue a statement in response to it shortly. Later the same day, Lister reiterated his argument that it was “utterly absurd ” to compare al-Zinki and other groups to ISIS or al-Qaeda and that this was “literally beyond debateable”. To do so after having just watched the group’s members taunt and then behead a child was shocking. Furthermore, Lister’s paradoxical plan for ostensibly “winding down” the conflict in Syria — written after the al-Zinki beheading had occurred — included the US dramatically increasing arms shipments to rebel groups.”
(“Charles Lister and the ‘moderate’ Syrian rebels.” Angry Arab News Service, 14 Dec. 2016. Infotrac Newsstand, http://link.galegroup.com/apps/doc/A474396763/STND?u=upenn_main&sid=STND&xid=8e444561. Accessed 14 Apr. 2018.)
Nonetheless, Lister is a useful source. No one for example, contests this view that:
“The two principal jihadist actors in Syria are the al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra and the now notorious Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). While ISIS grew exponentially in Syria and Iraq in 2013–14 and has established something close to a proto-state across vast swathes of both countries, Jabhat al-Nusra remains an integral part of the transnational al-Qaeda movement, whose modus operandi has consistently incorporated a clearly deepened focus upon posing an international threat”.
(Ibid: Charles Lister (2014) Assessing Syria’s Jihad)
But this dominance of IS and Al Nusra, does not diminish the fact, that several other groups were vying for position. This was inevitable, since the Syrian government of Bashar Assad, recognized that they could only benefit from ‘rule and divide’. And they heated up the sectarian flame, as had been threatened by Rami Makhlouf (discussed above). Accordingly the Assad regime released from jails Islamic zealots. Syria had served the USA by holding Islamic warriors who had been fleeing from Iraq. Prior to that of course, Syria had been used as a place of the infamous ‘renditions’. Lister explains the overall effects on the Syrian resistance.
First there was a ‘rapidly expanding … core Sunni Jihadist component” of the insurgency:
“The Syrian insurgency has had an overt Sunni jihadist component since 23 January 2012, when Jabhat al-Nusra announced its emergence and claimed responsibility for its first attack – a suicide bombing in Damascus on 23 December 2011, which killed 40 people. However, Jabhat al-Nusra had in fact been covertly active on a minimal scale in Syria from at least August 2011, thanks to the release of Islamist detainees from Syrian prisons under a series of presidential amnesties in May–June 2011; to the presence of a number of existing al-Qaeda-linked jihadist cells; and to the arrival of then senior ISIS commander Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani from his base in Mosul, Iraq…Therefore, by early 2012, a quickly expanding Syrian insurgency already contained a core Sunni jihadist component, as well as a number of fast-growing conservative Salaist groups, such as Ahrar al-Sham, Liwa al-Islam and Suqor al-Sham, all of which were established by detainees released from Sednaya Prison in 2011”. (Ibid: Charles Lister (2014) Assessing Syria’s Jihad
The development of Jihadist movements moved towards several organizations, some that had been already in Syria, and more that were funded from surrounding states:
“In addition to ISIS and al-Qaeda, several pre-existing jihadist organisations with principal bases of operation outside Syria have established active wings inside Syrian territory, including the North Caucasus-based IK; the China- and Pakistan-based, Uighur-dominated East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM); and the Lebanon-based Jund al-Sham. …. Syria is also now home to at least eight other jihadist groups that are likely to remain active in the countries from which the majority of their members derive, including Harakat Sham al-Islam (led and dominated by Moroccans), al-Katibat al-Khadraa and Katibat Suqor al-Izz (Saudis), Usud al-Khilafah (Egyptians), Katibat al-Ba ar al-Libya (Libyans), Junud al-Sham (Russians and North Caucasians), Katibat Imam al-Bukhari (Uzbekistanis), and Jamaat Ahadun Ahad (Turks)”. (Ibid: Charles Lister (2014) Assessing Syria’s Jihad)
But as already discussed, the key forces were those of IS and Al-Nusra:
“As the number of Jihadist groups grew through 2013 and 2014, the 2 key nodes of al-Qaeda and IS (or its predecessors the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) emerged as defining influences around which other factions either aligned themselves or asserted continued independence.” Lister, Ibid,. 2015, “Al-Qaeda, The Islamic State and Evolution of Insurgency”;
Syrian ISIS
