Theses on the 2024 Re-emergence of the Syrian anti-Assad Revolution

Theses on the Re-emergence of the Syrian anti-Assad Revolution
23 December 2024

Preface

Unequivocally, the final fall of the Assad hereditary and fascist regime is a great step forward to be celebrated by and for the Syrian people. All progressive and communist peoples share in the delight of the Syrian people to see the end of Bashar Assad’s regime. Countless numbers of Syrian workers and peasants have died till now, from a brutal Assadite oppression.

The current situation in Syria also marks a broader key moment, the withdrawal of Russia from the center of the Middle East. In a swinging geopolitical see-saw, the prior humiliation of the USA in both Iraq and Afghanistan, has been in a sense reversed.

The sheer human toll of the Syrian Revolution, or Civil War – was enormous:

“The civil war killed over 300,000 people in 10 years of fighting, with some estimates putting the true toll at twice that number. Tens of thousands remain in detention, including 100,000 believed missing or forcibly disappeared in Assad’s prisons since 2011, and subject to what United Nations monitors have described as systematic torture. Over 12 million people have been displaced.”
(Ruth Michaelson; ‘We can barely believe what’s happening’: how Syria’s frozen conflict flared into hot war that could topple Assad”; London Observer, 7 December 2024; at:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/dec/07/syria-assad-damascus-hayat-tahrir-al-sham-insurgents)

But in the midst of celebrating Assad’s fall, caution by Marxist-Leninists is more than warranted. Marxist-Leninist analysis must avoid two opposite errors.

The first is to simply dismiss the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) as being a tool of the USA and Israeli Zionists from the outset. This first error is made by some elements of the so-called ‘campist’ school of pro-Putinites.

A second and opposite danger is to fail to see the dangerous elements in the developing HTS government. An unstinting, uncritical over-praise of the HTS with disregard of its markedly reactionary past form of Sunni fundamentalism, would be incorrect. The HTS are at essence fundamentalist nationalists. Where this could lead should itself induce caution. An additional cause for caution is the HTS leadership, now overt courting of Western imperialist and Israeli backing. We believe this is a relatively new development. When it began is not fully clear as yet. Although its very recent development has been fostered via Turkey – a member of NATO and a key ally of the USA, and indeed of Israel. We do not believe this recent development affects the progressive nature of the HTS destruction of the Assadist state.

Ultimately three singular important facts need to be reconciled with the joy of Assad’s fall.

The first is that the architects of the fall of Assad are far from being Marxist-Leninists. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) will impose their own anti-working class ideologies on the Syrian workers and peasants. Moreover those new rulers of Syria themselves are bound to have to come to an accommodation with external imperialism. In the absence of an independent Marxist-Leninist Party of Syria, the fate of Syria is tied to those imperialist forces.

This leads to the second point. That is the continued Israeli and USA imperialist strategy to re-draw the map of the Middle East. They seized their opportunity after: Successfully and effectively destroying any medium term potential for Gaza forming any Palestinian state; the genocidal war on Palestinians; the forcing of Lebanon into a humiliating settlement; the cowing of Iran into silence. Israel swiftly occupied a large chunk of Syria.

Finally, and thirdly is the larger picture of an overt jockeying of two opposing main blocks of imperialists. This jockeying descends ever-faster towards an open, ultimately armed confrontation and war. On one hand is the block of the USA and the Western forces of Europe, Scandinavia and Israel. On the other hand is the opposing force of Putin’s Russia, Xi Yi Pin’s China and North Korea.

Because of its location in the Middle East, Syria will now bear the post-Gaza brunt of the inter-imperialist collision. Syria had already felt this inter-imperialist collision in the first phase of the Syrian ‘Revolution‘ war up to 2016, as the Putinite air force and mercenaries entered Syria. Those forces came to the aid of Bashar Assad. In doing so Russia’s obtained its berths on the Mediterranean. Regardless, the Russian intervention interrupted the social revolution. Although Russia has exited the Syrian stage, it will try to retain its port at Tartous in Syria – while extending its presence in Libya (Michael Karadjis, 24 December 2024; at https://theirantiimperialismandours.com).

Now Western imperialists already exert a sway over the rebel forces of HTS. That includes Turkey. For now, under Recip Erdogan, Turkey has moderated any other disagreements it may have with the USA and Israel. The quid pro quo for Turkey was that the USA once more reneges on its’ commitment to the Kurds. In this instance to the Rojava Kurds.

Summary of Prior Materials
The intent of this piece is to summarise the new stage of Syria. To enable a quick summary of a complex situation, a thesis format is used.

To do this efficiently we summarise earlier events of the Syrian Civl War, or the Syrian Spring. In turn to achieve this we have reprised but shortened some materials from previous works. These include:

1. A work on how the Assad fascist state was established, with its’ origins in the Ba’th Party. This was detailed in “A Short Marxist-Leninist History of Syria – to 2016”;
May 24, 2018 At https://mlrg.online/history/a-short-marxist-leninist-history-of-syria-to-2016/.

2. We also followed the entry of Putin’s forces and the chemical war attacks of Assad in “Douma”; February 6, 2021; at https://mlcurrents.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/douma-syria-mltoday.pdf ). Both works describe the start of the Syrian ‘Arab Spring”, and the emergence of the various Islamic anti-Assad factions.

3. We also previously discussed the Kurdistan movements previously. Since Kurdistan lies in the intersection of the four countries of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria – any sensible work on has to consider all of these. Two of three parts on Kurdistan were published. We began in Iran going up to the ‘Mahabad Republic’ in Theses on Kurdistan – A Marxist-Leninist Framework – Part One”; July 29, 2019 at: https://mlcurrents.net/2019/07/29/theses-on-kurdistan-a-marxist-leninist-framework/

4. In Part Two of “Theses on Kurdistan”, we had focused upon Iraq and Turkey, highlighting history relevant to the Kurdish national movement )“Kurdistan – A Marxist-Leninist Framework”; January 1, 2020 at https://mlcurrents.net/2020/01/01/kurdistan-a-marxist-leninist-framework-part-two/) We had anticipated a Part Three – which discussed the politics of Öcalan and the PKK. It leads up to the Rojava State, but this was split off into a separate work. That final part remains unfinished as of yet.

All posted links in those works were accessed at original times of publication up to 2020.                                                                                                           Newer links for the events of 2024 were accessed up to December 25, 2024.

Table of Contents
Map 1

Introduction

The 2011 Syrian Arab Spring, the Local Coordinating Committees
Start of the Syrian Spring
The Kurdish forces largely go their own way
The USA try to manipulate the Syrian United Front into their control
The religious communities of Syria
Disrupting the Syrian Revolution by igniting sectarianism
The Iraqi Connection
The Iraqi USA Occupation
The Islamic fundamentalist take-over of the Syrian Resistance
The Islamic fundamentalist take-over of the Syrian Resistance
The Idlib based ‘Syrian Salvation Government’ of HTS

The Resurgence of the 2011 Syrian Revolutionary Spring, in the Winter of 2024
The December 2024 Liberation from the Assad forces
Immediate steps of the new HTS Government of Syria – A parade of foreign ministers-delegates
Background to the Kurdistan Statelet of Rojava, and the PKK
Reaction of Israel and the response by the HTS
Were the USA and Israel aware of the forthcoming HTS and SNA assault?

Conclusions

Introduction

1. The fall of Assad is a significant victory for the Syrian toiling masses. Regardless of which forces in the end brought the cruel dictator Basher Assad down. The Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) (the Organization for the Liberation of the Levant) was the main force which achieved this. This was at origin a fundamentalist Islamic party. Currently the leopard is trying to show the world that it has changed its spots into a democratic force.

2. Marxist-Leninists do not on principle refuse to join in or support – a United Front that declares for clearly defined progressive objectives. That extends to organisations which profess an avowedly Muslim character. One example to follow, is that of the MList forces in Tunisia, as led by Hamma Hammami (Secretary-general of the Tunisian Workers Party [PCOT]) (See: “A Short Marxist-Leninist History of Syria – to 2016”; Ibid; at https://mlrg.online/history/a-short-marxist-leninist-history-of-syria-to-2016/)

3. In November 2024, the leader of the HTS informed Turkish President Recip Erodogan of an imminent drive to Aleppo. Erdogan then primed the forces of the Syrian National Army (SNA) to move North against the Kurdish statelet of The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), or Rojava – led by the Abdullah Ocalan forces of the PKK. In December 2024, the HTS successfully led a movement aimed primarily to remove the fascist dictatorship of the Assads.

4. The next immediate question will be that of Rojava. While the USA imperialists have assured the Rojava of security in the past including up to 750 army members and air force presence – this is unlikely to remain or obstruct Turkish moves. The Kurdish national movement has foolishly and repetitively relied on USA imperialism before, to achieve its bourgeois national statehood – and has been predictably betrayed each time. This is likely to happen once more – this time to the Rojava government.

5. But as yet the new state government of Syria is at only the initial stages of its development. It’s aim appears to be restoring a state form of democracy. This may develop into either a progressive or reactionary direction. However in the absence of an identifiable MList party, the prognosis for a social revolution is poor. Moreover, depending on some key factors, the freedom from Assadite fascist dictatorship may soon invoke a new sectarianism. It also already seems likely that the new ruling HTS is coming to an accommodation with USA and Israeli imperialism.

