Soviet-Polish Relations – Part Two, from the 1920 Soviet-Polish War Up to the Warsaw Uprising of 1944

by Hari Kumar, 27 July, 2023

Click here for Part One: Soviet-Polish Relations from the Soviet-Polish War to the Warsaw Uprising of 1944.

The Soviet-Polish peace treaty was finally signed at Riga on March 18, 1921.

In Part One of this article, maps were particular to the Polish-Soviet war of 1920.

This larger scale map, shows the more exact course of the Curzon Line, with a map from the newspaper ‘The Guardian”. It also shows the Lines of the Red Army troops in 1944

(from Coates & Coates Ibid p. 116)

Introduction

Part One of this article focused on the Polish-Soviet War. This had to start with briefly reviewing the history of rivalry and wars between Poland and Russia extending over centuries. This history was both long and very intense. As W.P.Coates and Zelda Coates, the 1948 scholars of Poland-Russian relations commented:

“for six centuries the Eastern Slavs—Great Russians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians on the one hand—and the Poles, one of the branches of the Western Slavs, on the other—were engaged in a bitter fratricidal struggle interrupted by periods of peace, some of short, others of long, duration, which were only at best prolonged armistices.” [1] 

Such a bloody history was then, and is now – bound to condition Polish governmental attitudes to the USSR state. When the Russian Tsarist state was transformed by revolution in 1917, the old ruling classes of Poland had a new reason to fear its Eastern neighbour. The Polish landowning classes and its militarist leaders, fretted about their own class rule.

This article deals centrally with the 1944 Warsaw Uprising. But starting the year 1944 is inadequate to provide an explanation of events. The key developments up to 1945, included how the landed aristocratic landowning class stopped a weak national bourgeoisie from successfully launching a democratic revolution. The class oppression of the peasantry, and the unemployment of the working class led to a Bonapartist regime under Pilsudksi.

But a further key explanation of events in 1944, was the long intense history of anti-Soviet activity of the so-called “London Poles”. These came from the Polish ruling class who claimed to exercise Polish governmental rights from London. They had fled Poland after the German invasion. One of their motivating factors was a fervent wish to retain the territories Poland had gained under the Treat of Riga.

We saw in Part One, that the Treaty of Riga, had left the USSR without some of its Russian historical territory. Parts of its ethnic and cultural territory with its peoples – Byelorussia and Ukraine –  were colonized by the Polish Government. At the same time the Polish ruling class was building European alliances against the USSR:

“Except for very short periods the Polish authorities between 1921 and 1939 pursued a policy of unqualified enmity towards the Soviet Union.

At first there were many frontier incidents, many hostile incursions into Soviet territory, but as the Soviet Union grew stronger these incidents gradually died down.

Successive Polish Governments right up to the spring of 1939 were constantly plotting and scheming (a) to dismember the Soviet Union; (b) to build up a bloc of States separating the Soviet Union from Western Europe. No secret was made of these intentions.” [2]

Polish governments after Pilsudski, were led by the “Colonel’s Cabinet”. Its members in particular Colonel Beck. increasingly drew close to the fascist state under Hitler. But the need of the times was to unite against Hitler. Going against the interests of Poland as a nation, its rulers frustrated every attempt of European Allies to unite with the USSR against Hitler.

At the same time, the Allies repeatedly rejected a Treaty of Mutual defence with the USSR,  hoping Germany would turn against the USSR. To frustrate that and in self-defence, the USSR signed the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact.

When Germany in a long anticipated blitzkrieg took Poland, the USSR marched into Eastern Poland. As “The Times” of Britain (the flagship paper of the British ruling class) recognised, Russia had no choice. The USSR had to occupy “White Russia and Ukraine” – the parts that had been taken by Poland after the Treaty of Riga. If did not, the USSR would have been a puppet state of Germany, and the “next victim”:

“Russia knows well that were Hitler to defeat the Western Powers, or merely attain an inconclusive peace with them, his programme for German puppet States in White Russia and the Ukraine would quickly revive, and Russia would be his next victim. Hitler, on the other hand, is quite aware that if he is defeated by the Western Powers, Stalin will neither mourn nor succour him.” [3]

This led to the new demarcation line which was mainly along the old Curzon Line, but did in some parts swing West:

“Soviet-German communique was issued on the night of September 22, 1939, stating:

“The Governments of Germany and the U.S.S.R. have established a demarcation line between the German and Soviet armies which passes along the River Pissa, then along the Narev up to its confluence with the River Bug, then along the Bug up to its confluence with the River Vistula, then along the Vistula up to the mouth of the River San, and then along the San up to its source.”

(As the Coates say – Ed) “A glance at the map will show that this new line was in parts considerably to the west of the Curzon Line.” [4]

The USSR bore most of the toil, hardships and sheer mortality of the World War against Hitler and Emperor Hirohito’s forces. Yet Poland was quite content to help delay the Second Font in the West against Hitler coming into being. Into the bargain, Poland was very willing to act as an accomplice to Goebbels and Hitler in the Katyn accusations to the USSR.

The events between 1939 and 1924, which included the covert alliance of exiled Polish Government representatives in London, with Germany. The bourgeois press commentors at the time were quite clear on this. Moreover, they pointed out that – for example in the case of Katyn – the Polish government was opportunistically finding any shabby excuse to undermine the USSR – together with Hitler’s forces.

It is impossible to understand the events around the “Warsaw Uprising’ without such background and foundation. Albeit they are not the main focus of this work, these will of necessity be discussed.

Despite the enormous obstacles, the USSR pushed the German fascists out of Russia. They then took the counter-attack to liberate Poland. But Poland’s London leadership was divided. The most dominant group were the heirs of the Pilsudski militarist neo-fascists. They knew that in the post 1939 USSR occupied Byelorussia, Ukraine and part of Poland proper – a new spirit had risen. This had formed a socialist movement, assisted by the USSR. Naturally it was resisted by the Polish government-in-exile.

That Government-in-exile wanted to pre-empt the Russian liberation of Warsaw. Hence the abortive, hastily, ill-organized, and very likely to fail – “Warsaw Uprising” was launched.  One launched without agreement with the Red Army coming towards Warsaw. In military terms, this was more than foolish. As a bourgeois historian of the Warsaw Uprising wrote:

“When, how and why (did) the authors of the insurrection decide that Warsaw should be freed from the Germans ‘by Polish effort alone twelve hours before the entry of the Soviets into the capital’?” [5]

This is the fundamental question to be addressed in this present article. To do so, the attitudes of Polish leaders towards the USSR and Hitler are central. We start in 1921.

A brief word on sources

Frequently older worthwhile sources – even when not by Marxist authors – seem to have become quickly forgotten by the ML-ist movement. This work has benefited from their insights.

These forgotten key works include:

W.P. Coates and Z.Coates “Six Centuries of Russo-Polish Relations”, London 1948; Alexander Werth “Russia at War 1941-1945“, London 1964; and

Ernie Trory “Poland in the Second World War“, Hove Sussex 1983.

Newer key sources for this work have included:

Jan. M. Ciechanowski; “The Warsaw Rising Of 1944”, Cambridge U Press; 1974;

Geoffrey Roberts, “Stalin’s Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939-1953”, Yale, 2007.

Chronology of some key events following the Polish-Soviet War 1920

1. Poland’s class divisions after the 1920 Polish-Soviet War

The character of Poland in 1920 – a landlord predominant ruling class over a mass peasantry

Poland in 1920 was a feudal-type state whose dominant landlord classes were obstructing bourgeois freedoms and industrialization. Hence its character was a semi-feudal aristocrat, on which a small industrial-capitalist state had begun but was being restricted.

The fundamental needs of Polish society in 1920 onwards were to curb and dispossess the landlord class; to introduce land reform; and to ensure an untrammeled democratic movement for all including the national minorities. These minorities included those in Poland before the Treaty of Riga, but also those occupied by Poland after it. These were a necessary prelude to the on-going socialist transformation of society.

The class composition of Poland in 1921 can be seen from the results of a census undertaken at that time. The overwhelming majority of the population was a mixed peasantry, meaning that is spread from a relatively ‘rich’ fraction to poor and rural labourers.

Table 1: Data from the 1921 Census

From Norman Davies[6]

The land concentration was dramatic with about half of the cultivated land lying in the hands of the aristocratic landowning class. Many of the small-holdings (“more than 2,000) could not support the ‘owner’-peasant:

“The results of the 1921 Census revealed land concentration: farms of more than fifty hectares (which accounted for less than 1 per cent of all farms) accounted for almost half (47.3 per cent) of the agricultural land of Poland. On the other side there was the largest group of more than two million unsustainable small farms of up to five hectares, which accounted for more than 60 per cent of all Polish farms. This group of farms comprised two subgroups, which were almost identical in terms of number (slightly more than one million) and percentage (slightly more than 30 per cent): farms with an area of up to two hectares and farms with an area of between two and five hectares. Within the first subgroup of those micro-farms, approximately a third accounted for farms the size of which did not exceed half a hectare.32 Thus, it can be noted that the farm structure in Poland at the beginning of the 1920s was much polarised; and the number of medium-sized farms was relatively small.” [7]

While land-owning aristocrats “old Polish aristocrats” – were wealthy, they were not at the top of the financial tree. In fact the Jewish and German entrepreneurs were – although “they were smaller in size numerically”:

“evidence shows that … (in 1923).. the very top of the wealth distribution in the Russian partition (the largest of all partitions, inhabited by 57% of the population of interwar Poland) was predominantly non-Polish, and the role of old Polish aristocratic families was smaller than might have been suspected. By contrast, Jewish and German entrepreneurs were highly overrepresented in industry and trade…  (In) the Congress Kingdom (Warsaw) and its largest industrial city (Łódź ) there was over-representation of Jews and Germans and the under-representation of Poles at the very top of industrial wealth. Thus, previous research casts doubts on the common assumption that the top of the wealth distribution in interwar Poland was dominated by old, landowning Polish aristocratic families.” [8]

Moreover the countryside estates of (mainly) Polish landowners, were also heavily indebted. Hence the aristocrats were ‘pinched’:

“While Poles were overrepresented among large landowners, they were underrepresented among industry owners… We should also keep in mind that agriculture in Poland was heavily indebted in the interwar period…  Even the richest landowners had to take loans to maintain their level of consumption from pre-war times.” [9]

Pilsudski tried to assist the landowning aristocracy. He also by virtue of his anti-minority views fostered the already obvious chauvinism of Polish society, further. His loyalties were divided however, as he also favoured pro-German forces – which included a small portion of the bourgeoisie. Hence one target he held in mind was Jewish capital.

Political Parties in Poland in 1920

However, chauvinism was to be found in all classes and in most of their political representatives and parties. There was a residue of an intense nationalism. This was bred in the centuries long years in which Poland was partitioned and denied its national rights. It readily took on the colours of national chauvinism and clericalism:

“In the restored Polish Republic after 1918, the protagonists of.. a new type of national patriotism..  vehemently insisted that ethnic Poles be masters in their own house and, as a corollary, were strongly reluctant to permit any participation in political life to Poland’s minorities (German, Jewish, Ukrainian, White Russian), who accounted for approximately thirty per cent of her population. This school was chauvinist even where socially progressive, and its intense nationalism led it into political alliance with clericalism, for the Roman Catholic faith was regarded as one of the major repositories of the essence of Polish nationhood.” [10]

While many parties formed, two broad divisions can be discerned.

One was the reactionary camp which represented the landowning aristocrats. This camp was largely pro-German and anti-Russian (and by extension anti-Soviet):

“There was.. after 1918 a group of conservative land-owning nobility with ideological head-quarters in Wilno and Cracow. … identifying themselves during, the partition period with the Tsarist and Hapsburg empires.. (who) looked primarily to expansion and consolidation toward the east, where the pre-partition Commonwealth had held vast Lithuanian, White Russian, and Ukrainian lands in a quasi-federal relationship with Poland proper…

During the first years of the restored Republic they were excluded from political power by the electoral principle of the rural masses that “peasants elect peasants”; they were also self-excluded by their unwillingness to contaminate themselves with involvement in the democratic political processes of the Republic… these conservatives were actively wooed during and after the crisis of 1926 by Pilsudski.” [11]

Opposed to this was a heterogeneous grouping of tendencies – from ‘right’ to ‘left’ – who supported varying degrees of democratic reforms. But they were also infected by nationalism:

“The political stance of the leading circles was unashamedly nationalist. ‘Polishness’ became the touchstone of respectability.. the PPS (Polish Socialist Party), the PSL (Polish Peasant Movement), and the National Democrats all shared the concern for national unity which under the later Sanjaca regime assumed overriding priority,.. this left very little scope for revolutionary parties.” [12]

There were several peasant based parties.

The Pliast Peasant party was a ‘centrist but nationalistic’ party, led by Wincenty Witos, which from the middle of 1923 became a perennial ally of the Right.

A more radical peasant party was the Wyzwolenie (Liberation SL).

Later the Union of Rural Youth Youth’s ‘Beacon Fires ‘ (ZMF – wici) was to become the most important rural movement known overall as ‘Agrarism’ (Peasant’s Power’).  It became widespread, especially after the SL was banned. [13]

Two wings of the Polish ruling class

World War One forced some reckoning of the various factions into two rival camps. We saw above that one was objectively pro-comprador to the German and Austro-Hungarian empires, and it was led by Pilsudski. This wing included large sections of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS). They were fiercely anti-Soviet:

“The ‘social-patriots,’ latter professed a pro-Austrian orientation, hoping to gain the favor of Austria-Hungary’s Dual Monarchy. The PPS envisaged either a Triple Monarchy, with the Slavic segment (composed of Galicia and of Russian Poland) counterbalancing the Germans and Magyar parts, or restoration of some sort of separate Polish statehood. This school of thought, or ‘orientation,’ as it was then called, was headed by Pilsudski and supported by most of his friends from the former right wing of the PPS, the so-called Revolutionary Faction, as well as by Galician socialists; it proved to be the dominant view…” [14]

Another wing lay in the National Democrats (led by Dmowski), who formed a right wing within Pilsudksi’s multi-class alliance (of the landowners and a small portion of the bourgeoisie). But this right-wing portion were however anti-German – while also being anti-Soviet. Despite their repugnance of Soviet Russia, they nonetheless are attracted by a potential market in the East. They supported a fast development of industry:

“In contrast to Pilsudski’s military activities against Russia in the First World War, the National Democrats endorsed the war effort of the Tsarist Empire in which they saw both a Slavic shield against the German aggressor and a vast market for those Polish industries which their “positivist-organic” orientation was fostering.” [15]

Following the Treaty of Riga Poland colonizes Byelorussia and Ukraine

Polish landowners with Polish governmental support exerted a direct political and economic suppression of the peoples in the areas seized from the USSR, under the Treaty of Riga. In addition they wielded a religious oppression – dominant Poles being Roman Catholic  – whereas Byelorussians and Ukranians were Orthodox or Uniats. The area over which they tyrannized was large and Poles were in a very significant minority:

“To quote the authoritative historian of the Conference, Temperley (“A History of the Peace Conference in Paris”) . . . “it may be pointed out that the territory inhabited by definitely Polish majorities amounts to something like 90,000 square miles.” However, the Republic of Poland prior to the outbreak of the War in 1939, on the authority of the Statesmen’s Year Book, covered an area of 150,052 square miles, i.e. Poland annexed an area of 60,000 square miles, 1 inhabited by non-Poles (an area larger than that of England and Wales combined).” [16]

The ’Times’ reported that even after the movement into the area of many Polish settlers, there were very few Poles in the area:

“Between 1921 and 1931 many Polish settlers and officials moved into Byelorussia and the Ukraine, yet “The Times” after a very thorough analysis of the 1931 (Polish) census, came to the following conclusion: “On a liberal estimate, there were hardly more than 2,250,000 to 2,500,000 Poles east of the Curzon Line in a total population of over 11,000,000.” [17]

The provisions of the Treaty of Riga were not honoured by the Polish government, in especial as regarding armed attacks by Petliuria on Soviet Ukraine and Byelorussia:

“It remains to be added that quite unduly favourable though the Treaty of Riga was to Poland, its conditions were not kept faithfully by the Polish Government. Thus, according to Article 5 of the Riga Treaty both parties undertook not to create or support on their territory organizations which set themselves the aim of armed struggle against the other party. Yet before six months had elapsed Petliura was permitted to organize armed detachments in Poland. These bands again and again attacked the Soviet Ukraine, and villages situated in Soviet Byelorussia were raided by them.” [18]

Western Allies ignore East territorial thrust of Poland and coercions of population

It was recognised in the British administration of Prime Minister Lloyd George, that the USSR had been harshly treated and would likely not long tolerate this. So much so that “all the efforts of the Poles” to get border guarantees from the British state failed. Until that is Lloyd George was forced from office in Britain. Thereafter in 1923 the “Council of Ambassadors” ignored the USSR, but acceded to Poland’s demands:

“The conditions had been forced on a temporarily weak Russia and every Allied statesman knew that this Eastern Alsace Lorraine would not be tolerated by a recovered Russia. The Allied statesmen temporized. So long as Lloyd George remained Prime Minister, despite all efforts of the Poles, the British Government refused to recognize the new frontiers. After he left office in the autumn of 1922, the Poles redoubled their efforts but still without success. Finally, however, the Council of Ambassadors sitting in Paris on March 14, 1923, without any reference to the Soviet Government decided with many misgivings to accept the Eastern frontiers of Poland as laid down in the Treaty of Riga.” [19]

This was never accepted by the USSR who protested that same day:

“On the same day the Soviet Government sent a strong note of protest to the Allied Governments against the decision of the Council of Ambassadors. It is very important to recall this fact. The Soviet Government was in no way morally committed to recognize the decision of the Council of Ambassadors.” [20]

“By the Treaty of Riga Russia and the Ukraine renounced their rights to the territories situated to the west of their new Polish frontier but this does not in any way imply that the fate of these territories is a matter of indifference to them.” [21]

Even the articles within the Treaty of Riga were flouted by Poland. The Treaty stated there was to be fair, respectful treatment of the USSR minorities of Ukranian, Byelorussian and Russian origin – drawn by the Treaty into Poland:

“Article VII of the Treaty provided for special rights for the Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Russians who had remained in the part of the Ukraine and Byelorussia which was annexed by Poland. This Article laid down that in accordance with the principles of the equality of rights and of nationality, all persons of Russian, Ukrainian or Byelorussian nationality in Poland should have all the rights essential for the development of their culture, language and religion. Poland did not fulfill these conditions.

Actually the Polish Government persecuted and oppressed the Ukrainians and Byelorussians in every possible way. While in the Soviet Ukraine and in Soviet Byelorussia prosperity and culture developed rapidly, in Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia poverty and ignorance were rampant.” [22]

The enormous discontent within those areas was recorded by the British leading press reports. The ‘Times’:

“The Warsaw correspondent of ‘The Times’ in a long article sympathetic to the Pilsudski Government, recorded the following grudging admission:

The 1,500,000-odd White Russians in the north-east of Poland and 4,000,000 odd Ukrainians in the south-east, never having been reconciled to a Polish Administration, are with very few exceptions, unwilling citizens, or revolutionaries when they have been educated, and an easy quarry for the agitator when they belong to the great majority of illiterates. The Soviet has been alive to its opportunities for exploiting the discontent in these minorities, aided by the mistakes of Polish Governments and the rigidness of Polish officials. In certain sections of the borderland a very dangerous agitation was recently brought to light.” [23]

The ‘Guardian’:

“The Warsaw correspondent of the Manchester Guardian cabled:

One specific grievance of the Ukrainians is that, because of the peculiarities of Galician law, they are virtually denied a voice in local government and municipal matters. Another is that the land laws and the conditions of landownership in that section of Poland are extremely irksome to the Ukrainians because they virtually condemn the peasants to a state of serfdom.”

Such grievance was rising to the level of a “hatred” that would wreak a vengeance said the Guardian”:

“One important result of this, according to the Manchester Guardian correspondent, was that “It is quickening the national spirit and stimulating a feeling of hatred that may some day result in the oppressed becoming the oppressors.” [24]

Poland’s government and its right wing saw itself as legitimately demanding its “own colonies” should be “returned”:

“Poland’s claim to colonies,” cabled the Warsaw correspondent of the Manchester Guardian is being raised afresh here in the official and other papers to-day and is, I understand, the subject of discussions in political quarters. Inspired press articles declare that while Germany is soon to demand the return of her colonies from France and England, Poland, too, being a big European Power, should quickly register her demand.” [25]

As we saw many centrist and left wing parties had absorbed this nationalist spirit also. It formed the bedrock of the refusal to join into mutual security pacts, as we will see below.

2. The formation and character of the Polish Communist Formations

The early organisations of the Polish Socialists

Socialists had begun organising in Poland from 1878 onwards, led by Ludwik Warynski. However, the working class was still numerically small, numbering about 78,000 and fewer than the number of craftsmen in 1864. [26] By 1882 Warynski had formed the “Proletariat”. It was one of many, most of whom got swept up into the Russian anarchist inspired ‘People’s Will’ (Narodnya Volya). They became dominated by the ideologies of Mikhail Bakunin and Louis Blanqui. This and the ultra-left positions they took, including that nationalism was unimportant, prevented direct links with Marx and Engels.

The Union of Polish Workers (1888-1893) was founded by Julian Marchlewski (Jan Karski), Adolf Warszawski (Warski), and Bronislaw Wejsoiowski (Smutny). This group later joined the Social Democratic Party of Poland and Lithuania (see below).

In 1892, a unity congress of differing trends of Polish socialists was held in Paris and became the social democratic Polish Socialist Party (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna – PPS). It agreed to work with Russian socialist parties, but it insisted that on Poland it was themselves who formed policy and directed activity. It largely took the guide of the Erfurt Programme of the German Social Democratic Party.  The predominant view in the PPS was one of supporting nationalist secession of Poland from under the three-way partitions of the dictatorial Empires. [27]

The SDKP and Rosa Luxemburg and early anti-nationalist views

This shortly led to a split within the PPS on whether the movement should call for Polish independence. Those argued that it should not, formed the “Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland (SDKP)”. It was to this wing that Rosa Luxemburg belonged. Jozef Pilsudski represented the wing arguing for Polish independence.

The theoretical and practical battles stemming from the National Question in Poland, were fought out at the Second International Socialist Congress of London in 1896.  The PPS was represented by Pilsudski and the SDKP by Luxemburg respectively. Luxemburg’s move to dismiss the issue of freedom for subjugated nations was rejected. [28]

When Felix Dzierzynski, a Lithuanian socialist joined the SDKP, it became the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and of Lithuania (SDKPiL). Dzierzynski with Luxemburg and Marchlewski – became its’ leaders.[29] They pushed from early on for Poland and its working party to become formally, a part of the Russian Bolsheviks (in the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party RSDWP). This perspective neglected the Polish struggle in favour of the future socialist Russia.

A considerable energy of the SDKPiL was spent attacking the national struggles including that of Poland. But at the same time, Luxemburg insisted on autonomy from the fast consolidating Bolshevik fraction of the RSDWP in contrast to Dzierzynski. Luxemburg also resolutely attacked the Iskra clause 7- which supported self-determination for Poland and other minorities in the Tsarist Empire. This position of hers led to a series of critiques by Lenin on the Polish leaders of the SDKPiL.

The Bund was also a force of socialism, organised Jewish workers. It was fatally parochial and insisted upon autonomy in policy and practice as regards to the Jewish population – rejecting the notion of any other basis for their nationality. Jews were a large percentage of the Polish urban proletariat.

During the 1905 Russian revolution, the PPS split again over whether or to endorse Polish separation and nationhood. Pilsudski had already begun organising his army, into the legion.

Meanwhile the SDKPiL moved closer to formal affiliation directly to the RSDLP. After the 1905 revolution, Bolsheviks and Mensheviks were trying to unite again – but on the Iskra platform. As the SDKiLP delegates were elected on the Central Committee of the RSDLP (including Leo Jogiches), they never gave way on the national question. [30] It was also during this time that the SDKiLP’s paper “Social Democratic Review” became dominated by Leon Trotsky’s writings. [31]

By the First World War, much sectarianism had splintered the various factions.

Attitudes of the Polish left to the First World War

The war was opposed by SDKPiL and parts of the left of the PPS:

“A majority of the SDKPiL and PPS-Left, however, remained as hostile as ever to any such “social-patriotic” solution, and advocated.. active resistance to war, on an international scale and in cooperation with Russian comrades. Of the two factions of the SDKPiL, the oppositionist Warsaw Committee was closer to Lenin and the Bolsheviks”. [32]

SDKPiL launched demonstrations and strike waves against the war.

As the attitude to WWI splintered the socialist forces, those closest to Lenin drew towards the Zimmerwald left. Yet once again the left wing of the SDKPiL refused to accept any role – as Karl Radek put it – for any “unification of Poland [stressed by the pro-Russian orientation] nor for independence”. [33] Lenin’s counter-attack was vigorous, but again it did not lead to significant changes in the views of the Polish leadership.

Nonetheless, under the influence of the Zimmerwald Left led by Lenin, various fractions of the SDKPiL moved to unite at a conference in November 1916.

After the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, Lenin’s views on Polish independence had not changed:

“As far as the efforts of the SDKPiL in Russia are concerned, the minutes of the Seventh All-Russian Conference of the Bolshevik Party in Petrograd make a most interesting document. At this conference Lenin, supported by Stalin, defended the right of self-determination against Dzierzynski, Pyatakov, and Makharadze. Lenin warned the Polish delegation not to overlook the aspirations of their native country and once more outlined the dangers of such a position. Lenin’s speech of May 12, 1917, was especially strong. Replying to a statement of Dzierzynski, who presented the traditional point of view of the SDKPiL, Lenin gave an exposition of his doctrine. He praised the SDKPiL for its uncompromising internationalism, but he also spoke some harsh words on its failure to understand the Bolshevik tactical line. Lenin said:

The Polish comrades come and tell us that we must renounce the freedom of Poland, its right to separation.. In Russia we must stress the right of separation for the subject nations, while in Poland we must stress the right of such nations to unite.” [34]

By the time of the 1917 revolution, some 2 million Polish workers were living and working inside the former Tsarist Russia – now the USSR. The Polish socialists were invited to take a major role in the newly created Commissariat of nationalities:

Leszczyriski (Lenski).. of the SDKPiL in Moscow, was designated by the Council of People’s Commissars to head the newly created Department for Polish Affairs. This was to be part of the Commissariat for Nationalities, under Stalin, and, at the beginning, all Polish socialist groups in Russia, including the PPS, accepted the new office and tried to cooperate with it. Soon, however, the PPS was discouraged and slowly withdrew its support, and other parties became

… in Moscow and Petrograd in 1918, delegates to the Council of Revolutionary Organizations were to be elected out of 60,000 resident Poles, some 3,000 voted for the Bolshevik list. Only the SDKPiL and the extremist wing of the PPS-Left firmly supported the Bolsheviks…  Even then the members of the SDKPiL, who had so wholeheartedly merged with the Bolsheviks, angrily objected to the repeated emphasis on self-determination, and reiterated instead their old battle cry of simple incorporation into Russia. This was, however, opposed by the Soviet government.” [35]

The Polish Socialists during the phase of the Russian Civil War

While the Brest-Litovsk negotiations took place, the SDKPiL supported the Left Communists.

Nonetheless, after the Bolshevik Revolution, the SDKPiL took steps towards forming soviets. It unfortunately took an ultra-leftist position on land reform, contrary to that which the peasant parties already had taken. It argued for an outright state ownership of all expropriated for all land (including small peasant proprietors), not just for large estates. The peasantry wanted land expropriation to be followed by land distribution to the peasantry. The SDKPiL course was bound to alienate the peasantry:

“The radical agrarian parties advocated outright expropriation of large estates for division among the peasants. .. (This) outbid the more moderate socialists, all of whose programs were limited to some sort of land nationalization. In August 1918 appeared the first issue of the SDKPiL newspaper for the villages, and it preached socialization of land and communist farming. The PPS at its Fourteenth Congress in September 1919 voted an agrarian program which compromised between orthodox Marxist doctrine on the subject and the realistic requirements of everyday struggle. While the program called for immediate and unconditional expropriation of large estates without compensation, it accepted individual ownership of small farms.” [36]

Correspondingly it did not attract any mass appeal from peasants. Meanwhile, largely spontaneous local councils of workers and peasants were formed, of varying resolve and socialist vision. In Lublin Galicia on November 7^th 1918 the council declared a ‘People’s Government’:

“there was an unexpected appearance of an organized group which claimed to be the government of the whole country. This “people’s government” was headed by Ignacy Daszyήski, … A manifesto was issued declaring the new state to be a republic, with a one-chamber parliament. A minimum wage, protection of labor, and social security were provided for, and radical land reform was promised, to be achieved by wholesale expropriation of all large estates, without compensation to previous owners.” [37]

Other worker councils were started across Poland including Lodz, Warsaw, and Daborwa. But Pilsudski’s national ‘Peoples militias’ put down most of these by arms.

Moreover, the Socialist parties of all ilk were taken aback by the formation of the new Polish state, supported by the Allied Entente in the Versailles Treaty. They had long been anti-independence:

“The emergence of an independent Polish state proved a painful blow to both left-wing Marxist groups. It was a rude shock to the chiefs of the SDKPiL, who had ridiculed the idea of a possible rebirth of Poland at every step and branded it both Utopian and undesirable.” [38]

Land Reforms

The more far-seeing elements of the ruling class – at least those in the intelligentsia and the small industrialists –  saw that there was a need for through going land reforms:

“From the very beginning of Poland’s independence agrarian reform became one of the principal worries of a country suffering from a faulty land structure. More than half the rural population lived on dwarf holdings, and public debate centered not around the issue of whether reform was necessary but around the problem of its extent and its timetable. In July 1919, after a lengthy debate, the Diet laid down fundamental principles for reform which provided for the gradual distribution of large estates.” [39]

Land reform was called for by the PSL. In fact the Sejm (Parliament) agreed to break up estates of more than 400 hectares – but this was never fully enacted. It is true that 2,655,000 hectares were transferred to peasants – but this was only about one fifth of the private land holdings in the estates of Church, State and private landowners. [40]

As the economy failed, the cash income of peasants dropped to almost one-third. Tax strikes if the peasantry, workers strikes in cities, and protest marches grew. Police versus peasant clashes became a “minor guerilla war”. [41]

In the towns and cities unemployment became a plague affecting about 10%-45% of the population in 1936. Of those registered as unemployed, only 20% got any relief payments. A strike wave hit in 1922-1923., and then in 1933-1937.