The rise of the Syrian ISIS is itself, inextricably linked with the legacy of sectarianism in Iraq, as fostered by US imperialism. The USA had deliberately turned a blind eye to the excesses of the Iraqi Shia faction of Nuri al-Maliki:
“From July 2012–July 2013, Operation Breaking the Walls sought to release imprisoned members, particularly senior commanders, and to expand the geographical reach of ISIS attacks. Following on from this operation’s grand finale – the breaking out of approximately 500 prisoners from Abu Ghraib prison on 21 July 2013 – ISIS announced and began Operation Soldiers’ Harvest, which explicitly sought to undermine the confidence and capabilities of Iraqi security forces and to exploit continuing sectarian tensions resulting from the perceived repression of Iraq’s Sunni minority by its Shia-led government under Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. … Since ISIS’s dramatic gains in Iraq post-June 2014, significant quantities of weaponry, including US-made armoured Humvees, M16 and M4 rifles, and M198 howitzers, have been transferred into the Syrian theatre and have been used to considerable advantage in battles against both the government and opposition”. (Ibid: Charles Lister (2014) Assessing Syria’s Jihad
Thus the USA bears a major responsibility for the rise of the Syrian Islamic factions, having created the sectarian fires in Iraq. Its hypocritical posturing against the Islamic Fundamentalism is – hypocritical.
Jabhat al-Nusra
The origins of the Jabhat al-Nusra are in the al-Quada:
“Having been established by a prominent ISIS commander in 2011, Jabhat al-Nusra has since emerged as an independent al-Qaeda affiliate based in Syria and currently commanding approximately 6,000 fighters. Since its public emergence in January 2012, the group has evolved considerably. While its first six months of operations in Syria saw it act as a stereotypical terrorist organisation, killing dozens of civilians in spectacular urban bomb a acks and raiding largely civilian targets deemed supportive of the government, by August 2012 it had transformed into a professional insurgent group coordinating with nationalist FSA units. The effects of this strategic evolution and political pragmatism meant that when the US designated it as an alias of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in December 2012, opposition civilians marched the following Friday to the theme of ‘We are all Jabhat al-Nusra’. The failure throughout 2013 of the moderate opposition to practically unite its armed factions under an efficient and representative structure meant that Salaist and jihadist factions, including Jabhat al-Nusra, grew significantly in size and influence.” (Ibid, Charles Lister (2014) Assessing Syria’s Jihad)
Initially the al-Nusra faction was careful to work with the Syrian opposition:
“al-Quaeda’s Jabhat al-Nusra.. has arguably established an even more sustainable presence in Syria than IS. … Jabhat al-Nusra has carved out a stake in Syria that over time has become both tacitly accepted and militarily powerful. Its sustained focus on recruiting heavily from within Syria’s pro-opposition population has ensured it has, by and large avoided the .. isolation from popular opposition. experienced by IS.. Jabhat al-Nusra was the first Jihadist group to become active in Syria, announcing its emergence publicly in January 2012”.
(Lister, Ibid,. 2015, “Al-Qaeda, The Islamic State and Evolution of Insurgency”; p. 2)
“Although the number of Syrians within the senior leadership is relatively small, the group is nonetheless still primarily reliant on Syrian foot soldiers for its military operations… it has primarily relied on enlisting Syrians who are ideologically appropriate for its cause or simply eager to fight for what has long been perceived as an extremely capable insurgent organization”
(Lister (2014) Assessing Syria’s Jihad)
“While IS had maneuvered itself into being an avowed enemy of the entire Syrian insurgency by late 2-13 and early 2014 Jabhat al-Nusra had quite ingeniously redefined itself as a jihaidist organization enjoying a broad acceptance within Syria’s opposition-supporting community. By pragmatically managing its relations with the broader insurgency, Jabhat al-Nusra was limiting the extent of its al-Qaeda–like objectives. However, at least within its senior leadership, the intent to one day establish Islamic emirates across Syria remained. Such objectives began to materialize more overtly in late 2014 until the re-emergence of resistance induced a ‘re-moderation; in April 2015.” (Lister, Charles R. “Al-Qaeda, The Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency”; N.York 2015; OUP; p. 4)
But this became impossible as foreign arms were solicited and became essential to the struggle. This led directly to the regional powers becoming involved, and they were not interested in supporting the Syrian opposition per se.