6. Who are the HTS?
We previously noted that the HTS were originally an off-spring of the ISIS forces in Iraq. They had several name changes before ending up as HTS. We briefly recap the story and trace their path up to 2024. Here it simply helps to understand that their ejection from Aleppo marked an effective stale-mate between the rebels and Assad aided by Russia and Iran. But the rebels were never ‘defeated’ as such. They remained active and set up a functioning state-let in Idlib Province.

“Since, HTS has been the dominant Islamist militia fighting the regime of Syrian President Bashar al Assad. It is an umbrella group for five smaller armed factions to have up to 10,000 fighters. A Sunni Muslim movement, HTS just over half of Idlib Province and small parts of surrounding provinces—a of northwest Syria roughly the size of Rhode Island.”
(Christopher Solomon; “HTS: Evolution of a Jihadi Group”; July 13, 2022; Wilson Center; at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/hts-evolution-jihadist-group )

7. To follow the situation across Syria in the text, the above Map may be of help. It shows up to the 6 December 2024 the main cities and areas of Syria, and who controlled them before the fall of the Damascus stronghold of Assad.
(Ruth Michaelson; ‘We can barely believe what’s happening’: how Syria’s frozen conflict flared into hot war that could topple Assad”; London Observer, 7 December 2024; at:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/dec/07/syria-assad-damascus-hayat-tahrir-al-sham-insurgents )

The 2011 Syrian Arab Spring, the Local Coordinating Committees

Start of the Syrian Spring
8. The Syrian Spring began largely in rural areas:

“in Syria it was chiefly a revolt of the peasantry – a protest by the Sunni periphery against what was perceived as the Ba’ath regime… It was Daraa that would become the epicentre of opposition to the regime in early 2011: first ignited by the detention of schoolchildren for anti-regime graffiti, before morphing into demands for both their release along with that of other political prisoners, and then fully-fledged anti-regime protests targeting emergency laws, poor socio-economic conditions, corruption, police brutality, and arbitrary detention. Further highlighting its economic vulnerabilities, there was an insistence on also curtailing restrictive laws that forbade buying and selling of property and measures to alleviate poverty in the area. From these rural towns, the revolt would spread to the countryside. By mid-2012, the revolution came to the major cities, Damascus and Aleppo”.                                     (Amar Diwakar; “Affirming the Syrian Revolution: Experiments in Autonomy”; Economic & Political Weekly; May 27, 2017)

9. In the Syrian Spring of 2011, an initial leadership arose to form the Local Coordinating Committees (LCC). As observers pointed out the LCC arose “from the streets”:

“An opposition drawing its strength from Syria’s restive streets has begun to emerge as a pivotal force in the country’s once-dormant politics, organizing across disparate regions through the Internet, reaching out to fearful religious minorities and earning the respect of more recognized, but long divided dissidents. The Local Coordination Committees… have become the wild cards … Their success has stemmed from an ability to stay decentralized, work in secret and fashion their message in the most nationalist of terms.”
(Anthony Shadid, Coalition of Factions From the Streets Fuels a New Opposition in Syria, New York Times, June 30, 2011 https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/world/middleeast/01syria.html?r=2&pagewanted=all)

10. The direction of the LCCs was promising.
But they fell into vacillations especially over the role of force. However ardent they were, the leaders of the LCCs tragically lacked a sensible strategy, and certainly they had no Marxist-Leninist leadership. In these conditions, the LCC naïvely eschewed any role of armed struggle.
This condemned them quickly to an ineffectiveness, losing the initiative to branches of Islamic fundamentalists. This can be seen from this “Statement to the Syrian People”:

“In an unprecedented move over the past several days, Syrians in Syria and abroad have been calling for Syrians to take up arms, or for international military intervention. This call comes five and a half months of the Syrian regime’s systematic abuse of the Syrian people, whereby tens of thousands of peaceful protesters have been detained and tortured, and more than 2,500 killed. . . . we specifically reject this position as we find it unacceptable politically, nationally, and ethically. Militarizing the revolution would minimize popular support and participation in the revolution. Moreover, militarization would undermine the gravity of the humanitarian catastrophe involved in a confrontation with the regime. . . If we maintain our peaceful demonstrations, which include our cities, towns, and villages; and our men, women, and children, the possibility of democracy in our country is much greater. If an armed confrontation or international military intervention becomes a reality, it will be virtually impossible to establish a legitimate foundation for a proud future Syria. We call on our people to remain patient as we continue our national Revolution.“
(The Local Coordinating Committees in Syria”. (At: http://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/24360/Syrian-Local-Coordinating-Committees-on-Taking-Up-Arms-and-Foreign-Intervention)

11. Inevitably other forces emerged to take over the leadership of the anti-Assad struggle. Initially this was within the broad coalition of the Syrian National Council (SNC), formed from exiled anti-Assad forces. Elements of the Syrian Free Army (SFA) – which had developed from mutinying splinters of the Assadite army, also joined the SNC. But its broad nature was evident from the inclusion of Sunni fundamentalists of the Muslim Brotherhood:

“The SNC was announced in Istanbul on October 2, 2011. …. by a coalition of groups and individuals, including signatories of the Damascus Declaration (2005), the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, various Kurdish factions, representatives of the Local Coordination Committees, other political parties or platforms including Damascus Spring, and the National Bloc, representatives of the Alawi and Assyrian communities, and some independent figures. By March 2012, the SNC claimed it comprised 90 percent of the opposition parties and movements”.
(Diwan: Middle East Insights from Carnegie;”Syrian national Council”; at http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/48334?lang=en)

However it was a largely expatriate forces. It was also fraught with tensions. Two tensions in especial are to be noted.

12. First by November 8th 2012, representatives of the LCC in the SNC withdrew stating failures to make “serious” reforms:

“In early November 2012, the Executive Committee of the LCC announced its formal withdrawal from the SNC on November 9, accusing the council of being under Muslim Brotherhood control and of failing to reform into a truly representative structure. LCC spokesperson Rafif Jouejati additionally condemned the SNC’s failure to elect any women to its new General Secretariat.”
(Diwan: Middle East Insights from Carnegie; Local Coordination Committees of Syria http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/50426?lang=en)

The Kurdish forces largely go their own way

13. The second is that from the start, whether from hostility to it by other sectors of Syrian society; or more likely, by the conscious design of its own leadership – the Kurds were not whole heartedly involved in this pan-Syrian freedom movement. Rather their thrust was to find thie way to a Kurdish statehood. Of thirteen Kurdish parties in Syria, none took part in the Syrian oppositon summit in Antalya Turkey on 31 May, 2011:

“The National Movement of Kurdish Parties in Syria, was a coalition of Syria’s 12 Kurdish parties. It boycotted a Syrian opposition summit in Antalya, Turkey on 31 May 2011, stating that “any such meeting held in Turkey can only be a detriment to the Kurds in Syria, because Turkey is against the aspirations of the Kurds”.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rojava_conflict

Furthermore during the creation of the Syrian National Council in August in Istanbul , only 2 parties took part – the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK).

Actually the entire trajectory of the Kurdish parties remained quite different from the rest of the Syrian anti-Assad struggle. In the Kurdish areas, calls to join the Syrian Revolution quickly followed the Daara events.

But then under the influence of Iraqi Kurdistan president Massoud Barzani an agreement between the PYD and the Kurdish National Council (KNC), formed on 12 July 2012 – the Kurdish Supreme Committee to form a governing body of all Kurdish-controlled territories in Syria.

Shortly after, the People’s Protection Units (YPG) took a major city, of Kobanî on 19 July 2012, and then Amuda and Efrîn. The Assadite Syrian Army had been pulled to the South to fight the rebls there. The KNC and PYD began a joint leadership council to govern the entire area.
See Wikipedia ( Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria

The USA try to manipulate the Syrian United Front into their control

14. But events were overtaking it as the USA imperialists put their own stamp on the exile movement. Already on October 31, 2012 USA Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had begun to by-pass the SNC, supporting a reorganization of exile-led forces. (Diwan: Middle East Insights from Carnegie;”Syrian national Council”; at http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/48334?lang=en)

This resulted by November 11th , 2012, in the formation of the Syrian National Coalition for Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (SNCROF), in Doha, Qatar. The council elected George Sabra as president.

The religious communities of Syria

15. Syria had for centuries been home to several communities. Today the population of Syria reflects that complex past, but it became largely Muslim. By 1946 Arab speakers formed 85% of the population. Christian Maronites were a numerically significant minority. At the time of the French Mandate (1920-1946) the population consisted of:

Sunnis (60% of the total population); ‘Alawis 11.5%; Druze 3.0 %; Ismaílis 1.5%; Christians 9.9%; Non-Arabs (Kurds 8.5%; Armenians 4.2%; plus small numbers of Circassians and Jews.                                                                                                             (Malik Mufti: “Sovereign Creations- Pan-Arabism & Political Order in Syria & Iraq”; Cornell; 1966; p.45).