The Cracow Rising of 6 November 1923 was called by the PPS, but it left 32 dead after army assaults.

The Polish Mark fell dramatically, leading to the introduction of a new currency – the Zloty. Polish industrial development was stifled, especially with the loss of the Russian market. By 1938 the total industrial output had only reached the level of 1913. [42] An attempted State sponsored industrialisation – mainly of war industries – did improve matters. However the mass of peasantry was still struggling.

Formation of the Communist Workers Party of Poland (CWPP)

Rosa Luxemburg was born in Poland although she spent many years working for the Communist Party Germany (KPD) and the Spartakus Bund. However her early political work was in Poland and she was always enormously influential in the Polish socialist and communist movement. Her positions on Polish independence became especially important to the Polish movement. Lenin was very critical of her viewpoint.

From the start of preparation meetings of the Polish party, it took a Luxemburgist position – as opposed to a Leninist one – on two inter-related questions. First the national question and second the peasant question:

“November 15 and 16, 1918, the SDKPiL, convened in Warsaw to prepare for merger. … unification with the PPS-Left should be carried out on the basis of the SDKPiL program. The war, said the resolution, was the mortal crisis of capitalism …  Social revolution and dictatorship of the proletariat were the only solution and it was the duty of the party to organize an immediate fight for power.

… After a successful revolution the best conditions for development of native agriculture would be created by large-scale, centralized, communal farming. With the introduction of dictatorship of the proletariat, private ownership of land as well as private trade in agricultural products would be abolished, and land would become the exclusive property of the socialist community. During the transition period, however, small farms would be left in the hands of those who were willing to work them without hired labor. …

The date of December 16, 1918, was fixed for a unification congress

… This party, to be called the Communist Workers’ Party of Poland, should prepare to undertake an immediate armed struggle for power.” [43]

Luxemburg was in conflict with the positions of Lenin and other Marxists of the RSDLP. But she was in harmony with the positions of Leon Trotsky. [44] Her influence in the communist movement of both Poland (the CWPP) and Germany (Communist party of Germany CPG) was long lasting. Polish-born Rosa Luxemburg, moved to Germany in 1897:

“Rosa Luxemburg has left behind deep traces in the German and Polish Communist movement. One can say without exaggeration that for a considerable number of years.. both parties grew up under the influence of her ideas and guidance”. [45]

“All the new leaders fully subscribed, (to) the guiding lines of policy laid down by Rosa Luxemburg in the foundation document of the, CPG and subsequent policy statements in ‘Rote Fahe’. On nearly all subjects her word was law … And even after the personal element of tribute had gradually died away,, her work was still the fount of all orthodoxy in Germany”. [46]

As a historian of the Polish Party put it about the Polish movement:

“The general ideological outlook of the created Polish Communist party was to a large degree influenced by the ideological positions inherited with the theoreticians and leaders of the SDKPiL. The leading figures here were Rosa Luxemburg, Leon

Jogiches (Tyszko), Adolf Warszawski (Warski), Karol Sobelson (Radek), Jozef Unschlicht (Jurowski), Marcin Kasprzak, Julian Leszczynski (Lenski), Jakob Firstenberg (Hanecki), Julian Marchlewski (Karski), and Feliks Dzierzynski… Two, Warski and Leszczynski, were to become important leaders of the Polish Communist movement.” [47]

Indeed both the CWPP and the CPG were handcapped by an ultra-leftism directly attributable to Luxemburgism. Her influence was felt during the Unity conference of Polish leftists:

“The third part of the program defined the immediate tasks of the new party and expressed its attitude toward the perennial socialist controversy, that of Poland’s political future: all power should go to the proletariat of towns and villages, organized in the councils of workers’ delegates. The land problem — the rejection of land distribution among the peasants, the lack of mention of the worker peasant alliance, the stress on land workers — this was the main point of variance with the Bolshevik position. The platform was edited in distinctly Luxemburgist terms:

“…the Polish proletariat rejects every political solution.. connected with the evolution of a capitalistic world, solutions like autonomy, independence, and self-determination. Since the proletariat is fighting against all its enemies and for the dictatorship of the proletariat, it will oppose all attempts at creating a bourgeois, counterrevolutionary Polish army and oppose every war for national frontiers. The proletariat will create its own revolutionary armed forces. For the international camp of social revolution there is no problem of national frontiers.” [48]

Despite this, the party correctly characterised the Polish state: “the Polish Republic was a semi-feudal, semi-bourgeois state.” [49] Attempts by the Soviet Bolsheviks to send solid leaders in the guise of working in the Red Cross delegation failed, where one member (Wesolowski) was murdered.

Unfortunately, when the first parliamentary election to the Constituent Assembly took place in Poland in February 1919 – the CWPP reacted with an ultra-Left boycott of elections.  Moreover the Workers Councils while still popular experienced. Dispiriting sectarian war ensued between the CWPP and the PSP. Finally and fatally – the CWPP refused to comply with new legislation to register parties, leading to its being declared illegal. This eroded even further its influence on the masses, since it could not make contact so easily with them.

The CWPP did join the Communist International, where it was represented by Jozef Unszlicht, a long-time member of the Russian Bolshevik Party living in Moscow.

The CWPP in the Polish-Soviet War and up to the Pilsudski 1926 coup

We detailed this war in Part One. We discussed the failure of the Soviet invasion of Poland – as opposed to its initial self-defense of USSR territory. Here we draw attention to the reservoir of ultra-left policies in the CWPP traceable to the views of Rosa Luxemburg.

The party protested the initial Polish attack on Kiev by holding demonstrations. However it found little resonance in the masses.

On May 5 a special council was created in Moscow on the war against Poland. Karol Radek made a programmatic speech in which he followed Lenin’s characterisation of Pilsudski being an Allied instrument. Radek wrote around this time in support of the “export of revolution”:

“Radek, while conceding that a future proletarian Poland should freely determine her relation to Communist Russia, formulated a slogan …:

“Poland” [wrote Radek] “must cease to be a wall protecting Europe from Russia and become a bridge between Russia and Germany.” [50]

On May 5 top ranking Polish Communists met to hear a report from S. Budzynski (Tradycja) who “emphasized the internal tensions within Poland”. He concluded that Poland  “was ripe for full-scale social upheaval.”

As the war progressed, Marchlewski and many other leaders made similar exaggerated estimates of the imminent social revolution in Poland. Moreover an ultra-left, cavalier and – Luxemburgist – attitude towards the peasantry again became obvious. Marchlewski:

“In a speech made by Marchlewski at the Second Congress of the Communist International, a short time before the establishment of the Provisional Revolutionary Committee:.. . In Poland, declared Marchlewski, as all over East Central Europe, predominantly a grain-producing area, large scale farming was a necessity. Consequently, squires’ estates should not be destroyed but taken over and run by the state as grain-producing factories.” [51]

The Provisional Revolutionary Committee for Poland was set up on August 2, 1920, in Bialystok, with Marchlewski (chairman), Feliks Dzierzynski, Feliks Kon, and Jozef Unszlicht (members) and Edward Prochniak (secretary). It also had “about eighty officials”. [52]

The Committee reflected its Luxemburgist views. It was dismissive about the peasantry, despite Lenin’s repeated injunction to launch the peasants rebellion and land seizure inside Poland. Marchlewski said instead that:

“peasants’ cooperatives should be established”; and “Cooperative farming is the only possible stepping stone toward socialism.” [53]

This approach was unlikely to lead to peasant support for the Polish communists. Only Dzierzynski supported Lenin’s view, but he was over-ruled.

By the 1922 elections the CWPP’s anti-electoral position have swung to accepting participation in elections. This came after the Comintern demanded the policy be changed. However its prior policy of electoral boycotts and failure to officially register, had left it an illegal party. To circumvent this, it fought in new elections through a front called ‘Union of Town and Country Proletariat”, and won 2 seats.

To a certain extent then, its ultra-leftist policies were successfully amended. But it still did not support self-determination for oppressed nations, nor land distribution to peasants.

At this stage, it was led by “Warski  (Warszawski),  Walecki   (Horwitz),  and  Wera  Kostrzewa   (Koszutska), or the “Three  W’s.” [54]

At the Second Party Congress – held in Moscow in August 1923 – its’ prior ultra-leftism underwent an open self-criticism.[55]

Even so, it adopted an openly pro-Trotsky position in the evolving and increasingly open conflict between Trotsky and the Marxist-Leninists in the CPSU(B) led by Stalin.[56]

In addition, it supported the ultra-left positions of Brandler of the Communist Party of Germany. Its delegates went to the 5^th Congress of Comintern in Moscow in July 1924. There a Polish commission was struck. It was chaired by Stalin, who opposed a purge:

“One had to bear in mind that, generally speaking, a surgical operation carried out without much need, leaves an unpleasant aftertaste in the ranks of the party.” [57]

Nonetheless, many CWPP Central Committee members were removed, including the “3 Ws”. This was formalised at the Third Party Congress in 1925 near Brest Litovsk, which adopted the slogan of “Bolshevization of the Party”. Replacements included three who had been resident in Moscow – Lenski (Leszcynski), Leon Purman, and Henryk Stein (Kaminski). The party name was changed to the Communist Party of Poland (KPP). The new leadership however continued to adopt a leftist position, which extended to individual terror and assassination. [58] A Second Polish Commission in Moscow, chastised and removed them. Warski was again put into the leadership.

Thus it was Warski who was responsible for swinging the KPP into support of Pilsudski’s coup in 1926. This became known as the “May Error” and is discussed below. 

3. The Pilsudski Coup and its consequences

Pilsudski and his clique of colonels –  pro-landlord and pro-small industrialists   

The commander-in-chief of the Polish Army, Marshall Pilsudksi was a key protagonist in Poland. As we saw in Part One, he was a former member of the PSP, but always more of a nationalist than a socialist. His social programme was decidedly to support the landed estate owners.

Pilsudski’s nationalism formed his grand project of the greater Polish Commonwealth as an empire from sea to sea (Black Sea to the Baltic Sea). But the corollary of this was to try and cramp, and infringe on the territory of the USSR:

“Stanislaw Mackiewicz, a keen admirer and supporter of Marshal Pilsudski wrote:

“He [Pilsudski] visualised a Poland, as strong as possible, associated with a Ukraine governed from Kiev and supported in turn by a free Caucasus. Poland would thus be at the head of a long chain of anti-Russian nations, spreading from the Gulf of Finland, from Tallinn, to the Caspian, Tiflis, and Baku. This was only half the scheme.

The author continued:

Pilsudski planned a union of the countries menaced by the common German and Russian danger. His eye went from the snows of Sweden and Finland to the mosques of Turkey. The task was difficult. Out of the haze of great plans, there came only two practical achievements: (1) the collaboration with Estonia, that small bridgehead of Russia (this was not very much, for Estonia could offer little help and would require a great deal); (2) the alliance with Rumania, a country with seventeen million inhabitants, rich, though not particularly well governed.

Pilsudski’s policy.. (found – Ed).. no adherents other than Estonia and Rumania.” [59]

The more progressive pro-industrialist factions of Polish society knew that the reactionary Pilsudski wanted to become President – and that he would obstruct reforms.

Accordingly, Edward Dubanowicz from the ‘National Democrats’ party, framed the March 17 Constitution 1921. This carried one Article 46 – which was specifically targeted against Pilsudski. It barred the President – who by title was head of the armed forces – from exercising any command in wartime. As such it “emasculated the presidency and an omnipotent legislature.” [60]

As hoped, the National Democrats and their class allies succeeded in Pilsudski’s refusal to serve as President in the post-Riga period. On 30 May 1923, Piłsudski resigned his army post – the Chief of the General Staff. Following this he officially resigned. His ally – Gabriel Narutowicz – was elected as President, representing a “Left-Center-National Minorities” coalition. Within a week he was assassinated by a Rightist fanatic. This deepened divisions between the right wing parties, and those between the National Democrats and Pilsudski.

Effectively barred from power, Pilsudski could not keep from manipulations. With lobbying, his friends gained leading posts. The former PPS leading member, and friend of Pilsudski – Stanislaw Wojciechowski – became the new President. General Wladyslaw Sikorski was made Prime Minister, of whom we shall hear more later. But problems arose as the emasculated Presidential office did not allow adequate legislative powers to any holder. A profusion of political parties also made ruling alliances and coalitions difficult to effect. Corruption grew.

As Pilsudski continued to pull strings from outside government, his hand was visible in many government appointees. He was also again made Chief of the General Staff – and first Marshall of Poland. His various allies formed a movement sanacja (or ‘sanation’ in English – for a ‘healing’ of a moral societal breakdown), which became a coalition from right to left. It is relevant to recall that before forming the Legions in conjunction with the ‘Central powers’, Pilsudski had been a leading member of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS).

A serious economic crisis grew, forcing many governments to resign. This forced out the Sikorsky alliance, and a Right-Piast Peasant coalition took control headed by Wicenty Witso (Piast). Witso became merely a veneer for the right-wingers. As Stanislaw Thugutt, the leader of the Wyyzwolenie Peasant party said:

“Witos could have been a great peasant but, alas, chose to become the court fool of the gentry.“ [61]

Witos had shown his support for the rich peasantry, and not the poor or middle peasantry, and this endeared him to the right wing of the National Democrats:

“Witos and representatives of the two main right-wing parties provided, instead of compulsory agrarian reform, that the state should parcel out up to one million acres of land yearly, paying full compensation at market prices. The land was to come first from state farms and only second from private estates which would volunteer to dispose of a part of their land; 60 per cent of the total area to be distributed would be situated in the eastern part of the country where the squires’ estates were largest and were in the worst financial shape. This shift in the policy of the Piast reflected the clash of interests between rich and poor peasants. The rich had enough money to purchase land, and wanted only to bring pressure to bear upon landowners so that they would dispose of part of their estates to those who could afford to buy land.” [62]

The Witos government could not last amidst hyper-inflation and failure of the Land Reforms. This allowed Wladyslaw Grabski to take the Premiership and finance ministry:

“The Witos government was plagued from its very beginning by inflation (which turned into hyperinflation) and popular unrest over the unsettled economic situation. It was however the question of agrarian reform that brought the government down. Five deputies from Witos’s party formed their own party, PSL “Piast-Left,” and withdrew their support from the government when progress on land reform remained elusive. This action led to the government’s replacement by a new cabinet. It was the issue of fiscal policy that brought down another center-right cabinet, that of Grabski. While this cabinet was nonparty in character, it relied on a coalition of center and right parties for support. Throughout the period of interwar democracy, the Polish state faced perpetual fiscal crisis.” [63]

The Pilsudski Bonapartist Coup of 1926

By August 1925 the zloty fell dramatically, and the state bank (Bank Polski) was seriously depleted in balance of payments. A multi-party cabinet was formed of five parties (National Democratic, Christian Democrat, Piast Peasant, National Labor and Socialist Party – only the Wyzwolenie Peasants refused to participate).  However matters deteriorated and bank failures swept over Poland. Unemployment reached 400,000 on an under-estimate no including two million “superfluous” village poor. A care-taker government pending a full coalition was being stitched together by Witsos on May 10^th.

Thus from 1925 inwards, amidst considerable social chaos Piłsudski became more public again. He had already resigned his post as Chief of the General Staff.

By May 12^th Pilsudski demanded that the Cabinet under Witso resign. The crisis continued to develop as Witos was preparing a third attempt at a coalition government. Pilsudksi pre-empted this by carrying out an armed coup in 1926 ensuring presidential legislative powers to his nominee. A strike of socialist railwaymen was pivotal to Pilsudksi’s success. [64]

The coup was supported by the Polish Socialist Party, the Peasant Parties and the Communist Workers Party of Poland (CWPP).

This was a military coup or a Bonapartist dictatorship. Provisionally we can define this by three features. (i) It is a dictatorship is launched at a time of a ‘stale-mate’ between contending class forces. (ii) During its course the proletarian or poorest sections of society are duped into supporting a militarist dictator who in reality represents the ruling conservative class forces. (iii) They are usually imposed when social conditions are moving towards a crisis, but there is no effective working class party that can provide the way forward to the class. (See Appendix for a fuller discussion of the Marxist use of the term).

The support of the CWPP of Poland to Pilsudski and his coup then seems strange.

Was this an error, or what lay behind this support? The CWPP were certainly poorly led, and it seems this was a genuine error on their parts. [65] At this time Warski was the main leader of the CWPP and the decision was made to support the Pilsudski coup.

Whether a possible error by the CWPP was committed had international repercussions.

Attempted Frameup of Stalin at the Comintern over the Coup

Whether of academic or of Trotskyist origin, most histories paint the decision of the CWPP (or CPP) to support Pilsudski as another of “Stalin’s impositions on the non-Russian communist movement”. As for example the historian M. K. Dziewanowski, who finds this as “beyond doubt”:

“It seems beyond doubt that CPP tactics in support of Pilsudski’s coup had been approved by Moscow. The pattern in Poland was the same as in China, where Communists were ordered to collaborate with the Kuomintang. Limited cooperation with Pilsudski was openly and repeatedly announced by Warski (Warszawski) and his associates; the collaboration was discussed and blessed by the main theoretical organ of the Comintern, the Communist International. Then, when the new disaster of Pilsudski’s regime ensued, a scapegoat was sought. But now any change in CPP leadership was extremely difficult, because all factions of the party acted unanimously, after recently undergoing a series of Comintern-sponsored purges. Consequently, there was no serious “blood-letting” on this occasion. After severe admonitions and a meek submission by CWPP leaders, the story was closed, with only a slight reshuffling on the Central Committee. Warski and his rightist group remained in control temporarily. By tacitly allowing the CWPP to support Pilsudski, Moscow hoped to provoke civil war or to aid in establishing a “democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants.” [66]

The late Neil Davidson of the SWP cited Isaac Deutscher, speaking for the Trotskyist camp:

“Behind the grotesquery lay two political calculations. One was Russian foreign policy. During the entire period between 1924-1928, during which Stalin assumed complete control of the Russian state, the Comintern was involved in a search for allies to is tight, such as the Kuomintang in China… As part of this orientation, it sought “unity” with various Social Democratic organisations including the Polish PSP, and since it supported its offer member Pilsudski in his bid for power, so did the Communist Party of Poland.” [67]

However, had Stalin ‘told’ the CWPP to support Pilsudski? As it happens we have some information on this – from two works of Stalin’s. Firstly at a speech to railway workers in Tiflis – Stalin had this to say on whether or not Communists should support Pilsudski, since:

“An opinion exists that the movement headed by Pilsudski is a revolutionary movement. It is said that Pilsudski is fighting for a revolutionary cause in Poland—for the peasants against the landlords, for the workers against the capitalists, for the freedom of the oppressed nationalities in Poland against Polish chauvinism and fascism. Because of this, it is said, Pilsudski deserves to have the support of the Communists.

That is absolutely wrong, comrades!” [68]

Stalin went on to point to class division in the Polish ruling class such that:

“Actually, what is going on in Poland at present is a struggle between two groups of the bourgeoisie: the big bourgeois group, headed by the Poznaners, and the petty-bourgeois group, headed by Pilsudski. The purpose of the struggle is not to defend the interests of the workers and peasants or the interests of the oppressed nationalities, but to consolidate and stabilise the bourgeois state. The struggle arises from a difference concerning the methods of consolidating the bourgeois state.”

Poland was in crisis, or “a state of disintegration” – one in which the bourgeoisie risked being exposed and bringing to a head the revolutionary movement:

“The fact of the matter is that the Polish state has entered a phase of complete disintegration. Its finances are going to pieces. The zloty is falling. Industry is in a state of paralysis. The non-Polish nationalities are oppressed. And up above, in the circles close to the ruling elements, there is a regular orgy of theft, as is admitted quite freely by spokesmen of all the various groups in the Sejm. The bourgeois classes are therefore faced with the dilemma: either the disintegration of the state goes so far that it opens the eyes of the workers and peasants and brings home to them the necessity of transforming the regime by a revolution against the landlords and capitalists; or the bourgeoisie must hurry up and stop the process of decay, put an end to the orgy of theft, and thus avert the probable outbreak of a revolutionary movement of the workers and peasants before it is too late.”

And indeed there were elements of the working class that misguidedly supported Pilsudski:

“Undoubtedly, the workers and peasants link their aspirations for a radical improvement of their lot with Pilsudski’s struggle. Undoubtedly, for this very reason the top section of the working class and the peasantry in one way or another support Pilsudski, as being the representative of strata of the petty bourgeoisie and petty nobility, in his struggle against the Poznaners, who represent the big capitalists and landlords. But undoubtedly also, at the present time the aspirations of certain sections of Poland’s labouring classes are being utilised not for a revolution, but to consolidate the bourgeois state and the bourgeois order.”

Stalin does not stint in acknowledging that the CWPP was “weak” and had made an error:

“That raises the question of the Polish Communist Party. How could it happen that the revolutionary discontent of a considerable section of the workers and peasants in Poland brought grist to the mill of Pilsudski, and not of the Polish Communist Party? Among other reasons, because the Polish Communist Party is weak, weak in the extreme, and because in the present struggle it has weakened itself still further by its incorrect attitude to Pilsudski’s army, in consequence of which it has been unable to assume the lead of the revolutionary-minded masses… Our Polish comrades committed a gross error… ”

Stalin ends with agreeing with a German communist – Ernst Thälmann:

“Comrade Thälmann’s criticism is absolutely correct.”

Indeed Thälmann in “Die Rote Fahne“(3 June 1926) had termed Pilsudski’s “white bayonets” as “Bonapartist”:

“What is the meaning of Pilsudski’s so-called struggle against reaction? It is clear to every Marxist that two different and opposed elements took part in the last revolution: on the one hand the working class and the toiling peasantry, the impoverished middle class, the oppressed national minorities – but on the other hand the military clique in the person of Pilsudski, whose aims were by no means revolutionary , but are reactionary. He does not set himself the task of liberating the proletariat from the yoke of the fascists and the bourgeoisie, but of betraying all layers of the working people in the name of “law and order”, in the name of the bourgeois constitution, in the name of the counter-revolutionary bloc and in the name the footman-like servility to English imperialism. It is precisely in the connection of this counter-revolutionary role with the simultaneous exploitation of the broad masses’ illusions of freedom, in the raising of the democratic flag over the white bayonets that the peculiar Bonapartist character of Pilsudskiism lies. Therein lies its fundamental class contradiction.” [69]

Thälmann goes on to equate the Pilsudski coup with the Kornilov march against the Kerensky government, noting that Lenin had not for an instance considered supporting the Kerensky government, while at the same time urging the Bolsheviks to fight Kornilov.

However, some elements within the Communist International were supporting the CWPP lending its support to Pilsudski. Those elements included Kamenev, Trotsky and Zinoviev – but not Stalin. Stalin had in fact urged the contrary position:

“I should like, first of all, to deal with the attacks of Kamenev, Zinoviev and Trotsky on sections of the Comintern, on the Polish section of the Comintern…

The question of the Polish Party. Zinoviev boldly stated here that if there is a Right deviation in the person of Warski in the Polish Party, it is the Communist International, the present leadership of the Comintern, that is to blame. He said that if Warski at one time adopted—and he certainly did adopt—the standpoint of supporting Pilsudski’s troops, the Comintern is to blame for it.

That is quite wrong. I should like to refer to the facts, to passages, well-known to you, of the verbatim report of the plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission held in July of last year,

I should like to refer to and cite the testimony of a man like Comrade Dzerzhinsky, who stated at the time that if there was a Right deviation in the Polish Party, it was fostered by none other than Zinoviev. That was during the days of the so-called Pilsudski rising, ² when we, the members of the Polish Commission of the E.C.C.I. and of the Central Committee of our Party, which included Dzerzhinsky, Unszlicht, myself, Zinoviev and others, were drafting the resolutions for the Communist Party of Poland. Zinoviev, as the Chairman of the Comintern, submitted his draft proposals, in which he said, among other things, that at that moment in Poland, when a struggle was flaring up between the forces that were behind Pilsudski and the forces that were behind the Witos government of Poland, that at such a moment, a policy of neutrality on the part of the Communist Party was impermissible and that for the time being no sharp pronouncements against Pilsudski should be made.

Some of us, including Dzerzhinsky, objected and said that that directive was wrong, that it would only mislead the Communist Party of Poland. It was necessary to say that not only a policy of neutrality, but also a policy of supporting Pilsudski was impermissible. After some objections, that directive was accepted with our amendments.” [70]

In summary there is no evidence to support the contention that Stalin had pushed any such policy of support of Pilsudski onto the CWPP. Bizarrely the Trotskyists agree that the Pilsudski coup should not have been supported.

Modern Historians on Pilsudksi’s motives

What truth is there in Stalin’s contention that Pilsudski’s coup was aimed against the Poznan bourgeoisie? The industrialists had tried to expand, but were still largely based in Western Poland in Poznan:

“Pilsudski’s lack of support, indeed resistance, from Western Poland (the Poznan area and Pomerania) was a factor in his decision to overthrow the democratic government in May 1926. These western Poles had lived under Prussian/German rule during the partition and were more strongly anti-German, less anti-Russian, than other Poles. Their politics followed a more middle-class pattern than the rest of the nation where the peasant-noble relationship was the dominant legacy. In sum, they were less inclined to follow the white horse upon which Pilsudski rode.” [71]

Moreover even the land distribution in the Poznan area had become more centralized than other parts of Poland – more especially the Eastern parts including Galicia:

“Diffusion of advanced farming techniques, related to an adoption of capital-intensive industrial crops such as sugar beet, contributed to a spectacular improvement in productivity in the Prussian partition between 1882 and 1907, surpassing that in the rest of Germany. Productivity advances were dominantly captured by the top of the distribution because of relatively high land inequality—an outcome of the Prussian land reforms, which favoured larger estates at the cost of smallholdings. Large estates were the driving force behind the structural transformation of agriculture in East Elbia, in what has often come to be generalised as the ‘Prussian’ road to industrialisation (Lenin, 1908). However, the causation might have run the other way, from inequality to growth, notably by alleviating accumulation constraints in line with the “classical channel.” [72]

It seems that Stalin’s analysis is largely supported by contemporary writers then.

Following the coup

Pilsudski and his puppet government principally supported the landowners. Although it is true that Pilsudski also tried to win over the principal Polish industrialists:

“He made a number of approaches to the large landowners, with whom he had co-operated before and during the war.. The alliance was sealed by Pilsudski’s presence at a banquet at the Radziwill estate of Nieswiez in late October 1926, which was attended by many principal landowners…. The government was also successful in winning the support of the principal Polish industrialists’ organization.” [73]

Pilsudski had formally established a rule by a coup and assumed power as a dictator, but he carefully preserved the fig-leaf legitimacy of an enfeebled Parliament – the Sejm. As a stage-manager he appointed Kazimierz Bartel as Premier, and Ignacy Moscicki as President. Pilsudski was:

“…in fact, a curious combination of an old-fashioned military dictator and a political manager.. Pilsudski, to the surprise of some of his more zealous supporters, did not establish a dictatorship after the coup. (but – Ed) His successor as president was the largely apolitical figure of Ignacy Moscicki, (who ensured – Ed) constitutional changes passed by the Sejm in August 1926 .. (to) strengthen the power of the executive. The president was granted the right to dissolve parliament and, in addition, if a budget was not passed by parliament during the requisite five-month session, the government’s proposals were to have the force of law. The president’s power to issue decrees was widened.” [74]

He ensured the slogan of the army was anti-Russian:

“Pilsudski was in fact largely responsible for the virtually unchallenged acceptance in the army of the slogan ‘Eyes east’.” [75]

The social contradictions intensified as expected by Marxist-Leninists:

“The years 1926 to 1928 brought the CPP considerable expansion both in active membership and in the number of satellite and fellow traveling organizations. Popularization of the party’s new agrarian program was influential among landless peasants in central Poland, particularly in the heavily overpopulated Lublin and Kielce provinces. This ascendancy was achieved for the most part indirectly, first through the Independent Peasant Party, and then through its ideological successor, the Peasant Self-Help.” [76]

Equally consistent were moves towards forming a “non-party” amorphous “moral bloc”. This was in its core coming close to a fascist ideology incorporating a ‘moral’ healing of a ‘societal breakdown’ (see p.15). In 1928 the pro-Government pro-Pilsudski party incorporated that principle of Sanacja. It’s form was “a Non-Party Bloc for Co-operation with the Government” (Bezpartyjny Blok Wspotpracy z Rzadem – BBWR.

This primarily had a membership of landowners and industrialists, but also included some puppet, pro-government Jewish, Ukrainian and Byelorussian individuals. In 1935 it was to spawn the ‘Camp of Nation Unification’ (OZoN) a more openly militaristic and fascistic type of party. That was led by General S.Skwarczynski and Marshall Edward Smigly-Rydz.