Local Foreign Power Involvement
As the regional states saw that the rapidly escalating Syrian cauldron would set the Middle East ablaze, they entered the fray:
“As time passed, actors on the more Islamist end of the insurgent spectrum began demonstrating superior levels of internal organisation and insurgent coordination, and were thus enjoying sustained and reliable sources of support from outside sources. Qatar in particular played a key role in buttressing such groups in the conflict’s first 12 months, while Turkey and Jordan had an influence on their borders with Syria which ensured that certain groups acquired more reliable channels of support than others.”
(Lister, Charles R. “Al-Qaeda, The Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency”; N.York 2015; OUP; p. 3
The entry of these states led to a dis-united and fissiparous opposition, one that could not mount an effective resistance to the Syrian state:
“The consistent failure of external states with interests in supporting the revolution to unify their position of assistance explains not only the proliferation of insurgent factions, but also the opposition’s incapacity to prevent a genuine threat to the Assad regime. The fact that groups found themselves having to compete with each other for funding and support, and in so doing were often moulding their image and ideological frames of reference towards those potential backers, meant that very few of them retained a consistent strength and long-term viability. .. Thus separate attempts to establish and operationalise provincial military councils the supreme military council and a ministry of defence within the exiled interim governments all fell far short of attaining.. success on the ground inside Syria.”
(Lister, Charles R. “Al-Qaeda, The Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency”; N. York 2015; OUP; p. 2)
“However, the emergence of several Western-backed, moderate rebel coalitions since late 2013 in Syria has encouraged a further evolution within Jabhat al-Nusra. These moderate coalitions – such as Harakat Hazm, the Syrian Revolutionaries Front and the Southern Front – were initially established to combat the spread of ISIS, but their continued and increasingly prominent existence since the expulsion of ISIS fighters from areas of northern Syria has meant that Jabhat al-Nusra now perceives their role as a potential threat. This development, combined with ISIS’s overshadowing successes, has prompted Jabhat al-Nusra to begin adopting a far more self-assertive and unilateral approach to its operations, particularly in the northern governorate of Idlib and in Daraa in the south”.
(Charles Lister (2014) Assessing Syria’s Jihad, Adelphi Papers, 54:447-448, 71-98
“Jabhat al-Nusra is seeking to cut out the moderate opposition from its key source of support in Hatay. This, plus ISIS’s gradual advance towards the other critical northern crossing at Bab al-Salameh in northern Aleppo, poses a potentially existential threat to Syria’s moderate opposition. .. Jabhat al-Nusra does intend to establish Islamic emirates in Syria, but only ‘by consulting those who have an Islamist affiliation’ and through the group’s ‘Sharia Arbitration Charter’, … Ridding key stronghold regions of Western-backed and potentially anti-jihadist, moderate rebels would seem an obvious first step in that direction.” (Ibid: Charles Lister (2014) Assessing Syria’s Jihad
What was the goal of these foreign powers?
The Strategic interests of Foreign powers inside the Syrian Civil War?
Manuscript to be resumed from here.
APPENDIX: A RECENT SYRIAN CHRONOLOGY
This is drawn from several sources. It only provides a skeleton for the reader.
SOURCES:
(1) “Al-arabiya”: at alarabiya.net http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/03/16/200987.html; Friday, 16 March 2012
(2) Syria profile – Timeline’; BBC, 7 January 2018. at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14703995
(3) ‘The Independent’ https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syrian-civil-war-timeline-tracking-five-years-of-conflict-a6929411.html
(4) Deutsche Welle; http://www.dw.com/en/syria-civil-war-timeline-a-summary-of-critical-events/a-40001379
2011 February – March 15, 2011 Demonstrations break out in the city of Daraa after security forces detain a group of boys accused of spray-painting anti-government graffiti on their school walls. Security forces open fire on the unarmed protesters, killing four.
2011
March 18-23, 2011 – The protests in Daraa continue for several days, with a security ‘crack-down’ by the state. Reports cite 60 deaths… Over the next days, Daraa is sealed off.