Both religious grouping, with further sub-divisions into communal sects, retarded a sense of a united ‘national’ identity in Syria. These divisions included religious differences. The main division spurring rivalry was within Islam – between Shi’ia and Sunni. In Syria the Shi’ia took the form of the ‘Alawi sect, with its’ own unique mystical theological component. Tribal differences played important roles even down to the battles within the Ba’th Party in the 1960s.

16. The largest group of Muslims in both the Muslim world and in Syria, are the Sunni, who adhere to the sunnah (practice) of Mohammed alone, whose sayings (hadith) form the Holy Words.
The Salafi or Wahhabi sect is named after a jurist from Najd, called Ábd al-Wahhab (1703-1791). During the Ottoman expansion, Wahhab founded a ‘Puritanical’ sect. Adherents consider themselves as Sunni Muslims, but they are rejected by most Sunni and Shi’ia as being “a vile sect”. This sect became headed by the Ibn-Saud dynasty of Saudi Arabia. (Lewis Bernard, “The Arabs in History”; New York 1966; p. 161).

The other main group within Islam is the Shi’i (Or Shi’ia). In Syria, the ‘Alawis [or ‘followers of ‘Ali] as we noted are a sect of Shi’i Muslims; as are the Druzes and the Isma’ilis. The Shi’ia in the 8th century, claimed that ‘Ali – the Prophet Mohammed’s cousin and son-in-law – was robbed of his inheritance by the first three Caliphs. The Shi’ites also claim that ‘Ali was of divine status. They are therefore seen as ‘infidels’ by the Sunni Muslims.

In Syria, the ‘Alawi were concentrated in the mountainous areas, or worked as fellahin day-labourers. They tended to be dominated by the Sunni or the Christian-Maronites.

The Sunnis were at one time closely linked to the Turkish rulers of the Ottoman Empire, and oppressed the ‘Alawis and the other minorities. However the French colonists reversed the preferences, primarily to raise up the Maronites as their compradors – and to a lesser extent the ‘Alawis. (Seale P: “Assad – The Struggle for the Middle East”; London; 1988; p.17).

17. Under the Assads – who were themselves ‘Alawite – that sect became the most powerful, and controlled the army. In the diverse communities of Syria, Hafiz Assad welded a sectarian state to enable corporate state development. The historian David Hirst wrote:

“It is not in any real sense, the Ba’athists who run this country. It is the ‘Alawites… In theory they run it behind the party, but in practice it is through their clandestine solidarity within the party and other important institutions… Behind the façade, the best qualification for holding power is proximity – through family, sectarian, or tribal origins – to the country’s leading ‘Alawaite, President Assad.”
(Hirst, D; Guardian; 26 June, 1979; Cited by Van Dam Nicholas: “The Struggle for power in Syria. Politics & Society Under Assad & the Ba’ath party”; London 1997 p. 100)

18. At times various deeply sectarian attacks were launched by the ‘Alawaite Assad State. As for example, in the attacks on towns that supported the Muslim Brotherhood, as in the Hama Rising of 1964. After the Muslim Brotherhood was essentially destroyed inside Syria, on the whole the State preferred to build a corporate state ostensibly for ‘all Syrians’. But the State’s corrupt favouring of ‘Alawites was very visible who essentially took over the Army and the breaucracy, and also the top capitalists in ‘national’ industries.

Disrupting the Syrian Revolution by igniting sectarianism

19. After the Syrian Spring started, the LCC worked hard to ensure little sectarian splintering. In particular it strived to avoid anti-‘Alawaite attacks. However as it grew in strength, the Assad regime began to deliberately unleash Sunni sectarianism precisely to disprupt the anti-Assad unity. They calculated that attacks on the ‘Alawi and Christians would not only splinter the LCC united front, but would drive those being attacked to the Assadite camp.

In 2016 we noted the Syrian Assadite state and USA imperialists occupying Iraq:

“bear responsibility for fostering a situation where Islamic fundamentalists forces captured the narrative, and then out-numbered and out-gunned the secular resistance.”
(“Syria”; https://mlrg.online/history/a-short-marxist-leninist-history-of-syria-to-2016/ )

The Assad regime achieved their goal using two principal tactics.
First they set free Sunni and Salahist extremists captured as they tried to penetrate into USA occupied Iraq.
Second they used ‘false flag’ operations by paid hooligans who supposedly were ‘Sunnis’, using them to assault other communities.

The nascent Syrian revolutionary movement arising from below, was first split and marginalized, and then butchered.

The Iraqi Connection

20. How had these Sunni Jihadists been put into Syrian jails in the first place? While some were from the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, many were more recently incarcerated. They had been trying to enter Iraq from Syria – before the eruption of the Syrian Spring, in order to attack the USA occupying forces. The Syrian government was trying to use them as a bulwark against the USA:

“Internal State Department cables released by WikiLeaks confirm that the U.S. had intelligence showing that almost all foreign al Qaeda volunteers entered Iraq via Syria and that Assad and his top aides were fully aware. In 2010, they acknowledged as much to visiting U.S. officials, a WikiLeaks cable showed. “In principle, we don’t attack or kill them immediately,” Gen. Ali Mamluk, now Assad’s top intelligence advisor, said of al Qaeda operatives. “Instead, we embed ourselves in them, and only at the opportune moment do we move.”
(Roy Gutman, Assad Henchman: Here’s How We Built ISIS Dark Allies Apr. 13, 2017; ‘Daily Beast’; at: https://www.thedailybeast.com/assad-henchman-heres-how-we-built-isis )

The view that Assad enabled the ISIS is commonly held amongst leaders in the Middle East, for example – the comprador bourgeois Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani:

“The Syrian government made an enormous mistake in 2003,” said Massoud Barzani, the president of the Kurdistan Regional Government in a recent interview with ‘The Daily Beast’ at his military headquarters in Suheil, in the far north of Iraq’s Kurdistan region, near the Syrian and Turkish borders. “They opened the door to terrorists in order to put pressure on the American troops in Iraq so they wouldn’t even think of war (against Syria).”
(Roy Gutman, Assad Henchman: Here’s How We Built ISIS Dark Allies Apr. 13, 2017; ‘Daily Beast’; at: https://www.thedailybeast.com/assad-henchman-heres-how-we-built-isis )

21. Syria also imprisoned Salafists wishing to join ISIS, in order to reassure President Obama that the Syrian state were assisting the USA. As Syrian General Ali Mumlak told US officials in 2010, they wanted to use the Islamic fundamentalists:

“The regime not only had penetrated the networks but often ran them. That was by design. As Gen. Ali Mamluk told US officials in 2010, the regime as a practice would “embed ourselves” among Islamic extremists in order to turn on them later. Mamluk is currently Assad’s senior intelligence adviser.”
(Roy Gutman, Assad Henchman: Here’s How We Built ISIS Dark Allies Apr. 13, 2017; ‘Daily Beast’; at: https://www.thedailybeast.com/assad-henchman-heres-how-we-built-isis )

22. In 2011 the ‘Alawite Syrian elite released Sunni extremist prisoners who had been captured en route to Iraq in the post-USA invasion period. Syria had served the USA by holding Islamic warriors who had been fleeing from Iraq. Prior to that of course, Syria had been used as a place of the infamous ‘renditions’. Upon release, many of these Jihadis took part in the Syrian anti-Assad resistance, but of course now injecting a sectarian spirit into it:

“The Syrian insurgency has had an overt Sunni jihadist component. . . Jabhat al-Nusra had in fact been covertly active on a minimal scale in Syria from at least August 2011, thanks to the release of Islamist detainees from Syrian prisons under a series of presidential amnesties in May–June 2011; to the presence of a number of existing al-Qaeda-linked jihadist cells; and to the arrival of then senior ISIS commander Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani from his base in Mosul, Iraq. . . Therefore, by early 2012, a quickly expanding Syrian insurgency already contained a core Sunni jihadist component, as well as a number of fast-growing conservative Salaist groups, such as Ahrar al-Sham, Liwa al-Islam and Suqor al-Sham, all of which were established by detainees released from Sednaya Prison in 2011”.
(Charles Lister (2014); Assessing Syria’s Jihad”; Survival, 56:6, 87-112)

23. The Assadite regime thus moved consciously to infect the peaceful and non-sectarian movement with a poisonous, ultimately self-defeating sectarianism:

“Mohammed Al-Saud: “In 2011, the majority of the current ISIS leadership was released from jail by Bashar Al Assad,” he said. “No one in the regime has ever admitted this, or explained why.” Al-Saud, a Syrian dissident with the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, left Syria under threat of arrest in 2011.”
(Simon Speakman Cordall, ‘How Syria’s Assad Helped Forge ISIS’, ‘Newsweek’; On 6/21/14 at: https://www.newsweek.com/how-syrias-assad-helped-forge-isis-255631 )

24. Syrian intelligence had already formed links in prison with the extremists, allowing them closely to track their rise in the rebel movement. This according to former intelligence officials.