Pilsudski now resigned, demanding his protégé be his replacement. But a small social-democratic opposition refused – instead insisting on voting the socialist leader Daszyriski in power as Premier. At this time Pilsudski’s inner circle of “the Colonels Group” began pushing harder against any possible democratic norms. This began an increasingly tense stand off in Parliament as:

“Conflict soon arose over the government’s failure to present for ratification its supplementary credits not authorized in the budget, the removal from the courts of a number of prominent judges and its demands for constitutional reform. Increasingly Piisudski’s inner circle of legionaries.. often referred to as the ‘Colonels’ group’, began to urge the government to take a harder line in relation to parliament. The constitutional issue became pressing when the BBWR presented its

proposals to parliament on 6 February 1929. These were totally un-acceptable to the Left and were denounced in the socialist paper Kobotnik as constituting in practice the liquidation of parliamentary democracy.” [77]

The critical factor rapidly was revealed to be the corrupt financial affairs of the BBWR and Pilsudski:

“The minister of finance, Gabriel Czechowicz, wished to present (its supplementary credits) to parliament for ratification, but was prevented from doing so by Pilsudski, who seems to have feared that budgetary scrutiny would reveal that he had obtained from the treasury an extraordinary credit of 8 million zloty (£180,000) for the BBWR election campaign.”

Debacles followed with the resignation of Bartel – a pro-Pilsudski PM. Then ensued the first of the “Colonel Cabinets” with Kazimierz Switalski, and other close Pilsudski allies.

Sliding towards more open fascism

As the international financial crisis from Wall Street crashes hit Poland worse than many other European countries (barring Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia) – a polarization escalated. The Communist Party was ineffectual. The right wing organised as open fascists:

“In October 1928 the main National Democratic grouping, the Popular National Union, was re-formed as the National Party and began to cooperate closely with the near fascist “Camp for a Greater Poland (Oboz Wielkiej Polski) formed under Dmowski’s aegis in December 1926.” [78]

The Center and Left (social democrats) 6 parties (the PPS, the three peasant parties, the Christian Democrats and the National Workers’ Party) formed a united front known as the Centrolew. That held a special congress on 29 June – which demanded the “removal of the governments of the dictator Jozef Pilsudski’ and their replacement by a constitutional cabinet”. [79]

Over this time, however the Communist Party had swung from its previous incorrect support of Pilsduski, to now an ultra-leftism, isolating itself. It called the Centrolew “one of the different fractions of Polish fascism”.^[80]  In doing so it refused to ally even with the newly emerged single peasant party:

“The PPS continued to maintain its support for the peasant groups which united to form a single Peasant Party (Stronnictwo Ludowe SL) in March 1931. The united party overcame the divisive tendencies within its ranks and tended to become more radical as the slump persisted. Calls for expropriation of large estates without compensation became more frequent, and in 1932 and 1933 there were rural ‘strikes’ when peasants refused to allow agricultural produce to be transported to the towns.” ^[81]

In the division of his opponents, and by further stratagems Pilsudski again became PM and dissolved Parliament. He was aided by a peasant revolt organized by the Ukrainian Military Organisation in November 1929 in East Galicia which he put down with brutality. Waves of arrests targeted the Centrolew and thousands were locked up. Now manipulated elections led to government electoral victory.

By now Pilsudski was ill and day to day management was exercised by his Legion veterans. The army held most government state positions.  Shortly this was true of provincial posts also. A steady curtailment of democratic rights ensued with legislative decree powers, anti-strike legislation, press censorship, and removal of university professors who were anti-government.

The economic crisis escalated under the dictatorial rule, and the suffering fates of the arrested prisoners became widely known. Opposition grew.

4. The Failure to form mutual security Pacts Against Hitler

Polish Foreign Policy eschews collective security pacts involving the USSR.

It was at this point that Pilsudski began making overtures to the French for a unipolar alliance. This continued a long-lasting pattern of anti-USSR maneuvers in the build-up to the Second World War by Polish governments. It presaged the refusals to engage in collective security pacts against Hitler, and indeed – the disastrous and doomed attempts of the “Warsaw rising” to try and prempt the Soviet liberation of Poland from Hitlerite occupation in 1944.

Even as Hitler was rising, Pilsudski began the path of standing off from “collective security” which would have included the USSR:

“By the agreement of January 1934 Poland stood aside from efforts to create a system of collective security. Pilsudski launched Poland upon this policy. Jozef Beck was only his executor, just as the other colonels pursued his policies in other fields.” [82]

And at the same time, Polish government authorities developed a “small-power imperialism” towards the minorities in and outside its borders:

“As Germany grew in strength Poland pursued the aims of small-power imperialism. Poland renounced unilaterally the minorities treaty in September 1934. Territorial demands against Czechoslovakia in the Cieszyn area were revived. Poland seemed to behave as if she would be a partner of Germany in the reshaping of Central Europe. France in particular resented Polish opposition to Barthou’s plan for an eastern guarantee pact. Pilsudski and Beck set their face against any agreement which would allow the USSR to play any part in Central European affairs. The Franco-Soviet pact was signed on 2 May 1935 and Laval decided for internal political reasons to go to Moscow, stopping on 10—11 May in the hope of seeing Pilsudski, but Pilsudski was then on his deathbed.” [83]

On Pilsudski’s death in 1935, the vacuum was shortly filled by Edward Rydz-Śmigły as the army’s Inspector-General, who later became Marshall. Ignacy Mościcki, remained President. But various members of the “Colonels”, or the “President’s Men”, were dominant over a weakly opposed civilian “Castle Group“. Steadily democratic norms were further eroded:

“Residual parliamentarianism was soon undermined. The first inroads were made by the new electoral law adopted on 8 July 1935 in spite of the strong resistance of the opposition and even some sections of the government camp. The law made virtually impossible a free selection of candidates and increased enormously the control of the regime over elections.“ [84]

Importantly, Colonel Jozef Beck – an ex-legionary devoted to Pilsudski – remained at the Foreign Ministry as its chief and fled at the Nazi invasion:

“continued the Marshal’s policy of hostility towards the Soviet Union until on September 17, 1939, he fled across the Rumanian frontier as an exile.” [85]

The Colonels further manipulated constitutional rules. When the elections were held in the autumn of 1935, the opposition parties refused to participate in them:

“The majority of the Opposition in the last Parliament—representing several million voters—decided immediately after the enactment of the electoral laws to take no part in the present election,” cabled The Times correspondent from Warsaw, “and they have adhered to their decision. The National Democratic Party, the Socialists, the People’s Party (Peasants), and several others have therefore faded out of the political picture—at least for the present. Again in the autumn of 1938, the Opposition parties decided to boycott the elections.” [86]

This ended in an unimpeded “collective dictatorship” – namely a form of fascism:

“For practical purposes the (new) constitution established a collective dictatorship and dispensed with the safeguards common to normal parliamentary states.” [87]

The British media of the day, agreed upon such characterisation and agreed that democracy had ceased to exist in Poland since the May 1926 coup:

“for all practical purposes democratic government ceased to exist in Poland after Pilsudski’s military coup d’etat in May 1926. True, the Seym continued to meet and elections were held, but the real rulers of Poland were the “Colonels.” Poland was aptly called “The Colonels’ Republic.” A new Constitution was adopted April 1935 which was a travesty of democracy.

“President Moscicki signed Poland’s new Constitution to-night,” cabled the Daily Herald Warsaw correspondent. “It becomes operative to-morrow and makes the President absolute ruler of the country. It is assumed that Marshal Pilsudski, the Minister of War and virtual Dictator of Poland, will now become President.

“His rights will include: Appointment and dismissal of the Cabinet, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and the President of the Supreme Court. He will be empowered to summon and dissolve Parliament, decide on peace or war, and negotiate agreements with foreign Powers.” [88]

“The President has become chief of the State in fact as well as in name,” commented The Times editorially, April 25, 1935, “with command of the forces and power to dismiss and appoint Ministers, to dissolve and summon the Seym, and to nominate one of the two candidates for the succession to his office, the other being chosen by a body appointed by the party in power. Such a system leaves no loopholes for rival parties and influences, even if they were strong enough to make use of them . . . Such a version of Parliamentary methods may be distasteful to English democrats; but it must be remembered that the record of democratic practice in Poland is not a good one.” [89]

As dictatorship internally took place, Poland pursued a more intense pro-colonial policy:

“The Times correspondent in Warsaw, April 7, 1938, in the course of a long cable headed “Colonies for Poland,” stated:

The annual “Colonial Days” campaign, which began to-day and ends on Wednesday, is on a much larger scale than in former years, and demonstrations are to be held throughout Poland on Sunday to impress on public opinion the urgency of the colonial problem. Every day for a week, moreover, the wireless will make the public “colonial-minded,” and the campaign was launched last night with a broadcast speech by General Kwasniewski, the president of the Colonial and Maritime League.” [90]

The failed ‘Eastern Locarno Treaty; and Poland leaves the League of Nations

Established to ensure the provisions of the Versailles Treaty were enforced, the League of Nations was a militarist tool of the Entente initially. Hence the USSR initially refused to join it. Yet in the increasingly aggressive climate moving towards a new world war, the USSR saw a small potential in it. But as for any initiative aiming at a sensible mutual security pact involving the USSR, Poland would sabotage it. For example the “Eastern Locarno Pact”:

“The Polish Government determinedly and unfortunately with success opposed the proposed Eastern Locarno (Eastern Pact of Mutual Guarantee), whose aim was to include the U.S.S.R., Germany, Poland, the Baltic States and Czechoslovakia in a pact of non-aggression and mutual assistance. The proposal had finally to be dropped because Poland and Hitler’s Germany refused to accept it.” [91]

In 1934, the Soviet Union became a member of the League of Nations, as Stalin said in order to be in place where “aggressors can be exposed” and to use it “as a certain instrument of peace, however feeble”. At the 18^th party congress Stalin explained the USSR position:

“At the same time, in order to strengthen its international position, the Soviet Union decided to take certain other steps. At the end of 1934 our country joined the League of Nations, considering that despite its weakness the League might nevertheless serve as a place where aggressors can be exposed, and as a certain instrument of peace, however feeble, that might hinder the outbreak of war. The Soviet Union considers that in alarming times like these even so weak an international organization as the League of Nations should not be ignored. In May 1935 a treaty of mutual assistance against possible attack by aggressors was signed between France and the Soviet Union. A similar treaty was simultaneously concluded with Czechoslovakia. In March 1936 the Soviet Union concluded a treaty of mutual assistance with the Mongolian People’s Republic. In August 1937 the Soviet Union concluded a pact of non-aggression with the Chinese Republic.” [92]

“Duranty: Is your attitude towards the League of Nations always exclusively negative?

Stalin: No, not always and not under all circumstances. You perhaps do not fully understand our point of view. In spite of Germany’s and Japan’s withdrawal from the League of Nations – or possibly just because of it – the League may become a certain factor in retarding the outbreak of hostilities or in preventing them altogether. If that is so, if the League can prove to be something of an obstacle that would make war at least somewhat more difficult and peace to some extent easier, then we shall not be against the League. Yes, if such is the course of historical events, the possibility is not excluded that we shall support the League of Nations despite its colossal shortcomings.” [93]

But at this point Poland, not liking that Maxim Litvinov had won credibility for the USSR at Geneva when negotiating to join the League of Nations. Hence Pilsudski and Beck acted quickly. Fearing exposure of its treatment of Byelorussia and Ukraine, Poland declared to the League of Nations that it would no longer honor minority agreements, on September 14, 1934.

Even bourgeois commentators accused Polish Foreign Minster Beck, of a collaboration with the Nazi Germans, who had already been openly attacking the League of Nations. [94]

“True, Poland and the Soviet Union concluded a non-aggression pact in July 1932 and in May 1934 this pact was extended for ten years, but this extension was only accepted by Poland after a similar pact had been concluded with Germany. But to paraphrase Mr. Lloyd George, the vintage of the Soviet-Polish Pact was badly bottled and soon went sour.” [95]

“After this proposed Pact had been killed by the joint efforts of Poland and Hitler’s Germany, the U.S.S.R. and France in May 1935 signed the Franco-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact, but the Polish Government did their utmost to prevent its ratification.

“The striking manifestation of unity,” cabled the Daily Telegraph correspondent from Warsaw, “given by the Polish Press—both Government and Opposition—in the past 24 hours in condemning the Franco-Soviet Pact is significant. Not for many years has the Press been so agreed over foreign affairs.” [Daily Telegraph February 14, 1936.” [96]

Since Poland and Germany both denounced the attempted Franco-Soviet Pact, it was clear that they had  formed an anti-Soviet alliance. Poland was pushing for a Franco-German Pact in fact, to usurp the Franco-Soviet Pact.

British falsely ‘guarantee’ Poland’s Statehood against Nazi Germany

While the British government had appeased Nazi Germany, they made pledges to secure Poland that were impossible to fulfill without the agreement of the USSR:

“Military experts and well-informed publicists were convinced that, without Soviet aid, Poland would be helpless against Germany.

Mr. Lloyd George, referring to the guarantee given in the spring by the British Government to Poland against German aggression, declared:

“It looked magnificent, but men who had some knowledge of the problems pointed out to him [the Prime Minister] that it was not war.

I was the first to call attention to that obvious fact in the House of Commons.

I denounced it as sheer madness to give such a pledge in the absence of military support from Russia.

Russian troops could alone hope to reach the battlefield in time to save the Polish army from being crushed by an overwhelming German superiority in men, and especially in equipment.

The Chief of our General Staff was abroad in France when this hare-brained pledge was given. I have good reason to believe that on his return he and his advisers pointed out that we did not possess the means to redeem it.” [97]

Military experts agreed on the need to obtain the military under-pinnings for Poland in the event of German Nazi attack. However not only was the British Government ignoring this, the state of Poland was also burying tis head in the sand. This was because all such attempts to actively involve the USSR, were adamantly rejected out-of-hand by the Polish Government.

“Despite the unquestionable facts of the military situation of Poland the Polish Government categorically and uncompromisingly refused every proposal put forward during the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations for military collaboration on her territory with Soviet Forces, and her attitude was an important contributing factor to the complete failure of the negotiations.” [98]

Consequently, the USSR struggled to persuade the Western powers of the need to effect a mutual security pact. This forced a strategic change of direction.  This was always understood by the USSR leaders – as a temporary spiking of the Allied strategy of pushing Nazi Germany East.

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact [99]

In his notorious book ‘My Struggle’, written in mid-1920s, the Nazi leader Adolf Hitler expressed frankly the foreign policy the Nazis intended to follow:

“We National Socialists consciously draw a line beneath the foreign policy tendency of our pre-War period. . . . We stop the endless German movement to the south and west, and turn our gaze towards the land in the East…

If we speak of soil in Europe today, we can primarily have in mind only Russia“. [100]

Thus, the coming to power of the Nazi government in Germany in January 1933 heralded a situation in Europe which clearly presented great danger to the Soviet Union — and not, of course, to the Soviet Union alone.

The Marxist-Leninists in the leadership of the Soviet Union, concerned to defend the socialist state, responded to this new, more dangerous situation by reorientating Soviet foreign policy, by adopting a policy of striving for collective security with other states which had, objectively, an interest in maintaining the status quo in the international situation.

The objective basis of the Soviet policy of collective security was that the imperialist Powers of the world could be divided into two groups.

One group — Germany, Italy and Japan had a relatively high productive power and relatively restricted markets and spheres of influence. As a result, these Powers had an urgent need to change the world to their advantage; they were relatively aggressive Powers.

Another group of imperialist Powers — Britain, France and the United States — had relatively large markets and spheres of influence and thus had objectively more need to keep the world as it was than to see it changed; they were relatively non-aggressive Powers.

Stalin, who argued that the Second World War had already begun, summed up this position to the 18th Congress of the CPSU in March 1939:

“The war is being waged by aggressor states, who in every way infringe upon the interests of the non-aggressor states, primarily, England, France and the USA. .
Thus we are witnessing an open re-division of the world and spheres of influence at the expense of the non-aggressive states.” [101]

As a socialist state, a working people’s state, the Soviet Union had the strongest interest of any state in the preservation of peace.

The Soviet government’s policy in the 1930s, therefore, was to strive to form a collective security alliance with the European non-aggressive imperialist states, Britain and France — a collective security alliance strong enough either to deter the aggressive imperialist states from launching war or to secure their speedy defeat.

The Soviet Government summed up this post-1933 foreign policy in 1948:

“Throughout the whole pre-war period, the Soviet delegation upheld the principle of collective security in the League of Nations”. [102]

Stalin maintained that the British and French imperialists had, objectively, an interest in joining the Soviet Union in such a collective security alliance, the governments of Britain and France, led respectively by Neville Chamberlain and Edouard Daladier, did not recognise this objective fact because of their detestation of socialism and the Soviet Union and their wish to see it destroyed.

As Stalin told the 18th Congress of the CPSU in March 1939:

“England, France and the USA … draw back and retreat, making concession after concession to the aggressors…

The chief reason is that the majority of the non-aggressive countries, particularly England and France, have rejected a policy of collective security, of collective resistance to the aggressors, and have taken up a position of ‘non-intervention’…

The policy of non-intervention reveals an eagerness, a desire, not to hinder Germany, say, . . . from embroiling herself in a war with the Soviet Union…
One might think that the districts of Czechoslovakia were yielded to Germany as the price of an undertaking to launch war on the Soviet Union”. [103]

On 31 March 1939, without consulting the Soviet Union, the British government gave a unilateral guarantee to defend Poland against aggression. The leader of the liberal Party, David Lloyd George, told the House of Commons:

“I cannot understand why, before committing ourselves to this tremendous enterprise, we did not secure beforehand the adhesion of Russia … If Russia has not been brought into this matter because of certain feelings that Poles have that they do not want the Russians there, … unless the Poles are prepared to accept the one condition with which we can help them, the responsibility must be theirs”. [104]

The Anglo-French guarantee stimulated public pressure on the appeaser governments to at least make gestures in the direction of collective security.

So, on 15 April 1939 the British government made an approach to the Soviet government suggesting that it might like to issue a public declaration offering military assistance to any state bordering the Soviet Union which was subject to aggression if that state desired it.

Two days later, on 17 April the Soviet government replied that it would not consider a unilateral guarantee, which would put the Soviet Union in a position of inequality with the other Powers concerned. It proposed:

Firstly, a trilateral mutual assistance treaty by Britain, France and the Soviet Union against aggression;

Secondly, the extension of guarantees to the Baltic States (Estonia, Finland, Latvia and Lithuania), on the grounds that failure to guarantee these states was an open invitation to Germany to expand eastwards through invasion of these states;

Thirdly, that the treaty must not be vague, but must detail the extent and forms of the military assistance to be rendered by the signatory Powers.

On 27 May the British and French governments replied to the Soviet proposals with the draft of a proposed tripartite pact. The British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain commented on the British draft in a letter to his sister at this time:

“In substance it gives the Russians what they want, but in form and presentation it avoids the idea of an alliance and substitutes declaration of intention. It is really a most ingenious idea”. [105]

Vyacheslav Molotov, who had just taken over the post of People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs from Maksim Litvinov, rejected the draft on the grounds that it proposed in the event of hostilities not immediate mutual assistance, but merely consultation through the League of Nations.

On 2 June the Soviet government submitted to Britain and France a counter-draft making these points.

The British and French governments responded by saying that Finland, Estonia and Latvia refused to be guaranteed.

The Soviet government continued to insist that a military convention be signed at the same time as the political treaty, in order that there might be no possibility of any hedging about the application of the latter. On 17 July Molotov stated that there was no point in continuing discussions on the political treaty until the military convention had been concluded.

On 23 July the British and French governments finally agreed to begin military discussions before the political treaty of alliance had been finalised.  But the delegation only finally arrived in Moscow on 11 August.

Moreover the Soviet side discovered that it had no powers to negotiate, only to ‘hold talks’. Furthermore, the British delegation was officially instructed to:

“Go very slowly with the conversations.” [106]

But as the negotiations for an Anglo-French-Soviet mutual security pact dragged on month after month, a number of warning shots were fired from Moscow.

On 11 March 1939 Joseph Davies, the former US Ambassador in Moscow, wrote in his diary about Stalin’s speech to the 18th Congress of the CPSU a few days before:

“It is a most significant statement. It bears the earmarks of a definite warning to the British and French governments that the Soviets are getting tired of ‘non-realistic’ opposition to the aggressors…

It certainly is the most significant danger signal that I have yet seen”. [107]

Then, on 3 May 1939 Maksim Litvinov was replaced as Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, and his replacement by a close colleague of Stalin, Vyacheslav Molotov.

Meanwhile, interminable delays from the British and French delegations at Moscow were noted by Andrei Zhdanov on 29 June:

“the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations on the conclusion of an effective pact of mutual assistance against aggression have reached a deadlock…
The Soviet Government took 16 days in preparing answers to the various English projects and proposals, while the remaining 59 days have been consumed by delays and procrastinations on the part of the English and French…

Not long ago … the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Beck, declared unequivocally that Poland neither demanded nor requested from the USSR anything in the sense of granting her any guarantee whatever… However, this does not prevent England and France from demanding from the USSR guarantees … for Poland…

It seems to me that the English and French desire not a real treaty accepable to the USSR, but only talks about a treaty in order to speculate before the public opinion in their countries on the allegedly unyielding attitude of the USSR, and thus make easier for themselves the road to a deal with the aggressors. The next few days must show whether this is so or not.” [108]

Since it was becoming clear that the USSR was being deliberately held to worthless negotiations while Germany was gearing up for war against the USSR, the USSR spiked the plans of the British and French. It accepted offers floated from Germany of a non-aggression pact from the 29 July. By August 23^rd the German Nazi Foreign Minister Ulrich Friedrich Wilhelm Joachim von Ribbentrop had arrived in Moscow and the same day signed the non-aggression protocol.

Under the terms, neither party would attack the other, and should one party become the object of belligerent action by a third Power, the other party would render no support to this third Power.

Even more strongly criticised than the pact itself has been a ‘Secret Additional Protocol’ to the pact which laid down German and Soviet ‘spheres of interest’ in Europe.

But the term ‘sphere of interest’ does not necessarily have implications of imperialist domination. Where two states are likely to be affected by war but wish this not to involve them in mutual conflict, then the demarcation of spheres of interest is a legitimate and desirable act.

The ‘secret additional protocol’ declared:

“1. In the event of a territorial and political transformation in the territories belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) the northern frontier of Lithuania shall represent the frontier of the spheres of interest both of Germany and the USSR…

2. In the event of a territorial and political transformation of the territories belonging to the Polish State, the spheres of interest both of Germany and the USSR shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula and San”. [109]

In ordinary language, this meant that the German government promised that, when German troops invaded Poland, they would not attempt to advance beyond the ‘Curzon Line’. This as we saw in Part One of this article, was drawn by the British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon, after the First World War as the ethnic boundary separating the Poles from the Ukrainians and Byelorussians. (See Map 1). The area east of this line had been Soviet territiory which was seized by Poland, from the Soviet Union following the Revolution – in the Treaty of Riga.

Germany had thus agreed that it would raise no objection to the Soviet government taking whatever action it considered desirable east of this line.

Speaking to the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union on 31 August, Molotov described the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact as:

“A turning-point in the history of Europe, and not of Europe alone”. [110]

Molotov emphasised that the Soviet negotiations with Germany were on a completely different level to the Soviet negotiations with Britain and France:

“We are dealing not with a pact of mutual assistance, as in the case of the Anglo-French-Soviet relations, but only with a non-aggression Pact.” [111]

So that, as a result of the signing of the German-Soviet pact:

“the USSR is not obliged to involve itself in war, either on the side of Great Britain against Germany or on the side of Germany against Great Britain.” [112]

Even such anti-Soviet writers as Edward Carr agree that the Soviet government’s decision to sign the non-aggression pact with Germany was an enforced second choice, which was taken only with extreme reluctance:

“The most striking feature of the Soviet-German negotiations … is the extreme caution with which they were conducted from the Soviet side, and the prolonged Soviet resistance to close the doors on the Western negotiations”. [113]

What did the USSR gain by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact – since the German state invaded it anyway in two years? It gained “a breathing space” as E.H.Carr said:

“The Chamberlain government.. as a defender of capitalism, refused… to enter into an alliance with the USSR against Germany…

In the pact of August 23rd, 1939, they (the Soviet government — Ed.) secured:
a) a breathing space of immunity from attack;
b) German assistance in mitigating Japanese pressure in the Far East;
c) German agreement to the establishment of an advanced defensive bastion beyond the existing Soviet frontiers in Eastern Europe; it was significant that this bastion was, and could only be, a line of defence against potential German attack, the eventual prospect of which was never far absent from Soviet reckonings. But what most of all was achieved by the pact was the assurance that, if the USSR had eventually to fight Hitler, the Western Powers would already be involved”. [114]

The contemporary historian Geoffrey Roberts is generally of the same mind:

“By the end of July, however, the triple alliance negotiations had dragged on for months and the dilatory approach of the British and French to the forthcoming military talks indicated that London and Paris intended to spin them out even longer, in the hope that Hitler would be deterred from attacking Poland by just the possibility of an Anglo-Soviet– French alliance. So, instead of flying to Moscow the Anglo-French military delegation sailed to Leningrad on a slow steamer and arrived with no detailed strategic plans for a joint war against Germany.” [115]

Moreover, Roberts charges historians who attack Stalin on this question, with a malign intent and slanderous reliance on a forged document:

“One of the key texts in this oeuvre is a speech Stalin supposedly made to the Politburo on 19 August 1939 in which he reviewed the prospects for the ‘sovietisation’ of Europe as a result of a war that he intended to provoke and then prolong by signing the Nazi–Soviet pact. The problem is that the ‘speech’ is a forgery. Not only was there no such speech, but it is doubtful that the Politburo even met on that day (it rarely met at all by the late 1930s). It is, as the Russian historian Sergei Sluch has termed it, ‘the speech of Stalin’s that never was’. Stalin’s so-called speech made its first appearance at the end of November 1939 in the French press. Its publication was plainly a piece of black propaganda designed to discredit Stalin and to sow discord in Soviet-German relations. The text’s content marked it out as obviously false. Stalin was reported as saying, for example, that already – on 19 August – he had an agreement with Hitler giving him a Soviet sphere of influence in Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary. It was not taken very seriously outside France, although Stalin himself was moved to issue a statement denouncing the reported speech as a lie. Far from plotting war in 1939, Stalin feared that he and his regime would become the chief victims of a major military conflict. Ultimately, that is why he gambled on a pact with Hitler; it was no guarantee of peace and security, but it did offer the best chance of keeping the Soviet Union out of the coming war. No doubt like everyone else Stalin expected that if Britain and France did declare war on Germany there would be a prolonged conflict, a war of attrition – one which would provide some time and space for the Soviet Union to strengthen its defences. But he was far too cautious to gamble everything on a simple repeat of the First World War.” [116]

The German Invasion of Poland

While the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact did stave off the immediate invasion of the USSR – it could not protect Poland. But the Germans marched in a blitzkrieg into Poland. As the Germans invaded Poland, the Polish failure to accept treaties that included Russia – was completely exposed as foolish:

“By September it was clear what a tremendous difference the acceptance of the Soviet offer would have made. As Lloyd George so justly wrote:

We must not conceal from ourselves the enormous difference it would have made to our chances if at this hour the great air fleet of Germany, which is so appreciably facilitating the advance of her armies in Poland, were confronted by the equally powerful fleet of Russia—and if two powerful Russian armies were advancing, one upon East Prussia and the other towards Cracow.

This was the plan placed before our military missions by Voroshilov, the Soviet War Minister. The tragic story of the rejection of this plan has yet to be told, and responsibility for the stupidities that lost us Russia’s powerful support justly affixed and sternly dealt with.” [117]

Later ‘authorized’ historians – namely those trusted to protect British versions of history and therefore enabled access to Archives) – gave a rather naïve perspective of Britain’s response to the German invasion of Poland. However even they acknowledge the remarkable delay of 2 days, before war was declared by Britain on Germany. Sir Ernest L. Woodward puts it:

“With their guarantee to Poland in March,1939, the British decision had been taken and made public. Great Britain (and France) had engaged themselves to defend Polish independence against German attack. They would honour their engagement. Thenceforward the decision between peace and war rested with Hitler. If he attacked Poland, he would be at war with the Western Powers. The task of British diplomacy, therefore, in the critical weeks and hours before September 1 was to try to restrain Hitler from bringing upon the world the fearful calamity of war. There was no question of giving way if Hitler chose war.

The invasion of Poland began in the early hours of September 1. Great Britain did not declare war on Germany until September 3.” [118]

The collapse of the Polish Government

Very quickly Polish resistance to the German invasion ceased:

“In fact, within a week of their invasion of Poland the Germans occupied the industrial areas of Silesia, and were approaching Warsaw. On September 17 the Russians invaded eastern Poland… On October 5 Polish organised resistance was at an end.” [119]

Hanns Frank, was made the Governor General of Occupied Poland. He had been an early advocate of Hitler during the Weimar Republic.  His diaries later proved his conduct of atrocities against in particular Jews in Poland. For these crimes he was hung following the  Nuremberg War Criminals Trial.

Why did the Polish resistance fail so quickly? The Coates points out the problems faced by the minorities in Poland. They cite the USSR paper ‘Pravda’ – who said the minorities in Poland did not express a “wave of patriotism”:

“Why did the Poles collapse so rapidly? Why was the Polish State with 30,000,000 inhabitants so weak? The answer is not in doubt. One important reason undoubtedly was that the eight million Ukrainians and three million Byelorussians within the Polish State had no desire to fight for task-masters whom they hated. In Moscow they had no illusions on this point. Pravda on September 14, 1939, stated:

“It was impossible to create in Poland that internal unity and consolidation of the forces of a multi-national State which alone could give rise to a mighty wave of patriotism, and which would have inspired the Polish army (within which there were not only Poles but also Byelorussians and Ukrainians) to make a united powerful effort to repulse the enemy. The national minorities of Poland did not and could not become a reliable support of the State regime. A multi-national State which is not consolidated by ties of friendship and equality between the nations inhabiting it but which, on the contrary, is based on the oppression and inequality of the national minorities cannot form a strong military force.” [120]

The Soviet Government watched events closely. By the morning of September 17^th, 1939 – they took steps to secure the Western border of the USSR against encroachment by Germany:

“The Soviet Government handed the following Note to the Polish Ambassador in Moscow:

“Mr. Ambassador, the Polish-German war had revealed the internal insolvency of the Polish State. In ten days of hostilities Poland had lost all her industrial regions and cultural centres. Warsaw, as the capital of Poland, no longer exists. The Polish Government has fallen to pieces and shows no sign of life. This means that the Polish State and its Government have virtually ceased to exist; the treaties concluded between the U.S.S.R. and Poland have thereby ceased to operate.