March 25, 2011 – Troops open fire on protesters in several cities and crowds clash on the streets of the capital of Damascus.
April 26, 2011 – Thousands of soldiers backed by tanks and snipers open fire on civilians in Daraa. Armed security agents conduct house-to-house sweeps. Neighborhoods are sectioned off and checkpoints are erected. Electricity, water and cellphone services are cut. At least 11 people are killed and 14 others lay in the streets, either dead or gravely wounded.
June 7, 2011 – Mutiny by Syrian soldiers in the northern town of Jisr al-Shughour, where 120 troops were killed, according to the government.
Aug. 5, 2011 – After several days of a ferocious assault on the city of Hama, hundreds are left dead by Syrian security forces backed by tanks and snipers.
Aug. 18, 2011 – The United States, Britain, France and Germany and the European Union demand that Assad resign, saying he is unfit to lead. Syrian government assets in US frozen.
Oct. 4, 2011 – Russia and China veto a European-backed U.N. Security Council resolution that threatened sanctions against Syria if it didn’t immediately halt its military crackdown against civilians.
Oct. 24, 2011 – The U.S. pulls its ambassador out of Syria over security concerns.
Nov. 12, 2011 – The Arab League suspends Syria’s membership.
Nov. 27, 2011 – The Arab League overwhelmingly approves sanctions against Syria to pressure Damascus to end its crackdown, an unprecedented move by the League against an Arab state.
Dec. 28, 2011 – Syrian security forces open fire on thousands of anti-government protesters in the central city of Hama, killing at least six people. The government also releases 755 prisoners following a report by Human Rights Watch accusing authorities of hiding hundreds of detainees from the observers.
2011 October – New Syrian National Council says it has forged a common front of internal and exiled opposition activists.
2011 November – Arab League votes to suspend Syria, accusing it of failing to implement an Arab peace plan, and imposes sanctions.
2012
2012 Jan. 2, 2012 – An explosion hits a gas pipeline in central Syria and the government blames “terrorists.” The opposition accuses the government of playing on fears of religious extremism and terrorism to rally support behind Assad.
2012 February – Government steps up the bombardment of Homs and other cities.
2012 March – UN Security Council endorses non-binding peace plan drafted by UN.
Feb. 4, 2012 – Russia and China veto a resolution in the U.N. Security Council that backed an Arab League plan that calls for Assad to step down.
Feb. 26, 2012 – Syria holds a referendum on a new constitution, a gesture by Assad to placate the opposition. The West dismisses the vote as a “sham.”
March 1, 2012 – Syrian troops take control of Baba Amr after a government assault that raged for weeks. The rebels retreat, having run low on weapons under unbearable humanitarian conditions. Syria’s main opposition group, the Syrian National Council, forms a military council to organize and unify all armed resistance.
March 8, 2012 – Syria’s deputy oil minister announces his defection in an online video, making him the highest-ranking official to abandon Assad’s regime since the uprising began.
March 13, 2012 – Syrian military forces reportedly take control of the northern rebel stronghold of Idlib along the border with Turkey, a major base that army defectors had held for months. An international rights group said the army is mining the border with Turkey.
March 15, 2012 – On the first anniversary of the start of the uprising, thousands march in a pro-Assad rally in Damascus. Tanks and snipers continue to besiege Daraa. The U.N. secretary-general says more than 8,000 have been killed.
July 2012: Fighting spreads to Aleppo, Syria’s second-largest city and its former commercial capital.
June 2012- Turkey changes rules of engagement after Syria shoots down a Turkish plane, declaring that if Syrian troops approach Turkey’s borders they will be seen as a military threat.
July 2012 – Free Syria Army blows up three security chiefs in Damascus and seizes Aleppo in the north.
August 2012 – Prime Minister Riad Hijab defects, US President Obama warns that use of chemical weapons would tilt the US towards intervention. Kofi Annan quits as UN-Arab League envoy after his attempts to broker a ceasefire fail.
November 2012 – National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces formed in Qatar, excludes Islamist militias. Arab League stops short of full recognition.
December 2012 – US, Britain, France, Turkey and Gulf states formally recognise opposition National Coalition as “legitimate representative” of Syrian people.