“Every extremist group is penetrated by the regime,” Serriya said. Former Sednaya prisoners took top positions in Islamist forces. For example, Abu Lukman, one of the founders of Syrian al Qaeda branch Jabhat al Nusra, is now the emir, or administrator, of Raqqa. Mahmoud al-Khalif, another Sednaya graduate, works in the security area and Haj Fadel al-Agal is responsible for social relations. One former prisoner, Abu Abdulrahman al-Hamwi, is the emir of Nusra in Hama province. Other leaders include Abu Naser Drusha, a cousin of Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, the founder and principal leader of Nusra, Abu Hussien Zeniah, now in charge of Nusra operations in Qalamoun area near Damascus, and Abu Hafs al-Kiswani, a Nusra commander in Dara’a, southern Syria.”
(Simon Speakman Cordall; Ibid)

25. Moreover, from the earliest days of the Syrian Spring, or Syrian civil war, the regime planted ‘false flags’ to incite the population against each other. Not only did this fear of each other prevent a united front from developing, it bound the ‘Alawites even closer to the regime. To achieve this they used a thug militia known as shabeeha – a part of the mukabarat (the secret police):

“From the very start, the regime also resorted to a campaign of rumours and false-flag operations to divide Sunnis from Alawis on the Syrian coast, the home region of top regime figures and at least half of the total Alawi community. In March, armed gangs were unleashed on the port city of Lattakia. They drove around shooting from their cars, screaming threats of rape and murder. In Sunni areas they declared themselves as vengeful Alawis; in Alawi areas they posed as vengeful Sunnis. These thugs were shabeeha… meaning ‘ghost’, after the Mercedes Ghost, a car popular with the mukhabarat.. the term came to refer to the substate thug militias, financed by pro-regime businessmen, to which much of the repression was subcontracted.”
(Yassin-Kassab, Robin, and Leila Al-Shami. Burning Country : Syrians in Revolution and War, Pluto Press, 2018. p. 48-49)

26. By 3 June 2011, the UN had reported that 1,000 people had died in the first three months of the uprising and nearly 3,000 had been detained. The scale of brutality and repression is difficult to fathom.

The Iraqi USA Occupation

27. At around the same time, the USA was fostering in Iraq a sectarian war between Sunni Islamists and Shi’ia Islamic factions. The USA had deliberately turned a blind eye to the excesses of the Iraqi Shia faction of Nuri al-Maliki which fostered sectarianism because of :

“the perceived repression of Iraq’s Sunni minority by its Shia-led government under Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki”.
(Lister (2014); ‘Assessing Syria’s Jihad’; Ibid)

Many imprisoned ISIS members were able to escape from the notorious Abu Ghraib prison. It is unclear whether any active or direct USA complicity was involved in this. Nonetheless, these escapees further exacerbated Iraqi sectarianism :

“From July 2012–July 2013, “Operation Breaking the Walls” sought to release imprisoned members, particularly senior commanders, and to expand the geographical reach of ISIS attacks. Following on from this operation’s grand finale – the breaking out of approximately 500 prisoners from Abu Ghraib prison on 21 July 2013 – ISIS announced and began “Operation Soldiers’ Harvest”, which explicitly sought to undermine the confidence and capabilities of Iraqi security forces and to exploit continuing sectarian tensions. . .”
(Lister (2014); ‘Assessing Syria’s Jihad’; Ibid)

28. The USA led imperialist aggression against Iraq, ultimately failed. It was followed by the USA humiliation and withdrawal from Iraq. The USA had fostered Sunni-Shi’ia sectarianism in the Iraqi war for its own ends. But now those flames were uncontrollable as new fundamentalist forces were being constructed. Recall they had done this before in Afghanistan as weapons initially against the Russian revisionist occupation. Facing this the USA withdrawal from Iraq, was a defeat akin to that in Vietnam earlier.

The USA powers now determined to exert its ends through its’ agents, the regional powers. These were first and foremost the Israeli state, but also Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. In addition the newly formed ‘statelets’ of Kurdistan were conveniently also beholden to the USA.
(The USA led war in Iraq, is dealt with in detail in: ‘Kurdistan – A Marxist-Leninist Framework, Part Two’; January 2020; at https://ml-today.com/2020/01/01/kurdistan-a-marxist-leninist-framework-part-two/ )

The Islamic fundamentalist take-over of the Syrian Resistance

29. As the USA imperialist war of aggression centered on Iraq ground into an inconclusive ending, the Shi’ia forces of the fundamentalist state of Iran became dominant. Meanwhile the Syrian resistance to Assad in the Syrian Spring began. The Iraqi-Syrian border was completely porous and guerrillas moved back and forth. Some became consolidated within Syria.

30. Inside Syria, the Salaist and Sunni groups essentially became the dominant forces in the anti-Assad movement, and the FSA disintegrated:

“The conflict in Syria has changed significantly since the first signs of an armed insurgency began to emerge in late May 2011. While the largely nationalist-minded Free Syrian Army (FSA) gradually devolved into an amorphous gathering of locally focused militia units with minimal command links to a leadership in Turkey, the capabilities and influence of Salaist and Sunni jihadist groups expanded considerably”.
(Charles Lister (2014) Assessing Syria’s Jihad, Adelphi Papers, 54:447-448, 71-98; also at: Survival, 56:6, 87-112)

“The rapid proliferation of armed factions meant that by mid-2013, the Syrian insurgency contained at least 1,000 operationally independent insurgent units, some of which were entirely dependent upon external support, while others remained limited to extremely localised theatres. …. As such, the Syrian jihad has become a truly international phenomenon, with at least 15,000 foreign nationals from at least 90 countries having engaged in combat in the country since 2011. This represents a rate of foreign fighter influx into a civil conflict that is unprecedented in modern history”.
(Lister, Charles (2014); Ibid)

31. The Jihadii take-over process of the Syrian Revolution, was aided by several countries – particularly in the Middle East:

“In addition to ISIS and al-Qaeda, several pre-existing jihadist organisations with principal bases of operation outside Syria have established active wings inside Syrian territory, including the North Caucasus-based IK; the China- and Pakistan-based, Uighur-dominated East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM); and the Lebanon-based Jund al-Sham. . . Syria is also now home to at least eight other jihadist groups that are likely to remain active in the countries from which the majority of their members derive, including Harakat Sham al-Islam (led and dominated by Moroccans), al-Katibat al-Khadraa and Katibat Suqor al-Izz (Saudis), Usud al-Khilafah (Egyptians), Katibat al-Ba ar al-Libya (Libyans), Junud al-Sham (Russians and North Caucasians), Katibat Imam al-Bukhari (Uzbekistanis), and Jamaat Ahadun Ahad (Turks)”.       (Charles Lister (2014) Assessing Syria’s Jihad; Ibid)

32. Nonetheless, despite the profusion of other organisations – the key forces were those of Islamic State (IS) and Al-Nusra:

“As the number of Jihadist groups grew through 2013 and 2014, the 2 key nodes of al-Qaeda and IS (or its predecessors the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) emerged as defining influences around which other factions either aligned themselves or asserted continued independence.”                                                     (Lister, Charles R. “Al-Qaeda, The Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency”; New York 2015; OUP).

33. Jabhat al- Nusra was established by the senior ISIS commander Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani or Jolani; (whose real name is now often used, being Ahmed al-Sharaa in 2011. But it became an ‘independent’ Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate. It began initially as a terrorist group attacking often civilains. But it then began coordinating with FSA units. Its success was such that it did win large-scale civilan support:

“when the US designated it as an alias of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in December 2012, opposition civilians marched the following Friday to the theme of ‘We are all Jabhat al-Nusra’.”
(Lister C; 2014; Ibid)

34. In July 2016, Jabhat al Nusra was renamed Jabhat Fatah al Sham (Front for the Conquest of the Levant). At that time it renounced allegiance to al Qaeda – in fact it was ‘give dispensation’ to do so by al-Qaeda.

As the Syrian city of Aleppo came under severe Russian attack in 2016, Staffan de Mistura, the U.N. Special Envoy for Syria urged Jabat Fatah al Sham to leave the city with their weapons to Idlib saying “I am ready physically to accompany you” as:

“its 1,000 fighters were essentially holding 275,000 civilians “hostage” as Syrian and Russian forces tried to take the city. More than 300 people died and more than 1,200 had been injured in the fighting over the previous two weeks.“
(Christopher Solomon; “HTS: Evolution of a Jihadi Group”; July 13, 2022; Wilson Center; at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/hts-evolution-jihadist-group )

Finally in December 2016, Jabhat Fatah al Sham, did just what de Mistura had asked. They evacuated fighters out of Aleppo as Syrian forces recaptured the northern city. The fighters went to Idlib province.