Abandoned to her fate and left without leadership Poland has become a fertile field for any accidental and unexpected contingency which may create a menace to the U.S.S.R. Hence while it was hitherto neutral, the Soviet Government can no longer maintain a neutral attitude towards these facts, nor can the Soviet Government remain indifferent when its blood brothers—Ukrainians and Byelorussians—inhabiting Polish territory, having been abandoned to their fate, are left without protection.

In view of this state of affairs the Soviet Government has instructed the Higher Command of the Red Army to order troops to cross the frontier and take under their protection the fives and property of the population of Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia.” [121]

Accordingly, by midday, September 18th, the Red Army advanced some 90 miles west of the pre-war (1939) Soviet-Polish frontier. [122]

When this took place the “London Poles” (the Polish “government-in-exile” – see below) demanded that the British declare war on the USSR. Their demand was rejected:

“The British Government now had to consider whether they should regard this Russian attack on Poland as a casus belli. According to the terms of a secret protocol attached to the Anglo-Polish treaty of alliance the British guarantee of assistance to Poland applied only in the case of aggression by Germany. The British Government were free to decide whether they would or would not declare war on the U.S.S.R. The determining factor (as Lord Halifax told Count Raczynski, Polish Ambassador in London) in their decision had to be whether a declaration of war would or would not help towards the defeat of Germany.” [123]

The USSR movement up to the Curzon line

Effectively a vacuum had developed in the Eastern most areas of Poland. As Molotov said:

“Our troops entered the territory of Poland only after the Polish State had collapsed and actually had ceased to exist… The Soviet government could not but reckon with the exceptional situation created for our brothers in the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia, who had been abandoned to their fate as a result of the collapse of Poland”. [124]

Molotov reported that the Ukrainian and Byelorussian peoples, previously under POlich oppressive rule welcomed the Soviet troops:

“The Red Army … was greeted with sympathy by the Ukrainian and Byelorussian population, who welcomed our troops as liberators from the yoke of the gentry and from the yoke of the Polish landlords and capitalists.” [125]

In the House of Commons on 20 September, Conservative MP Robert Boothby agreed that the move was in the interests of security against German aggressive intents:

“I think it is legitimate to suppose that this action on the part of the Soviet Government was taken … from the point of view of self-preservation and self-defence … The action taken by the Russian troops … has pushed the German frontier considerably westward…

I am thankful that Russian troops are now along the Polish-Romanian frontier. I would rather have Russian troops there than German troops”.
[126]

Even that great aggressor of the British ruling class Winston Churchill, acknowledged the intent of the Russians:

“…but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest. It cannot be in accordance with the interest or safety of Russia that Nazi Germany should plant itself upon the shores of the Black Sea, or that it should over-run the Balkan States and subjugate the Slavonic peoples of South Eastern Europe. That would be contrary to the historic life-interests of Russia.” [127]

Correspondents of the capitalist press agreed with Soviet contemporary Soviet sources that the Red Army was welcomed as liberators by the Ukrainian and Byelorussian population concerned:

“As the Moscow correspondent of “The Times” rightly said:

“Mr. Stalin is withdrawing his forces from the purely Polish territory to a roughly ethnographic frontier. That means that only the Ukrainians and White Russians are being taken into the Soviet Union, and it is argued that the Allies, when victorious, would be unlikely to insist on the reincorporation of these peoples in the new Polish State. The Soviet withdrawal could, therefore, be a cautious move by Stalin in order to avoid unnecessary complications.”

In the course of its leading article in the same issue, “The Times” stated:

“It is to be noted, however, that the latest line of partition restricts the Russian share of ethnic Poland. Russia takes over in the main the White Russians and Ukrainians.”

Similarly, the diplomatic correspondent of the Daily Telegraph declared:

“By fixing its new western frontier on the line indicated in the statement issued from Moscow the Soviet Government appears to claim that it has done no more than to reclaim those territories east of the “Curzon Line” which were captured from Russia by Poland in 1920 and annexed to the re-created Polish State under the Treaty of Riga in 1921.” [128]

Modern-day writers such as Ciechanowski acknowledge that the populations in the areas taken over by the USSR were non-Polish:

“Riga frontiers, while the Russians, who in November 1939 had incorporated Polish territories occupied by them into the Soviet Union, considered them as now belonging to the Soviet Ukraine and Byelorussia. The large towns in these regions were Polish, especially Wilno, Lwow and Bialystok, but the majority of the population was Ukrainian and Byelorussian. Out of the total population of some 13 millions about 5 millions were Polish.” [129]

In fact the policy of the USSR to safeguard borders against Germany, had been foreshadowed. Stalin had said in an interview to Roy Howard a USA press magnate in 1936 – that history showed that aggressive countries who “intend to make war” seek “frontiers across which” they could attack. Stalin said that aggressors “usually find such borders”:

“Howard: The Soviet Union appears to believe that Germany and Poland have aggressive designs against the Soviet Union, and are planning military cooperation.

Poland, however, protested her unwillingness to permit any foreign troops using her territory as a basis for operations against a third nation. How does the Soviet Union envisage such aggression by Germany? From what position, in what direction would the German forces operate?

Stalin : History shows that when any state intends to make war against another state, even not adjacent, it begins to seek for frontiers across which it can reach the frontiers of the state it wants to attack, Usually, the aggressive state finds such frontiers.

It either finds them with the aid of force, as was the case in 1914 when Germany invaded Belgium in order to strike at France, or it “borrows” such a frontier, as Germany, for example, did from Latvia in 1918, in her drive to Leningrad. I do not know precisely what frontiers Germany may adapt to her aims, but I think she will find people willing to “lend” her a frontier.“ [130]

Social liberation inside former Polish areas under Soviet control

The USSR forces had – in effect liberated – the minorities under Polish oppression. Unsurprisingly, they sponsored a social liberation:

“Daily Herald September 22, 1939, we read:

Peasant committees are now supervising the division of landlords’ estates in some districts of the Polish Ukraine and White Russia.

Land and implements have already been shared out in certain places.

The Soviet troops also brought the hitherto oppressed peoples culture. The Daily Herald correspondent, for instance, stated:

Schools using the White Russian language are to be opened soon. Teachers are already being trained.

Ukrainian workers are reported to be taking over control of factories and electing management committees.” [131]

“The Times” reported that:

“The new Soviet order is now functioning almost completely at Vilna, Baranowicze, and other towns in western White Russia. Police who had remained at their posts were disarmed, some being arrested, and were succeeded by “workers” guards.” [132]

“In the former Russian and Austrian territories of Poland the agrarian question was a burning one, and the Poles have failed to solve it by thorough-going agrarian reform. One great obstacle was that Polish domination beyond the Curzon Line was mainly based on the Polish ownership of the big landed estates. In these eastern provinces the relations between manor house and village were tense, even before the last war; and they have become much tenser in the last twenty years. The Russian armies now entering these provinces need little encouragement from Moscow, Kiev or Minsk to make the White Russian and Ukrainian peasants seize the estates of the Polish big, or merely substantial, landowners, who must be deemed lucky if they escaped with their lives. Probably their Polish officials and retainers, the Catholic clergy, and a good many of the Polish colonists planted in these territories in the last twenty years have also fled or are in danger.” [133]

“Elections were held throughout Byelorussia and the Western Ukraine on October 22, 1939. Three days later The Times correspondent cabled from Moscow—as regards the Western Ukraine:

“Roughly 4,780,000 people or 93 per cent of the electorate, went to the polls, and 91 per cent of the voters supported Bolshevist candidates for the national convention,” and with respect to Western Byelorussia: “The results were still better, only two out of the 929 candidates failing to secure election. Nearly 97 per cent of the electorate went to the polls, and about 91 per cent of the 2,700,000 voters supported the candidates.”

And the same journal in the course of a leader, November 2, 1939, declared:

It must be recognised that White Russia and the Ukraine are a racial part of , the Russian family, and the results of the recent elections organised by the Soviet authorities in those provinces may conform pretty closely with the natural feelings of the inhabitants.”[134]

Molotov said:

“The recent elections to the National Assemblies of Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia, conducted for the first time in the history of those territories on the basis of universal direct equal suffrage and secret ballot, have shown that at least nine-tenths of the population of these regions have long been ready to rejoin the Soviet Union. Decision of the National Assemblies, of Lvov and Byelostok with which we are all now familiar, testify to the complete unanimity of the people’s representatives on all political questions.” [135]

On May 10, 1940, the German army invaded France – and by June 22, Germany controlled northern France and all the coast to Spain. A Quisling government was set up in Vichy.

5. The London Poles and their provocations

The Polish National Government-in-exile and General Sikorski

The Polish Government fled immediately after the German invasion of Poland. The President in exile in Paris, “dissolved” the Parliament and set up a Polish exile government, which called itself the “Polish National Council”:

“The Polish Government in power at the outbreak of the war in September 1939, had been elected under the terms of the 1935 Constitution. As the Germans swept through the country, the members of the Government fled abroad and some of them reassembled in Paris in the autumn of 1939…. (announcing – Ed) in a Reuter cable from Paris dated November 11, 1939:

“The Polish Parliament has been dissolved by a presidential decree appearing in the Monitor Polski, the official Polish law journal, to-day. …  because it “was not an exact expression of the feeling of the nation, and, secondly, had not taken into consideration modification of the electoral law.” …

A month later, President Raczkiewicz, acting under Article 79 of the 1935 Constitution which authorized the President in wartime to issue decrees without the consent of Parliament, called into being the Polish National Council (Rada Narodowa)… as a substitute for Parliament (with -ed) all groups and parties, including the opposition parties being represented. The opposition parties, i.e. the Radical Peasant Party, the Socialist Party, etc., decided to collaborate. The National Council held its first meeting in Paris on January 23, 1940.” [136]

“The Times reporting… the first meeting:

“Paderewski felt sure that none of those present desired a return simply of the situation existing before May 1926. Also, although it might be held that the Polish Governments of the past 13 years were greatly responsible for the fate that had befallen Poland, the Governments that went before them were not ideal. . .

General Sikorski said that the cause of Poland’s rapid defeat lay in a system of government divorced from the nation.” [137]

General Sikorski went on to become the head of government. In brief, he had always been a Polish nationalist:

“Sikorski had, since 1908, been connected with the Polish struggle for independence. In Poland he was regarded as a staunch and resolute democrat and opponent of the Sanacja. (The term Sanacja was used to describe the regime which ruled Poland in the years 1926-39). In Switzerland, in 1936, he tried with Ignacy Paderewski to create a common opposition front to the Sanacja. On 30 September he was commissioned by W. Raczkiewicz, the new President of Poland, to form a Polish Government in exile, in which the pre-war Opposition Parties were represented. On 7 November he was appointed the C-in-C of the Polish Armed Forces. By combining these two offices – of both political and miitary head of the Government – Sikorski became the dominant figure of the Cabinet.” [138]

Sikorski went on to ally with the Polish “Home Army”, while in exile in London. But there was wide support instead for the Polish communist-led resistance instead.

Following the subsequent French military collapse and Nazi German occupation, the self-proclaimed Polish “Government” took up an offer of refuge from Britain. Most of its representatives arrived there on June 22, 1940. The exiles collectively became known also as the “London Poles”.

Within a month – in the last week of July 1940, it had launched virulent attacks on the USSR:

“The Polish Foreign. Minister, M. Zaleski, in the course of a debate of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Polish National Council, made a violent and abusive attack on the Soviet Government…

On August 21, 1940, Mr. Butler (Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) informed the House of Commons that the Polish Government had left “His Majesty’s Government in no doubt” that they considered themselves in a state of war with the Soviet Union, and in reply to a supplementary question Mr. Butler added: “the hon. member .. . knows quite well that it is the desire of His Majesty’s Government to improve relations with the Soviet Union.” [139]

The intention of the Polish Government-in-Exile – or the London Poles was announced clearly by the Polish official newspaper Dzientiik Polski in its issue November 14, 1940. This was to continue to occupy “from the Baltic to the Black Sea” – or in other words the same vision expressed by Pilsudski:

“The area that belonged at different times to the Polish State extends from the Baltic to the Black Sea and from the river Oder to the rivers Dnieper and Dvina .. . Everywhere in this huge area traces of Polish culture are to be found, testimony to the lasting bonds with Poland and her civilisation. Pre-war Poland was able only partially to unite the lands of her cultural and living space….

After this war, with God’s help, we shall rebuild Poland, we must give her more appropriate and adequate frontiers compatible with her historic mission. We must firmly take under our rule the Baltic Sea with East Prussia; we must collaborate with the Czech and Slovak politicians; we must find the way to get the people of Eastern Poland to fight Moscow’s barbarism and the scourge of Bolshevism.” [140]

By May 19, 1941, Sikorski was alleging Stalin was a “Russian Quisling”:

“the Polish Prime Minister, General Sikorski, told a number of journalists that “Stalin would continue to surrender to Hitler and might even become a Russian Quisling!”

Fortunately for the world at large, including Poland, the nefarious efforts of the Polish Government in London ended in complete failure.” [141]

Despite all attempts however, at this stage – the British government refused to accede to Polish pressure to guarantee Poland’s borders in the Treaty of Riga:

“Mr. Eden, the Foreign Secretary, after announcing the signature of the Agreement to the House of Commons, in reply to a supplementary question, stated: “There is as I said no guarantee of frontiers.” The British Government again as in the past gave no guarantee of the frontiers of the Treaty of Riga, 1921.” [142]

However, Sikorski was adamant that Poland should retain the Treaty of Riga frontiers:

“General Sikorsky, the then Polish Prime Minister, was unfortunately surrounded by many Fascists of the Pilsudski persuasion and probably in order to keep the support of these gentry, in the course of a broadcast, July 31, 1941, he stated: “The present agreement only provisionally regulates disputes which have mutually divided us for centuries. But it does not permit even of the suggestion that the 1939 frontiers of the Polish State could ever be in question. It does not allow of any idea that Poland has resigned anything.” [143]

Naturally the Soviet Government strongly objected to this interpretation in Izvestia:

“The Polish-Russian frontiers cannot be regarded as immutable. Britain is not guaranteeing the Polish frontiers.” [144]

But Sikorski refused to discuss with the USSR any further this issue:

“Sikorski refused, however, even to discuss territorial issues with Stalin. Failure to resolve this problem conclusively in 1941 was to cast a bleak shadow on RUsso-Polish relations up to the outbreak of the Warsaw Rising in August 1944.” [145]

The Nazi war criminal Joseph Goebbels rejoiced in the manifest division in the Allied Front:

“Our anti-Bolshevik propaganda has achieved notable successes. Already all leading London papers warn against the dangerous Axis propaganda whose sole purpose is that of sowing discord between the allies. This discord has already become strikingly visible. The quarrel between the Soviet Union and Poland concerning the drawing of frontiers exceeds by far the bounds usually respected by allies in wartime. The English newspapers are striving hard to soft-pedal this discord, but the Polish emigre government naturally won’t content itself with cheap promises.” [146]

In a still unclear incident in regards to the cause, Sikorski died in a plane crash in July 1943. Stanislaw Mikołajczyk was appointed as his successor. Mikolajczyk had previously been prominent in the Polish People’s Party “Piast” or Polish Peasant Party (PSL). The change in leader did not change the tack. Mikolajczyk continued Sikorski’s yielding to the ultra-right wing of Polish gentry, and thus its’ policies on the borders with the USSR.

Churchill’s devious policy shifts over World War 2 to Potsdam 

After Churchill’s government declared war on Nazi Germany, he and the USA presidents (in turn Roosevelt and Truman) initially wanted to prop the USSR up during the War. But as the USSR began to win the struggle against Germany, against overwhelming odds – the attitudes of the Western Allies shifted. This played out over the borders of Poland.

Churchill was initially quite accommodating towards the Soviet negotiations with the Polish government. Certainly while the USSR’s help was needed to defeat the Nazis. As the Cabinet trusted historian of British wartime policy writes:

“Mr. Churchill, while doing what he could for the Poles in argument with Stalin, thought that the Polish Government in exile had been unwise in refusing to accept, explicitly and without delay, the heavy Russian demands on the pre-1939 Polish eastern frontier.“ [147]

Underlying Churchill’s postures was a lingering hope for the defeat of the USSR. To this end he procrastinated about opening of a Second Front, ensuring the USSR bore the terrible burdens of anti-Nazi wars. Both Britain and the USA proclaimed they were the friends of the USSR. Hence some tangible aid was received by the USSR. But this was a tiny fraction of both what was possible – and even less of what was needed.

However the USSR troops won at Stalingrad on the 31 January 1943. Despite Hitler’s insistence, for all intents and purposes General Field-Marshall Paulus surrendered. After this the Soviet army began to swing West into Europe to liberate it. Accordingly the attitudes of both Churchill and Truman – began to shift away from even verbal support.

By March 23, 1944 – Stalin was forced to remind Churchill that at the Tehran Conference (28 November to 1 December 1943), Churchill had agreed the Curzon Line marked the border:

“I was struck by the fact that both your messages and particularly Kerr’s statement bristle with threats against the Soviet Union. I should like to call your attention to this circumstance because threats as a method are not only out of place in relations between Allies, but also harmful, for they may lead to opposite results.

The Soviet Union’s efforts to uphold and implement the Curzon Line are referred to in one of your messages as a policy of force. This implies that you are now trying to describe the Curzon Line as unlawful and the struggle for it as unjust I totally disagree with you. I must point out that at Tehran you, the President and myself were agreed that the Curzon Line was lawful. At that time you considered the Soviet Government’s stand on the issue quite correct, and said it would be crazy for representatives of the Polish émigré Government to reject the Curzon Line. But now you maintain something to the contrary.

Does this mean that you no longer recognise what we agreed on in Tehran and are ready to violate the Tehran agreement?

I have no doubt that had you persevered in your Tehran stand the conflict with the Polish émigré Government could have been settled. As for me and the Soviet Government, we still adhere to the Tehran standpoint, and we have no intention of going back on it, for we believe implementation of the Curzon Line to be evidence, not of a policy of force, but of a policy of re-establishing the Soviet Union’s legitimate right to those territories, which even Curzon and the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers recognised as non-Polish in 1919.

You say in your message of March 7 that the problem of the Soviet-Polish frontier will have to be put off till the armistice conference is convened. I think there is a misunderstanding here. The Soviet Union is not waging nor does it intend to wage war against Poland. It has no conflict with the Polish people and considers itself an ally of Poland and the Polish people.

That is why it is shedding its blood to free Poland from German oppression. It would be strange, therefore, to speak of an armistice between the U.S.S.R. and Poland. But the Soviet Union is in conflict with the Polish émigré Government, which does not represent the interests of the Polish people or express their aspirations. It would be stranger still to identify Poland with the Polish émigré Government in London, a government isolated from Poland. I even find it hard to tell the difference between Poland’s émigré Government and the Yugoslav émigré Government, which is akin to it, or between certain generals of the Polish émigré Government and the Serb General Mihajloviæ.” [148]

For a period Churchill continued to vacillate. Even as late as 5^th November 1944, he was apparently agreeable to the Curzon Line, amongst other “line(s)”:

“Although I have not said anything to you (i.e Stalin) about Poland you may be sure that I have not been idle. At present they (i.e. The London Poles – ed) are still talking to the United States Government and I do not know what answer I shall be able to extract. However I take this opportunity of assuring you that I stand exactly where I stood when we parted and that His Majesty’s Government will support at any armistice or peace conference the Soviet claims to the line we have agreed upon. It will be a great blessing when the election in the United States is over.” [149] 

By the time of the Potsdam Conference July 17 – August 2, 1945, the division between the British, the USA and (although a minor partner) France – against the USSR was established and clear. Poland was becoming an even more volatile issue. The views of USSR on the Polish border was now dispensable. The ‘authorized’ British historian acknowledged this:

“The history of war-time diplomacy ends with the Potsdam Conference, and the surrender of Japan. The Allies had won the war, but were in disagreement about the purposes to which they would put their victory. The Russians had maintained their hold on the satellite states, and after having arrested a number of non-communist Polish politicians with whom they were nominally in negotiation, finally agreed to the admission of a few non-communists to their Provisional Polish Government. They were also pledged to allow free elections in Poland…  Mr. Churchill had wanted the Allied armies to stand on the lines they had occupied, and not to withdraw to their allocated zones of occupation before obtaining a genuine fulfilment of the Yalta obligations. … The final compromise was proposed by Mr. Byrnes. Mr. Attlee and Mr. Bevin accepted it, though with misgivings, especially in regard to Poland! Mr. Churchill – writing some eight years later – has said that he would never have conceded the western Neisse frontier to Poland, and that, if necessary, he would have had a ‘public break’ over the matter.“ [150]

The Soviet-Polish Military Agreement

The Polish London authorities used several arguments to justify their hostility to the USSR, and reluctance to sign a mutual security pact – despite pressure from their British hosts:

“A number of important problems bedevilled Russo-Polish co-operation. First, there were arguments connected with the size, equipment and deployment of the Polish Army in Russia, which finally led to its withdrawal to the Middle East in the summer of 1942, in an atmosphere of mutual recrimination. Secondly, there was the question of about 8,000 missing Polish officers, captured by the Russians in September 1939, … Finally, there were constant Russo-Polish disputes about the citizenship of all persons who resided in the Polish territories annexed by the Soviet Union. The main bone of contention was, however, the unresolved frontier dispute, which intensified at the beginning of 1943, when the Red Army began to regain the initiative on the Eastern Front, and its eventual return to Poland appeared likely.” [151]

Nonetheless, the British government continued to exert pressure on the Polish exiled representatives to come to terms with the USSR. Finally a Soviet-Polish Military Agreement was signed in Moscow, August, 15 1941.

“On 30 July a Soviet-Polish pact was signed in London. The treaty provided for the restoration of Russo-Polish diplomatic relations, military co-operation, the creation of the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R., and an amnesty for all Polish citizens detained in the Soviet Union. It failed to settle conclusively the issue of future boundaries between the two countries, although Moscow recognised that the Soviet-German agreements of 1939 with regard to Poland had ‘lost their validity’. [152]

The Agreement set out details to form a Polish Army in the Soviet Union. This was to be formed from those Polish army members who had been captured by the Soviets and imprisoned in the USSR. Many had been previously involved in aggressive war acts against the USSR in the 1920 Polish-Soviet War.

The Soviet-Polish Military Agreement was signed in Moscow, by Stalin and Sikorsky, on December 4, 1941. A declaration of friendship and mutual assistance between the two countries followed. It read:

“The Government of the Soviet Union and the Government of the Polish Republic, motivated by a spirit of friendly agreement and military co-operation, declare:

1. 1. German Hitlerite Imperialism is the most evil enemy of mankind. It is impossible to make any compromise with it. Both Governments, together with Great Britain and other allies, and with the support of the United States of America, will continue the war until complete victory and the final destruction of the German invaders.
   2. In putting into operation the agreement signed in July 1941, both Govern¬ ments will lend each other full military aid during the war. The forces of the Polish Government on Soviet territory will conduct the fight against the German robbers shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet forces. In peace time the basis of mutual relations will be good-neighbourly collaboration, friendship, and the carrying out of obligations agreed upon.
   3. After the victorious termination of the war and the suitable punishment of the German criminals, the task of the Allied governments will be to guarantee a just and endurable peace. This can only be achieved by a new organisation of international relations based on an enduring alliance between the democratic countries. In the creation of such an organisation a vital condition will be respect for international law supported by the collective armed forces of all Allied countries. Only under such conditions can the Europe destroyed by the German barbarians be resurrected and a guarantee given that the catastrophe now occurring in Europe will not be repeated.

Plenipotentiary of the Soviet Government.” [153]

Sikorsky was reported by the ‘Times’ as being “very satisfied” with his Moscow visit. On this visit, Sikorski discussed with Stalin the Polish soldiers and officers who had been captured by the Soviet troops in Eastern Poland after the German invasion. Many of these were anti-communist. They had been moved to camps in Russia. A plan was evolved to form them into an army to fight alongside the Soviet army, against the German Nazi invaders:

“On his return to Great Britain, General Sikorsky expressed himself as very pleased with his visit to Moscow: “He returns very well satisfied with all the results” wrote the Diplomatic Correspondent of The Times. “The Soviet Government promised all speedy help in establishing a Polish army in Russia, and Stalin showed in the clearest way that he desired to see a strong and independent Poland established after the war. Before leaving Russia General Sikorsky visited the Polish camps east of Moscow.”  [154]

But while General Sikorsky had promised that the Polish army in Russia would take the field by October 1, 1941 – it never happened. It was supposed to have been led by General Anders, a confirmed anti-Soviet Polish veteran of the Polish-Soviet War.

Meanwhile Sikorsky and the London based ‘Polish National Council’, took all opportunities to broadcast their adherence to the frontiers of the Treaty of Riga. It became clear that the Polish troops that had been formed into a fighting force inside Russia – was intended to fight with the British instead, in Persia. As Coates and Coates say:

“the Polish Command said that it was not yet ready. They continued to make excuse after excuse, and finally they asked permission to evacuate their Forces to Iran.

The Soviet authorities agreed and the evacuation was effected in March and August 1942. The reason.. (was).. they hoped to use these forces and others against the U.S.S.R. after the defeat of Germany.

At the same time the … in London on December 6, 1942, the Polish National Council sent a statement to the press declaring: “In the question of our eastern frontiers the National Council holds to the basis of the Treaty of Riga.” This was underlined by General Sikorsky.“ [155]

Yet even at this time, the Polish London press was publishing details of German atrocities conducted in Poland – showing they knew exactly who the real barbarians were. Although, you would not know it from their behaviour to come.

The Katyn mass graves allegations against the USSR

Very shortly afterwards, the Polish London representatives joined a major provocation launched by that Nazi arch-enemy of the truth – Joseph Goebbels.

In April 1943, the German Government stated that mass graves had been found at Katyn near Smolensk. This had been under Soviet administration after 1939. But with the German invasion of the USSR it had been taken over by Germany. It was only liberated by Soviet troops in September 1943.

The mass graves interred ten thousand Polish officers. Nazi Germany was claimed they had been murdered in February and March 1940, by the Soviets, before Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941.

That this was intended as a frame-up by the German authorities and by Joseph Goebbels – is quite likely from his “Diary”:

“We are now using the discovery of 12,000 Polish officers, murdered by the GPU, for anti-Bolshevik propaganda on a grand style. We sent neutral journalists and Polish intellectuals to the spot where they were found. Their reports now reaching us from abroad are gruesome. The Fuehrer has also given permission for us to hand out a dramatic news item to the German press. I gave instructions to make the widest possible use of this propaganda material. We shall be able to live on it for a couple of weeks.” [156]

“The Katyn incident is developing into a gigantic political affair which may have wide repercussions. We are exploiting it in every manner possible. So long as ten to twelve thousand Polish victims have sacrificed their lives anyway – probably not entirely without their fault, for they were the real instigators of this war – they might as well now serve to open the eyes of the peoples of Europe about Bolshevism.” [157]

Most credible authorities, saw the German lie as an obvious attempt to divide the Allied forces. Many were therefore surprised when the Polish Government quickly echoed the German lies. The London Poles insisted upon an international investigation by the Red Cross. Their motives in doing so were to denigrate and weaken the USSR, to enable Polish claims to Ukraine and Byelorussia. Yet even in their statement to the press, April 17, 1943:

“The Polish Cabinet, referring to German crimes against Polish officers, among other things declared:

“The Polish Government recalls such facts as: The removal of Polish officers from prisoner-of-war camps in the Reich and the subsequent shooting of them for political offences alleged to have been committed before the war; mass… “ arrests of reserve officers subsequently deported to concentration camps, to die a slow death. From Cracow and the neighbouring district alone 6,000 were deported in June 1942.” [158]

Despite this the Polish Government-in-exile completely bought into the Goebbels lie:

“The final break occurred on 26 April 1943, soon after the German announcement of the discovery, at Katyn Woods, near Smolensk, Soviet territory occupied by the Wehrmacht of the mass graves of thousands of Polish officers captured by the Red Army in September 1939. This discovery was followed by Polish and German requests to the International Red Cross in Geneva for an investigation of the whole affair. In response to this tactically unfortunate Polish move the Russians accused the Polish Government of co-operating with the Nazis in slandering them and of putting pressure upon them in order to gain territorial concessions. They argued that this made relations between Moscow and the Polish Government impossible.” [159]

As Goebbels commented on April 17, 1943:

“In the evening a Globe Reuter report reached us containing a declaration by the Polish Government-in-exile. This declaration changes the whole Katyn affair fundamentally in that the Polish Government-in-exile now demands that the International Red Cross take part in the investigation. That suits us perfectly. I immediately contacted the Fuehrer, who gave me permission to send a telegram to the International Red Cross, requesting it to collaborate to the greatest extent possible in identifying the corpses. This telegram is signed by the Duke of Coburg and Gotha, whose name is well known in England and who has many family connections there. In that way, in my opinion, something has been started the repercussions of which we simply can’t imagine as yet.

[Duke Charles Edward of Coburg-Gotha was a grandson of Queen Victoria of England and father-in-law of the Swedish Crown Prince’s son.]” [160]

The Soviet Government replied on April 18, 1943, denying the accusations, charged the Germans with having themselves committed the murders and then on April 25, 1943, severed diplomatic relations with the Polish Government in London. M. Molotov’s Note to M. Romer, the Polish Ambassador in Moscow, stated:

“Mr. Ambassador, on behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics I have the honour to notify the Polish Government of the following:

The Soviet Government considers the recent behaviour of the Polish Government with regard to the U.S.S.R., as entirely abnormal, and violating all regulations and standards of relations between two Allied States. The slanderous campaign hostile to the Soviet Union launched by the German Fascists in connection with the murder of the Polish officers, which they themselves committed in the Smolensk area on territory occupied by German troops, was at once taken up by the Polish Government, and is being fanned in every way by the Polish (Official Press.