2013
January 2013 – Syria accuses Israel of bombing military base near Damascus, where Hezbollah was suspected of assembling a convoy of anti-aircraft missiles bound for Lebanon.
March 2013: After advancing in the north, rebel forces capture Raqqa, the first major population centre controlled by the opposition.
March 19, 2013: A gas attack kills 26 people, at least half of them government soldiers, in the northern town of Khan al-Assal. A UN investigation concludes that sarin nerve gas was used, but cannot determine who used it. Both the government and the rebel forces accuse each other of using the prohibited gas.
May-June 2013: Backed by thousands of Lebanese Hezbollah fighters, Assad’s forces recapture the strategic town of Qusair from rebels, near the border with Lebanon.
August 21, 2013: A much more lethal chemical attack – sarin gas – kills hundreds in the rebel-held suburbs of Damascus. UN investigators determine that ground-to-ground missiles packed with sarin were fired into civilian areas while people slept. The US and others blame the Assad regime for the attack.
September 2013 – UN weapons inspectors conclude that chemical weapons were used in an attack on the Ghouta area of Damascus in August that killed about 300 people, but do not allocate responsibility. Government allows UN to destroy chemical weapons stocks, process complete by June 2014.
December 2013 – US and Britain suspend “non-lethal” support for rebels in northern Syria after reports that Islamist rebels seized bases of Western-backed Free Syrian Army.
2014
January-February 2014 – UN-brokered peace talks in Geneva fail, largely because Syrian authorities refuse to discuss a transitional government.
February 2014: Peace talks led by UN-Arab League mediator Lakhdar Brahimi in Geneva end without a breakthrough.
March 2014 – Syrian Army and Hezbollah forces recapture Yabroud, the last rebel stronghold near the Lebanese border.
9 May 2014 Rebels withdraw from the old quarter of Homs in a significant symbolic victory for the government.
3 June 2014 Syrians in government areas vote in presidential elections. Assad, one of three candidates, overwhelmingly wins with 88.7 per cent.
June 2014 Isis seizes much of northern and western Iraq and declares a self-styled Islamic caliphate. This extends from Aleppo to eastern Iraqi province of Diyala.
3 July 2014 Isis takes control of Syria’s largest oil field, al-Omar.
19 August 2014 Isis releases video of beheading of American journalist James Foley, the first of five Westerners to be beheaded.
September 2014 US and five Arab countries launch air strikes against Islamic State around Aleppo and Raqqa.
2015
January 2015 UN estimates Syria’s conflict has killed at least 220,000 people and uprooted nearly a third of the prewar population of 23 million from their homes.
26 January 2015 With the help of US-led air strikes, Kurdish fighters take control of Kobani.
January 2015 Kurdish forces push Islamic State out of Kobane on Turkish border after four months of fighting.
28 March 2015 The north-western city of Idlib falls to Islamist groups led by al-Nusra.
May 2015 – Islamic State fighters seize the ancient city of Palmyra in central Syria and proceed to destroy many monuments at pre-Islamic World Heritage site.
September 30 2015 After providing military aid behind the scenes since the war’s inception, Russia actively enters the conflict, saying they target the Islamic State group. But the West and Syrian opposition say it overwhelmingly targets anti-Assad rebels. The Russian air force carries out relentless bombing attacks against Assad opponents and is accused of deliberately bombing civilian targets, including hospitals. A civil war that had been deadlocked for four-and-a-half years begins to move steadily in favor of the Assad regime.
14 November 2015 Seventeen nations meeting in Vienna adopt a timeline for a transition plan in Syria.
18 December 2015 The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 2254 endorsing the Vienna road map. Syrian Army allows rebels to evacuate remaining area of Homs, returning Syria’s third-largest city to government control after four years. Jaish al-Fatah (Army of Conquest) Islamist rebel alliance takes control of Idlib Province, putting pressure on government’s coastal stronghold of Latakia.
2016
March 2016 Syrian government forces retake Palmyra from Islamic State with Russian air assistance, only to be driven out again in December.
August 2016 Turkish troops cross into Syria to help rebel groups push back so-called Islamic State militants and Kurdish-led rebels from a section of the two countries’ border.