Jabhat Fath al Sham Hunkers down in Idlib Province

35. In Idlib a regrouping took place. In fact early on, some of its’ leaders understood that it had to compromise on imposing Sharia law. This was essential to persuade the population around Idlib that it would be the best rulers. One of its inspirations was Droukdel:

“Abu Musab Abdul Wadud (Abdelmalek Droukdel), emphasising the implementation of a patient, long-term strategy focused on integrating into local dynamics, shaping alliances, avoiding enemies, and abstaining from an overly swift imposition of Islamic law. In 2012–13, Droukdel wrote a letter to his forces in Mali in which he compared al-Qaeda in Mali (AQIM) to a parent and Mali to a child, stating:
‘The current baby is in its first days, crawling on its knees, and has not yet stood on its two legs … If we really want it to stand on its own two feet in
this world full of enemies waiting to pounce, we must ease its burden, take it by the hand, help it and support it until it stands … One of the wrong policies that we think you carried out is the extreme speed with which you applied Sharia … Our previous experience proved that applying Sharia this way… will lead to people rejecting the religion and engender hatred towards the mujahideen.’
Similarly Jabhat al-Nusra’s Jawlani released a statement in late 2012 telling his fighters that, ‘day after day, you are getting closer to the people after you have conquered their hearts and become trusted by them’ and warning against ‘being hard on them’: ‘begin with the priorities and fundamentals of Islam and be flexible on the minor parts of the religion’.”
(Lister C; 2014; Ibid)

36. Even so, Jawlani was marked by the USA with a bounty:

“The United States listed Jolani (aka Jawlani) as a “specially designated global terrorist” in 2013. In 2017, the FBI offered a reward of $10 million for information leading to his arrest.”
(Christopher Solomon; “HTS: Evolution of a Jihadi Group”; July 13, 2022; Wilson Center; at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/hts-evolution-jihadist-group)

There was always however some ambivalence, since Jahbat and its descendant HTS was seen as “the least bad option”:

“In 2018, Turkey formally declared HTS to be a terrorist group. Yet Turkey has also worked tolerated and occasionally coordinated with the movement. “HTS is an effective fighting force against the real terrorists and an effective fighting force against Assad, and the Turks need that,” James Jeffrey, a former U.S. ambassador to Turkey, told PBS Front Line. HTS is “the least bad option of the various options on Idlib, and Idlib is one of the most important places in Syria, which is one of the most important places right now in the Middle East.”
(Christopher Solomon; “HTS: Evolution of a Jihadi Group”; July 13, 2022; Wilson Center; at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/hts-evolution-jihadist-group)

Turkey – having called the HTS a “terrorist group” – nonetheless found it worthwhile to assist them when the Syrian Army launched a new offensive against Iblid:

“In 2018, negotiations between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin led to the creation of a demilitarized zone—between nine to 12 miles long—at the border between Turkey and Syria. It was short-lived. In May 2019, Syrian launched an offensive against HTS and another rebel coalition in Idlib and Hama provinces.
In February 2020, Turkey launched Operation Spring Shield to counter an offensive by the Syrian regime in Idlib. In March 2020, Turkey and Russia brokered another ceasefire agreement that created a nearly four-mile corridor along M4 highway that was patrolled by Turkish and Russian forces.”
(Christopher Solomon; “HTS: Evolution of a Jihadi Group”; July 13, 2022; Wilson Center; at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/hts-evolution-jihadist-group )

37. But there are several factions within the HTS, and it is likely that some have higher degree of adherence to the goal of instituting a state based on Sahria law.

“HTS has three factions, according to Orwa Ajjoub, a researcher at Lund University in Sweden. They include “those with a high sense of pragmatism led by al Jolani”; a second faction with a “vested interest in HTS’s dominance”; and “a minority ideological faction largely sidelined by al Jolani and his supporters,” Ajjoub wrote in 2021.
Jolani’s inner circle is predominantly Syrian, which reflects his efforts to “recast the group as more of a local Syrian organization,” Dareen Khalifa, an analyst at the International Crisis Group, said in 2022. Since most hardline elements “have either left [HTS] or were killed or completely marginalized,” Jolani’s faction drives the group’s agenda.
HTS’s short-term goal is to “stabilize the area under our control and administer it through an alliance of local Syrian revolutionary forces that are committed to protecting Idlib,” Jolani told the International Crisis Group in January 2020. But HTS is “a project built from circumstance and won’t last forever,” he said. “We don’t have a predetermined long-term plan.” HTS will someday develop a political manifesto “that could clarify our identity,” he said.”                                                                       (Christopher Solomon; “HTS: Evolution of a Jihadi Group”; July 13, 2022; Wilson Center; at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/hts-evolution-jihadist-group)
See also: Al-Nusra – Counter-extremism Project”; Decmeber 7 2024; at https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/al-nusra-front-hayat-tahrir-al-sham )

38. While the Assad regime hung on with the support of both the Iranian Hezbollah Shi’ia forces and the Russian Putinite army, it never could eliminate the Northern based fundamentalists around:

“Latakia, Idlib, Aleppo and Hama, with a small additional presence in Homs and the Qalamoun Mountains bordering Lebanon. During the outbreak of inter-factional conflict in northern Syria in late 2013, which gained intensity in January 2014, the majority of these groups (except Usud al-Khilafah) remained either independent or tacitly loyal to Jabhat al-Nusra.”
(Lister 2014 Ibid )

39. Effectively the Russian and Iranian intervention, and their massive military support to Assad – had stale-mated and halted the anti-Assad movement – but not defeated it.

But both Russia and Iran had to bow out in December 2024. For Russia, after it began its imperialist war on Ukraine in 2022 – supporting Assad became unsustainable:

“Russia already had a decades-long relationship with the Assad government, and had military bases there before the civil war. Russian President Vladimir Putin used his country’s presence in Syria, and support of Assad, to challenge the power and dominance of the West in the region.
In 2015, Russia launched an air campaign and sent thousands of troops in support of the Assad regime. In return, Russia received 49-year leases on an air base and naval base, which provided crucial hubs in the eastern Mediterranean for transferring military contractors in and out of Africa.
This marked an important stage in Russia’s attempt to assert itself as a global power, previously focusing its efforts on nations that were once in the Soviet bloc. But fighting a war in Ukraine since 2022 preoccupied Assad’s ally, contributing to the Syrian military’s swift defeat to rebel groups in late November and early December.”
(Mallory Moench; “The global players in Syria before and after Assad”; BBC 10 December 2024; https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cd75e8gdy9jo )

As far as Iran is concerned its fighters had also been vital to preserve Assad’s regime. But in 2024, its’ recent weaknesses were severely exposed by the Israeli attacks on Gaza and on Lebanon:

“Thousands of Shia Muslim fighters armed, trained and financed by Iran – mostly from the Lebanon-based Hezbollah movement, but also from Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen – have also fought alongside the Syrian army.
But . . . Hezbollah was weakened by conflict with Israel in Lebanon, likely hastening the downfall of the Syrian military.”
(Mallory Moench; “The global players in Syria”; Ibid BBC 10 December 2024; )

40. During the long stalemate in the Civil War between 2017-2024, the Astana process froze a sub-division of Syria into zones. This was agreed to by Russia, Turkey and Iran. Effectively the Syrian President had no independent voice:

“Turkey, Russia and Iran took hold of the Syrian peace talks in 2017 through the Astana Process, but the outcome of their 21 meetings has been a political deadlock and divided country in which different factions held sway in different areas, until two weeks ago.”
(Patrick Wintour; “As Assad’s power crumbles, Turkey, Iran and Russia disagree on way forward for Syria“London Observer, 7 December 2024; at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/dec/07/assad-syria-turkey-iran-russia-diplomats-regime

41. As time went on, and into November 2024 – Assad’s military allies (Russia and Iran) tried to persuade Assad to meet with Syrian rebels; and also to agree to Turkey’s wish to suppress the Kurdistan statelet of Rojava. But he consistently simply refused:

“Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov . . . also suggested fresh efforts would be made to persuade Assad to normalise relations with Turkey, including over Ankara’s demand that it can intervene to prevent Kurdish forces using northern Syria to mount attacks inside Turkey.
Earlier this year, Assad had refused to speak to Turkey so long as Turkish forces remained in Syria. This refusal led the President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to give the implicit green light to militant group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) last month to mount its stunningly successful attacks on Aleppo, and more recently into the city of Homs.”
(Patrick Wintour; “As Assad’s power crumbles, Turkey, Iran and Russia disagree on way forward for Syria“London Observer, 7 December 2024; at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/dec/07/assad-syria-turkey-iran-russia-diplomats-regime )

42. As noted above, even with Iranian and Russian support, Assad and his army never eradicated the Sunni based opposition. In especial the Northern based Idlib governate that evolved into a state-like stucture run by al-Nusra. By this time the name al-Nusra had been changed to the HTS. It was the strongest jihadist group left standing in Syria:

“The United States designated HTS as a foreign terrorist organization in 2018. HTS has since tried to project a more pragmatic image. It jettisoned the transnational goal of exporting its ideology and adopted a local focus on replacing the Assad regime. As of mid-2022, HTS had military superiority over other jihadist groups in Idlib. It had also withstood years of the regime’s ground assaults as well as Russian airstrikes”. (Christopher Solomon; “HTS: Evolution of a Jihadi Group”; July 13, 2022; Wilson Center; at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/hts-evolution-jihadist-group)

The Idlib based ‘Syrian Salvation Government’ of HTS

43. In the Northern regions of Syria, the HTS effectively imposed a functioning statelet, known as the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG):