Far from offering a rebuff to the vile Fascist slander of the U.S.S.R., the Polish Government did not even find it necessary to address to the Soviet Government any inquiry or request for an explanation on this subject.

Having committed a monstrous crime against the Polish officers, the Hitlerite authorities are now staging a farcical investigation, and for this they have made use of certain Polish pro-Fascist elements whom they themselves selected in Occupied Poland, where everything is under Hitler’s heel, and where no honest Pole can openly have his say.

For the “investigation,” both the Polish Government and the Hitlerite Government invited the International Red Cross, which is compelled…

(under) conditions of a terroristic regime, with its gallows and mass extermination of the peaceful population, to take part in this investigation farce staged by Hitler. Clearly such an “investigation,” conducted behind the back of the Soviet Government, cannot evoke the confidence of people possessing any degree of honesty.

The fact that the hostile campaign against the Soviet Union commenced simultaneously in the German and Polish press, and was conducted along the same lines, leaves no doubt as to the existence of contact and accord in carrying out this hostile campaign between the enemy of the Allies – Hitler – and the Polish Government.

While the peoples of the Soviet Union, bleeding profusely in a hard struggle against Hitlerite Germany, are straining every effort for the defeat of the common enemy of the Russian and Polish peoples, and of all freedom-loving democratic countries, the Polish Government, to please Hitler’s tyranny, has dealt a treacherous blow to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government is aware that this hostile campaign against the Soviet Union is being undertaken by the Polish Government in order to exert pressure upon the Soviet Government by making use of the slanderous Hitlerite fake for the purpose of wresting from it territorial concessions at the expense of the interests of the Soviet Ukraine, Soviet Byelorussia and Soviet Lithuania.

All these circumstances compel the Soviet Government to recognize that the present Government of Poland, having slid on to the path of accord with Hitler’s Government, has actually discontinued allied relations with the U.S.S.R., and has adopted a hostile attitude towards the Soviet Union.

On the strength of the above, the Soviet Government has decided to sever relations with the Polish Government.

Please accept, Mr. Ambassador, the assurance of my very high esteem.” [161]

Stalin’s correspondence to Churchill of April 21, 1943 makes the same points, including the coordinated timing of Polish and German allegations:

“The fact that the anti-Soviet campaign has been started simultaneously in the German and Polish press and follows identical lines is indubitable evidence of contact and collusion between Hitler – the Allies’ enemy – and the Sikorski Government in this hostile campaign.

At a time when the peoples of the Soviet Union are shedding their blood in a grim struggle against Hitler Germany and bending their energies to defeat the common foe of the freedom-loving democratic countries, the Sikorski Government is striking a treacherous blow at the Soviet Union to help Hitler tyranny.”[162]

By April 27, 1943 – Goebbels was hailing the success of “German propaganda” and the split in the allied Front:

“The most important theme of all international discussion is naturally the break between Moscow and the Polish Emigre Government … All enemy broadcasts and newspapers agree that this break represents a 100 percent victory for German propaganda and especially for me personally. The commentators marvel at the extraordinary cleverness with which we have been able to convert the Katyn incident into a highly political question. There is grave apprehension in London about this success of German propaganda. Suddenly all sorts of rifts are noticed in the allied camp the existence of which nobody had hitherto admitted … There is talk of a total victory by Goebbels! Even important American senators publish worried comments … Alarm in London has reached its highest pitch. The Poles are given a perky talking to because of their precipitate action and are blamed for having played right into the hands of German propaganda…

One can speak of a complete triumph of German propaganda. Throughout this whole war we have seldom been able to register such a success.”[163]

At this time, the Western world still depended upon the USSR to hold the Germans at Stalingrad. Hence Churchill appeared to agree with Stalin, even while trying to persuade Stalin to restore relations with Poland. On 30^th April 1943, Churchill wrote in reply to Stalin, defending Sikorski as a “helpful man.. for the purposes of the common cause”:

“Mr. Eden and I have pointed out to the Polish Government that no resumption of friendly or working relations with the Soviets is possible while they make charges of an insulting character against the Soviet Government and thus seem to countenance the atrocious Nazi propaganda. Still more would it be impossible for any of us to tolerate inquiries by the International Red Cross held under Nazi auspices and dominated by Nazi terrorism…

So far this business has been Goebbels’ triumph. He is now busy suggesting that the U.S.S.R. will set up a Polish Government on Russian soil and deal only with them. We should not, of course, be able to recognise such a Government and would continue our relations with Sikorski who is far the most helpful man you or we are likely to find for the purposes of the common cause. I expect that this will also be the American view.” [164]

Stalin’s reply on May 4^th 1943, was blunt, making clear he had not fallen for Churchill’s bluster, which had aimed to disguise Churchill’s failure to warn the Poles against collaboration with Goebbels:

“In sending my message of April 21 on interrupting relations with the Polish Government, I was guided by the fact that the notorious anti-Soviet press campaign, launched by the Poles as early as April 15 and aggravated first by the statement of the Polish Ministry of National Defence and later by the Polish Government’s declaration of April 17, had not encountered any opposition in London; moreover, the Soviet Government had not been forewarned of the anti-Soviet campaign prepared by the Poles, although it is hard to imagine that the British Government was not informed of the contemplated campaign. I think that from the point of view of the spirit of our treaty it would have been only natural to dissuade one ally from striking a blow at another, particularly if the blow directly helped the common enemy. That, at any rate, is how I see the duty of an ally. Nevertheless, I thought it necessary to inform you of the Soviet Government’s view of Polish-Soviet relations. Since the Poles continued their anti-Soviet smear campaign without any opposition in London, the patience of the Soviet Government could not have been expected to be infinite.

You tell me that you will enforce proper discipline in the Polish press. I thank you for that, but I doubt if it will be as easy as all that to impose discipline on the present Polish Government, its following of pro-Hitler boosters and its fanatical press. Although you informed me that the Polish Government wanted to work loyally with the Soviet Government, I question its ability to keep its world. The Polish Government is surrounded by such a vast pro-Hitler following, and Sikorski is so helpless and browbeaten that there is no certainty at all of his being able to remain loyal in relations with the Soviet Union even granting that he wants to be loyal.

As to the rumours, circulated by the Hitlerites, that a new Polish Government is being formed in the U.S.S.R., there is hardly any need to deny this fabrication. Our Ambassador has already told you so. This does not rule out Great Britain, and the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. taking measures to improve the composition of the present Polish Government in terms of consolidating the Allied united front against Hitler. The sooner this is done, the better. Upon his return from the U.S.A.” [165]

Stalin’s reply was quite categorical, at that time the USA was not imminently planning to form a new Polish government.

In any case informed public opinion was aware that the Polish London exiles were in general vehement and often un-reasonable. As far as major sections of the English bourgeois press is concerned, it recorded:

“We do not intend to enter into any argument about the details of the dispute,” declared the Evening Standard in a typical comment. “But on two simple counts we believe the Polish Government must be held responsible for the breach. First, they had no right to suppose that a German allegation might contain the truth. Second, they had no right to call for an investigation on territory occupied by the enemy.”

Mr. A. J. Cummings wrote: “The Polish Government and its Press seized upon it so readily as to suggest that they welcomed the chance to asperse the Soviet Union and to discredit her with her principal Allies.” [166]

German munitions in Katyn Graves – Goebbels aware of significance

The graves were supposed to date from the period in 1940 when the Smolensk region had been administered by the USSR. The significance therefore of the finding of German munitions, bullets and spent cartridges in the graves – was not lost on Goebbels:

“Unfortunately German munitions were found in the graves of Katyn. The question of how they got there needs clarification. It is either a case of munitions sold by us during the period of our friendly arrangement with the Soviet Russians, or of the Soviets themselves throwing these munitions into the graves. In any case it is essential that this incident be kept top secret. If it were to come to the knowledge of the enemy the whole Katyn affair would have to be dropped.” [167]

By September 23, 1943 Goebbels was getting more anxious as:

“Unfortunately we (i.e Nazi Germany) have had to give up Katyn. The Bolsheviks undoubtedly will soon “find” that we shot the 12,000 Polish officers. That episode is one that is going to cause us quite a little trouble in the future. The Soviets are undoubtedly going to make it their business to discover as many mass graves as possible and then blame them on us.” [168]

A summary of evidence linking the massacres to the Germans rather than the USSR

It is beyond the scope of this work to refute in detail the German Nazi allegations. This task has been performed previously. [169] [170] The Trory case largely comes down to the following key facts [171]:

• Prior to the capture by the Nazis, the forest had been a popular picnic area and there was public and free access. There had been a Young Pioneers camp at the site up till 1941.
• The Nazi capture of Smolensk was followed by heavy armed patrols with orders to shoot trespassers, around the forest at Katyn.
• Witnesses reported that Polish prisoners were used for road repair by Soviet troops. But they had not been able to be evacuated by the time of the German invasions and seizure of Somolensk area.
• Numerous reports that the 537^th Construction Battalion of the German army occupied it. This construction unit was “in fact an extermination unit”.
• Inconsistency of dates claiming execution of prisoners as published by German authorities on pieces of materials; eg. Witnesses testified that interactions with specific prisoners – including dated pieces of paper exchange – dated 1941.
• Witness testimony of those inhabitants gang-pressed to work in the camps by the German army, reporting trucks driving off with gangs of prisoners wearing Polish officer hats – and then hearing gnu-shots – and trucks returning empty.
• Testimony from the former director of the Smolensk observatory (Prof Bazilevsky), pressed into service as Burgomaster by the Germans. He reported numerous incriminating eye-witness accounts. Including conversations with the Sonderfuehrer of the 7^th Department of the German Commandant’s office – Hirschfeld. These were corroborated by documentary hand-written accounts.
• Other testimony including that of a priest in the Smolensk district of German searches for bribable or intimidatable “witnesses” to corroborate German accounts of the Katyn Massacre.
• German preparations of the massacre site, using Russian POWs to remove clothing and all documents dated later than April 1940. Witness testimony to this effect came from peasants in the area who had talked to escaped Russian POWs.
• Witness evidence of German transports to the Katyn site of dead bodies.
• ‘Burdenko Commission’ findings including evidence of body tampering; missed documents on the bodies of dates between 12 November 1940 and 20 June 1941; some forensic data on degree of putrefaction of bodies being more consistent with recent killings rather than from 1940; and the manner of killings.
• Evidence from the ‘Nuremberg Trial’ by a forensics pathologist who had conducted post-mortem on one of the corpses; who also testified to German pressure on a team of pathologists to endorse German findings. Also at the Nuremberg trial was a telegram by German officer named “Heinrich” recording that the Polish Red Cross delegation had found German cartridges “Caliber 7.65 mm. Firm ‘Geko’ “.

Trory also cites a 1976 British Foreign Officer spokesman in response to the Tory MP: “It has never been proved to the satisfaction of ‘Her Majesty’s Government’ who was responsible”. [172]

Furr adds evidence of further inconsistencies. However a lot of his detail has been challenged. [173] No doubt that particular debate will continue, and we look forward to rebuttals.

This author will not in this article, pursue the details further. Nor is this the correct moment to discuss the nature of “what is evidence?“ Nor is the usual line taken by bourgeois historians, to be analysed [174] – although a formal examination of that line remains necessary.

However – In the overall picture of German instructions from Himmler to exterminate Polish officers; the German conduct inside Poland; and the pattern of anti-Soviet attacks; and the utility of the discovery to the Polish government-in-exile  – it seems extremely likely that the perpetrators were the Nazis.

7. Dissolution of the Polish KPP (formerly the CWPP)

In 1938 the KPP was severely disrupted – and then dissolved – by suspicions of infiltration by “Fascist and Trotskyite spies”. An official statement came from Dmitri Manuilsky, which indicated the role of the Communist International in dissolving the CWWP, published in 1939:

“The only official Soviet pronouncement on the subject of the CPP dissolution is a report by Manuilsky on the Eighteenth Congress of the Bolshevik party. There the following passage is found:

In order to split the Communist movement, the Fascist and the Trotskyite spies attempted to form artificial “factions” and “groups” in some of the Communist parties and stir up a factional struggle … [The party that was] most contaminated by hostile elements was the Communist Party of Poland where agents of Polish fascism managed to gain positions of leadership. These scoundrels tried to get the party to support Pilsudski’s Fascist coup in May 1926. When this failed they feigned repentance for their “May error,” made a show of self-criticism and deceived the Comintern just as Lovestone and the police “factionalists” of the Hungarian and Yugoslav parties had once done. And it was the fault of the Comintern workers that they allowed themselves to be deceived by the class enemy, failed to detect these maneuvers in time, and were late in taking measures against the contamination of the Communist parties by enemy elements … The Communist parties … have investigated their leading workers and removed those whose political honesty was questionable. They have dissolved illegal organizations which were particularly contaminated, and have begun to form new ones in their place.”  ^{[175] [176]}

The timing of this attack on the KPP, coincided with a peak in the Yezhov led conspiracy to sabotage the CPSU(B).

Yezhov and before him Yagoda – aimed the NKVD against honest communists labelling them as “counter-revolutionaries”, in order to alienate workers and peasants from the State. This was argued by W.B.Bland from at least 1976.^{[177] [178]}  His research indicated that when open attempts to counter the Marxist-Leninist path were foiled by the CPSU(B) leadership in the late 1920s, the enemies of socialism developed underground means of achieving the same ends. High office in the secret services – which every state needs – were captured by the enemies of socialism – first, Yagoda, and then Yezhov:

“In any state the security police form an important part of the state apparatus. A key facet of the plans of the opposition conspiracy was, therefore, to gain control of the security police. In 1934 the head of the Soviet security police, Vyacheslav Menzhinsky, died, and was replaced by his former deputy, Henrikh Yagoda. At his trial for treason in 1938 Yagoda admitted having been a member of the underground conspiracy and of having arranged for the murder of Menzhinsky, which was made to appear as from natural causes. For the next four years the NKVD was in the hands of the opposition, who at first used it mainly to protect the members of the opposition conspiracy. “ ⁴⁴

Stalin organised his own intelligence service in 1934:

“Stalin now in a minority on the Political Bureau” replied by using his limited powers as General Secretary of the Party to reorganise his personal bodyguard into an intelligence service, headed by Aleksander Poskrebyshev, under his control.” ⁴⁴

But that was only after the murder of Sergei Kirov in 1934, after which Stalin had criticized the NKVD for “lack of effectiveness”:

“In 1935-6 Stalin made a number of criticisms of the “lack of effectiveness” of the state security police. In consequence Yagoda was eventually (in September 1936) dismissed as head of the NKVD, to be replaced by his deputy Nikolai Yezhov who, it later transpired, was also a member of the opposition conspiracy.

Under Yezhov, during 1937 and 1938, the NKVD taking Stalin’s criticism into account — was extremely “active” While continuing to cover up genuine conspirators, it proceeded to arrest and imprison large numbers of perfectly honest Communists on trumped-up charges.” ⁴⁴

The new counter-revolutionary strategy adopted by Yezhov, used a mask of extreme vigilance – while extending attacks on honest citizens and honest comrades. It is relevant then that Yezhov considered the Comintern to be “a nest of spies”:

“Known by various names— the Great Terror, the Great Purges, the Stalinist Terror, the Yezhovshchina —the mass repression destroyed the lives of many residents of the USSR, native-born and foreign-born, and profoundly altered, even deformed, the Bolshevik Party and Soviet society. It mortally wounded the Comintern….Because Yezhov, head of the NKVD, considered the Comintern to be a “nest of spies,” ^[179]

Prominent members of the ECCI included Pyatnitsky and Dimitri Manuilski:

“One ECCI member was the representative of the Central Committee of the VKP [CPSU(B)]. Throughout the late 1920s and the early 1930s, that person was Osip Pyatnitsky. In 1935 , after Pyatnitsky’s transfer to work in the Central Committee offices, Manuilsky assumed that role.” ^[180]

In his diary Georgi Dimitrov (in the Banac English edition) the first note on any ECCI secretariat is first found for 20 December 1936, at a meeting of the secretariat on the Polish question. This discussed:

“Strengthening the party as a Polish party. A commission has been selected: D[imitrov], L[en ´ski], Kol[arov], Moskv[in], Ercoli [Togliatti], Loz[ovsky]”. ^[181]

Yezhov was especially exercised about “émigrés acting as spies” from 1934 onwards:

“Krajewski’s 1934 report on émigrés acting as spies, Yezhov’s comments, and revelations during the VKP’s 1935 verification of party documents (proverka) that large numbers of party cards had been forged or were missing and that non-party members, Soviets and foreigners alike, illegally possessed cards — all these brought to the forefront the issue of the political reliability of émigrés, in particular those who belonged to the VKP. The concern of the VKP leaders over this issue is evident in their efforts to restrict immigration to the USSR. A Politburo resolution of 1 December 1935 sought to stem the entry of émigrés from Poland, west Ukraine, and Lithuania. It cancelled all approvals for entry that the ECCI and MOPR had issued and ordered VKP oblast committees not to accept anyone from the Polish section of the Comintern without the explicit approval of the Central Committee in the person of Yezhov.” ^[182]

Manuilsky echoed Yezhov:

“In the report to the Plenum, Manuilsky repeated many of the assertions and concerns expressed by Krajewski, Yezhov, and the Politburo. He began by stating that “the main reason for the obstruction of political and educational work among the ranks of political émigrés is the degeneration [ razlozheniia ] within and the entry of enemies into the ranks of the Polish, Hungarian, Finnish, and other political émigrés.” He criticized the International Organization for Aid to Revolutionary Fighters (MOPR), which had formal responsibility for political émigrés, because it provided “no guarantee against penetration by hostile elements; on the contrary, it facilitates avowed enemies’ legal entry into the USSR. The enemies of the USSR and the Comintern use political emigration as a channel [kanal] for penetrating their agents into the USSR and even the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)(VKP(b)…

Manuilsky claimed that some fraternal parties had made it a practice to send to the USSR people who had committed “political mistakes and crimes” in their native countries. By so doing, those parties had allowed “suspicious” elements to enter the USSR. …

His report and the announcement at the Plenum that the party membership screenings of 1933-1935 (the purge of 1933-1934 and the verification procedure
– proverka of 1935) had revealed that missing and doctored party cards were in the hands of “enemies of the USSR” convinced the Central Committee of the need to act. It passed a resolution that – after noting the penetration into the VKP of enemies in the guise of political émigrés and members of foreign parties— ordered an exchange of party documents (obmen partdokumentov) to ferret out all hostile elements.” ^[183]

In a letter from Manuilsky to Yezhov, the former signalled for attacks on the KPP:

“the ECCI Secretariat believed the Polish Communist Party to be “the major supplier of spy and provocateur elements to the USSR.” … Prominent members of the CPP, which from the early 1920s was the largest Communist Party in Eastern Europe, held leadership positions in the Comintern. Such credentials were a source of pride for Polish Communists.” ^[184]

“During the intraparty struggles following Lenin’s death, the leaders of the Polish CP expressed disagreement with the methods employed by Stalin and the Central Committee majority, and supported Trotsky’s positions as they related to the Comintern.… some members were loyal to the reigning Moscow leadership, others to Trotsky and the German Left Communist group (the Fischer-Maslow group), still others to the ideas of Rosa Luxemburg. Political divisions within the Polish CP ran deep.” ^[185]

“from at least the late 1920s, the VKP delegation in the ECCI suspected that police agents had infiltrated the Polish CP…. When the VKP delegation in the ECCI met in Stalin’s office on 14 May 1929 , it resolved: “To take all essential measures for protecting the CC CPP from provocations corroding the [Polish] party. To ask the Collegium of the GPU [state security organ] to take measures for exposing provocateurs in the CPP.” From that point on, Soviet security organs kept a watchful eye on the Polish CP.” ^[186]

“Throughout the 1930s, Soviet security organs maintained that provocateurs and Polish counterintelligence agents, in particular agents of the Polish Military Organization (POW), had infiltrated the Polish CP and its Central Committee. … When the security organs deemed it appropriate, they informed the ECCI about its investigations, which from 1933 – 1934 on resulted in the arrests of hundreds of Poles. The ECCI was well aware of the suspicions and arrests of Poles… In January 1936 an unsigned “Resolution on CPP Organizational Issues,” which circulated among the ECCI members, reinforced that assumption.” ^[187]

The Secretariat viewed the situation in the Communist Party of Poland as “extremely serious, requiring urgent radical measures to improve the party and strengthen the leadership.” What most concerned the Secretariat were the dangers posed by the “agents of the class enemy,” the “disorganizing work of the Pilsudshchina,” and the “remnants of sectarianism.” ^[188] These calls culminated in the dissolution of the KPP:

“its call to “dissolv[e] the Polish section of the Comintern, which, owing to the lowering of its Bolshevik vigilance, has failed to prevent infiltration by spies and saboteurs into the VKP(b),” was a radical and ominous solution to what the Secretariat viewed as a persistent problem.” ^[189]

Even staunch Marxist-Leninists – such as Clara Zetkin – were perturbed about the climate within the ECCI:

“The German Communist Clara Zetkin, wrote to Jules Humbert-Droz, a Swiss Communist and an adherent to the Bukharin line, that the Comintern had become “a dead mechanism that swallows orders in Russian and issues them in different languages.” ^[190]

Interim Summary to this point 

Before moving on to the Warsaw Uprising, we summarise the key points.

i. The post-Pilsudski Government of Poland obstructed a mutual security pact that could have stopped Hitler.

ii. After Poland was invaded by Germany the Polish ruling class fled leaving a vacuum of power.

iii. The USSR occupied Eastern Poland following the German occupation of Poland to secure its borders – which assisted in delaying the German invasion of the USSR by two years. This enabled the USSR a certain amount of time before the actual German invasion of the USSR.

iv. Even then the Polish exiled ruling class representatives of the self-proclaimed government in exile – continued to attack the USSR to delegitimize its’ self-defense.

v. This went to the extent of an alliance with Nazi Germany to slander the USSR with false accusations on the Katyn Forest massacre.

8. Inside Occupied Poland

We move onto the struggle inside Poland, starting with a few words as an introduction. Struggles for unity were complicated by factional struggles, and wartime conditions.

The Polish National Council organized a Home Army – the Armia Krajowa (AK). Rather than fighting the German occupiers, it fought against the communist organised People’s Army resistance of the Armia Ludowa (PL), who were opposing German invaders in Eastern Poland Lublin.

Naturally, such divisions and sabotage hampered any organized resistance of those fighting the German occupying forces – including the USSR.

After the USSR won at Stalingrad its Red Army swung “Westward” to liberate Europe. Class battles erupted between the landed gentry and capitalist class – and the workers and peasantry. Those class struggles were in the background until the German invaders retreated from the USSR counter-offensive.

Increasingly the attitude of the Western Allies – Great Britain and the USA – began to switch over to an increasingly overt opposition to the USSR.

It is this immediate background that sheds light on the Warsaw Uprising. We can now address the query noted above:

“When, how, and why (did) the authors of the insurrection decide that Warsaw should be freed from the Germans ‘by Polish effort alone twelve hours before the entry of the Soviets into the capital’?” [191] 

The Sikorski led Polish Home Army (AK), and the communist led People’s Army (AL)

The core of a resistance army was set up in Warsaw in September 1939 by Maj-General Tokarzewski and Lt. Gen. J.Rommel. Both supporters of Pilsudski. Initially it was known as the Victory for Poland Service (Sluzba Zwyciestwu Polski, SZP). [192] This planned for an eventual national uprising against the German occupiers, but also against the Bolsheviks. Its core goal from the start was in Tokarzewski’s words, to:

“ensure the continuity of the State, maintain the honour and morale of the nation and, on this basis, continue the struggle against the Germans and certainly also the Bolsheviks.“ [193]

From the start, it was heavily composed of pre-1939 formerly pro-Pilsudski Officer Corps. The Polish Socialist Party, the Peasant Party, and the National Democratic Party – all supported its role. As such it was heavily dominated by the pro-landed gentry class and rich peasantry:

“By the time war broke out in 1939 the Polish Officer Corps was 18,668-strong and recruited mainly from the intelligentsia, the middle class, the landed gentry and the more prosperous sections of the peasantry. Its upper echelons were composed primarily of Pilsudski’s ex-Legionnaires”. [194]

It formed a “Polish Underground State” – Panstwa Podziemnego – with political, administrative and military components. [195] At first Sikorski was reluctant to establish links with it – since he was suspicious of its’ pro-Pilsudski views. However the ‘Government of National Unity’, or the Polish National Committee in Paris soon confirmed links. But it proceeded to take over the SZP.

Gen Sikorski appointed a Ministerial Committee for Home Affairs, under the chairmanship of Gen Kazimierz Sosnkowski. He had been a very close collaborator of Jozef Pilsudski, until the 1926 coup d’etat. Sikorski also established another “official” underground organisation.

Calling itself the Association for Armed Struggle – Zwiazek Walki Zbrojnej, ZWZ – it was based in Paris. But the key personnel were inside Poland. Sosnkowski ordered Maj-Gen Tokarzewski to command the resistance in the Soviet Zone. Col Stefan Grot-Rowecki, Chief of Staff to Tokarzewski, was made military Commander of the Warsaw area and the German Zone.

The Polish National Committee and the government-in-exile now renamed the resistance as the Home Army – Armia Krajowa (AK). This section of the Polish Armed Forces directly declared allegiance to the London exiled Government.

“From now on the emigre Government’s policies, activities and standing among Poland’s allies affected the fortunes of the resistance in Poland, and vice versa.” [196]

However, the control by the London Poles over all wings of the Resistance even in its own Home Army was never complete. This led to problems:

“Despite its considerable, though often qualified, popularity, the pro-London movement failed to bring all resistance forces under its control. This failure had grave repercussions; it led to a bitter struggle for power between rival resistance groups during the last years of the war. Some of the political and ideological aspects and causes of the Warsaw Rising may be traced to this internal conflict. “ [197]

Besides such tensions between Tokarzewski and the London Poles, other more fundamental political differences gave rise to serious conflict in the anti-German resistance. For the Resistance also consisted of a communist wing which directly confronted a fascist wing:

“the Communist-controlled People’s Army (Armia Ludowa – AL) and the ultra-nationalist near-fascist National Armed Forces (Narodowe Sily Zbrojne -NSZ). … differed so widely from the pro-London movement.” [198]

After the death of Grot-Rowecki, in early July 1943, Sosnkowski appointed General

Tadeusz Bor-Komorowski as the successor. He appointed as his Chief of Staff General Tadeusz Pelczynski (‘Grzegorz’) . Both were ex-Pilsudski-ites and ex-Cavalry officers from the First WW. Bor-Komorowski in especial had many extreme Right allies.

Sosnkowski as C-in-C had by October 1943 instructed Bor-Komorowski and the Home Army that the USSR should be held as enemy forces unless the USSR had accepted the Polish frontier demands. This was the content of the Instruction, sent to Warsaw in December 1943, by the London Poles. In fact:

“The C-in-C emphatically rejected the idea of unqualified military co-operation between the Soviet and Polish forces in the task of liberating Poland.” [199]

The Home army was told that they should rely on cooperation with the non-USSR Allied forces. The Home Army was to be hidden and secretive from any Russian forces coming into Poland. However the London Poles had no such cooperative assurances from the Western Allies. Mikolajczyk also, as late as October 1943 was planning such an alliance would forestall any Russian forces within Poland, and he saw a ‘Warsaw Uprising’ in this context. [200]

Nor could the Western Allies give such commitments, since it was becoming increasingly clear that it would be the USSR forces that would liberate Poland.  Although the London Poles knew the risks were immense – these were considered as some sort of sacrifice in an “act of despair”:

“Sosnkowski shared the Prime Minister’s misgivings concerning the staging of the rising without sufficient help from the West, with one reservation; he maintained that ‘acts of despair are sometimes unavoidable in the lives of nations in view of the common feelings of the population, the political symbolism of such acts and their moral significance for posterity.’ [201]

Plans were now being made in seriousness for the Rising.

“in December 1943-the C-in-C was urging Bor- Komorowski to make provision for the creation of the nucleus of an anti-Soviet resistance movement, especially in the eastern territories around Wilno and Lwow.”[202]

General Kukiel, the London-based Polish Minister of National Defence in London, strongly pushed for a seizure of Warsaw before the Russian entry. This Warsaw Plan was to be effected by General Bor-Komorowski on 1 August. But, even before then Bor-Komorowski drew from the ‘Instruction’ from the London Poles, his military plan – the “Burza” or Operation Tempest. This accentuated the aggressive anti-USSR intent.

“Bor-Komorowski told the Cabinet of this development in his communication to Sosnkowski, dated 26 November 1943, and received in London during the first days of January 1944, by which time the Russians were already on territory which before the war had been Polish. He wrote:

“I have issued an order … instructing all commanders and units which will take part in the fighting against the retreating Germans to reveal their presence to the Russians. Their task . . . will be to manifest... the existence of Poland.” [203]

Operation ‘Burza’ was to begin from a radio order by Bor-Komorowski in the ‘general German retreat’.

Before further following this to its bitter end, we must first re-trace our steps and bring the communist movement’s developments to this point.