August 24, 2016 The joint OPCW-UN panel determines that the Syrian military used chlorine gas in three separate attacks against its opponents – two of those attacks were carried out by helicopter. But investigators also determine that IS militants also used mustard gas.
December 2016 Government troops, backed by Russian air power and Iranian-sponsored militias, recapture Aleppo, the country’s largest city, depriving the rebels of their last major urban stronghold.
2017
January 2017 Russia, Iran and Turkey agree to enforce a ceasefire between the government and non-Islamist rebels, after talks between the two sides in Kazakhstan.
US intervenes
February 28, 2017 Russia and China veto a UN Security Council resolution calling for sanctions against the Syria government in response to its use of chemical weapons.
April 2017 US President Donald Trump orders a missile attack on an airbase from which Syrian government planes allegedly staged a chemical weapons attack on the rebel-held town of Khan Sheikhoun.
May 9, 2017 Trump approves military plans to arm the Kurdish YPG Kurdish Popular Protection Units. These fight alongside the main opposition Syrian Democratic Forces, which captures the important Tabqa dam from Islamic State, as part of the effort to retake the Syrian city of Raqqa from IS militants. The move infuriates Turkey, which has long sparred with the US over the YPG. Washington considers the YPG crucial to defeating the IS in Syria. But Ankara views the group as an extension of the Kurdish PKK militant group, which it (and Washington) considers a terrorist organization.
June 2017 US shoots down Syrian fighter jet near Raqqa after it allegedly dropped bombs near US-backed rebel Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
July 7, 2017: Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin agree to a limited ceasefire in three war-torn provinces in southwest Syria. After six years of fighting residents are weary of the conflict, but wary about whether the ceasefire will hold.
July 9, 2017 The ceasefire takes effect at 12 noon and an uneasy calm prevails during the initial hours.
July 23, 2017 Syrian warplanes bomb the suburbs of Damascus, just one day after the military had declared a cessation of hostilities in the area.
July 2017 The Lebanese militant group Hezbollah and the Syrian army launch a military operation to dislodge jihadist groups from the Arsal area, near the Lebanese-Syrian border.
October 2017 The Islamic State group is driven from Raqqa, its de-facto capital in Syria.
November 2017 Syrian army takes full control of Deir al-Zour from Islamic State. Syrian and Iraqi forces put IS under pressure in the dwindling areas still under its control.
December 2017 Russian President Putin visits, declaring mission accomplished for his forces in the battle against Islamic State. Government troops, with Russian support, continue reclaiming areas from rebels in the north-western Idlib province.
2018
January 2018 Turkey launches an assault on northern Syria to oust Kurdish rebels controlling the area around Afrin.
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According to a senior Israeli government minister close to prime minister, Yitzak Shamir:
“Direct Syrian control of the PLO will be beneficial to us for a number of reasons. … our experience has shown that Syria can keep a firm hand on the Palestinian terrorists if it is in their interests to do so. Despite the fierce rhetoric from Damascus, there has been no attack against us from the Golan Heights for 10 years” (Christopher Walker, ‘Israel welcomes prospect of Syrian-controlled PLO’, The Australian, November 11, 1983).“
https://mkaradjis.wordpress.com/2013/09/24/syria-and-the-palestinians-almost-no-other-arab-state-has-as-much-palestinian-blood-on-its-hands/
“The Lebanon deal was followed by Assad sending the Syrian army to fight on the US side during its attack on Iraq in the 1991 Gulf war, yet another of the long list of Assad’s policies which do not sit easily with the “anti-imperialist” image foisted onto the regime by overseas admirers on the left” and far-right. This pattern continued after Hafez al-Assad bequeathed his crown to his son, Bashar Assad, in 2000. Assad’s Syria became one of the key destinations to where the US sent Islamist suspects to be tortured in the “renditions” program. Indeed, as Mehdi Hasan writes, “Syria was one of the “most common” destinations for rendered suspects. Or, in the chilling words of former CIA agent Robert Baer, in 2004: ‘If you want a serious interrogation, you send a prisoner to Jordan. If you want them to be tortured, you send them to Syria’” (https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/feb/19/syria-us-ally-human-rights)”. Ibid Karadjis