“HTS has been able to impose its hegemony on a certain number of military groups, through both repression and inclusion in the past few years. Based on these developments, it positioned itself to launch this attack. It has become a quasi-state actor in the areas it controls. It has established a government, the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG), which acts as HTS’ civil administration and provides services. There has been a clear willingness by HTS and SSG in the past few years to present themselves as a rational force to regional and international powers in order to normalize its rule. This has notably resulted in more and more space for some NGOs to operate in key sectors such as education and healthcare, in which SSG lacks financial resources and expertise. . . HTS—which is still categorized as a terrorist organization by many powers including the U.S.—has also been trying to project a more moderate image of itself, trying to win recognition that it is now a rational and responsible actor. This evolution dates back to the rupture of its ties with al-Qaeda in 2016 and its reframing of its political objectives in the Syrian national framework. It has also repressed individuals and groups connected to Al-Qaida and the so-called Islamic State.”
(Joseph Daher Interview, in Tempest; at: https://tempestmag.org/2024/12/understanding-the-rebellion-in-syria/ December 9, 2024)

As Daher states above during the SSG rule some basic rights – for example of women – were suppressed. In an even more recent interview, HTS spokesman gives cause for fears of suppression of women’s rights in the new Syrian state:

“Obeida Arnaout, the spokesman for the Sunni fundamentalist HTS gave an interview on Wednesday with the Lebanese Al-Jadid channel . . .
Asked about whether women would be allowed to continue to serve as judges, as they did in secular, Baathist Syria, he replied that they would be allowed to go to law school, but maybe not to preside over courts: “”Women certainly have the right to learn and receive education in any field of life, whether in teaching, law, judiciary, or others. However, for women to assume judicial authority, this could be a subject for research and study by specialists, and it is too early to discuss this aspect. . . “As for women’s representation in ministerial and parliamentary roles, we believe that this matter is premature and should be left to legal and constitutional experts who will work on rethinking the structure of the new Syrian state. Women are an important and honored component, so tasks must align with roles that women can perform. There will be no concerns regarding women’s issues.””
(Juan Cole; “Syria’s New Fundamentalist Government: Women “biologically” Unsuited to Politics, Universities to be Segregated”; 20/12/2024; at https://www.juancole.com/2024/12/fundamentalist-biologically-universities.)

The Resurgence of the 2011 Syrian Revolutionary Spring, in the Winter of 2024

The December 2024 Liberation from the Assad forces

44. As noted above, two key rebel forces – Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) and the Syrian National Army (SNA) recently took Aleppo, Idlib, Hama and finally Damascus.
A year long planning had taken place including starting bomber-drone units by the military wing led by Abu Hassan al-Hamwi. The decision to commence the offensive attack was taken in November 2024. It was timed both to forestall an apparent imminent normalisation of Syrian-Assadite relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE – and to take advantage of Russia’s and Iran’s handicaps.                                                                                               (William Christou, “Syrian rebels reveal year-long plot that brought down Assad regime“; Guardian December 13, 2024).

The Turkish government openly sponsors and arms the SNA fully. But it has also been coordinating with the HST, although this is more discreet. Neverthetheless a coordinated attack occurred, and the BBC states:

“Meanwhile, conflict in Syria’s north continues: At the same time as HTS launched its offensive, the SNA launched a separate assault on areas held by the SDF. . .
Many believe the offensive could not have happened without Turkey’s blessing. Turkey has denied backing HTS.”
(Mallory Moench; “The global players in Syria before and after Assad”; BBC 10 December 2024; https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cd75e8gdy9jo )

The Guardian reports similarly:

“Turkey has made it clear it is happy to see the mix of rebel, Islamist and pro-Turkish groups march on to the Syrian capital, Damascus, while Iran and Russia regards the HTS as terrorists.”                                                                                                             (Patrick Wintour; “As Assad’s power crumbles, Turkey, Iran and Russia disagree on way forward for Syria“London Observer, 7 December 2024; at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/dec/07/assad-syria-turkey-iran-russia-diplomats-regime )

45. Hence the two forces conducted a coordinated, determined attack, which was then joined by several other smaller rebel groups who had been prepared for this event. Assadite forces simply crumbled, and Assad himself fled to a Russian exile by December 7. The Liberation of Damascus was complete by the 8th December:

“Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) launched a military campaign on November 27, 2024 against the Syrian regime’s forces, scoring stunning victories. In less than a week, HTS and SNA took control of most of Aleppo and Idlib governorates. Then, the city Hama, located 210 kilometers north of Damascus, fell into the hands of HTS and SNA following intense military confrontations between them and regime forces supported by the Russian air force. Following Hama, HTS took control of Homs.

Initially, the Syrian regime sent reinforcements to Hama and Homs, and then, with the support of the Russian air force, bombed the cities of Idlib and Aleppo and its surroundings. On December 1 and 2, more than 50 airstrikes hit Idlib, at least four health facilities, four school facilities, two displacement camps, and a water station were impacted. The airstrikes have displaced over 48,000 people and severely disrupted services and aid delivery. The dictator Bashar al-Assad had promised defeat to his enemies and stated that “terrorism only understands the discourse of force.” But his regime was already crumbling from everywhere.

While the regime was losing town after town, the southern governorates of Suweida and Daraa liberated themselves; their popular and local armed opposition forces, separate and distinct from HTS and SNA, seized control. Regime forces then withdrew from localities about ten kilometers from Damascus, and abandoned their positions in the province of Quneitra, which borders the Golan Heights, which is occupied by Israel.

As different opposition armed forces, again not HTS nor SNA, approached the capital Damascus, regime’s forces just crumbled and withdrew, while demonstrations and the burning of all symbols of Bashar al-Assad multiplied in the various suburbs of Damascus. On the night of December 7 and 8, it was announced that Damascus was liberated.”
(Joseph Daher Interview, in Tempest; at: https://tempestmag.org/2024/12/understanding-the-rebellion-in-syria/ December 9, 2024)

Immediate steps of the new HTS Government of Syria – A parade of foreign ministers-delegates

46. Every indication is that the HTS is making significant overtures to the USA and other Western imperialists. The transparent rush is to reassure Western imperialism and its allies they are not “terrorists” and are only aiming at a democratic state. It seems to be working. So far envoys of the USA, UK, France, Germany and Turkey have been amongst the most prominent visitors anxious to meet Ahmed al-Sharaa.

Indeed it has to be said that the Syrian development is very convenient for the USA imperialists and Israel. The map of the Middle East was already changed with obliteration of Gaza, the savage attacks on Lebanon, and the crippling of Iran. Syria was now likely to fall into the imperialist lap.

47. The HTS at this period fervently attempts to portray itself as non-sectarian. And indeed some current measures being taken to reassure Christians and ‘Alawaites and Kurds – do seem convincing at first blush:

“In February 2021, for his first interview with an U.S.journalist, its leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, or Ahmed al-Sharaa (his real name), declared that the region he controlled “does not represent a threat to the security of Europe and America,” asserting that areas under its rule would not become a base for operations abroad.
In this attempt to define himself as a legitimate interlocutor on the international scene, he emphasized the group’s role in fighting against terrorism. As part of this makeover, it has allowed the return of Christians and Druze in some areas and established contacts with some leaders from these communities. . . .
Following the capture of Aleppo, HTS continued to present itself as a responsible actor. HTS fighters for instance immediately posted videos in front of banks, offering assurances that they wanted to protect private property and assets. They also promised to protect civilians and minority religious communities, particularly Christians, because they know that the fate of this community is closely scrutinized abroad.
Similarly, HTS has made numerous statements promising similar protection of Kurds and Islamic minorities such as Ismaelis and Druzes. It also issued a statement regarding Alawites that called on them to break with the regime, without however suggesting that HTS would protect them or saying anything clear about their future. In this statement, HTS describes the Alawite community as an instrument of the regime against the Syrian people.
Finally, the leader of HTS, Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, has stated that the city of Aleppo will be managed by a local authority, and all military forces, including those of HTS, will fully withdraw from the city in the coming weeks. It is clear that al-Jolani wants to actively engage with local, regional, and international powers.”
(Joseph Daher Interview December 9, 2024, in Tempest; at: https://tempestmag.org/2024/12/understanding-the-rebellion-in-syria/ )

These steps include meeting representatives of the Druze in Damascus :

“Ahmed al-Sharaa, the leader of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) group that toppled Syrian president Assad, said all rebel factions would “be disbanded and the fighters trained to join the ranks of the defence ministry” during a meeting with members of the minority Druze community.”
(Oliver Holmes, “Syrian HTS leader says rebel factions that overthrew Assad will be ‘disbanded’”; Guardian December 17, 2024)

To further convince the Druze community, the Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt was also greeted in Damascus:

“Al-Sharaa on Sunday also hosted Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt as several governments and Syrians alike express concerns over the protection of minorities under the new Syrian government, including the Kurds, Christians, Alawites, and the Druze who are an Arab minority practising an offshoot of Islam.
“We take pride in our culture, our religion and our Islam. Being part of the Islamic environment does not mean the exclusion of other sects. On the contrary, it is our duty to protect them,” al-Sharaa said during his meeting with Jumblatt, in comments broadcast by Lebanese broadcaster Al Jadeed.”
(“Turkiye FM meets Syria’s new leader, calls for lifting of global sanctions”; Aljazeera 22 December, 2024; at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/12/22/turkiye-fm-meets-syrias-new-leader-calls-for-lifting-of-global-sanctions )

Background to the Kurdistan Statelet of Rojava, and the PKK

A fuller history of Turkish relations to the Kurds, and Turkish relations to the USA are given elsewhere (Kurdistan part Two – See Preface). Here a simplified precis is given to understand Turkish leader Erdogan’s attitude to the Kurdish enclave of Rojava. In addition the extraordinary contortions of the PKK serve as a backdrop, to fully gauge the pro-USA imperialist bent state of Rojava.