Formation of Communist Resistance Forces and the Polish Workers Party (PPR) 

The Communist formal resistance began to be organized in January 1942, after the Polish Workers’ Party (Polska Partia Robotnicza PPR) was created in Warsaw. Its’ leaders were Marceli Nowotko and Pawel Finder. Both were in the prior Communist Party of Poland, disbanded by the Comintern in 1938. They were parachuted into Poland in December 1941:

“With instructions to establish contact with Communist organisations in the country and use them as a basis in creating a new Polish Marxist-Leninist Party. Nowotko and Finder were members of a special ‘Initiative Group’… trained at the Comintern school… in 1941…

The first party manifesto, drafted in Russia … called for the creation of a national front ‘for the struggle for free and independent Poland’. ” [204]

The PPR declared a broad anti-sectarian base and accordingly wished to cooperate with Sikorski’s forces. Sikorski declared that both the PPR and the NSZ-fascists were not to be trusted. As the communists assisted the formation of administrations in the Russian zone they gained credibility. They became quite large in size, and were very influential. Especially amongst the youth who were impatient to struggle against the Germans. The communists formed:

“The People’s Guards (Gwardia Ludowa – GL), which in 1944 became the People’s Army (AL). In June 1942 the Party allegedly had 4,000 members and had recruited 3,000 men to its military detachments. By the end of 1942 the PPR’s military activities comprised intelligence and sabotage work and the preparations for armed insurrection. From its inception, its political and propaganda activities gave rise to deep concern among the pro-London circles.” [205]

The passivity of the Home Army could not counter the German terror and policy of ‘collective responsibility’. That targeted all community members for any individual acts of resistance. But Grot-Rowecki could not convince the London Poles to allow him to surge the Home army into more active resistance:

“The Warsaw leaders were, however, ordered by the Government to limit retaliatory operations to a bare minimum, not to extend them beyond the areas affected by the expulsion and at all costs to prevent the outbreak of general insurrection. They were told to resist the demands of the masses for more drastic measures.” [206]

Grot-Rowecki warned his commanding office-in-chief that the fight against the German Army took second place to considerations of the Russo-Polish border dispute:

“because of the Russo-Polish dispute he had diminished operations against the Wehrmacht and ‘especially [those] against the communication lines leading to the East’, was concentrating his efforts on German security and administrative organs and intended to continue with this policy.” [207]

While urging the Home Army to resist, the PPR also correctly approached the Home Army with united front proposals to unify all resistance inside Poland. Because Marceli Nowotko was assassinated under unclear possibly internal factional struggles, in December 1942 the leadership passed to Pawel Finder.

Finder delegated Wladyslaw Gomulka to negotiate with the Government-in-exile delegates inside Poland. The PPR urged by the use of open letters – a national front. It warned of “Polish mass extermination: and “the plight of the Jews.” [208] While these open letter pleas remained unanswered, negotiations were begun in Warsaw with the London Pole representative.

That representative was Professor Piekalkiewicz. The talks failed – largely because the London Poles feared loss of power, were the proposals by the PPR presented by Gomulka to be accepted:

“That a new Government should be created in Poland which could, in time, replace the Cabinet in London. This Government should direct the launching of the insurrection and organise the elections to the constituent assembly, after the liberation. The PPR stated that it was well-disposed to the Government in London but had reservations about its composition and its social and political tendencies. In the view of the PPR the exiled Government acted as a necessary representative of Polish interests abroad, but should not be allowed to assume power automatically when it returned to Warsaw. Therefore, Gomulka stated, a new Government should be established, within the country, in which some members of Sikorski’s Cabinet, including the General himself, should be allowed to serve.” [209]

Talks were disrupted when Professor Piekalkiewicz was arrested by the German forces. But his successor Jan Stanislaw Jankowski and Grot-Rowecki rejected the offer – unless the PPR were prepared to completely subordinate itself to the London Poles pledging the London Poles allegiance:

“pledge of absolute loyalty to the pro-London leadership; secondly, a declaration of complete independence of foreign authorities and of readiness to defend the country against aggression from any quarter; finally, a recognition of the inviolability of Poland’s pre-war frontiers. Thus, the pro-London leaders were insisting on what amounted to an undertaking, from the PPR, to fight against Russia if necessary.” [210]

Neither could the PPR have accepted, nor would it have been correct from a ML-ist viewpoint, to do so. Gomulka became Secretary-General of the Party in November 1943 after Finder was arrested by German intelligence.

The PPR continued to move ahead to attempt to form a democratic national front. Their programme was openly to move to a democratic state and tackle the land question:

“The November declaration stated that the establishment of a democratic system in post-war Poland could not be entrusted to the London Government, as its authority rested upon the provisions of Pilsudski’s ‘undemocratic, illegal’ Constitution of 1935. Instead, the Party suggested that the task should be entrusted to a Provisional Government, to be formed, at some unspecified date, by ‘the anti-fascist national front’. This Government would supervise free elections to the National Assembly, which in turn would elect the President, the Government, and enact a new Constitution… It would also introduce far-reaching social and economic reforms, as outlined in the March programme but with a number of significant changes in regard to the solution of the agrarian question. Both private and church estates were to be expropriated and redistributed. The Party stated that it would approve the seizure of estates by the peasants and agricultural workers during the take-over period. Finally, the party insisted that the test of the truly democratic nature of any political movement must be the request for expropriation of
landed estates without compensation.” [211]

It was the London Poles again, who obstructed a United Front. In the view of one historian – Ciechanowski JM – who fought during the Warsaw Uprising himself, and who was captured and imprisoned by the Germans:

“the pro-London authorities made a serious political mistake in refusing to come to an understanding with the Communists which might well have allowed them to influence the PPR’s policies, or might at least have prevented the Communists from creating a rival national authority.” [212]

Meanwhile inside Poland itself, the Polish people moved further towards the PPR. This was reported to London in August 1943 by General Bor-Komorowski (Grot-Rowecki’s successor as leader if the Home Army) who:

“Told London that, although the PPR’s hostility to the Government and its representatives had led to some ‘spontaneous liquidation of Communists’ in the provinces, among some groups of the radical intelligentsia prone to revolutionary ideas pro-communist tendencies were growing” [213]

This shift occurred as the German repression had led to more fierce resistance:

“The mounting German terror, coupled with the growing Polish belief that the war would soon end, was giving rise to a general demand for the intensification of underground operations against the Nazis.. The Communists, who from the outset had been propagating the idea of intensification and expansion of sabotage and guerrilla activities, were profiting from this situation. Their slogan, ‘The Red Army is doing its job – we must do ours’, was gaining currency. The Government Delegate said that the position of the pro-London circles was becoming more difficult because officially they could not counteract propaganda of this kind, especially as the British and American politicians were full of praise for the Red Army; he complained that their pro-Soviet statements, probably made for ‘political reasons’, were reaching the Polish public and there causing ‘acute disorientation.” [214]

In September 1943, Bor-Komorow issued an order to ‘combat brigands’. This was clearly aimed at the PPR. [215]

The Tehran Conference

Stalin raised this order against ‘brigands’ and its targeting the PRR, at the wartime allied Tehran conference. This was a meeting between Stalin, F.D.Roosevelt, and Churchill, held between 28 November to 1 December 1943.

But in addition, Bor-Komorow’s ‘anti-brigand order’ targeted Jewish militants, branding them as ‘brigands’. There can be no other interpretation since by 1943 the Home Army was fully aware of the devastating German attacks on Polish Jewry. The Home Army had clearly communicated details to the London Poles:

“In the first months of 1943, the Polish Underground intelligence received more and more evidence of Nazi crimes. A report of the Department of Internal Affairs of the Delegate’s Bureau discussed the situation of the Jews around occupied Poland. In the Kraków region, it reported, Jewish communities only remained in Kraków (12,000), Tarnów (6000), and Rzeszów (2000). Jews in Radom and Kielce were being treated “with particular bestiality” while in Galicia as a whole there were few Jews, the report stated. The report estimated that in the Lublin district nearly all the Jews had been murdered. “Some of them are hiding in the forests, forming bandit groups (zespoły bandyckie),” it stated. The use of the term “bandit groups” to describe Jewish fugitives from the ghettos during the liquidation campaigns began to be more pronounced. To many Jewish historians, the appearance of this term in underground reports revealed a gross lack of sympathy for the predicament of Jews in hiding.” [216]

Meanwhile the murderous attacks on the communists continued. Gomulka reported by January 1944 that the Home Army had simply left the killing of communist guerillas to the fascist NSZ. Only in July 1944 did the London Poles and their Home Army condemn the NSZ – perhaps because they were now also killing Home Army members. [217]

The Union of Polish Patriots – A unity forum for Poles outside of Poland

The USSR correctly formed a coordinating front for Polish liberation, outside of Poland. It served to unite all Poles outside of Poland for a democratic national front. This was called the Union of Polish Patriots:

“The PPR’s attempts to create the ‘democratic national front’ in Poland followed the establishment in Moscow, in March 1943, of the communist-inspired Union of Polish Patriots (Zwiazku Patriotow Polskich – ZPP), ostensibly to unite and organise the one and a half million Poles in Russia for the struggle against the Germans regardless of their political affiliations. In reality, the ZPP was intended to form the nucleus of the future Government of Poland. In June 1943 – shortly after the suspension of Russo-Polish diplomatic relations – the ZPP pledged itself to help Poland to liberate herself from Nazi domination, to create in the U.S.S.R. Polish military formations which were to fight on the Eastern Front, to strive for the restoration of parliamentary democracy and, finally, to strengthen the ties between Poland and her ‘natural ally’, the Soviet Union.” [218]

The Polish Division of Berling and Wasilewska

As the victory of the USSR forces drew near, the defence of Stalingrad had defeated six field armies, and the complete destruction of the 6^th army  of the Germans by February 1943. was coming to an end, the overall goal of its members were to form a new government. But reflecting the diversity of forces within it, the ZPP did not have a unified single plan for post-liberation Poland. It was in fact divided, and included elements such as General Zygmunt Berling – an anti-communist who had been captured during the 1939 occupation of Eastern Poland, by the USSR.

Berling refused to serve for General Anders who insisted on moving the Polish army to Persia to fight with the British. Berling and Col. Wanda Wasilewska – a Polish communist – were helped by Stalin to build a Polish army on Russian soil to help free Poland from German oppression. But it had difficulty in connecting to the liberation forces inside Poland.

“At the end of 1943, when it had become clear that Poland would be liberated by the Red Army, the Union (ZPP) started to prepare plans for the assumption of power in the country by trying to establish in Moscow a Polish National Committee, which would assume the role of Provisional Polish Government…

The ZPP’s plans were not coordinated with those of the PPR, or even discussed with the communists in Poland, because of a break-down in radio contact with Warsaw, which lasted from November 1943 until January 1944. Moreover, certain elements within the ZPP, especially those connected with its military formations, under Gen Z. Berling, were ready to exclude the PPR from their plans for assuming power after the entry of the Red Army into the country.” [219]

The National Council of Poland (Krajowa Rada Narodowa – KRN).

In response to the increasing divisions within the Union of Polish Patriots (Zwiazku Patriotow Polskich – ZPP, the communist fraction organised the Central Bureau of Polish Communists in the U.S.S.R. (Centralne Biuro Komunistow Polskich – CBKP). This took the leadership of the national democratic front movement within Poland.

However, it was superseded in this by the PPR established National Council of Poland (KRN):

“The disputes within the ZPP led to the creation in Moscow, in January 1944, of the Central Bureau of Polish Communists in the U.S.S.R. (Centralne Biuro Komunistow Polskich – CBKP) which assumed political control over all activities of the ZPP, including those of its armed forces, and was to act as the link between the ZPP and the Soviet authorities and the PPR.

While the ZPP was trying to settle its internal problems and was preparing the creation of the Polish National Committee in Moscow, the PPR established in Warsaw, on 31 December 1943, the National Council of Poland (Krajowa Rada Narodowa – KRN). When, in January 1944, the ZPP was told of the creation of the National Council, its members abandoned their own plans for establishing a National Committee in Moscow.” [220]

While the Peasant and the Socialist parties refused to work with it, the KRN refuted the London “government-in-exile”. Instead it argued for return to the 1921 Constitution of Poland (i.e. the pre-fascist un-amended Constitution):

“The PPR leaders had decided to set up the KRN, in spite of the refusal of the Peasant and Socialist Parties to serve on it, in the hope that many of the left-wing rank-and-file members of these parties might be willing to support the Council and its activities. The absence of official cooperation from the Peasant and Socialist Parties meant, however, that the KRN was a Communist-dominated body with a narrow political base. The KRN declared itself to be ‘the factual political representation of the Polish nation’ for the duration of the war. It renounced the London Government, the 1935 Constitution, and advocated a return to the provisions of the 1921 Constitution as the fundamental laws of the country. Yet it conceded ‘the need for the existence abroad’ of a body which would represent Polish interests to the  Allied powers. The KRN claimed for itself the power to issue binding decrees until such time as the proper legislative body was established. The executive power was vested in its presidium, headed by Boleslaw Bierut, a leading member of the PPR. In the provinces the KRN was to be represented by a network of provincial councils. The KRN pledged itself to unite and mobilise the entire nation and its resources for the struggle against the Germans. It renamed its People’s Guards the People’s Army, under Gen Michal Zymierski, and rather extravagantly declared itself to be in command of all Polish armed forces fighting against the Germans.” [221]

These positions made clear that a significant portion of Poles in Poland, did not accept the London Poles as the Government. Of course it also led to vehement anti-communist agitation by the London Poles. This led to a tense situation. Gomulka sent a delegation to Moscow to obtain Stalin’s advice and approval for the above steps taken:

“Edward Osobka-Morawski, deputy-chairman of the KRN, and Col Marian Spychalski, a member of the Central Committee of the PPR. On 22 May Stalin received.. the delegation together with the representatives of the ZPP. He stated that he was prepared to recognise the KRN as representative of the Polish nation and to enter into official relations with it once it had established an executive organ. The latter would be of use to him in his negotiations with Churchill and Roosevelt, who were urging him to recognise the London Government, which he had no intention of recognising in its existing form. It was agreed that the hard core of the new Polish Government should be recruited from the KRN and its supporters and certain unnamed politicians then in Poland. These were to head the main Ministries and command the Army. He agreed to supply the People’s Army with war materials.”  [222]

It was then decided that the KRN’s executive body would assume the title of Polish Committee of National Liberation, Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego – PKW).

On Stalin’s urging the wording the “Committee of National Liberation” (Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego – PKW – sometimes abbreviated as PKWN) was adopted – rather than the “Provisional Government” – on July 21st. Meanwhile, the PPR continued to make repeated attempts to form a United Front with all relevant parties – The Peasant Party, the Socialist Party, and the Home Army and the London Poles.

The strengths of resistance fighters on the eve of the Warsaw Uprising

A few days before the ‘Warsaw Uprising’ the leaders had to move away from Warsaw to Lublin to form the PKW.

By this stage the PPR had an estimated 20,000 members – including large numbers of the left wing of the Peasant and the Socialist party. The Peoples’ Army claimed 50,000-60,000 partisans – thus weaker than the Home Army. Later:

“In 1957 Gomulka himself admitted that in this crucial period the PPR and the KRN were not supported by the majority of the nation.“ [223]

The Home Army was numbered at varying estimates around “a few hundred thousand men… most of them unarmed”. In June 1944, the London based Polish general staff estimated that Bor-Koromovski had arms for 32,000 men alone. In Warsaw the numbers were 50-70,000 fighters including 4,300 women. But only one-sixth had weapons. [224]

9. The Warsaw Uprising

Operation Bagration of the USSR in 1944

As the USSR Red Army defeated the German Army at Stalingrad, the USSR Stavka and leaders began quickly to move to the ambitious Bagration operation. This aimed to destroy the last intact German force. It quickly escalated to a plan to completely free all USSR territory, as Stalin’s Order of the Day proclaimed on 1 May 1944:

“The biggest Soviet military operation of 1944 was Bagration, named by Stalin after a Georgian hero of the Napoleonic Wars. The plan was to surround and destroy Army Group Centre – the Wehrmacht’s last major intact force on the Eastern Front – and expel the Germans from Belorussia. Planning for the Soviet summer campaign of 1944 began early in the year and by mid-April the General Staff had worked out its basic strategy: a campaign to liberate the remaining quarter of the USSR still under German occupation. This goal was proclaimed by Stalin in his Order of the Day on 1 May 1944: ‘the objective now is to liberate all our territory from the Fascist invaders and to restore the State frontiers of the Soviet Union in their entirety, from the Black Sea to the Barents Sea’.” [225] [226]

Bagration was a very complex operation bring together a main attack from the Belorussian Fronts – together with a Ukranian Front. These together alone had assembled:

“2.4 million troops, 5,200 tanks, 36,000 artillery pieces and 5,300 military aircraft. They had a two to one superiority over the Germans in personnel, six times as many tanks and four times as many planes and artillery.”

In addition, the Leningrad Front and Baltic Front joined, in order to get Finland out from the war, and to tackle Arm Group North. Finally a close coordination with the Anglo-American launch of the European Second Front was effected. This had long been requested by Stalin and stalled by the Western allies, but it was finally happening.

The year 1944 was “the year of the Ten Victories” – after the Leningrad Blockade was finally broken. The Red Army came up to the River Bug after the “Mud Campaign”, crossing that they were in Rumania, and crossed the Dniester and the Pruth. Odessa was liberated, and Finland was removed from the war, and the USSR did not continue onto Helsinksi. But the liberation of Belorussia was most pertinent to the Polish situation, and this trapped almost 30 German divisions around Minsk. This enabled the liberation of Western Ukraine (and Lwow), and freed the Lublin area of East Poland and also Estonia and Lithuania.  [227]

Bagration was a tremendous success, but came at a terrible cost of Soviet deaths and casualties:

“Belorussia was the main centre of Soviet partisan operations against the Germans and by summer 1944 up to 140,000 partisans were organised into some 200 detachments…  On 19–20 June the partisans launched a wave of attacks … The main Soviet ground attack began on 23 June and was a stunning success.

…100,000 Germans were encircled and trapped east of Minsk. Vilnius, the Lithuanian capital was recaptured… Between 22 June and 4 July, Army Group Centre lost 25 divisions and well over 300,000 men; another 100,000 were lost in the weeks that followed. By the end of the July it had ceased to be an effective fighting force. However, the destruction of Army Group Centre did not come cheap. The four main Fronts involved in Operation Bagration suffered three-quarters of a million casualties during the course of the campaign to liberate Belorussia. … By the end of the operation Belorussia and Western Ukraine were back in Soviet hands, Finland was about to capitulate, the Red Army had penetrated deep into the Baltic States and in the south were heading for Belgrade, Bucharest and Budapest. John Erickson argue(d) that …”For the German army in the east it was a catastrophe of unbelievable proportions, greater than that of Stalingrad.’.. the symbol of capitulation was the image of 57,000 German POWs led by their generals being marched through the streets of Moscow on 17 July 1944.” [228]

“The victories of 194 were spectacular, but very few of them were easy victories. The Germans fought with extreme stubbornness in Poland (especially in August when the Russians were stopped outside Warsaw), at Ternopol in the Western Ukraine (which with its three weeks intensive street fighting, was reminiscent of Stalingrad); ..  German resistance was also particularly fierce in all areas on the direct road to Germany…” [229]

Bagration “propelled” the Red Army into Central and Southern Poland. Lublin was freed on July 23. This led to the new target being identified of Warsaw. By July 31 the Red Army arrived on the banks of the River Vistula to Praga – opposite the city of Warsaw:

“The aim of Bagration was to liberate Belorussia, but the collapse of Army Group Centre and the rapid advance of the Red Army propelled Soviet forces to the borders of East Prussia and into central and southern Poland. By the end of July the Red Army was converging on the Polish capital Warsaw from several directions. The extent of the Red Army’s penetration westwards raised the question of the future direction of the offensive now that Belorussia had been liberated. On 19 July Zhukov proposed to Stalin .. to occupy East Prussia, … a Stavka meeting with Stalin on 27 July.. decided that East Prussia would be too tough a nut to crack … The capture of Warsaw was a much more promising prospect, and the decision was made to cross the River Vistula at a number of points and concentrate the Soviet offensive in the direction of the Polish capital. Pride of place in the campaign for Warsaw, which was expected to fall to the Red Army in early August, was given to the 1st Polish Army. Recruited from among Polish citizens.” [230]

Map 3: Drawn by author, Map shows converging USSR Fronts on to Poland; marked modification of Map 14; Roberts Ibid; Map 14; p.201;

The Lublin Polish Administration

As the Russian army rapidly moved West, Stalin was careful to keep Churchill briefed. Churchill had been anxious that Stalin meet Mikolajczyk. He had replaced in July 1943, Sikorski after the latter’s death. Churchill wanted Poland and the USSR to come to terms and Stalin to again recognise the London Poles. Therefore in regards to Poland in particular, Stalin stated that the Polish based Polish Committee of National Liberation, was the responsible administration in the freed areas. It was not going to be the Red Army forces. In particular this applied to the city of Lublin. This administration was to become known as The Lublin Poles – as opposed to the London Poles.

“I am now writing to you on the Polish question only. Events on our front are going forward at a very rapid pace. Lublin, one of Poland’s major towns, was taken today by our troops, who continue their advance. In this situation we find ourselves confronted with the practical problem of administration on Polish territory. We do not want to, nor shall we, set up our own administration on Polish soil, for we do not wish to interfere in Poland’s internal affairs. That is for the Poles themselves to do. We have, therefore, seen fit to get in touch with the Polish Committee of National Liberation, recently set up by the National Council of Poland, which was formed in Warsaw at the end of last year, and consisting of representatives of democratic parties and groups, as you must have been informed by your Ambassador in Moscow. The Polish Committee of National Liberation intends to set up an administration on Polish territory, and I hope this will be done.  We have not found in Poland other forces capable of establishing a Polish administration. The so-called underground organisations, led by the Polish Government in London, have turned out to be ephemeral and lacking influence. As to the Polish Committee, I cannot consider it a Polish Government, but it may be that later on it will constitute the core of a Provisional Polish Government made up of democratic forces. As for Mikolajczyk, I shall certainly not refuse to see him.

It would be better, however, if he were to approach the Polish National Committee, who are favourably disposed towards him.” [231]

After the liberation of Lublin by the Red Army on July 23, a manifesto was issued at Chelm on July 25 by the National Liberation Committee – becoming known as the “Lublin Committee”. This announced the imminent liberation of all Poland.  This denounced the London Polish exiled government as having been formed under the 1935 fascist constitution. [232] It emphasised a new “Slav Unity”.

In the meantime the Home Army A.K. had been prepared by the London Poles to put into operation a plan carried in “The Instruction” (see above). This informed the military plan of the Home Army, supposedly for liberation, known as “Operation Tempest”:

“By the middle of 1944 the Polish Government-in-Exile’s underground forces in Poland had created, and in some provinces, started to enact a plan for the liberation of their homeland from the occupying German administration. This plan was known as Operation Tempest.” [233]

But what this meant in reality, was the disruption of the Lublin-based PKW and its allies, the new administration, and the Red Army, and the Polish Division headed by Berling:

“Recruitment to the Berling Army was resisted, desertion encouraged and infiltration of the new Polish government organized. Due to the early weakness and division within Poland’s pro-Soviet administration, the Polish Committee for National Liberation (PKWN or PCNL), AK forces were able to penetrate many of the new structures of the fledgling administration, including even the security services.” ²²⁰ 

Alongside this disruption, the AK tried to claim power in Lublin for the London Poles. However, this was effectively countered by the People’s Army AL:

“On the morning of the 27th July 1944, the Polish Communist People’s Army (Armia Ludowa, AL) started concentrating its units surrounding Lublin and entered the city in a conspicuous show of force. On the same day units of the Berling Army started to enter the city. The entrance of large Polish Communist forces inspired local Communist groups within the city to set up People’s National Unions. Just as ominously, even though Radio Moscow had announced the creation of a new Polish puppet committee, the PKWN in Chełm on 21 July, in reality it was from the 27th that this Communist alternative was functioning in Lublin province’s eastern city.” [234]

The USSR advance is halted by vigorous German counter-attack at the Vistula

As the Polish Division of the Red Army – a part of Marshall Georgy Zhukov’s 1st Belorussian Front – was posed on the River Vistula it was 20,000 strong. They were led by Marshall Zhukov and Marshall Konstantin Rokossovskii.

Between 27 July and 4 August 1944, the Soviets and the 1^st Polish division were able to establish two bridgeheads over the River. However the German army had re-grouped, and was desperately concerned to hang onto Warsaw as it “barred the way to Berlin”. The Soviets were now far ahead of their supply lines, and were tired:

“Soviet plans soon ran into trouble when the Red Army came up against strong German defences in the Warsaw area. The Wehrmacht was down but not out, and the Germans quickly rebuilt the strength of Army Group Centre by transferring divisions from other sectors of the Eastern Front and from western Europe. Warsaw barred the way to Berlin and was a crucial strategic outpost for the Germans to defend. As the Germans stabilised their defensive position, so the Soviet offensive lost its momentum. Soviet troops were tiring, the Red Army’s supply chains were now stretched hundreds of miles long, and the Red Air Force’s relocation to forward deployed airfields had disrupted operations and allowed the Luftwaffe to regain some of the initiative in the air.

Nonetheless, the Soviets did manage to establish a number of bridgeheads on the western bank of the Vistula and to get as close to Warsaw as Praga, a suburb of the city on the eastern side of the river.” [235]

Hence the attack on Warsaw by the USSR was halted. The commanders considered and initially planned for, re-starting on the 6^th August. But with German opposition, it could only start in mid-September and was halted again for failures for lack of success. It would be January before the situation improved adequately to re-start:

“In charge of the Warsaw operations were Zhukov, the Stavka co-ordinator of operations on this sector, and Rokossovskii, the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front. On 6 August they reported to Stalin that strong enemy forces in the Warsaw area necessitated the drafting into action of some reserve divisions.32 On 8 August Zhukov and Rokossovskii submitted to Stalin a detailed plan for the capture of Warsaw which involved securing the attack force’s flanks, consolidating the existing bridgeheads on the west bank of the Vistula, and reinforcing the 1st Belorussian Front. They estimated that the operation could begin on 25 August.33 The go-ahead was given by Stalin, but enemy counter-action in the Warsaw area meant that it was mid-September before the Soviets were ready for another major assault on the city, although local offensive operations continued throughout August and early September. But, as previously, the Red Army’s efforts to cross the Vistula in force and advance on Warsaw made little headway in the face of strong German opposition. In early October the Soviet attack was finally called off and the Red Army did not resume offensive operations against Warsaw until January 1945.” [236]

In the interim, the Warsaw Uprising erupted on August 1, 1944.

How and why had the London Poles decided to launch the Warsaw Uprising?

The entire fiasco of the premature and ill-timed Warsaw Uprising can be explained by one factor. This was the burning desire of the Polish reactionaries in the London Government to create a “legitimacy”. They reasoned this could be achieved by liberating Warsaw entirely by its’ own Home Army (Amria Krjowa AK). This would establish “the claims of the London Government to govern and represent Poland”.

The Uprising was led on the ground by General Bor-Komorowski and Stanslaw Jankowski Jankowski was an SOE agent who in 1942 was parachuted back into occupied Poland and led “Operation Agaton” to forge sophisticated documents. They chose the moment to rise in order to preempt what they thought – mistakenly – was going to be an easy entry for the Red Army into Warsaw:

“The Home Army’s attempt to free Warsaw before the entry of the Red Army was prompted mainly by political and ideological reasons. The authors of the insurrection decided to act because they were convinced that, if the claims of the London Government to govern and represent Poland were to be established in the eyes of the world, Warsaw must be liberated by forces loyal to that Government. By taking Warsaw the Home Army was to clear the ground for the final, decisive confrontation with Stalin, the outcome of which was to determine who would govern Poland-the London Poles or the Polish Communists and their sympathisers. To Jankowski and Bor-Komorowski, this was the crucial moment of the war for Poland; they believed that she stood at historic cross-roads, that her destiny was about to be decided.” [237]

“It was intended that seizure of political power for the London Government at the end of hostilities would constitute the crowning of their military success and the culmination of their struggle against the Germans. Moreover, a refusal to engage the Wehrmacht during its retreat from Poland might compromise their anti-German record in the opinion of the public at home and abroad.” [238]

Actually as we saw earlier, the initial intent to struggle against the Red Army had been made long before as the secret orders of the Polish C-in-C made clear:

“In accordance with the C-in-C’s instructions, as late as March 1942-despite the fact that Russo-Polish diplomatic relations had been re-established in July 1941 -the secret army was under strict orders to resist the Soviets, if they tried to enter Poland without the prior consent of the Polish Government.” [239]

To reiterate, the “Instruction” originally came from the London Committee. But of course they were to be enacted by the Home Army, led on the ground by Bor-Komorowski.

From the start the decision was predicated entirely on the imminent success of the Russian forces offensive. If this were to happen, the Chief of Staff General Tadeusz Pelczynski – emphasised the “foregone conclusion: of the Russian entry:

“Had Bor-Komorowski and his Staff made a more realistic analysis of the military situation, they would no doubt have abandoned their plan to free Warsaw during the first days of August 1944. They were well aware, even before the outbreak of the insurrection, that the success of their enterprise would depend on the outcome of the Red Army’s offensive on Warsaw. On 31 July – the day before the insurrection – Pelczynski told Jankowski that if the Russians did not soon enter Warsaw the insurgents would be massacred by the Germans. When making their final decision to rise, the Home Army Generals assumed that the imminent entry of the Russians into the city was a foregone conclusion.” [240]

Thus the whole foundation for launching the Warsaw Uprising was predicated on two “assumptions”.