48. The attitude of Turkey is especially important to the Kurds, since:

“well over half of the world’s 25 million to 30 million Kurds live in Turkey. The emerging statehood in the ‘South’ (north of Iraq) is, in effect, more vital to the Turkish polity than anything else in Iraq: Ankara’s biggest concern is no secret: the prevention of a Kurdish nation in northern Iraq. Turkish officials have long feared that a Kurdish state would incite their own Kurdish population leading to a possible uprising as Turkish Kurds express their solidarity with Iraqi Kurds realizing their long-lived dream of statehood.”
( cited by Ozcan, Ali Kemal. Turkey’s Kurds : A Theoretical Analysis of the PKK and Abdullah Ocalan, Routledge, 2005; p. 4)

49. The hostility of the modern Turkish state towards Kurdish movements is long standing, continuing from Ottoman Empire days. Even the term “Kurd” was substituted by the term “mountain Turks“. Whether secular or as later parties were – Islamicist – all ruling class parties were anti-Kurd. The modern manifestations of this began under Kemal Attaturk.

50. Since 2015 under Erdogan, the state adopted more trappings of a near fascist – but still only a heavily authoritarian state. His government – no less than prior ones – obediently followed the IMF prescriptions of ‘austerity’ – meaning of the working class. All Turkish bourgeois parties agreed:

To screw the vicious exploitation of workers and toilers higher; and to continue the national oppression of Kurdish people; and,
To maintain a brutal semi-military dictatorship over the masses.
All were also united for a militarist and expansionist foreign policy, in line with USA interests.
The Turkish ruling powers remained allied with both pro-US, pro-European big capital, and Israel.

51. Throughout all this, the Turkish state cultivated relations with Israel. Despite the deepening isolation from the Arab and Islamic world, the Turkish ruling classes reaped dividends from their cooperation with the Zionist state. As long ago as October 1998, they demanded and secured the expulsion of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK from Syria by military threats, and massing of their troops on the Turkish-Syrian border. It is possible that the Syrian reactionaries would not have complied with Turkish demands, had it not been for the indirect threat posed by the Israeli-Turkish alliance.

52. The PKK (“Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan” or “Workers Party of Kurdistan”) was formed in 1978. It was first known as the Kurdistan Devrimcileri (Kurdistan Revolutionaries). After this it had several more name changes. Following the capture of the organization’s leader Abdullah Öcalan, “the movement eventually converted itself from a ‘party’ to a ‘congress’ in its 8th ordinary congress, which ended in April 2002. The PKK became KADEK (“Freedom and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan”; Kongreya Azadya Demokrasya Kurdistan). Since the 1980s and especially in the wake of the start of guerilla warfare in Turkish (that is, Northern) Kurdistan in 1984, it had taken refuge in Southern Kurdistan establishing bases and mass support there.

From a Marxist-Leninist perspective, the main problem of the PKK can be summarised as one of a rank opportunism. It has moved in abrupt shifts from ultra-left to right. Soon after the PKK was established in 1978, an extremely sectarian line, was pursued. Especially in 1979 and 1980, the PKK launched physical attacks against almost all other revolutionary groups, including the TKP/M-L Harcketi and various Kurdish nationalist groups. Dozens, possibly hundreds of people, from different groups either died or were injured.

On October 13th, 1995, Öcalan sent a letter to US President Bill Clinton urging him to “exert his persuasive weight” on Turkey, and to assist in “stopping the massacre of a people.” In that letter, Öcalan also stressed that his party was “ideologically different from classical communist parties” and his party was:

“not insisting on changing the frontiers of Turkey and were not for secession from that country.”

At least from 1995, the PKK leadership was continuously underlining its aim to come to terms with Turkish reaction and imperialism in return for the simplest of democratic reforms, such as the recognition of the national identity of Kurdish people. It was systematically trying to assure them (i.e. Turkish reactionaries) of the PKK’s “peaceful” intentions and its readiness and eagerness to cooperate in maintaining “stability.” In an interview given in December 1995, Öcalan called on all political forces in Turkey to come to a “concensus”. He stated a collaborationist theme:

“We will call on the army, we will call on the bureaucracy. If you are in favour of a peace project with us, please come together. We will call on socialists, we will call on liberals. Let’s give an end to this foolish course of events; there exists a common ground. We can find a consensus, a conciliation; we all have our stake in this.”                                                                 (Ozgur Politika, 3 February 2002; Cited by Garbis Altinoglu in “A Proposal For A Revolutionary Way Out Of The Crisis; (Abridged from Turkish Document “Bunaluntlan Devrimci Cikis Onerisi”); in Alliance 50 December 2002; at: http://mlreview. ca/aml/AllianceIssues/ALLIANCE50_TURKISHREVOLUTIONARYMOVEMENT.htm)

53. The Kurdish resistance inside Turkey, ended when Abdullah Öcalan was captured in February 1999, with the assistance of the CIA ( Tim Weiner, “U.S. Helped Turkey Find and Capture Kurd Rebel”; NYT; Feb. 20, 1999; at https://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/20/world/us-helped-turkey-find-and-capture-kurd-rebel.html)

Yet – the PKK and Ocalan had already made – and would continue to make – major deals to hitch onto the USA tails. In 2000 Garbis Altinoglu pointed out:

“The PKK’s recent open collaboration with USA imperialism, has long been signalled.”
(Notes On The History Of MLKP And The Revolutionary Movement In Turkey By Garbis Altinoglu; Alliance Marxist-Leninist (North America) Number 35: August 2000; Http://Ml-Review.Ca/Aml/Allianceissues/All35mlcp%28turkey%29ga2000.Htm)

By July 2002 the PKK/KADEK leadership openly defended an American intervention in Iraq, and went so far as to criticize the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the KPD for not giving full and whole-hearted support for an imperialist war against Iraq:

“KADEK, the vanguard of democracy, is fighting regional reaction. Ruling forces, who bear responsibility for the exacerbation of problems, do not approve of an intervention by the US and its allies in the region and attempt to prevent such an eventuality. Ruling forces in Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria and other countries of the region feel obliged to form an alliance among themselves in an attempt to prevent intervention. The PUK and the KDP, which represent the local power in Southern Kurdistan are vacillating on the question of supporting the intervention.”
“At the Root of the Impasse in Middle East Stand the Exhausted Regimes”, Serxwebun”; (“Independence”), July 2002

By March 2013, now in jail Öcalan unilaterally declared a ceasefire between the PKK and the Turkish state. From about 2004, he had declared himself no longer a Marxist-Leninist – but a follower of Murray Bookchin – an anarchist. He called for Democratic confederalism – or a “system of popularly elected administrative councils, allowing local communities”.

54. Near to the start of the Syrian Civil War the many political representatives of the Kurds in Syria, made clear their lack of interest in joining a pan-Syrian United Front in the Syrian Revolution. They made it known they wanted instead a separate movement aimed at the national liberation of a part of Northern Syria, that they identified as a part of Greater Kurdistan. (This is covered above in #13 in the section entitled The Kurdish forces largely go their own way)

55. The Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its People’s Revolution Units (YPG) – fought intensely from September 2014-Spring 2015 against Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) during the Siege of Kobani. After winning this siege, together with some factions of the Syrian Free army and PKK volunteers – the PYD officially pronounced regional autonomy on 9 January 2014. They formed the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), also known as Rojava – which came into being as a state-let.                                                                                         (See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autonomous_Administration_of_North_and_East_Syria)

In accordance with its close relationship to the PKK and Öcalan they moved to make some progressive changes including to the rights of women. Later a Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) alliance evolved, including some remnants of the Free Syrian Army (FSA).

They went on to conquer the rebel-held, Arab-majority region north of Aleppo around Tel Rifaat in 2016 in “direct coordination with the Russian airforce.” (Michael Karadjis; at Marxmail Dec 12 #34029)

56. On 22 September 2014, the USA having long delayed making any overt anti-Assad moves – other than sanctions – gave support to the PYD Rojava state. Mainly because it was fighting ISIL. In September 2014, a United States-led coalition (of the USA, UK, France, Jordan, Turkey, Canada, Australia and others) started bombing al-Nusra and ISIL areas. By 2018 the First Trump administration was threatening to pull out all troops from Syria. But this was recanted, and:

“On 23 November 2019, the head of US Central Command stated there was no “end date” on the US’s intervention in Syria… On 19 December 2024, after the fall of the Assad regime, the Pentagonrevealed that there were around 2,000 US troops in Syria.”
USA Intervention in the Syrian War”; at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/US_intervention_in_the_Syrian_civil_war

57. It is not suprising that Turkey views the PYD, the YPG militia and the SDF – all as equivalent to the PKK. However, the EU, the US, and others cooperate with the PYD and the YPG militia in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and do not designate either a terrorist organisation. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Autonomous_Administration_of_North_and_East_Syria )

58. Turkey’s position is therefore somewhat divided. It is still a member of NATO, But on Kurdistan Turkey remains adamant. Indeed Turkey chafes at the existence of the Rojava Autonomous area, worrying this will ‘infect’ Turkish Kurds with similar dreams. During Syria’s civil war, Turkey supported non-Sunni Syrian rebel factions – most of which now fight under the banner of the Syrian National Army (SNA) – by providing arms, military and political support:

“Syria’s northern neighbour has mostly been concerned with using rebels to contain the Kurdish YPG militia, which Turkey accuses of being an extension of a domestically banned Kurdish rebel group, the PKK. Turkey also wants the roughly three million Syrian refugees living in its country to return home. . .
Turkish troops and allied rebels seized stretches of territory from the YPG and SDF along Syria’s northern border.
Turkey has also been politically involved. In 2020, Turkey and Russia brokered a ceasefire to halt a push by the government to retake Idlib, the rebels’ stronghold in the north-west.
Idlib was dominated by the Islamist militant group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which led the rebels who eventually overthrew Assad.
Many believe the offensive could not have happened without Turkey’s blessing. Turkey has denied backing HTS.”
(Mallory Moench; “The global players in Syria before and after Assad”; BBC 10 December 2024; https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cd75e8gdy9jo)

59. The SNF is composed of the most unsavoury elements of a markedly and violently anti-Kurdish thrust:

“Regarding the Turkish-backed SNA, it is a coalition of armed groups mostly with Islamic conservative politics. It has a very bad reputation and is guilty of numerous human rights violations especially against Kurdish populations in areas under their control. They have notably participated in the Turkish-led military campaign to occupy Afrin in 2018, leading to the forced displacement of around 150,000 civilians, the vast majority of them Kurds. In the current military campaign, once again SNA serves mainly Turkish objectives in targeting areas controlled by the Kurdish-led Syrian Defense Forces (SDF) and with large Kurdish populations. The SNA has, for instance, captured the city of Tal Rifaat and Shahba area in northern Aleppo, previously under the governance of the SDF, leading to the forced displacement of more than 150,000 civilians and many violations of human rights against Kurdish individuals, including assassinations and kidnappings. The SNA then announced a military offensive, supported by the Turkish army on the city of Manbij, home to 100,000 civilians, and controlled by the SDF.”
(Joseph Daher Interview, in Tempest; at: https://tempestmag.org/2024/12/understanding-the-rebellion-in-syria/ December 9, 2024)

60. In the midst of this, the YPG has called for defence from. . . Israel. As Probsting comments:

“It is a particular shame that the YPG – the self-proclaimed leadership of the Kurdish minority in Syria – has turned to Israel to build an alliance against the rebels. According to the Jerusalem Post – an English-language mainstream Israeli newspaper – “representatives of the Syrian Kurds have appealed to Israeli officials seeking assistance and protection. (…) Israel, which views the Kurdish community as a friendly and Western-oriented entity, has been working with Western countries since the beginning of the current campaign to ensure the security of the Kurds within the emerging new reality in Syria. The current situation, including the victory of Sunni jihadists and the intensification of the civil war, creates security and political uncertainty.”
(Michael Pröbsting, “We say: yesterday Idlib, today Damascus, tomorrow Jerusalem!”
https://www.thecommunists.net/worldwide/africa-and-middle-east/israel-declares-war-on-the-syrian-revolution/
by Revolutionary Communist International Tendency (RCIT), 10 December 2024 citing: Jerusalem Post: “Amid toppling of Assad, Kurds in Syria appeal to Israel for help”, 9 December 2024, https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-832615)

We can only agree with the assessment that:

“It is obvious that the YPG leadership which has collaborated closely with U.S. imperialism, and which now reaches out to Israel, does not represent the authentic interests of the Kurdish masses!”
(Michael Pröbsting: The Reactionary Role of the YPG/SDF in the Syrian Revolution, 6 December 2024, https://www.thecommunists.net/worldwide/africa-and-middle-east/the-reactionary-role-of-the-ypg-sdf-in-the-syrian-revolution/ )

Reaction of Israel and the response by the HTS

61. Israel seized its opportunity and both heavily bombed Assadite Syrian Army weapon depots and occupied the Golan Heights and beyond it:

“Israel seized the Golan from Syria in the closing stages of the 1967 Six-Day War and unilaterally annexed it in 1981. The move was not recognised internationally, although the US did so unilaterally in 2019.
Israel has conducted hundreds of air strikes against Iran-linked targets in Syria during the war, although it has rarely acknowledged such strikes.
Since rebels overthrew Assad, Israel has carried out hundreds of strikes across Syria. Targets have included Syria’s military infrastructure, naval fleet, and weapons production sites.
Israel has said it is acting to stop weapons falling “into the hands of extremists”.
Israeli forces have also seized the demilitarised buffer zone in the Golan Heights. Israel said the 1974 disengagement agreement with Syria had “collapsed” with the rebel takeover of the country.
It has also acknowledged that its troops are operating further inside Syria at “a few additional points” beyond the buffer zone, but insisted that they “are not advancing towards Damascus”.
(Mallory Moench; “The global players in Syria before and after Assad”; Ibid; BBC 10 December 2024)

62. For the best detailed summary of Israel’s attacks on Syria now – and the lack of any attacks on the Assadite regime until Israel began to attack Gaza – Michael Karadjis’s blog carries a text with definitive data and interpretation.                                                                                                                     (Michael Karadjis, “Israel’s massive attack on free Syria: Background and motivations”; 19 December; Their Anti-imperialism and Ours
at: https://theirantiimperialismandours.com/2024/12/19/israels-massive-attack-on-free-syria-background-and-motivations/

Were the USA and Israel aware of the forthcoming HTS and SNA assault?

63. The USA has denied any involvement with the succesful offensive against the Assad Government. As a statement on Novmeber 30, 2024 by National Security Council (NSC) Spokesperson Sean Savett put it:

“We are closely monitoring the situation in Syria and have been in contact over the last 48 hours with regional capitals. The Assad regime’s ongoing refusal to engage in the political process outlined in UNSCR 2254, and its reliance on Russia and Iran, created the conditions now unfolding, including the collapse of Assad regime lines in northwest Syria. At the same time, the United States has nothing to do with this offensive, which is led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a designated terrorist organization. The United States, together with its partners and allies, urge de-escalation, protection of civilians and minority groups, and a serious and credible political process that can end this civil war once and for all with a political settlement consistent with UNSCR 2254. We will also continue to fully defend and protect U.S. personnel and U.S. military positions, which remain essential to ensuring that ISIS can never again resurge in Syria.”
(Statement by NSC Spokesperson Sean Savett on Syria https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/11/30/statement-by-nsc-spokesperson-sean-savett-on-syria/

64. Above we outined that that the HTS leader was in close contact with Erdogan prior to the launch of the offensive that unseated Assad. We do not think it is plausible to even suggest that the USA and Israel had no fore-knowledge of this. It is far more plausible to suggest that an agreement was made that it would be Turkey – that would be the public face of the international prime backer of the HTS and the SNA.

It is not surprising then that Turkey’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan was one of the first to visit Ahmed al-Sharaa as the new head of the Damascus Government.

“Turkiye’s foreign minister has met with the head of Syria’s new administration, promising help with the political transition and rebuilding the war-torn country after the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime. In their meeting in Damascus . . . Turkiye’s Hakan Fidan and Syria’s de facto ruler Ahmed al-Sharaa stressed the need for unity and stability in Syria, as they called for the lifting of all international sanctions against the war-ravaged country. . . The two officials discussed the necessity of drafting a new Syrian constitution that protects the country’s minorities. The issue of Syrian refugees, Israel’s “violations” of Syrian sovereignty, and the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) issue were also on the agenda. . . Fidan’s visit to Damascus came amid fighting in northeast Syria between Turkiye-backed Syrian fighters and the Kurdish YPG group, which Ankara regards as a terrorist organisation.”
“Turkiye FM meets Syria’s new leader, calls for lifting of global sanctions”; Aljazeera 22 December, 2024; at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/12/22/turkiye-fm-meets-syrias-new-leader-calls-for-lifting-of-global-sanctions

65. The Turkish government will finally get what it wanted as part of the bargain. The days of Rojava are numbered, and the YPG and Kurdish nationalists will have had yet another let-down by the USA. At least their fourth betrayal over the decades long struggle of the Kurdish bourgeois nationalists.

66. The USA and Israel will also get what it wanted from the start of the Gaza war – an untrammeled path to dominatiion of the Middle East – and a new map. This story does not end here however. It is but a new spiral to the curve towards a new world war.

Conclusions

Once more it is important we are clearly understood.

The fall of Assad is a huge step forward for the Syrian people.

But it is not the HTS that will bring any further liberation for the Syrian people.

It seems to us very likely that the HTS will be part of the renewed, and invigorated new pro-USA pro-Israel alliance being formed in the Middle East – following the Gaza obliteration.

A Marxist-Leninist party is an urgent and major task for the Syrian people to solve, before they can launch a true revolution.