Firstly that the Soviet army would be at the doorstep of Warsaw within 12 hours; and Secondly that the Germans had no more capacity left for fighting the Home Army:

“From the purely military point of view their decision rested on two fundamental and simple assumptions; their profound belief that the Russians were on the point of taking the capital and their impression that the Germans were no longer capable of halting for long the Red Army’s advances in central Poland. Indeed, at the moment of the final decision, those responsible for it were confident that the Russians would take the city within a few days, if not hours. They reached this optimistic conclusion because of Monter’s (General ‘Monter’ – A. Chrusciel – ed) report that Russian tanks were already entering Praga. They expected the Soviet attack on the city to begin at any moment. ‘We were convinced that the occupation of Warsaw was one of the aims of the Soviet offensive’, said Pelczynski in 1951. “. . On about 21 July we became convinced that the Russians would cross the line of the middle Vistula without any strong opposition from the Germans…

The developments at the front between 21 and 25 July supported our supposition and strengthened our belief.’ ‘We believed’, he continued, ‘that the Muscovites would exploit the fact that the German troops were badly shaken, and that they [the Russians] would enter Warsaw, not to help us, but to further their own tactical interests’. Thus the Home Army generals were firmly convinced that the Russians were extremely anxious to capture Warsaw as soon as possible because of its strategic and military importance. They decided that ‘Moscow must be anxious to advance as far to the west as will secure favourable jumping off positions for their next offensive, aimed at the interior of the Reich [and] intended to forestall the occupation of its territories by the Western Allies, who had landed in Normandy.” [241]

“The second supposition, that the Germans were no longer able to stem the Russian advance in Poland, rested on the belief that the German defeats in the East, which had led to the destruction of about twenty-five of their divisions, the Anglo-American successes in Normandy and the attempt on Hitler’s life had all combined to produce a situation potentially catastrophic for the German Reich. ‘In these circumstances’, said Bor-Komorowski in 1949, ‘the possibility of the collapse of the Germans at the front and in their own country had to be taken into account.’ Referring to the attempted assassination of Hitler, Gen Pelczynski said: “We were greatly affected by this event which showed that the conspiracy against Hitler embraced the highest circles of the Reich’s armed forces and Hitler’s entourage.” [242]

These two mistaken assumptions, led to “highly optimistic prognostications” – i.e an over-weening and entirely falsely-based confidence:

“These highly optimistic prognostications gave birth .. to the idea that the Home Army should exploit German reverses and Soviet successes by liberating Warsaw .. they led the three Generals to conclude that the opportunity for certain victory over the Germans in Warsaw was within their grasp.

They expected their struggle to be short and virtually to assume the character of mopping-up operations. Their faith in certain victory was unshakeable’, writes Col Bokszczanin, ‘and any reservations were dismissed as signs of petty-mindedness and defeatism… In any case, a hard struggle ‘was not envisaged if for no other reason than because the Polish units had insufficient quantities of arms and ammunition… in any event victory [was considered] to be certain.’… Col Bokszczanin maintains that Gen Okulicki, the main advocate of the insurrection, imagined that there would be ‘no real struggle, but only a finishing off of an already defeated and disorganised enemy’.  In the Colonel’s opinion Okulicki’s optimism was fully shared by his immediate superiors Bor-Komorowski and Pelczynski”. [243]

Contemporaneous writings of its leaders tried to retrospectively shift the blame, wrongly emphasising that the Red Army “was in the Warsaw suburbs” and minimize the problems the Red Army faced. Alexander Werth’s comments are discreet, but clearly meant to expose the idiocy of these attempts :

“Stanislas Mikolajczyk in his ‘Rape of Poland’… keeps on referring to General Rokossovsky’s headquarters as ”only a few miles outside Warsaw and to the Red Army as being “in the suburbs of Warsaw from which it wouldn’t budge”. The fact that Warsaw and the Red Army were separated by a wide river, the Vistula, is only very incidentally referred to. His implication was that the Vistula was no serious obstacle and that , if they had wanted to, the Russians could easily have captured Warsaw and also saved many of the 300,000 Poles who were to perish in the 2 months fighting-cum-massacre.” [244]

We saw above how poorly armed the Home Army was in reality. The decision did not make “military sense”:

“Bor-Komorowski’s decision to fight in Warsaw would not make military sense, in view of the paucity of arms and ammunition at his disposal; he had no wish to stage a forlorn gesture, which endangered the lives and safety of over a million people. He himself stated that before the insurrection he had altogether discounted the possibility that it might fail. Its final outcome was to be determined by the entry of the Red Army into Warsaw. He estimated that the Russians would arrive in the city on the second or third or, at the latest, by the seventh day of the fighting. His Chief of Staff also expected that the struggle would be short, lasting for a few days; in any event, no longer than a week. He estimated that ‘Monter’s’ troops would be able, without much difficulty, to capture the greater part of the city and a number of less strongly defended German positions during their initial assault. Bor-Komorowski and Pelczynski appreciated that, because of the shortage of heavy weapons, the offensive power of their troops was weak.” [245]

Again, Bor-Komorowski expected to be rescued by the USSR:

“Bor-Komorowski’s own report, sent by him to London on 21 July, stating that he was, on the whole confident that on the Eastern Front the initiative was entirely in Soviet hands and that the Russians were expected to cross the Vistula without much opposition from the Germans.” [246]

This was because he recognised the Polish weakness with “no prospects of success”:

“a week earlier, on 14 July, Bor-Komorowski himself has stated that he had no intention of starting large-scale hostilities in the capital because, in view of the formidable German anti-insurrectionary preparation ‘a rising has no prospects of success’. Thus, only a fortnight before the insurrection he had considered his forces incapable of a sustained effort to capture the city. Within a week he ad changed his mind, not because his forces had become stronger but because he no longer believed the Germans to be capable of effective resistance, even to his badly armed troops, provided that the Polish operations were well-timed.”[247]

All military offense was to be launched “at the moment the Red Army crossed the Vistula”:

“Monter’s troops were to occupy the whole of Warsaw and immobilise its German garrison, thus paving the way for the establishment of a London-controlled administration which, as hosts, would receive the Russians. With regard to tactics, the Home Army Command intended to open its attack at the moment the Red Army crossed the line of the Vistula, south of Warsaw, and disorganised the defence of the German bridgehead in the neighbourhood of the city.” [248]

But, the Russian attack was repelled by the German re-grouping. It is clear that the Home Army commanders knew that this major set-back was taking place:

“Yet there are indications that the Red Army’s failure to take Warsaw at the beginning  of August 1944 was due chiefly to military causes. This emerges from an examination of some Polish, Russian and German sources. In October 1944 the officers of Gen Okulicki’s Staff in German-occupied Poland unequivocally ascribed the Russian failure to take Warsaw to ‘the general collapse of the Soviet offensive on the Vistula’. They maintained that Rokossovsky’s offensive had been halted at the gates of Warsaw by the arrival on the scene of fresh German armoured reinforcements. More significantly, Generals Bor-Komorowski, Pelczynski and ‘Monter’ admitted, after the rising, that at the beginning of August the Russians had met with serious military reverses in the approaches to Warsaw. In 1965 Gen Bor-Komorowski wrote that the Germans managed to ‘check the Russian attack on the capital’ by 5 August.2  In 1951 Gen Pelczynski said that ‘the Muscovites intended to take Warsaw in the first days of August, in the course of their initial attack. This did not happen. They met with serious difficulties of a military nature… Rokossovsky’s exposed flank near Warsaw encountered a localised attack from Model… but by 20 August Rokossovsky had freedom of action in this area.’

In the considered opinion of Bor-Komorowski’s Chief of Staff, Rokossovsky could not have renewed his attack on Warsaw before the end of August, by which time the insurrection was already three weeks old. Gen ‘Monter’ conceded, as early as 1946, that it was ‘possible to understand’ Russian behaviour on the Warsaw sector of the front in August 1944.  These guarded words imply that ‘Monter’ was prepared to accept the fact that at that time the Red Army was militarily unable to capture Warsaw.

Stalin and Rokossovsky gave similar accounts of the situation. On 9 August Stalin told Mikolajczyk that he had expected the Red Army to take Warsaw by 6 August; its failure to do so had been due to the arrival of five German armoured divisions in the Praga sector. On 26 August Rokossovsky said that the Russians would have taken Warsaw if this had been possible.  Indeed, Rokossovsky seemed very anxious to take the city; on 8 August he told Stalin that by about 25 August he would be able to stage a new attack on the Polish capital.” [249]

Perhaps the last word in this section should be that of Chief of the German General Staff – General Heinz Guderian, who in 1951 wrote that:

“We Germans had the impression that it was our defence which halted the enemy rather than a Russian desire to sabotage the Warsaw uprising.” [250]

The Charge against Stalin of sabotaging the Warsaw Uprising

The ‘Cold War’ was already starting up even as the ‘Hot War’ was still going on. It can be even said to have started with the false charges that the Soviets had deliberately stalled the attack on Warsaw to enable the Germans to wipe out the Polish resistance linked to the London Poles. As the historian Geoffrey Roberts puts it:

“The picture (above – Ed) of consistent, if ill-fated, Soviet efforts to capture Warsaw in summer 1944 runs completely counter to an alternative scenario: that when the Red Army reached the Vistula it deliberately halted its offensive operations to allow the Germans time to crush a popular uprising in the city.”  [251]

But this “alternative scenario” has several problems that it cannot overcome.

Firstly the Red Army did not as it pre-supposed that “at any stage “voluntarily slackened its efforts to capture Warsaw.”

Secondly, that alternative scenario does not relate at all to the extent of the German Wermacht recovery. As we saw, Heinz Guderian succinctly pointed out in 1951:

“We Germans had the impression that it was our defence which halted the enemy rather than a Russian desire to sabotage the Warsaw uprising.” [252]

Thirdly, rather than slowing Stalin’s and Rokossovskii’s pace of advance – the Uprising increased Stalin’s determination to take the city quickly – as he recognised the political agenda behind it:

“If anything, the uprising reinforced Stalin’s determination to capture Warsaw as soon as possible. When it began on 1 August Stalin had no idea the uprising would fail; indeed, the collapsing German military position indicated that it might succeed. The anti-Soviet politics of the uprising soon became clear to Stalin, making it even more urgent that the Red Army seize control of Warsaw as soon as possible.” [253]

Fourthly, the insurgents did not pose a military threat to the Red army as was sometimes alleged:

“It might be supposed that Stalin feared a clash with the Polish Home Army and was, therefore, content to let the Germans crush the AK in Warsaw. But the Red Army had been dealing with the AK ever since it crossed the frontiers of prewar Poland in early 1944, sometimes co-operatively, often conflictually, but at no stage did a few thousand Polish partisans pose a major threat or problem from the military point of view.” [254]

“As Rokossovskii said to Alexander Werth in an off-the-record interview at the end of August 1944: ‘And do you think that we would not have taken Warsaw if we had been able to do it? The whole idea that we are in any sense afraid of the AK is too idiotically absurd.’ [255]

NB A fuller version of this interview between Alexander Werth and Rokossovskii, is given in Appendix One.

Fifthly, the Warsaw Uprising had been launched without any military discussions with the Soviet forces. Indeed the imminent visit of Mikolajczyk was of no consequence – he wishes to surprise Stalin and the Red Army with a fait accompli. The Poles had of course alerted the British:

“On 26 July Mikolajczyk sent a telegram to Jankowski authorising him to order the insurrection on his own initiative. Before he left London, at about 6 p.m. on 26 July he received from Jankowski and Bor-Komorowski the news that they were ready to open their battle for Warsaw at any moment. This news must have encouraged Mikolajczyk greatly; a successful insurrection in the capital, insti- gated and executed by his supporters, seemed bound to strengthen his hand in the negotiations with Stalin and the Committee of National Liberation. Before his departure he informed Churchill and Eden that the Home Army Command had ordered a state of readiness for the general insurrection in Poland as from 25 July.”  [256]

From the start, Grot-Rowecki had accentuating the Home Army’s more anti-Russian belligerence. This was to continue after Grot-Rowecki’s arrest:

“The High Command of the secret army was becoming a policy-making body which often stood in contradiction to directives decided upon in London. This tendency was to survive arrest, and become more noticeable at the end of 1943 when Sikorski’s firm generalship was lacking and the new Home Commander was able not only to recommend his own policies but to obtain the Cabinet’s approval for them.” [257]

Even the British recognised that the launch was ill-timed and uncoordinated with the wider military objectives and plans. The British were informed about it on the 27 July. As Mr. Eden’s office told Dr Jozef Retinger, “one of Mikolajczyk’s emissaries in Poland” the next day:

“On 28 July the British informed (Ambassador -Ed) Raczynski:

that, quite apart from the difficulties of co-ordinating such action with the Soviet Government, whose forces are operating against the Germans in Polish territory, operational considerations preclude us from meeting the three requests you made for assisting the Rising in Warsaw …

… Therefore, there is nothing that His Majesty’s Government can do. Thus, diplomatically no preparations had been made for the Warsaw Rising.

As Eden put it: ‘It was set off by the local Polish commander without consultation with us and without co-ordination with the Soviet forces advancing on the city … .’  [258]

Yet not only had the Poles not informed the Red Army about the Uprising, but nor did the British:

“Finally, before the outbreak of the insurrection the British failed to pass on to the Russians the information received from Poland, that it was imminent. The Russians learned about the possibility for the first time from Mikolajczyk, at about 9 p.m. on 31 July; that is, about three hours after Bor-Komorowski had given the order for the insurrection to begin. Within less than twenty-four hours Warsaw became a battlefield.” [259]

Stalin in a message to Churchill on the 16^th August considered this secret launch not only as “reckless” but as “taking a heavy toll of the population:

“Now, after probing more deeply into the Warsaw affair, I have come to the conclusion that the Warsaw action is a reckless and fearful gamble, taking a heavy toll of the population.

This would not have been the case had Soviet headquarters been informed beforehand about the Warsaw action and had the Poles maintained contact with them. Things being what they are, Soviet headquarters have decided that they must dissociate themselves from the Warsaw adventure since they cannot assume either direct or indirect responsibility for it.” ^[260]

Mikolajczyk’s Moscow meeting with Stalin

As we saw, at the very same time that the uprising had begun on 1 August, Prime Minister Stanislaw Mikolajczyk of the London based Government-in-exile, was in Moscow for talks with Stalin. This had been much sought after by both Churchill and Roosevelt. Stalin had made clear to them, that he himself had no reason not to meet Mikolajczyk, but the latter ahd been stalling for some time.

Between the Polish government-in-exile and the USSR, there were always only two issues at stake. One was the line of the USSR-Poland border which meant the Polish demands of Byelorussia and Ukraine; the other was the composition of the post-war government of Poland.

At the Tehran Conference, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin had agreed that the Polish Eastern border would follow the Curzon Line, and that Poland would be recompensed by German territory. The Poles had not finally agreed on the details of this, although had agreed in principle. However when in January 1944 Operation Bagration crossed USSR troops into Poland, the Poles again asserted their governmental rights in the now liberated areas. These were Western Belorussia and Western Ukraine. The USSR responded that these had in 1939, declared for the USSR in 1939. But Moscow added that:

“On 11 January Moscow … that the USSR stood for a strong and independent Poland, one bounded by the Curzon Line in the east and in the west by ‘ancient Polish lands’ reacquired from Germany. Additionally, the Soviet Union was willing to transfer to Poland any areas in Western Belorussia and Western Ukraine with a majority Polish population… Moscow’s promise to negotiate the ethnic details of the Curzon Line was a definite gesture of conciliation.” [261]

This was a major concession by the USSR government. But the London Poles had already rejected this.

On the second question, Molotov had already indicated that the post-war “reconstructed Polish government” would include London Poles, including Mikolajczyk – as well as the PCNL (see p.76)

“Stalin presented to Churchill and Roosevelt on 23 July.. (that) while he did not consider the PCNL to be ‘a Polish Government’, he noted that it could become ‘the core of a Polish Provisional Government made up of democratic forces’.

The door remained open to a reconstructed government including Mikolajczyk.” [262]

The charge is often made that Stalin was dissembling. Namely that he had no intention that the Polish communists should share power in post-war Poland. Leaving aside the bias in these statements, there are several indications that this is not correct. In Stalin’s meetings with several influential persons it became very clear that Stalin was thinking of a bulwark against a renewed, revanchist Germany. This required a “long-term alliance of Slavic states”:

“Stalin’s conversations with two intermediaries..  Oscar Lange, a Polish-American Marxist economist (and) the pro-Soviet Polish-American Catholic priest Stanislaw Orlemanski revealed his strategic thinking about Polish–Soviet relations. Stalin wanted a friendly Poland with a left-leaning government that included his communist allies, but he also wanted a united country that was strong enough to participate in a long-term alliance of Slavic states against the future German threat.” [263]

“Germany will be able to renew itself in some 15 years. That is why we must think not only about how to end this war … but also about what would happen in 20 years, when Germany revives itself. This is why an alliance between Russia and Poland is absolutely necessary in order not to let the Germans become an aggressor once again. ” [264]

There were two meetings between the two leaders.

At the first one the Polish leader dropped into the conversation the news about the Warsaw Uprising. In this context he raised the question of the post-war government. Just as head to Churchill, Stalin emphasised that Mikolajczyk had to discuss this with the Lublin Poles – namely the PCNL (see p.76):

“Stalin’s first meeting with Mikolajczyk was on 3 August. … Mikolajczyk mentioned that an uprising in Warsaw had broken out and that he would like to be able to go to the Polish capital very soon to form a government that would combine the parties of the London Poles and those of the Polish communists. Stalin replied that the questions he had raised were of great political and practical importance but that Mikolajczyk had to negotiate those issues with the PCNL with a view to forming a united provisional government – a point that the Soviet leader repeatedly came back to in the ensuing conversation. When Mikolajczyk spoke of the role of the AK in Poland Stalin pointed out that its units were very weak and lacked guns, let alone artillery, tanks and planes. When Mikolajczyk suggested that the AK should be armed, Stalin replied that the most effective aid to the Soviet campaign to liberate Poland would be the formation of a unified government.” [265]

Another main question still remained, the border:

“Stalin restated the Soviet position that the Polish border should run along the Curzon Line in the east and the Oder River in the west; Poland would get Danzig but Königsberg would go to the Soviet Union. Responding to Polish claims to Lvov in Western Ukraine and Vilnius in Lithuania, Stalin said that ‘according to Leninist ideology, all peoples were equal’ and that he ‘did not want to offend the Lithuanians, the Ukrainians or the Poles’. He wenton to point out that the greatest territorial losses would be suffered by the Soviet Union, which was giving up that part of Poland that had once belonged to the Russian empire… The next day the British ambassador in Moscow sent Eden a very positive report of the Mikolajczyk–Stalin meeting” [266]

When Mikolajczyk met the PCNL however, he was very rigid insisting that the London Poles were the basis of government:

“Mikolajczyk’s talks with the PCNL leaders were less successful, the sticking points being the Polish Premier’s insistence that his exile government should form the basis of a new provisional government and that the communist-led partisans should be assimilated into the AK.” [267]

During the talks, Churchill and Stalin were sending notes about the Warsaw Uprising.

The Russian toll had been high in the War. It is quite understandable how the intransigence of the Polish government-in-exile would be viewed as unreasonable. As Roberts puts it:

“The Warsaw uprising was an emotional event for the Soviets, too. They hadlost millions of troops reaching Warsaw, and would suffer another half million casualties in liberating Poland from the Germans; they did not take kindly to suggestions that they had provoked the uprising and then abandoned he Warsaw population to their fate. Equally important was the fact that the Red Army was preparing further assaults on the Polish capital and the Soviet expectation was that Warsaw would fall to them within days, thus making redundant any question of supplying the uprising.” [268]

Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin and the Warsaw Rising – the USSR placed in a propaganda trap

The Allied leaders were soon involved in a back and forth about the Warsaw Uprising. Stalin responded to Churchill’s message of 4 August, with doubts about the Hoe Army’s ability to withstand 4 German divisions. He updated Churchill after the first talk with Mikolajczyk:

“On 4 August Churchill told Stalin the British intended to drop 60 tons of equipment and ammunition in the south-west section of the city. In his reply to Churchill the next day Stalin doubted the AK would be able to take Warsaw, because it was defended by four German divisions. On 8 August Stalin wrote to Churchill about his talk with Mikolajczyk:

‘It has convinced me that he has inadequate information about the situation in Poland. …’ Although the talks between the PCNL and Mikolajczyk had not been successful they had been useful, Stalin told Churchill, because they had provided an opportunity for an exchange of views. This was the first stage in the development of relations between the PCNL and Mikolajczyk and ‘let us hope that things will improve’, Stalin concluded.” [269]

These reiterated when Stalin updated Churchill on the Second meeting:

“In Mikolajczyk’s second talk with Stalin on 9 August the Polish Premier raised the question of Soviet aid to the Warsaw uprising. Stalin responded that he did not consider the uprising a ‘realistic affair when the insurgents had no guns whereas the Germans in the Praga area alone had three tank divisions, not to speak of infantry. The Germans will simply kill all the Poles.’ Stalin explained that the Red Army had advanced to within a few kilometres of Warsaw but the Germans then brought up reinforcements. The Red Army would continue its attack and take Warsaw, said Stalin, but it would take time. He was willing to supply the insurgents with munitions but worried about the supplies falling into German hands and asked Mikolajczyk if there were safe places to drop guns. After being reassured that there were such areas Stalin promised to give Rokossovskii the necessary orders and to pursue all possibilities.

Towards the end of the conversation Stalin once again aired his fears of a German revival after the war and emphasised the need for a Polish–Soviet alliance to meet this threat.” [270]

It was becoming rapidly and starkly clear that the Warsaw insurgents had fallen into an enormous hole and slaughter. Increasingly the Allies put pressure on an already strained USSR to drop supplies and men to the insurgents. So having known about the Uprising – and not having informed the USSR – the Allies now expected the USSR to sort it out.

The weapon of persuasion they used were false claims made by the bourgeois press that the Home Army had been spurred on by the USSR to start the Uprising. Moreover that they were “coordinated with the USSR”. The British and USA were apparently – “shocked” –  when the initial response of the USSR was that they would not cooperate in this senseless attempt:

“the onset of intense inter-allied acrimony about aid to the Warsaw uprising. The British had begun airlifting supplies to the Warsaw insurgents in early August, using their bases in Italy. On 13 August the Americans decided to drop supplies, using planes flying from Britain, but that required landing on Soviet airfields for refuelling before returning home. On 14 August Harriman forwarded to Molotov the request for landing and refuelling facilities. The response, a letter from Deputy Foreign Commissar Andrei Vyshinskii the next day, shocked British and American sensibilities. The Soviets would not co-operate with American air drops to Warsaw, announced Vyshinskii, because ‘the outbreak in Warsaw into which the Warsaw population has been drawn is purely the work of adventurers and the Soviet Government cannot lend its hand to it’. In a face to face meeting with Harriman and Clark Kerr later that day Vyshinskii was equally obdurate, pointing out that the Soviets had sent a liaison officer to the rebels in Warsaw but he had been killed. The next day Vyshinskii clarified the Soviet position: they would not co-operate with Anglo-American air drops but they would not object to them. This negative turn in the Soviet attitude to the Warsaw uprising seems to have been provoked by western press reports that the AK’s action had been coordinated with the Red Army, which was now refusing to aid the insurgents.

On 12 August Tass issued an angry denial and blamed the London Poles for the tragedy that was unfolding in Warsaw as the Germans moved to crush the uprising.” [271]

On 16 August Stalin wrote to Churchill pointing out that after seeing Mikolajczyk he had ordered supply drops to Warsaw but the liaison officer parachuted into the city had been captured and killed by the Germans:

“August 16, 1944.

After a talk with Mr Mikolajczyk I instructed the Red Army Command to drop munitions intensively into the Warsaw area.

A liaison officer was parachuted, but headquarters report that he did not reach his objective, being killed by the Germans.

Now, after probing more deeply into the Warsaw affair, I have come to the conclusion that the Warsaw action is a reckless and fearful gamble, taking a heavy toll of the population.

This would not have been the case had Soviet headquarters been informed beforehand about the Warsaw action and had the Poles maintained contact with them. Things being what they are, Soviet headquarters have decided that they must dissociate themselves from the Warsaw adventure since they cannot assume either direct or indirect responsibility for it.” ^[272]

The propaganda made out of this hay provided the strategy of Churchill and Roosevelt. They now pushed the USSR that aid would “propitiate world opinion”:

“On 20 August Churchill and Roosevelt appealed jointly to Stalin to drop supplies to Warsaw, if only to propitiate world opinion. Stalin replied on 22 August:

“Sooner or later the truth about the handful of power-seeking criminals who launched the Warsaw adventure will out … From the military point of view the situation … is highly unfavourable both to the Red Army and to the Poles. Nevertheless, the Soviet troops … are doing all they can to repulse the Hitlerite sallies and go over to a new large-scale offensive near Warsaw.

I can assure you that the Red Army will stint no effort to crush the Germans at Warsaw and liberate it for the Poles. That will be the best, really effective, help to the anti-Nazi Poles.” [273]

Stalin’s response – also pointed out that the action was “about the handful of power-seeking criminals”. Moreover the “military point of view” was “highly unfavourable both to the Red Army and to the Poles.”

“August 22, 1944.

The message from you and Mr Roosevelt about Warsaw has reached me. I should like to state my views. Sooner or later the truth about the handful of power-seeking criminals who launched the Warsaw adventure will out. Those elements, playing on the credulity of the inhabitants of Warsaw, exposed practically unarmed people to German guns, armour and aircraft. The result is a situation in which every day is used, not by the Poles for freeing Warsaw, but by the Hitlerites, who are cruelly exterminating the civil population.

From the military point of view the situation, which keeps German attention riveted to Warsaw, is highly unfavourable both to the Red Army and to the Poles. Nevertheless, the Soviet troops, who of late have had to face renewed German counterattacks, are doing all they can to repulse the Hitlerite sallies and go over to a new large-scale offensive near Warsaw. I can assure you that the Red Army will stint no effort to crush the Germans at Warsaw and liberate it for the Poles. That will be the best, really effective, help to the anti-Nazi Poles.” [274]

Nevertheless, the Soviets decided to make several drops. They had to point out however, that not only were personnel being dropped shot by the German, but that much of the rare supplies ended up being captured by the Germans:

“The memo also announced a change in policy on supplies to the insurgents, pointing out that the Soviets had already made several air drops but that each time the food and munitions had ended up in German hands. However, if the British and Americans insisted on such air drops the Soviets would co-operate and facilitate the operation. In mid-September the Soviets also began to step up their own air drops to Warsaw – a move which coincided with the launch of the Soviet attack on the city. Between 14 September and 1 October the 1st Belorussian Front made 2,243 flights to Warsaw and dropped 156 mortars, 505 anti-tank guns, 2,667 sub-machine-guns and rifles, 3 million cartridges, 42,000 hand grenades, 500 kilos of medicines and 113 tons of food.80 This compared with British supplies during August and September of 1,344 pistols and revolvers, 3,855 machine pistols, 380 light machine-guns, 237 bazookas, 13 mortars, 130 rifles, 14,000 hand grenades, 3,000 anti-tank grenades, 8.5 tons of plastic explosive, 4.5 million rounds of ammunition and 45 tons of food. Most of these supplies ended up in the hands of the Germans, although the Soviets claimed their low-level air drops were more accurate and effective than the high-altitude drops made by the RAF.” [275]

By September the USSR was urging an independent commission on the “launching of the uprising”:

“By September, however, the Soviets were beginning to worry about the public relations aspect of the affair. On 9 September the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs sent a memorandum to the British embassy proposing the establishment of an independent commission to investigate who was responsible for launching the uprising and why it had not been co-ordinated with the Soviet High Command.” [276]

For all that, the Warsaw Uprising was an absolute disaster in terms of the toll it took on the Polish population as the Germans savaged Warsaw and its population:

“The Warsaw uprising was a disaster for all concerned except the Germans. For the Warsaw Poles it was a catastrophe. The AK incurred about 20,000 fatalities and many thousands more wounded, while the civilian population, caught in the crossfire, suffered somewhere between 150,000 and 200,000 dead.When the uprising came to an end on 2 October the Germans finished the demolition job they had begun during the course of military operations against the AK by razing the entire city centre to the ground and deporting the surviving population to concentration camps. For the Polish government in exile the failure of the uprising represented a critical weakening of its ability to influence the postwar politics of Poland.” [277]

The capitalist press nonetheless fueled criticisms of the Red Army and why it had not taken Warsaw:

“the suspicion lingered that the Red Army allies had not done enough to aid the uprising. The Red Army was blamed for not capturing Warsaw sooner and the British and Americans were accused of appeasing their Soviet ally by not going public on their differences with Stalin over Poland. Within the Grand Alliance the diplomatic damage caused by differences over the uprising was limited and temporary, but in years to come the Warsaw controversy came to be seen as an important negative turning point in Soviet–Western relations and as an early harbinger of the cold war.” [278]

10. CONCLUSIONS

1.  The Warsaw Uprising was called prematurely, and without adequate military planning, and in secret – primarily for the purposes of creating a legitimacy for the London Polish “government-in-exile”. Failure was predictable.
2. During its terrible progress it became quickly evident that it would fail. The British and the USA governments – in collusion with the London Poles – decided to make it a propaganda weapon by which to attack the USSR.
3. This was the pattern of the attack on the USSR over the “Katyn Massacre”.
4. The USSR liberated Poland, and with the Communist partisans -created the grounds for completing the democratic revolution.

APPENDIX : Selected excerpts from Alexander Werth, interview with Rokossovsky  

(pp. 876-879)

“Rokossovsky on the 26^th August 1944:

“I can’t go into any details. But I’ll tell you just this. After several weeks heavy fighting in Belorussia and Eastern Poland we finally reached the outskirts of Praga about the 1^st August. The Germans at this point threw in four armoured divisions, and were were driven back.” P.876

Q ”Did you think on August 1 (as was suggested by the Pravda correspondent that day) that you could take Warsaw within a very few days?”

“If the Russians had not thrown in all that armour, we could have taken Warsaw, though not in a frontal attack; but it was never more than a 50-50 chance. A German counter-attack at Praga was not to be excluded, though we now know that before these armoured divisions arrived, the Germans inside Warsaw were in a panic, and were packing up in a great hurry”.

“Wasn’t the Warsaw Rising justified in the circumstances?”

“No it was a bad mistake. The insurgents started it off their own bat, without consulting us.”

P.876-877

“There was that broadcast form Moscow calling on them to rise.”

“That was routine stuff (sic). There similar calls from Swit radio [The AK radio] and also from the Polish BBC service – so I’m told. I didn’t hear it myself. Let’s be serious . An armed insurrection in Warsaw could only have been successful if it had been carefully coordinated with the Red Army. The. Question of timing was of the utmost importance. The Warsaw insurgents are badly armed, and the rising would have made sense only if we were at the point of entering Warsaw. That point had not been reached at any stage, and I’ll admit that some Soviet correspondent were much too  optimistic on the Ist August. We were pushed back. We couldn’t have got to Warsaw before the middle of August , even in the best of circumstances.  But circumstances were not good. Such things do happen in war. It happened at Kharkov in March 1943 and at Zhitomir last winter.”

“What prospect is there of your getting back to Praga within the next few weeks?””

“I can’t go into that. All I can say is that we shall try to capture both Praga and Warsaw, but it won’t be easy. “

“But you have bridgeheads south of Warsaw.”

“Yes, but the Germans are doing their damnedest to reduce them. We’re having difficulty in holding them, and we are losing a lot of men. Mind you we non-stop for over two months now. We’ve liberated the whole of Belorussia and nearly one fourth of Poland; but even the Red Army gets tired after a while. Our casualties have been very heavy.”

p.877-878

“Can’t you help the Warsaw insurgents from the air?”

“We are trying, to tell you the truth, it isn’t much good. They are holding only isolated spots in Warsaw, and most of the stuff will fall into German hands.”

“Why can’t you let British and American planes land behind the Russian lines, after dropping their supplies on Warsaw? There’s been an awful stink in England and America about your refusal.

“The military situation east of the Vistula is much more complicated that you release. And we just don’t; want any British or American planes mucking around here at the moment. In a couple of weeks we’ll be able to supply Warsaw ourselves from low-flying planes if the insurgents hold any recognisable area in the city. But this high altitude dropping of supplies on Warsaw from Western planes serves pracitcally no purpose at all.”

“Isn’t all this massacre and destruction in Warsaw having a terribly depressing effect on the Polish people here?”

“Of course it has. But a fearful mistake was made by the leadership. We (the Red Army) are responsible for the conduct of the war in Poland, we are the force that will liberate the whole of Poland within the next months, and Bor-Komarowski and the people around him have butted in. ryzhy v tirske – like the clown in the circus who pops up at the wrong moment and only gets rolled up in the carpet…If it were only a piece of clowning it wouldn’t matter, but the political stunt is going to cost Poland hundreds of thousands of lives. It is an appalling tragedy, and they re no trying to put the blame on us. It makes me pretty sick when I think of the many thousands of men we have already lost in our fight for the liberation of Poland. And do you think: he concluded, “that we would not have taken Warsaw if we had been able to do it? The whole idea that we are in any sense afraid of the Ak is too idiotically absurd.” p.878

“Two AK officers, Colonel Rawicz and Colonel Tarawa said they had left Warsaw on July 29 on the initiative of a “strong minority” of AK officers inside Warsaw to establish contact with Mikloajczyk (who was then in Moscow) in a last minute endeavour to persuade the London Government to use all its influence to call of the rising that was being prepared for August 1…Unfortunately it had taken the two colonels nearly a fortnight to reach Lublin and by then it was too late.”

Colonel Rawicz… said that the HQ had given the order for the rising as soon as the Russians were twenty miles from Warsaw, he and many other offices felt it would be folly to so until the Russians had reached the Vistula bridges.

“We did not think that the Russians could enter Warsaw before August 15^th. But the man-in-the-street (and you know how brave and romantic our Warsaw people are) was convinced the Russians would be there by August 2; and with tremendous enthusiasm they joined in.” p.879 

Notes

[1] W.P and Zelda K. Coates; “Six Centuries of Russo-Polish Relations”; London 1948; p.i

[2] Coates & Coates Ibid; p. 127

[3] Coates & Coates Ibid; p. 127 citing “Times” September 23, 1939

[4] Coates & Coates Ibid; p. 138

[5] Jan. M. Ciechanowski; “The Warsaw Rising Of 1944”; Cambridge U Press; 1974, p. ix

[6] Norman Davies, “God’s Playground – A History of Poland Volume 2; 1795 to the Present“; New York 1982, p.506

[7] Marta Błąd, “Land reform in the Second Polish Republic”; Rural History (2020), 31, 97–110

[8] Marcin Wroński, “Wealth inequality in interwar Poland”;  Economic History of Developing Regions; January 2023, Volume38 (1) p.1-40 

[9] Marcin Wroński, “Wealth inequality in interwar Poland”;  Economic History of Developing Regions; January 2023, Volume38 (1) p.1-40 

[10] Joseph Rothschild, “The Ideological, Political, and Economic Background of Pilsudski’s Coup D’ Etat of 1926”; Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 78, No. 2 (Jun.,1963), pp. 224-244

[11] Joseph Rothschild, Political Science Quarterly, Ibid;

[12] Davis N, “Volume 2”; p. 404

[13] Norman Davies “God’s Playground Volume 2”; Ibid; P.143

[14] Μ. K. Dziewanowski, “The Communist Party of Poland” Ibid; p. 57

[15] Davis N, “Volume 2”; p. 404

[16] Coates & Coates Ibid p. 117

[17] Coates & Coates Ibid; p. 118 citing “The Times” London; January 12, 1944.

[18] Coates & Coates Ibid; p. 118

[19] Coates & Coates Ibid; p. 119

[20] Coates & Coates Ibid; p. 119

[21] Coates & Coates Ibid; p. 122; citing Manchester Guardian, March 19, 1923.

[22] Coates & Coates Ibid; p. 121;

[23]  Coates & Coates, Ibid; p.123; citing “Times” June 27, 1927

[24] Coates & Coates, Ibid; p.124; citing ‘Guardian’ November 23, 1928.

[25] Coates & Coates, Ibid; p.124; citing January 19, 1939

[26] Μ. K. Dziewanowski, “The Communist Party Of Poland An Outline Of History”; Harvard 1976; p.11; 13;

[27] See Part 1 of this article at:

[28] Μ. K. Dziewanowski, “The Communist Party of Poland An Outline Of History”; Harvard 1976; p.25

[29] See Bland W.B. “Appendix “The Influence Of Rosa Luxemburg on the CPG”; to a larger work “ Revisionism In Germany Part One: To 1922 “; 1977 at http://ml-review.ca/aml/CommunistLeague/RevGer-App-RosaL.htm “

[30] Μ. K. Dziewanowski, “The Communist Party of Poland” Ibid; p. 51

[31] Μ. K. Dziewanowski, “The Communist Party of Poland” Ibid; p. 51

[32] Μ. K. Dziewanowski, “The Communist Party of Poland” Ibid; p. 57

[33] Μ. K. Dziewanowski, “The Communist Party of Poland” Ibid; p. 61

[34] Μ. K. Dziewanowski, “The Communist Party of Poland” Ibid; p.66

[35] Μ. K. Dziewanowski, “The Communist Party of Poland” Ibid; p.67

[36] Μ. K. Dziewanowski, “The Communist Party of Poland” Ibid; p.68

[37] Μ. K. Dziewanowski, “The Communist Party of Poland” Ibid; p.71

[38] Μ. K. Dziewanowski, “The Communist Party of Poland” Ibid; p.74

[39] Μ. K. Dziewanowski, “The Communist Party of Poland” Ibid; p.86

[40] Davis N, “Volume 2”; p. 411

[41] Davis N, “Volume 2”; p.412

[42] Davis N, “Volume 2”; p.417

[43] Μ. K. Dziewanowski, “The Communist Party of Poland” Ibid; p.75

[44] W.B.Bland for Communist League; January 1977.  “Revisionism In Germany: To 1922.
Appendix, The Influence Of Rosa Luxemburg on the CPG”; London January 1977; at:

http://ml-review.ca/aml/CommunistLeague/RevGer-App-RosaL.htm

[45] D. Manuilsky: “The Bolshevisation of the Parties;” in: “Communist International”, No. 10; 1925; p. 59; cited W.B.Bland ;“Revisionism In Germany; Appendix Rosa Luxemburg Ibid.

[46] J.P. Nettl: “Rosa Luxemburg”, Vol 2; London; 1966; p.787-8; cited W.B. “Revisionism In Germany: To 1922; Appendix Rosa Luxemburg Ibid.

[47] Μ. K. Dziewanowski, “The Communist Party of Poland” Ibid; p.76

[48] Μ. K. Dziewanowski, “The Communist Party of Poland” Ibid; p.78

[49] Μ. K. Dziewanowski, “The Communist Party of Poland” Ibid; p.79

[50] Μ. K. Dziewanowski, “The Communist Party of Poland” Ibid; p.90

[51] Μ. K. Dziewanowski, “The Communist Party of Poland” Ibid; p.92

[52] Μ. K. Dziewanowski, “The Communist Party of Poland” Ibid; p.92

[53] Μ. K. Dziewanowski, “The Communist Party of Poland” Ibid; p.92

[54] Μ. K. Dziewanowski, “The Communist Party of Poland” Ibid; p.100

[55] Μ. K. Dziewanowski, “The Communist Party of Poland” Ibid; p.103

[56] Μ. K. Dziewanowski, “The Communist Party of Poland” Ibid; p.108-109

[57] Μ. K. Dziewanowski, “The Communist Party of Poland” Ibid; p.109

[58] Μ. K. Dziewanowski, “The Communist Party of Poland” Ibid; p.115

[59] Coates & Coates Ibid; p. 127

[60] Joseph Rothschild, Political Science Quarterly, Ibid;

[61] Joseph Rothschild, Political Science Quarterly, Ibid;

[62] Μ. K. Dziewanowski, “The Communist Party of Poland” Ibid; p.102

[63] Bernhard, Michael; Institutions and the Fate of Democracy : Germany and Poland in the Twentieth Century, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005; p.107

[64] Davies “God’s Playground Vol 2” Ibid; p. 422

[65] See Appendix to substantiate this usage by Marxist criteria.

[66] M. K. Dziewanowski, “The Communist Party of Poland An Outline of History”; Cambridge Mass 1976; p. 122

[67] Neil Davidson, “How Revolutionary were the bourgeois revolutions?”; Chicago 2013; p. 258

[68] J. V. Stalin, “The British Strike and the Events in Poland Report Delivered at a Meeting of Workers of the Chief Railway Workshops in Tiflis”; June 8, 1926; Works, Vol. 8, January-November, 1926, pp. 164-181 CW Moscow 1954; or at https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1926/06/08bp.htm

[69] “Über die Taktik der Kommunistischen Partei Polens”, 3 June 1926; p. 370-374; in “For a Free socilaist Germany“; Selected Works 1919-1930 Vol1, 2; KAB(ML) 1970; or at:  https://kommunistische-geschichte.de/TeddyWerke/thaelmann-band1.pdf

[70] “The Political Complexion of the Russian Opposition”; Excerpt from a Speech Delivered at a Joint Meeting of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Comintern and the International Control Commission; September 27, 1927”; Works, Vol. 10, Moscow, 1954

https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1927/09/27.htm

[71] Robert Donnorummo, “ Poland’s political and economic transition“; East European Quarterly(Vol. 28, Issue 2) p.259 f

[72] Paweł Bukowski, Filip Novokmet, “Between communism and capitalism: long‐term inequality in Poland, 1892–2015”;  Journal of Economic Growth (2021) 26:187–239

[73] Leslie, “Poland Since 1863; Ibid; p.165

[74] R.F.Leslie, “The History of Poland Since 1863; p.160

[75] Leslie, “Poland Since 1863; Ibid; p.165

[76] Dziewanowski Ibid p. 127

[77] Leslie, “Poland Since 1863; Ibid; p.170

[78] Leslie, “Poland Since 1863; Ibid; p.172

[79] Leslie, “Poland Since 1863; Ibid; p.174

[80] Leslie, “Poland Since 1863; Ibid; p.181

[81] Leslie, “Poland Since 1863; Ibid; p.181

[82] Leslie, “Poland Since 1863; Ibid; p.183

[83] Leslie, “Poland Since 1863; Ibid; p.184

[84] Leslie, “Poland Since 1863; Ibid; p.178-188

[85] Coates & Coates Ibid; p. 128

[86] Coates & Coates Ibid; p. 121

[87] Leslie, “Poland Since 1863; Ibid; p.184

[88] Coates & Coates, Ibid; p.120

[89] Coates & Coates, Ibid; p.120

[90] Coates & Coates Ibid; p.130, citing ‘Times’ April 8, 1938.

[91] W.P.Coates and Zelda Coates; “Six Centuries of Russo-Polish Relations”; London 1948; p.128

[92] J. V. Stalin, “Report on the Work of the Central Committee to the Eighteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.); March 10, 1939”; Works, Vol. 14; London, 1978; https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1939/03/10.htm

[93] J. V. Stalin, “Talk with Mr. Duranty, Correspondence of The New York Times December 25, 1933”;  Works, Vol. 13, Moscow, 1954; and at: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1933/12/25.htm

[94] Coates; Ibid p. 125

[95] Coates & Coates Ibid p. 128

[96] Coates & Coates Ibid p. 128

[97] Coates & Coates Ibid; p. 131; Citing Sunday Express, July 23, 1939.

[98] Coates & Coates Ibid; p. 132

[99] This section largely consists of a shortened version of W.B.Bland “The German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939”; London 1990; at:

http://ml-review.ca/aml/AllianceIssues/WBBJVSNaziPact.htm

[100] A. Hitler: ‘Mein Kampf’; London; 1984; p. 598, 604;

[101] J. V. Stalin: op. cit.; p. 14.

[102] ‘Falsifiers of History: Historical Information’; London; 1948; p 15

[103] J. V. Stalin: op. cit.; p. 14-15, 16

[104] Parliamentary Debates. 5th Series, House of Commons, Volume 35; London; 1939; Col. 2,510

[105] Neville Chamberlain Archives, University of Birmingham, 11/1/1101

[106] ‘Documents on British Foreign Policy;’, 3rd Series, Volume 6; London; 1953; Appendix 5; p. 763.

[107] J. E. Davies: ‘Mission to Moscow’; London; 1942; p. 279-80

[108] A. Zhdanov: Article in ‘Pravda’, 29 June 1939, in: J. Degras (Ed.): ‘Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy’; London; 1953; p. 352, 353, 354

[109] ‘Documents on German Foreign Policy . . . ‘, Series D, Volume 7; p. 246-47

[110] V. M. Molotov: Speech to Supreme Soviet of 31 August 1939, in:  ‘Soviet Peace Policy’; London; 1941; p. 18

[111] V. M. Molotov: ibid.; p. 18

[112] V. M. Molotov: ibid.; p. 21

[113] E. H. Carr: ‘From Munich to Moscow: II’, in: ‘Soviet Studies’, Volume 1, No. 12 (October 1949); p. 104

[114] E. H. Carr: ‘From Munich to Moscow: II’, in: ‘Soviet Studies’, Volume 1, No. 2 (October 1949); p. 103

[115] Roberts, Geoffrey. Stalin’s Wars : From World War to Cold War, 1939-1953, Yale University Press, 2007; p.32

[116] Roberts, Geoffrey. Stalin’s Wars; Ibid; p.35

[117] Coates & Coates Ibid; p. 133; Sunday Express, September 10, 1939

[118] Sir Ernest Llewellyn Woodward, “British Foreign Policy in The Second World War” Volume 1; London 1970; p. 2\

[119] Woodward Ibid p. 10.

[120] Coates & Coates Ibid; p.134

[121] Coates & Coates Ibid; p.134

[122] Coates & Coates Ibid; p.135

[123] Woodward Ibid p.11

[124] V. M. Molotov: Speech to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 31 October 1939, in:
‘Soviet Foreign Policy’; London; 1941; p. 32

[125] V. M. Molotov: ibid.; p. 33

[126] Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, Vol. 351; House of Commons; London; 1939; Col. 996

[127] Winston Churchill, speech on October 1, 1939; Cited Coates & Coates Ibid; p.141

[128] Coates & Coates Ibid; p.140; citing “The Times”, September 30, 1939; & “Daily Telegraph” September 30,1939.

[129] Ciechanowski JM Ibid; p. 3-4

[130] J. V. Stalin, “Interview Between J. Stalin and Roy Howard (March 1, 1936)”; Works, Vol. 14; London, 1978; or at: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1936/03/01.htm

[131] Coates & Coates Ibid; p.138-9

[132] Coates & Coates Ibid; p.138; “The Times” September 25

[133] Coates & Coates Ibid; p.138; “The Times” September 25, and Sep 26 1939.

[134] Coates & Coates; Ibid; Citing “The Times”, October 12, 1939; p.142

[135] Molotov, Speech to the Supreme Council on October 31, 1939; Cited Coates & Coates Ibid; p.143;

[136] Coates & Coates; Ibid; p.143

[137] The Times, November 24, 1940; cited by Coates & Coates; Ibid; p. 144

[138] Jan. M. Ciechanowski; “The Warsaw Rising Of 1944”; Cambridge University Press; 1974,  p.2-3

[139] Hansard, August 21,1940, Col. 1279; and “The Times”, November 24, 1940; cited Coates & Coates Ibid; p.144

[140] Coates & Coates Ibid; p.144

[141] Manchester Guardian, May 21, 1941”; cited by Coates & Coates p.144

[142] Coates & Coates; Ibid; p.146

[143] The Times, August, 1, 1941; cited by Coates & Coates; Ibid; p.146

[144] Coates & Coates; Ibid; p.146

[145] “Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations, vol. i, Doc. No. 160, pp. 244ff, and Edward J. Rozek, Allied Wartime Diplomacy, A pattern in Poland (New York, 1958), pp. 94-5; cited by Ciechanowski JM Ibid; p.134

[146] Joseph Goebbels, “The Goebbels Diaries, 1942–1943”; Edited, Translated Louis P. Lochner; New York 1948; p. 259.

[147] Sir Ernest Llewellyn Woodward, “British Foreign Policy In The Second World War” Volume 1; London 1970; Introduction p.xlvii

[148] Message No. 257; “Personal And Secret From Premier J. V. Stalin To The Prime Minister, Mr. W. Churchill”; March 23, 1944. At: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/correspondence/01/44.htm

[149] Message No. 344; Personal And Secret Message From Mr Churchill To Marshal Stalin; 5th November, 1944;

https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/correspondence/01/44.htm

[150] Sir Ernest Llewellyn Woodward, “British Foreign Policy In The Second World War” Volume 1; London 1970; Introduction p.xlviii-lix

[151] Ciechanowski JM Ibid; p. 4

[152] Ciechanowski JM Ibid; p. 3; citing Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations, vol. i, Doc. No. 106, pp. 141-2.

[153] Coates and Coates, Ibid p.141

[154] The Times, January 7, 1942; Cited Coates & Coates. Ibid; p. 148

[155] Coates and Coates, Ibid p.148.

[156] Joseph Goebbels, “The Goebbels Diaries, 1942–1943”; Edited, Translated Louis P. Lochner; New York 1948; p.328

[157] “The Goebbels Diaries, 1942–1943”; Ibid; p.332

[158] The Times, January 15th, 1943; Cited by Coates & Coates; Ibid, p. 151

[159] Ciechanowski JM Ibid p. 5

[160] “The Goebbels Diaries, 1942–1943”; Ibid; p.332-333

[161] From ‘The Times’, April 19, 1943.” In Coates & Coates; Ibid, p.152-153

[162] Stalin to Churchill, April 21, 1943; Message no.80;  at https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/correspondence/01/43.htm

[163] “The Goebbels Diaries, 1942–1943”; Ibid; p.346

[164] Churchill to Stalin, 30^th April, 1943; Message No.154; at https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/correspondence/01/43.htm

[165] J. V. Stalin to Churchill Message No. 156; May 4^th 1943; at https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/correspondence/01/43.htm

[166] Evening Standard, 1 April 24, 1943; and News Chronicle, April 27, 1943; Cited Coates & Coates Ibid, p.154

[167] “The Goebbels Diaries, 1942–1943”; Ibid; p.354

[168] “The Goebbels Diaries, 1942–1943”; Ibid; p.487

[169] Ernie Trory, “Poland and the Second World War”; Hove Sussex 1983;

[170] Grover Furr, “The Mystery of the Katyn Massacre: The Evidence, The Solution“; Ohio 2018.

[171] Trory Ibid pp. 29-52

[172] Trory Ibid; p. 52

[173] Sergey Romanov; “Debunking Grover Furr’s Katyn screed”; February 14, 2023; https://holocaustcontroversies.blogspot.com/2023/02/debunking-grover-furrs-katyn-screed.html

[174] Anna M. Cienciala, Natalia S. Lebedeva, et al Katyn: A Crime Without Punishment (Annals of Communism Series), Yale, 2008

[175] Dmitri Manuilsky, “The Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

(B). Report,” World News and Views, April 6, 1939,cited in Dziewanowski, Ibid; p.151-152

[176] Nicholas Bethell, “Gomulka”, London 1962; p. 30;

[177] Bland W.B.; for Communist League: “Stalin the Myth and the Reality” 2005; https://www.marxists.org/archive/bland/1999/x01/x01.htm;

[178] Bland W.B. “Stalin the Myth and the Reality” Talk to Summer School of Communist League; London 1976; https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/periodicals/combat/x01.pdf

[179] Chase, William J. ”Enemies Within the Gates? The Comintern and the Stalinist Repression, 1934-1939, Yale University Press, 2001. p.2, p.7;

[180] Chase, William J.. Enemies Within the Gates? : The Comintern and the Stalinist Repression, 1934-1939, Yale University Press, 2001; p.18

[181] Dimitrov, Georgi. The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 1933-1949, edited by Ivo Banac, Yale University Press, 2003; p.44-5.

[182] Chase, William J; “Enemies Within the Gates?”  Ibid; p.103

[183] Chase, William J.. Enemies Within the Gates? Ibid; p.104

[184] Chase, William J Enemies Within the Gates? Ibid; p.117.

[185] Chase, William J.. Enemies Within the Gates? Ibid; p.118

[186] Chase, William J.. Enemies Within the Gates? Ibid; p.119

[187] Chase, William J.. Enemies Within the Gates? Ibid; p. 120

[188] Chase, William J.. Enemies Within the Gates? Ibid; p.121.

[189] 28 January 1936 resolution ECCI Secretariat on the Polish C; RGASPI, f. 495, op. 18, d. 1071, ll. 5 – 8;  cited by Chase, William J. Enemies Within the Gates? Ibid; p.122

[190] William J Chase Enemies Within the Gates? Ibid; p. 20; citing Archives de Jules Humbert-Droz, vol. 3 : Parti communistes et l’international communiste dans les annes 1928 – 1932 (Dordrecht, 1988 ), 165 . On this attitude, see also Fischer.” See footnotes p.427

[191] Jan. M. Ciechanowski; “The Warsaw Rising Of 1944”; Cambridge U Press; 1974

[192] Ciechanowski JM Ibid; p.69

[193] Ciechanowski JM Ibid; p.71

[194] Ciechanowski JM Ibid; p.72

[195] Ciechanowski JM Ibid; p.72

[196] Ciechanowski JM Ibid; p.83

[197] Ciechanowski JM Ibid; p.83

[198] Ciechanowski JM Ibid;

[199] Ciechanowski JM Ibid; p.152

[200] Ciechanowski JM Ibid; p.157

[201] Ciechanowski JM Ibid; p.158

[202] Ciechanowski JM Ibid; p.162

[203] Ciechanowski JM Ibid; p.164

[204] Ciechanowski JM Ibid; p.88

[205] Ciechanowski JM Ibid; p.89

[206] Ciechanowski JM Ibid; p.91

[207] Ciechanowski JM Ibid; p.93

[208] Ciechanowski JM Ibid; p.93-4

[209] Ciechanowski JM Ibid; p.95

[210] Ciechanowski JM Ibid; p.97

[211] Ciechanowski JM Ibid; p.102-103

[212] Ciechanowski JM Ibid; p.98

[213] Ciechanowski JM Ibid; p.98

[214] Ciechanowski JM Ibid; p.99

[215] Ciechanowski JM Ibid; p.101-102

[216] Zimmerman, Joshua D; “The Polish Underground and the Jews, 1939–1945”; Cambridge; 2015; p.184-185

[217] Ciechanowski JM Ibid; p.102

[218] Ciechanowski JM Ibid; p.104-5

[219] Ciechanowski JM Ibid; p.105

[220] Ciechanowski JM Ibid; p.106

[221] Ciechanowski JM Ibid; p.106-7

[222] Ciechanowski JM Ibid; p.110

[223] Ciechanowski JM Ibid; p.114

[224] Ciechanowski JM Ibid; p.115

[225] Soviet Foreign Policy during the Patriotic War: Documents and Materials, vol. 2, Hutchinson: London 1945 p.24; cited by Geoffrey Roberts, “Stalin’s Wars : From World War to Cold War, 1939-1953”, Yale, 2007; p. 199.

[226] Map drawn by author’s modification of Roberts, Geoffrey. Stalin’s Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939-1953, Yale University Press, 2007; pp. 193-194

[227] Alexander Werth, “Russia At War 1941-45; New York; 1964, p.764; p. 764-766.

[228] Roberts; Ibid; p.199-202

[229] Alexander Werth, “Russia At War 1941-45; Ibid; p.766

[230] Roberts; Ibid; p.204

[231] Message no. 301; Secret and personal from J.V.Stalin to W. Churchill; July 23, 1944 At: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/correspondence/01/44.htm

[232] Alexander Werth, “Russia At War 1941-45; Ibid; p.868

[233] James W. Blackwell, “The Warsaw Uprising: The View from Lublin”;

The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 89, No. 2 (April 2011), pp. 274-300

[234] James W. Blackwell, “The Warsaw Uprising: The View from Lublin”; Ibid.

[235] Roberts, Geoffrey; “Stalin’s Wars” Ibid; p. 204

[236] Roberts, Geoffrey; “Stalin’s Wars” Ibid; p. 204

[237] Jan. M. Ciechanowski; “The Warsaw Rising Of 1944”; Ibid; p. 243

[238] Jan. M. Ciechanowski; “The Warsaw Rising Of 1944”; Ibid; p.134

[239] Jan. M. Ciechanowski; “The Warsaw Rising Of 1944”; Ibid; p.131; citing Despatch from the Chief of the General Staff to the Commander of the Asso- ciation for Armed Struggle, 20 November 1941, Ldz. 3853, APUST

[240] Jan. M. Ciechanowski; “The Warsaw Rising Of 1944”; Ibid; p. 243

[241] Jan. M. Ciechanowski; “The Warsaw Rising Of 1944”; Ibid; p. 245

[242] Jan. M. Ciechanowski; “The Warsaw Rising Of 1944”; Ibid; p. 245

[243] Jan. M. Ciechanowski; “The Warsaw Rising Of 1944”; Ibid; p.246

[244] Alexander Werth “Russia at War 1941-1945“; Ibid; p. 869-870.

[245] Jan. M. Ciechanowski; “The Warsaw Rising Of 1944”; Ibid; p.247-248

[246] Jan. M. Ciechanowski; “The Warsaw Rising Of 1944”; Ibid; p.248

[247] Jan. M. Ciechanowski; “The Warsaw Rising Of 1944”; Ibid; p.248

[248] Jan. M. Ciechanowski; “The Warsaw Rising Of 1944”; Ibid; p.249

[249] Jan. M. Ciechanowski; “The Warsaw Rising Of 1944”; Ibid p. 250-251

[250] Jan. M. Ciechanowski; “The Warsaw Rising Of 1944”; Ibid p. 250-251

[251] Roberts, Geoffrey; “Stalin’s Wars” Ibid; p.206

[252] Cited by Jan. M. Ciechanowski; “The Warsaw Rising Of 1944”; Ibid; p. 251

[253] Roberts, Geoffrey; “Stalin’s Wars” Ibid; p.206

[254] Roberts, Geoffrey; “Stalin’s Wars” Ibid; p.206

[255] Werth, Russia at War p. 786; cited Ciechanowski; “The Warsaw Rising”; Ibid; p.206

[256] Jan. M. Ciechanowski; “The Warsaw Rising Of 1944”; Ibid p.63

[257] Jan. M. Ciechanowski; “The Warsaw Rising Of 1944”; Ibid p.148

[258] Jan. M. Ciechanowski; “The Warsaw Rising Of 1944”; Ibid p.67

[259] Jan. M. Ciechanowski; “The Warsaw Rising Of 1944”; Ibid p.67-68

[260] August 16, 1944; Message No. 321; Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin To The Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill; At: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/correspondence/01/44.htm

[261] Roberts, Geoffrey; “Stalin’s Wars” Ibid; p.208

[262] Roberts, Geoffrey; “Stalin’s Wars” Ibid; p.209

[263] Roberts, Geoffrey; “Stalin’s Wars” Ibid; p.210

[264] Roberts, Geoffrey; “Stalin’s Wars” Ibid; p.211

[265] Roberts ‘Stalin’s Wars”; Ibid p.212

[266] Roberts ‘Stalin’s Wars”; Ibid p.212

[267]  Roberts ‘Stalin’s Wars”; Ibid; p.213

[268] Roberts, Geoffrey; “Stalin’s Wars” Ibid; p.215

[269] Roberts, Geoffrey; “Stalin’s Wars” Ibid; p.213

[270] Roberts, Geoffrey; “Stalin’s Wars” Ibid; p.213

[271] Roberts, Geoffrey; “Stalin’s Wars” Ibid; p.213

[272] August 16, 1944; Message No. 321; Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin To The Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill; At: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/correspondence/01/44.htm

[273] Roberts, Geoffrey; “Stalin’s Wars” Ibid; p.215

[274] Message No. 323 Secret And Personal From Premier J. V. Stalin To The Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill And The President, Mr F. Roosevelt; August 22, 1944;  At: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/correspondence/01/44.htm

[275] Roberts, Geoffrey; “Stalin’s Wars” Ibid; p.215

[276] Roberts, Geoffrey; “Stalin’s Wars” Ibid; p.215

[277] Roberts, Geoffrey; “Stalin’s Wars” Ibid; p.215

[278] Roberts, Geoffrey; “Stalin’s Wars” Ibid p. 216